

70-20,152

FONTAINE, Roger Warren, 1941-
THE FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING PROCESS IN BRAZIL.

The Johns Hopkins University, Ph.D., 1970.
Political Science, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan



Roger Warren Fontaine 1970

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

The Foreign Policy-Making
Process in Brazil

by

Roger W. Fontaine

A dissertation submitted to the Johns
Hopkins University in comformity with
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.

Baltimore, Maryland

1970

ABSTRACT

The foreign policy-making process in Brazil has become in the last decade a complex set of interactions between decision-makers and interested groups and individuals. Moreover, the decisions made are also influenced by the political cultural milieu of Brazil which conditions the values held by those Brazilians involved in the policy-making process.

Foreign policy has been affected by the intellectuals. Although their concern has been recent, the intellectuals have enormously increased the attention paid to what Brazil's foreign policy should be. Their recommendations have covered the spectrum of policy, and in general they have argued for new, sometimes radical departures for Brazil. In the past, the intellectuals have expounded their views in response to a political leader's ideas on foreign policy. But despite their lack of originality (and quite often practicality) their impact on foreign policy cannot be questioned.

Brazilian pressure groups have played a growing role in making foreign policy too. Of special importance are the business and industrial confederations and the Roman Catholic Church. The former, however, are not

identical in their interests. On one end is a confederation of São Paulo industrialists who have favored innovation in policy (for example, recognition of Communist bloc nations, trade with the new African states) while on the other end is a group of Rio de Janeiro merchants and bankers who favor the old policies of close ties with the West and militant anti-communism. The Church as a whole does not involve itself in foreign policy, but certain outspoken clerics do. The more influential of these have favored Brazil's traditional foreign policy. Labor and student groups while intermittently active in voicing foreign policy preferences tended to act in support of the pre-1964 regimes. Since the revolution they have been stripped of any influence on policy-making.

The military since 1950 has been directly involved in foreign policy. This has come about from the splitting of the Armed Forces into distinct political factions. The left-wing nationalists first presented their views on foreign policy, and they were in turn vigorously attacked by the more conservative groups. Since then each faction has articulated its views and sought to capture positions of power within the military in order to impose its views on the official policy-makers. And despite the fact that the leftists were removed from power after 1964, it is still not clear which faction will win out.

The Congress traditionally has played little part in foreign policy. In the last decade, however, the Congress has reacted to the new foreign policy adventures, and in so doing found that it could have influence on policy. It has rejected treaties, vetoed Presidential choices on ambassadorships, and acted as a critic of any policy espoused by the President.

The President also has recently been active in foreign policy. Now it is the President who initiates new programs and who manages conflicting internal pressures on a policy issue. The President is more than a symbolic chief of state involved only in the ceremonial aspects of diplomacy. He has become a source of policy-making himself.

The President, however, cannot do it by himself. He depends on the Foreign Ministry which has a tradition of conducting foreign affairs with skill and efficiency. The Ministry is wholly composed of professional diplomats who manage to hold the reins of policy-making despite the lack of qualified personnel. The Ministry may be pressured, even over-ruled, but its day-to-day contact with all foreign policy matters gives them the central role in decision-making. Its power is likely to continue although recently it has ceded control of some questions to others.

PREFACE

A policy-making study of a large country like Brazil is a large, not to say diffuse, task, and that could not even possibly hope to succeed without considerable assistance from others.

Therefore I would like to acknowledge the help given to me by a number of individuals in the completion of this project. I should first like to thank those Brazilians who made my field research possible, especially Mr. Marcel Hasslocher of the Brazilian Embassy in Washington and Mrs. Lygia de Ras formerly of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. I would also like to thank Professor Artur Cezar de Ferreira Reis of the Pontificia Católica Universidade, Geraldo Heráclito de Lima and the other members of the Foreign Ministry for their insights and suggestions for further research. In this regard I would also like to mention Professors Philip Johnson and Kenneth Erickson for their assistance especially in regard to the labor and military sections while in Brazil.

I should like to thank Professors Philip Taylor and John Dreier of Johns Hopkins for their advice and close readings of the manuscript and Professor C. Neale Ronning of the New School for Social Research for his criticism

based on his own considerable knowledge of Brazilian politics.

Although this dissertation owes much to these individuals, I am alone responsible for any errors of fact or judgment.

--RWF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF BRAZIL:
ITS INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN
POLICY 8

III. BRAZILIAN INTELLECTUALS AND FOREIGN
POLICY 33

What is an Intellectual?
Characteristics of Brazilian Intellect-
uals Pertinent to Foreign Policy
The Vision of Brazilian Greatness
Brazilian Intellectuals on Area Policy

IV. PRESSURE GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICY . . 119

Economic Pressure Groups
Labor
Ideological Groups
The Church
Conclusion

V. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN FOREIGN
POLICY-MAKING. 167

Development of Factionalism
Effect of Factionalism on Foreign
Policy
Conclusions

VI. THE CONGRESS: THE SOMETIME CRITIC. . . 218

Organization
The Constitutional Powers
The Use of Power: Formal and Informal
Evolution of Influence and Evaluation

Chapter

VII.	THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN POLICY.	246
	Policy Innovation	
	The Power of Ceremony	
	The Management of Pressure Groups	
	Resolution of International Crises	
	Initiation of Legislation	
	Conclusions	
VIII.	THE FOREIGN MINISTRY: LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS.	276
	Role of the Foreign Minister	
	Organization of the Foreign Ministry	
	The Tasks of Itamarati	
IX.	FOREIGN MINISTRY, PERSONNEL, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEMS.	321
	Recruitment and Outlook of Itamarati	
	Personnel	
	Internal Politics of the Ministry	
	Itamarati's Relations with Others	
	Problems of the Foreign Ministry	
	Summary and Conclusion	
X.	CONCLUSIONS	369
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	387

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The study of foreign policy-making is a relatively new area of interest in political science. Nevertheless in the last few years considerable attention has been paid to how such a study should be conducted. But despite this abundance of methodological literature, there is a considerable scarcity of material on actual policy-making systems.¹

The research that has been done, by and large, is confined to the major powers: the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Among the lesser developed and non-Western nations virtually no research has been carried out.

This is not because they lack a foreign policy-making process: far from it. Their decision-making patterns can be quite complex indeed since the political elites of these countries will spend as much time on foreign affairs as they do on domestic matters. Therefore, this paper intends to examine the foreign policy

¹For methodology see inter alia, James N. Rosenau, editor, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1967); R. Barry Farrell, editor, Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966); Charles

process of one of these nations--Brazil.

Brazil has emerged in the last two decades as an increasingly important member of the world community. Although geographically situated in Latin America, it has sought an extra-continental role through increased contacts in the Afro-Asian world and relatively vigorous and increasing participation in multi-lateral organizations. As for the future, few Brazilians doubt that their country will attain the status of a great power within a half century or less. Outside observers tend to agree with them on this judgment.

However, even if these predictions prove to be optimistic in the face of Brazil's numerous domestic difficulties, it is unlikely that its role will diminish or that its policy-making process will become more simple.

A study of Brazil's foreign policy-making process, it should be stated, is not a study of a typical, underdeveloped non-Western nation. In the first place, Brazil is highly westernized. In the second place, most underdeveloped countries are small and likely to remain

F. Hermann "The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy" World Politics, XX (April, 1968), pp. 521-534; and the early seminal study, Feliks Gross, Foreign Policy Analysis (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954). For studies of actual policy-making see Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967); Burton M. Sapin, The Making of United States Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966); and Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/ USSR (New York: The Viking Press, 1965).

at a relatively low level of development for some time. Brazil on the other hand is large in population (nearly 100 million), large in area (bigger than the continental United States), and rich in natural resources and economic prospects. As far as it fits a ready classification, Brazil shares those characteristics of middle sized powers whose ambitions in foreign policy are limited only by their present domestic and economic problems. These countries include, among others, India, Communist China, Japan, Indonesia, and Egypt.

This study of Brazil's foreign policy is not intended to be diplomatic history. Thus, it will not go over in chronological fashion the events of the last decade. The material for this paper, however, is drawn from the last ten years since it has been within that time span that Brazil's foreign policy-making process has developed to its present state of complexity. The impact of rapid industrialization in the 1950s, and the consequent optimism about Brazil's future brought about a sudden spurt of interest in the nation's role in world politics. New policies were envisioned, debated, fought for, and sometimes implemented. Foreign policy was a subject of interest and concern for more than a few legally responsible officials. It became and still is somewhat of a national pastime.

It must also be added that this study is not for the moment directly concerned with the influences of the

international system on the policy-making process of Brazil. It will deal instead with the domestic influences. These influences are numerous and complex enough to warrant a full-scale study without adding often covert external pressures. Thus, this study then will attempt to examine and analyze the foreign policy-making system within Brazil.

There is no one correct approach for a study of policy-making although suggestions have not been lacking: the problem is selecting those which are useful from those which are not. In this paper, a modified systems analysis has been adopted. This analytical type of framework seeks to identify as many as possible of the relevant variables that go to make up the decision-making process which leads to Brazil's foreign policy. These variables will be examined on varying levels in terms of immediateness of impact on the decision-makers, and in terms of the degree of preciseness with which they can be analyzed. A primary level of influence is the Brazilian political culture, especially the belief system that contains the attitudes and values shared by most Brazilians. Not only will the content of the belief system be examined, and the manner in which it affects those who make demands on the decision-makers, but also its effect on the decision-makers themselves.

On a second level, somewhat closer to the center of policy-making, are those individuals who have become

Filmed as received

without page(s) 5.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS.

position. This has resulted in a quickened appreciation of that body by the principal shapers of foreign policy including the Foreign Ministry.

The President has recently emerged as a potent force in foreign policy-making in Brazil. His powers have always been great on paper, but it is only during the past decade that they have been employed with any real vigor. The President, for example, has often been the initiator of foreign policy, besides being generally responsible for the foreign affairs of the nation. Yet, even in this decade, owing to a number of complex factors, the Presidents have not been able to control foreign policy to the extent that several of them would have liked.

At the very center of decision-making is the Foreign Ministry--an institution which has long had a reputation for efficiency in its handling of the nation's interests. How true this impression is and how much the Foreign Ministry has had to share its power with others will be a major concern of this paper.

One more factor needs to be mentioned. Underlying these groups and institutions involved in policy-making is nationalism. Brazilian nationalism is a force that must be reckoned with by any foreign policy maker. To ignore it would invite a revolt of important sectors of society: intellectuals, industrialists, military officers.

Most observers agree, however, that nationalism

came late to Brazil.¹ Only in the last few decades has it played a major role in shaping the ideas of intellectuals and decision-makers. But what it lacks in historicity, it has made up in pervasiveness and emotional impact. Furthermore, there is a rather widespread consensus on what a nationalist ideology should include. According to Frank Bonilla:²

The things nationalist-minded Brazilians want for their country make a familiar list. They want planned action toward a highly productive economy of self-sustained growth controlled by Brazilians, higher standards of living for all, an independent foreign policy, and an end to the alienation and discontent born of prolonged inferior status.

How these goals are to be accomplished are matters of debate. But that is the point: it is the means which are discussed not the ends.

The jumping off place of Brazilian nationalism is economic development which is, by and large, a matter of domestic policy. But Brazilian nationalism has its foreign policy implications too, implications which concern us very much in a study of foreign policy-making. The point at which economic development and nationalism intersects with foreign policy is

¹ See Arthur P. Whitaker and David C. Jordan, Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 76-79.

² Frank Bonilla, "A National Ideology for Development: Brazil" in Kalman Silvert, ed., Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 234-235.

foreign investment. This has been a matter of great concern in Brazil and has provided an opportunity to examine a wide assortment of individuals and groups participating in government policy in this area.

Nationalism in Brazil, however, has affected other aspects of foreign policy-making. One reason that nationalism itself can flourish in Brazil is because the country cannot be dismissed as a small nation with large pretensions. Brazilians can afford to be grandiose about their nationalism especially in regard to Brazil's future role in world politics since the country has so much that is necessary for national greatness. It is one of the few that can make that claim with some assurance of actual success.

This sense of worthwhileness to the enterprise of nation-building is one reason why nationalism in Brazil has become a powerful molder of emotions. No group in or out of government can escape its influence, even if it wanted to. The focus on Brazilian greatness, of course, does guide the kind of foreign policy that people want. But Brazilian nationalism does not completely escape the xenophobia common to other nationalisms. This, however, is not as widely spread as the emphasis on Brazilian achievement. In Bonilla's opinion: "Not hate but moderation and reasonableness bordering on the coldly cynical give a unique stamp to the new nationalism".³ Cynical or not, the various

³
Ibid., p. 261.

currents of nationalist thought have played their part in shaping Brazilian foreign policy and will continue to do so whatever the general ideological outlook of the regime of the day.

The examination of these factors in decision-making will result in at least an approximate idea of who and of what is involved in shaping Brazil's foreign policy. Moreover, from this study should emerge some middle range hypotheses concerning how foreign policy is actually made by an emerging power on the international scene. What Brazil's role will be in the future is not this study's concern. However, it does intend to explore more fully those factors that will eventually determine what that role will be.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF BRAZIL: ITS INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY

The foreign policy-making process is not merely the sum total of demands articulated and decisions made. The influencing of a nation's foreign policy, indeed the influencing of the very demands and decisions made within the process is a result of the underlying political culture of a society. Thus, although it is not immediately visible, not easily or precisely defined, the nature of this primary variable must be spelled out in order to have knowledge of all factors that shape and determine Brazil's foreign policy.

The concept of political culture is not a new one although it has been examined systematically only recently.¹ Thus Sydney Verba in a recent essay defined it in the following manner:²

The political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation

¹The attempts to describe "national character" were earlier efforts at defining political culture. The outstanding example is Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vintage Books (2 vols.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).

²Sydney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture,"

in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics.

Political culture therefore consists of a set of beliefs and values. But what specifically does this have to do with Brazil's foreign policy? It is relevant for two interlocking reasons. First, shared beliefs color in a positive way the objectives and policies of a nation's foreign policy since the policy-makers themselves generally accept their tenets. Second, in a more negative fashion, the belief system acts as a check to policy which is radically incongruous to a society's cherished values.³

But what first is a belief system? It is a concept long appreciated, to be sure, but seldom defined by political scientists. Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall in a work on the American political party system have observed that a distinguishing factor of a community (as opposed to a casual aggregation of people) is that

in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. by Lucian W. Pye and Sydney Verba (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 513.

³One of the few foreign policy analysts to recognize this argued similarly:

Foreign policy objectives are shaped within the political idea-system, which in turn is a part of the cultural idea-system and of the whole culture. It is hardly possible to understand foreign policy objectives without this cultural perspective and, therefore, they should be analyzed within the context to a society and culture.

Gross, Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 63.

within the former a majority of the inhabitants share a number (not all) of common beliefs and values. The importance of this is that the shared beliefs support and continue to influence a society's social and political behavior and institutions. Furthermore:⁴

It includes not only "values," that is, the people's notions of what is good and beautiful and just, but also "conceptions of reality," that is, their ideas about the way things are and about the effectiveness of various means for making things as they are more like things as they should be.

Sydney Verba particularly has devoted some attention to the problem of "conceptions of reality." He states that such "basic belief dimensions" embrace the following:⁵

...the view of man's relation to nature,
...time perspective, ...the view of human nature and of the proper way to orient toward one's fellow man, as well as orientation toward activity and activism in general....

These definitions, however, still leave problems. In the first place, no belief system is a logical, consistent, precise, and static set of propositions. To quote Gunnar Myrdal, they are, in fact, "a mesh of struggling inclinations, interests, and ideals, some held conscious and some suppressed for long intervals but all

⁴Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), p. 470.

⁵Verba, Political Culture, pp. 521-522.

active in bending behavior in their direction."⁶ Most societies, including Brazil's, therefore, are not plagued with groups who have opposing but internally consistent sets of beliefs and values. Instead, the values are generally shared although they may overlap or be inconsistent with each other.⁷ This value sharing in a society furthermore, is not an all or nothing proposition. It is, like the temperature, a matter of degree. Brazil, for example, despite its racial, social, economic, and ecological diversity, has maintained a unity and coherence with a lower level of conflict than most of its neighbors. Therefore, it is quite likely to possess a widely shared belief system--at least among those Brazilians who count politically.

There are several research difficulties involved in this approach, and they are not easily dismissed. In the first place, there is a profusion of beliefs and values in such a large and culturally diverse population. Characteristics often vary from region to region--a phenomenon that most Brazilians understand and appreciate.

⁶Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (9th ed.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), p. xlviii. R. M. MacIver in The Web of Government (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947) prefers to call it a myth-system which he defines as "a complex of dominating thought-forms that determines and sustains all its activities. All social relations, the very texture of human society, are myth-born and myth sustained." MacIver, The Web of Government, p. 4.

⁷Ranney and Kendall, Democracy, p. 470. Ranney

For example, in the coastal cities, change is expected and welcomed.⁸ In the interior the opposite attitude prevails, and progress, if any, is hardly visible.⁹

Second, there is the problem of an observer's objectivity. John Santos, an American psychologist and student of Brazilian society has pointed out:¹⁰

Cultural conditioning of the perceptual and thought processes undoubtedly produces unique distortions, selection, exaggerations and insensitivities that can at best be only partially overcome. Certain problems and characteristics regarded as very important within a given culture may be de-emphasized or completely ignored....

Third, there is the small matter of evidence. In no society including the heavily researched United States has a thorough charting of anyone's belief system been carried out--least of all Brazil.

and Kendall found, for example, in the American belief system that side by side in apparent contradiction were the cherished values of idealism and materialism; individualism and collectivism; success and security. See especially pp. 471-473.

⁸For an amusing example of this see Jorge Amado's historical novel Gabriella: Cloves and Cinnamon, trans. by James L. Taylor and William L. Grossman (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), in which the inhabitants of Ilheus, a medium sized port in Brazil's Northeast, in the year 1925, speak nearly of nothing else but progresso by which they mean the new bus service to Itabuna.

⁹John P. Santos, "A Psychologist Reflects on Brazil and Brazilians," in New Perspectives of Brazil, ed. by Eric N. Baklanoff (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966), pp. 252-253.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 234-235.

These objections, however, do not mean the premature end of this investigation. The first difficulty involving a large and varied assortment of beliefs and values only becomes cumbersome if the intention is to list all of them. This is not my purpose. Beliefs and values will be chosen as they seem relevant to a better understanding of Brazilian foreign policy. This may sound a bit arbitrary, but the criterion is clear enough and criteria are never exact in shearing off data--as if they were some kind of methodological papercutters. The other part of the problem of objectivity is the difficulty of regionalism with its parochial sub-belief systems. While this is definitely a problem, it must be remembered that many values are still widely shared. For example, the attitudes toward work in Brazil despite regional nuances have a common core--namely, a hope for a job that demands little in time or energy.¹¹

The second research problem--that of objectivity--will hopefully be avoided by a minimum of personal observation and the use of secondary sources (as many Brazilian as possible) relying most firmly on areas of agreement among observers. The final difficulty of evidence is undeniable. But this is true of all research. One rarely is in a position of having too much information.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 251.

In regard to Brazil's belief system, there is evidence. Observers including psychologists, psychiatrists and cultural anthropologists, foreign and domestic, have in a fragmentary fashion begun the work. What is impressive is not only the quality, but the agreement on many essential points of the Brazilian character and belief system--although their explanations as to origin may differ. Yet in a final sense our incipient optimism at unravelling the system must be tempered by the warning of a profound and careful student of Brazil, Fernando de Azevedo who wrote:¹²

That we already have a character of our own, a particular cut of our own, a personality that is living and in some respects marked, there is not any doubt. But, besides some basic elements more easily definable, there is so much that is vague and imprecise, fluctuating and variable, that it renders this psychology in many points, if not unapproachable, at least resistant to a sure and penetrating analysis.

What is left then can only be a preliminary statement but which contains a sufficient number of insights that explain and perhaps predict Brazilian behavior in making foreign policy. Thus, what is sought in this first chapter is the framework in which policy is made--the attitudes and values of Brazilians and their leaders.

Before cataloguing the various aspects of the belief system, it is important to understand the degree of

¹²Fernando de Azevedo, Brazilian Culture: An Introduction to the Study of Culture in Brazil, trans. by W. Rex Crawford (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 116.

commitment and something of the nature of the value system in general. Its general traits seem to stress "the emotional, the irrational, and the mystical" to use Azevedo's phrase. He also notes that while it is true that opinions, prejudices, and "the logic of sentiments" help to create and defend the beliefs of all human groups, in Brazil "...sensibility, imagination, and religiosity have such intensity and force that culture rarely covers them over, only contributing to raise the effective and mystical from their primitive gross forms to higher and more delicate forms."¹³

And Azevedo adds significantly:¹⁴

This constant interference of sentiment in our judgment and opinion, the forms of emotional reasoning so frequent in all social classes... our lack of interest in objective considerations--are they not shown in fact by the affective and mystical background which appears in the tendency to put and solve in personal terms of "friend" and "enemy" the most concrete problems...?

Thus, we are dealing with a culture whose belief system is even more than usual a tangle of prejudices and sentiments suffused by an aura of intense emotion. The

¹³

Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁴

Ibid. Terms like "irrational and mystical" are relative. They may be compared with rational, pragmatic cultures found, for example, in the United States and the Philippines. See Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 57-63, and Jean Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), chapter 7.

significance of this is that such a belief system is likely to have a tenacious hold on people and is therefore resistant to change especially through national appeals.

Now for the belief system itself: earlier it had been said that a belief system contains what the conceptions of reality are including and especially "the effectiveness of various means for making things as they are more like things as they should be," that is, how reality can be manipulated to the convenience of the manipulator. How then does the Brazilian belief system cope with these questions, what effect does it have on Brazilian foreign policy?

In the first place, how do Brazilians regard the nature of reality? Observers have found that the Portuguese settlers and their descendants found an environment that was harsh and unyielding to reasonable efforts to overcome it. The North American, on the one hand, faced with less intractable surroundings typically believed that problems could be overcome if enough effort was expended. Therefore, as John Santos has observed, Americans think that all problems can be solved whether they understand them or not. Sometimes this bracing optimism is helpful, but at other times it makes the situation even worse.¹⁵ The Brazilian, however,

¹⁵

Santos, New Perspectives, p. 237.

would never be guilty of an attitude that regards nature as easily manipulable.¹⁶ Instead, reality presents to him an overwhelming challenge which, it is believed, can only be overcome by indirect and subtle means or, in Vianna Moog's expressive description, by "temporizing, detouring, distrusting, wriggling, tricking, biding his time, waiting for opportunities, developing subtleties...hence the jeito, the famous Brazilian "way" of doing things."¹⁷ But as Santos has observed, the subtle, indirect methods of the jeito may be no more successful--and the real problems "may remain untouched, unchanged and forgotten."¹⁸ Or if the problem itself is so enormous that even subtle approaches have no effect, the Brazilian may give up entirely. Azevedo remarks:¹⁹

¹⁶The respect for a relentless nature is graphically demonstrated by the enormous public disillusionment with Brasilia after a series of articles in a Rio daily which in detail described how the environment had defied man's best efforts to tame it. More research should better illustrate public reaction. Hopefully it will serve as an example of Brazilian psychology when faced by difficulty.

¹⁷Vianna Moog, Bandeirantes and Pioneers, trans. by L.L. Barrett (New York: G. Braziller, 1964), p. 223.

¹⁸Santos, New Perspectives, p. 236.

¹⁹Azevedo, Brazilian Culture, p. 121. Verba also finds that in traditional societies where nature is viewed as uncontrollable, there is bred a spirit of fatalism and resignation. This carries over into politics. "Political cultures in which the activities of the government are considered in the same class with such natural calamities as earthquakes and storms--to be suffered but outside of the individual's control--are by no means rare, and one

The Brazilian is not a man in revolt, for he is resigned, docile, and submissive to physical and moral fatalities which he has learned to endure with courage and to subordinate himself to them without bitterness, when he recognizes that they are superior to his resources of defense and action. His attitude in the face of life--a mixture of indulgence, piety, and irony--is a kind of resigned capitulation to the assault of the forces of a hostile nature, difficult to dominate, the violence of which he knows by his own experience....

The nature of reality and the Brazilian methods to overcome it has a number of practical consequences. In the first place, an unpredictable future undermines the chances of precise planning with its rational application of effort.²⁰ Second, it places a premium on the unpredictable stroke of luck²¹ or inspired improvisation in solving problems.²² Another result of this pessimism in regard to problem solubility is a love for general ideas which lead to nothing in contrast, as Moog insists, to the North American whose "passion is practical knowledge, which would assume that such an attitude would be closely related to a fatalistic attitude toward...nature." Verba cites Sicily as an example. Brazil would fit also. Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," pp. 521-522.

²⁰Santos, New Perspectives, pp. 248-249, and see also Azevedo, Brazilian Culture, p. 125.

²¹Relying on luck to bring sudden fortune instead of steady application of effort is not a Brazilian monopoly. Albert O. Hirschman in The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 16, has noted the same phenomenon after research in Colombia. He argues that the "ego-focussed image of change" prevalent there emphasizes success through "sheer luck" or "the outwitting of others through careful scheming.

²²Moog, Bandeirantes, p. 136.

leads to the gadget...."²³ Moreover, the Brazilian general idea is marked by neither "penetration, nor vigor, nor profundity" but verbal "facility, grace, and brillancy." A characteristic which Azevedo traces to the traditional Portuguese education with its scholastic, verbalistic, and dogmatic traits.²⁴ The consequences for foreign policy are clear.

In the first place, respect for an overtly hostile and complex reality does not condition policy-makers to take on foreign adventures above the routine. In cases where a new policy is launched with perhaps initial high hopes, the first almost inevitable setbacks produce discouragement and an abandoning of the project rather than replanning and renewed effort. Perhaps an outstanding example of this was the Quadros initiated scholarship program for African students--one of the few practical measures that emerged from a flood of rhetoric on the new Brazilian diplomatic offensive in emerging Africa. The program itself was ambitious: a sum of 20 scholarships were to be offered in 1962; 40 in 1963 and 100 in 1965. Hopes were high and good results were expected. The results, however, were not good.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Azevedo, Brazilian Culture, p. 125.

In the first place only 14 African students could be found. After language training in Bahia, the students were then distributed to various disciplines. Lonely, deficient in language instruction, and perhaps disappointed in the quality of study, all 14 returned to Africa before earning a degree. This initial failure after less than a year of the program instead of stimulating improvement resulted in abandonment of the entire project.²⁵

Another aspect of cultural conditioning as it relates to foreign policy is that planning is depreciated (the lack of it can be seen in the ill-fated scholarships for Africa), and reliance is placed on improvisation and luck. Quite often, of course, inspired improvisation can reap quick results. A skillful rhetorician like Jânio Quadros can often perform near miracles. He did, for example, attract the interest of U.S. policymakers of the Kennedy administration and convinced them of Brazil's need for heavy aid commitments. On the other hand, lack of planning allows too many unexpected situations that cannot be expertly handled by a few dedicated men or an untrained, unresponsive bureaucracy. Thus, the scholarship program or any aid program to Africa introduces

²⁵For details see José Honório Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, trans. by Richard A. Mazzara and Sam Hileman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 315 and Boletim No. 10 of Ministério de Relações Exteriores, Janeiro 3, 1962.

complexities that cannot be unravelled through luck or improvisation.

Finally, the Brazilian belief system itself encourages a penchant for lofty and perhaps hazy ideas which lead in the end to no practical action. As an example, the Quadros African policy again provides much enlightenment on this point. The President in his first Message to Congress (March 1961) eloquently laid the basis for his African policy:²⁶

Our effort in Africa could only constitute a small contribution, a small payment on the immense debt that Brazil owes to the African people. This moral reason alone justifies the importance that this government has attached to its African policy. But there is more. We want to help create in the southern hemisphere, a climate of perfect understanding on all levels: political, cultural, and spiritual. A prosperous, stable Africa is an essential condition for the security and development of Brazil.

Despite the loftiness of President Quadros' words and similar subsequent messages, Brazilian African policy was never translated into many practical actions.

The second part of a society's belief system concerns its values, what it considers to be the good, the true and the beautiful. The characteristics selected are those which perhaps will shed the greatest light on

²⁶Quoted by J.H. Rodrigues, "La Política Internacional del Brasil y África," FORO Internacional (Mexico City), No. 15 (ene.-marzo, 1964), pp. 328-329.

Brazil's international behavior. At the center of Brazilian values is the proper relation of the individual to his fellow beings. In the first place there is a streak of stubborn individualism arising perhaps, as Azevedo has hinted, from the still vast frontier which fostered self-reliance and undermined the spirit of cooperation. Azevedo adds that outside threatening influences like the Indian or the foreigner may unify but only temporarily because."...at the center the Brazilian remained essentially individualistic."²⁷

The motif of individualism is nevertheless deceptive. While individualism is cherished vis-a-vis a casual collection of other human beings, it does not supplant the notion of the family as a tightly knit organization, and Santos has noted that "there is a sharp decrement (sic) in the investment (sic) of energy, emotion and concern beyond the self, the family and the close circle of friends."²⁸ This huge expenditure of effort includes, as T. Lynn Smith discovered the responsibility for educating and training the young-- to a far greater degree than is usually the case in Western society.²⁹ The family orientation has two

²⁷Azevedo, Brazilian Culture, p. 129.

²⁸Santos, New Perspectives, p. 240.

²⁹T. Lynn Smith, Brazil: People and Institutions (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 480. In a separate study, Verba has stressed early

chief results. First it conditions Brazilians to regard seriously only problems immediately affecting their familial and familiar world. In contrast to Americans who are "comfortable" in assisting individuals at some distance to them--both emotional and geographic (private foreign aid programs like CARE and Foster Parents are only two examples), Brazilians, in Santos' words, "lack enthusiasm for involvement at a distance..../Thus/ to the Brazilian, involvement at a distance is simply not direct and meaningful...."³⁰ A second result stemming from the reliance on the family is the maintaining of the status quo. Little scope in such a system is given for outside innovation. "If the family lacks essential knowledge, habits, and skills, the deficiencies will be perpetuated generation after generation."³¹

This still leaves largely unexplained, behavior towards people outside the family. What all observers note first is kindness and hospitality for the stranger. Azevedo speaks for everyone:³²

Learning experiences may have no explicit political content at all despite the important impact they will have later on political attitudes. It is at home the child learns "basic lessons about the nature of authority, the trustworthiness and supportiveness of other people, the manipulability of the environment, and the desirability of such manipulation." Verba, Political Culture, pp. 551-552.

³⁰Ibid., p. 123.

³¹Moog, Bandeirantes, p. 224.

³²Santos, New Perspectives, pp. 242-243.

Their /Brazilians'/ sensitivity to the suffering of others, the ease with which they forget and forgive offenses received, a certain shamefacedness about showing their own egoism, the absence of any racial pride, a repugnance to radical solutions, tolerance, hospitality, liberality and generosity in hospitality /are at the center of personal relations outside the family./

Yet this is not the whole story as even Azevedo is willing to point out. Behind the kindness lies a natural reserve and suspicion. Azevedo calls it a defense reaction of men living in a vast and underpopulated land who were exposed to "adventurers" and "merchants" plus a largely unseen but tax-demanding government. All these factors left him "on the alert in a perpetual distrust which, even when he opened the gates of his house, would lead him to close those of his intimacy and of his heart."³³ Moreover, courtesy often is a means to restrain aggressive impulses. And on this point it is well to remember that while Brazil has been less violent than many other Latin American republics, it is far from being free of dissension as some claim. Thus Moog underlines the fact that emotional maturity has not yet been attained and bloodless events as the freeing of slaves must not deceive the observer.³⁴

Yet it is important to remember that aggressive

³³ Ibid., p. 123.

³⁴ Moog, Bandeirantes, p. 224.

impulses are generally checked and that another Brazilian value of preserving a cordial situation of the moment between two individuals is maintained. The effort to maintain the pleasantness of the present moment, in fact, leads to the syndrome of the promise. Typically, an American observer has written of it in the greatest detail:³⁵

...the promise is a quick, natural and easy gesture, It is often made in the fervor or stress of the moment, in an eagerness to say the polite thing at the right time, but these promises so easily made are just as easily forgotten. To say that the gesture is insincere or meaningless would do an injustice to the personal involvement that Brazilians experience in interpersonal contact. It is the gesture that is important, the warmth and friendliness generated in the interpersonal encounter...

The ease of momentary relations leads to another value highly prized by observers (especially Brazilians) of this society--namely, racial tolerance. In general, Brazil is noted for its lack of prejudice and the remarkable cohesiveness of such a multi-racial society. Gilberto Freyre's remarks on this are perhaps typical.³⁶

...social distance is...the result of class consciousness rather than of race or color prejudice. As the Brazilian attitude is one of large tolerance toward people who have African blood, but who can pass for white, nothing is more expressive than

³⁵Santos, New Perspectives, pp. 242-243.

³⁶Gilberto Freyre, New World in the Tropics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 119.

the popular saying: "Anyone who escapes being an evident Negro is white."

Elsewhere he adds: "...in respect of race relations the Brazilian situation is probably the nearest approach to a paradise to be found anywhere in the world."³⁷ But racial prejudice does exist and exists in a way that confirms the Brazilian values discussed earlier. In the first place race prejudice is expressed in various ways often subtle but at times overt. There are the highly derogatory sayings about Negroes. There is the white Brazilian reluctance to work and live with Negroes and to accept them into the family and to marry them with resistance highest to the latter two possibilities.³⁸

These findings confirm what has already been said about the value system. First of all the derogatory sayings are aimed at an abstract stereotype. On an interpersonal basis Brazilians are anxious to preserve the cordiality of the moment and not let racial prejudice show. In the second place, Brazilians demonstrate their familial concern by being most concerned with Negroes entering their supposedly inviolate family life. Thus Brazilian racial tolerance is a byproduct of that value which stresses interpersonal cordiality but cannot overcome familial

³⁷Ibid., pp. 8-9. See also Azevedo, Brazilian Culture, p. 130.

³⁸Charles Wagley, Introduction to Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 138-139.

privacy.

The familial core of Brazilian values perhaps is also linked to Brazilian patriotism, that is, the value Brazilians attach to their own country. As with many Brazilian phenomena, patriotism (or nationalism) is deceptive in its apparent contradiction. On the one hand, its existence can be attested by the eagerness with which politicians along the entire political spectrum, for example, loudly proclaim their pride in being nationalists first, last, and always.³⁹ Brazilian nationalism, if nothing else, is noisy enough. Underneath the surface, however, there is a more complex reality. Brazilians have among themselves an attitude of deprecation about Brazil that can achieve surprising proportions. Santos has uncovered one aspect of it in Brazilian buying habits:⁴⁰

Foreign goods and foreign lands, are obviously preferred, as indicated by the buying habits of Brazilians and their eagerness to visit foreign countries. The preference for foreign goods often causes them to overlook national products comparable in quality and workmanship. Much of this attitude has developed because products newly on the market have understandably been poor in quality.... But for better or for worse, the opinion has been formed, and being strong and definite in

³⁹The Brazilians themselves characteristically have a derogatory term for emotional patriotism "verde-amarilhismo," literally, "green-yellowism," the principal colors in the Brazilian flag.

⁴⁰Santos, New Perspectives, p. 238.

their likes and dislikes, Brazilians tend to stick by their opinions regardless of changes...

The causes can only be guessed at. Azevedo suggests a few: "...the great territorial extent and the scanty population of the country.../the lack of/ tempering by those great dramatic struggles with which the collective spirit grows strong and noble...."⁴¹ The latter especially seems of great importance, for Brazilians have not faced a real external threat for a century in contrast to the United States which has waged war with the Central Powers, the Axis and (more or less) the Communists all within the last half century. Another cause which links it with the previous discussion is that Brazilians are simply moved less by appeals from outside the family. There is then a real reluctance to expend one's resources on a rather removed and abstract object, namely the national interest.

What effect does this have on the foreign policy process? In the first place, the motif of individualism has a great influence on Brazilian foreign policy. It is merely necessary to understand its opposite--the cooperative attitude in policy-making. Cooperation, according to Hirschmann, involves:⁴²

⁴¹Azevedo, Brazilian Culture, p. 133.

⁴²Hirschman, Strategy, pp. 16-17.

,...the ability to engineer agreement among all interested parties, such as the inventor of the process, the partners, the capitalists, the suppliers of parts and services, the distributors, etc., etc.,...the ability to bring and hold together an able staff, to delegate authority, to inspire loyalty,...and a host of other managerial talents.

Hirschman is, of course, referring to economic entrepreneurs, but the managerial talent is important to government officials as he himself is quick to suggest.⁴³ On the other hand, excessive individualism undermines each of these desirable attributes of a successful policy-making apparatus with jealousy, suspicion and conflict finally neutralizing policy initiatives. Therefore, in the Brazilian foreign policy-making process, owing in part to the concern for individualism, the lack of cooperation and coordination should be apparent.

Family oriented values should also have its effect on foreign policy. In the first place, it breeds a parochial outlook on policy problems. The remote and abstract problems of modern diplomacy (for example, arms control and disarmament, international peace and security) should be the kind of questions that receive a much lower priority in the list of Brazil's foreign policies. On the other hand, the Brazilian sense of hospitality and

⁴³ Ibid., p. 18.

kindliness toward fellow human beings no matter how different from the Brazilian assures the high quality of face-to-face, personal diplomacy. In attempting to preserve the cordiality of the moment, foreign policy-makers in the simple attempt to preserve good will toward Brazil may be eminently successful. The side aspect of the promise may, however, be counter-productive as more literal minded people would expect them to be filled punctually.

Brazilian political culture, and especially its belief system, then does condition foreign policy. Its definition of reality and its articulation of values both help to do this. In the first place, there is the Brazilian notion that reality is harsh and unpredictable, that it yields only to clever manipulation or to a stroke of luck, but never to hard work. Such an attitude breeds either resignation or a deprecating attitude toward rational calculation. For Brazilians outside the center of the policy-making process this means a general apathy toward foreign policy. It is something for others to decide; one cannot influence its course. For the insider, the policy-maker himself, such an attitude toward reality inspires confidence in the hunch or intuition rather than in careful, rational analysis of the options available to him. It may also instill in him a sense of resignation when confronted with the complex problems of foreign

policy. This may lead to a taste for lofty, but hopelessly inoperable ideas which substitute for real problem solving.

Brazilian political culture also relates to the society's attitudes toward what is good. In essence, it is the familiar and concrete that is considered good. Except for members of the family and close friends, people are not to be trusted, especially the stranger. This suspicion, however, is mitigated by a sense of courtesy. In addition the stress on the concrete, that is, for example, the face-to-face contact, inspires a wish to please even though in the long run the quickly made promise will not be kept. This too has its effect on foreign policy. Given these beliefs, cooperation and coordination are difficult. On the one hand, a sense of courtesy and a desire to please are natural assets of the successful diplomat; on the other, the Brazilian may be handicapped by his inability to keep a hastily made commitment.

Such attitudes and beliefs no doubt have considerable effect on how foreign policy is made. They have their effect on the content of policy too. Attitudes and values embedded in Brazilian political culture will turn up in the following sections of this paper again and again. Their impact will then be seen in greater detail. Their influence if not obvious should at least cast more light on the policy-making process

in Brazil.

Much that has been noted in regard to the Brazilian belief system, it should be added, is not peculiar to Brazil alone. A good many of these characteristics are shared by Spanish-American and indeed Mediterranean cultures in general. Although these character traits are hardly unique to Brazil, they nevertheless to some extent have a bearing on the political life of the nation in general, and its foreign policy-making process in particular.

CHAPTER III

BRAZILIAN INTELLECTUALS AND FOREIGN POLICY

We think that it is time to react against the insanity of absolute confraternization which they are attempting to inculcate between Brazil and the great Anglo-Saxon republic. We believe that we are separated from them not only by a great distance, but by race, by religion, by nature, by language, by history, and by the traditions of our people.

The fact that Brazil and the United States are found on the same continent is a geographical accident to which it would be puerile to attribute an exaggerated importance.

The American fraternity is a lie. Take the Iberic nations of America--there is more hate, more enmity between them than between the nations of Europe.¹

The angry Brazilian intellectual who wrote those lines was neither contemporary, young, left-wing, nor even a nationalist. He was, in fact, a middle-aged monarchist from an aristocratic São Paulo family. The statement was published in 1893. Its author is cited to demonstrate a fundamental difficulty in writing about

¹Eduardo Prado, A Ilusão Americana (3rd ed.; São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense Ltda., 1961), p. 1. The first edition was published in 1893 and immediately confiscated by the police. It is perhaps ironic that more than fifty years would pass before Eduardo Prado would be hailed as a great patriot and nationalist by men he would have despised.

Brazilian intellectuals and their effect on foreign policy: they do not hold to neat, predictable patterns of belief dictated by social class, nor for that matter by any set of variables.² Nor as we shall see does their influence resemble the popular concept "thinkers propose, officials dispose."

With this forewarning one may ask: 1) What is an intellectual? 2) What are the characteristics of Brazilian intellectuals who are concerned with foreign policy? 3) What do they have to say? 4) Do they share assumptions and policies? 5) How effective are they? 6) What role will they play in the future?

What is an Intellectual?

The literature on intellectuals unfortunately has been scanty,³ and does not furnish a precise description of their characteristics. Certainly intellectuals are a diverse group. As Schumpeter has pointed out, they

²See Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), pp. 64-65.

³Although as Bertrand de Jouvenal said, this is true despite the fact that "their influence is unquestionable and a formidable advance in their numbers has occurred with the advent of universal education and universal information." Raymond Aron in the Opium of the Intellectuals has made nearly the same point when he has noted the absence of a "fully worked out sociology of the intelligentsia," and Karl Mannheim's complaint of years ago was that "the problem of a sociology of the intelligentsia is, in spite of the fact that much energy has been devoted to it, still in a preliminary

"hail from all the corners of the social world, and a great part of their activities consists in fighting each other and in forming the spearheads of class interests not their own."⁴

Intellectuals cannot be defined as persons with advanced educations or white collar professions, the antonym of the manual worker.⁵ Education is an external characteristic of an intellectual rather than his essence. Intellectuals may in one sense be defined as those who "work creatively with their minds, regardless of their professions."⁶ They are what Schumpeter has called "the scribbling set," that is, those people who "wield the power of the spoken and the written word."⁷ In our case this power is wielded to influence a

stage." This is still valid today. Quotations taken from George B. de Huzar, ed., The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960), p. 3.

⁴Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 146. Schumpeter goes on to note that despite these clashes, intellectuals do form "group attitudes and group interests" strong enough to make many of them act in ways usually ascribed to members of the same social class.

⁵Although Gaetano Mosca makes precisely that claim. The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), trans. by Hannah D. Rahn, pp. 377-378. Similarly, John H. Kautsky, ed., in Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962) pp. 44-45. See Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 146, for a spirited rebuttal.

⁶C.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 63.

⁷Schumpeter, Capitalism, p. 147. He adds a

government's foreign policy. The fact that they do work with their minds and their thoughts are transmitted to a wide audience, however, does not imply a favorable judgment on the quality of the product. It may well be, as Aron has said of French intellectuals, that their opinions are quite similar to non-intellectuals at first impression since they have the same mixture of "half-baked knowledge, of traditional prejudices, of preferences which are more aesthetic than rational, as in those of shopkeepers or industrialists."⁸ In short, intellectuals are defined by the salable product of their minds, but not by any inherent quality of that product.

Characteristics of Brazilian Intellectuals
Pertinent to Foreign Policy

Intellectuals who are interested in foreign policy are at present a flourishing phenomenon in Brazil. Less than twenty years ago, however, these men, and those publications specializing in foreign policy which they established, were rare. Before 1950 or 1955 only an occasional book would appear,⁹ usually a gracefully

further characteristic which is the "absence of direct responsibility for practical affairs." p. 147.

⁸Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1957) trans. by Terence Kilmartin, p. 213.

⁹Eduardo Prado's forthright polemic, A Ilusão Americana, is a rare exception and even his work was more

written collection of essays or speeches on Brazilian-Portuguese friendship¹⁰ or inter-American solidarity.¹¹ These were customarily written by men who were or had been members of the Foreign Ministry. After 1955 there was an explosion of books, journals and newspaper articles all devoted to some aspect of foreign policy. In contrast to the earlier period, there have been at least seventy-five volumes published between 1955 and 1968 which are devoted in part or in whole to Brazil's foreign policies. In addition, a number of journals slanted to international topics have arisen. Revista Brasiliense's first issue in September, 1955 included a blast directed at foreign investment; Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI) began publication in 1958; Política Externa Independente and Revista Civilização Brasileira first appeared in 1965. Some have since ceased publication (Revista Brasiliense) but they have been replaced with journals or similar views.¹² Newspapers

a critique of United States-Brazilian relations than a series of proposals for a new Brazilian foreign policy.

¹⁰João Neves da Fontoura, Palavras aos Portugueses (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Dois Mundos, 1946) and Pizarro Loureiro, Getúlio Vargas e a Política Luso-Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Zelio Valverde-Editor, 1941).

¹¹Afonso de Toledo Bandeira de Melo, O Espírito do Pan-Americanismo (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério de Relações Externas, 1956) and Jose Carlos de Macedo Soares, Conceitos de Solidaridade Continental (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1959).

¹²Other journals like Tempo Brasileiro (suspended

now feature foreign policy pundits such as Otto Maria Carpeaux and Roberto Campos who simply did not exist 15 years ago.

Another new development in the last four decades has been the foundation of institutes of foreign area and policy research. The Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, set up within the Ministry of Education in 1955, devoted itself to constructing a nationalist foreign policy.¹³ The Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais began work in 1956, maintains a library and publishes the previously mentioned RBPI. Finally, President Jânio Quadros decreed in 1961 the founding of an Institute of Afro-Asian Studies.

The recent vintage of foreign policy research and discussion is not the only peculiar characteristic of Brazilian intellectuals interested in these areas. The new foreign policy specialists come from a variety of disciplines. In a random sample of 25 foreign policy analysts, four were by profession literary critics, three were lawyers, three historians, three economists, three journalists, two poets, two novelists, two military officers, a diplomat, a political scientist, an engineer, a humorist, and a musicologist. The divisions themselves

in 1964) and Síntese Política Econômica Social less frequently ran articles on foreign policy but these too are of recent origin.

¹³Alvaro Vieira Pinto, Consciência e Realidade Nacional (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Educação e

border on the arbitrary since most of them have been involved in more than one professional activity. Joel Silveira, for example, aside from his work on foreign policy, has been a war correspondent, a novelist, an historian, and a social critic. Plínio Rolim de Moura has been an army officer, a political aide to Jânio Quadros, a diplomat, and a novelist. While all these intellectuals do make a living from writing and lecturing, it is very seldom confined to foreign policy or even to politics in general. This variety of educational backgrounds and careers highlights the novelty of foreign policy discussion outside official circles. It also explains the lack of sophistication in analysis--the free and easy use of data (when used at all) and the questionable logic encountered. This artlessness, however, may prove only temporary.

A third striking characteristic of intellectual output on foreign policy is that it does not perform the function usually assigned to it. The expected role is that thinkers produce new ideas from which policy makers may select.¹⁴ In Brazil in the last two decades the order has usually been reversed. A charismatic

Cultura, ISEB, 1961), pp. 501-502.

¹⁴C.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, p. 63, and Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 147.

political leader will select the themes, and the intellectuals will expand and refine but never alter the basic discussion guide lines. This continues until another politician suggests new subject matter for foreign policy analysis. The conclusion then is that intellectuals are not so much the creator of new ideas, but rather they perform the role of amplifying and commenting upon foreign policy guide lines handed down by the responsible political authorities.

There have been two periods illuminating this characteristic in recent Brazilian history. During the first, Getúlio Vargas promoted economic nationalism and sparked a furious debate on one aspect of foreign policy--attitude toward foreign investment.¹⁵ Although Vargas initiated this as early as the 1930s, it was most prominent in the presidential campaign of 1950. This campaign stimulated a number of far ranging proposals by the former dictator. His basic thrust was foreign investment and national sovereignty. He stated in Salvador:¹⁶

I have said it and I will repeat it: he who gives away his oil alienates his own independence...

¹⁵Arthur P. Whitaker and David C. Jordan, Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 81-83.

¹⁶From a speech given August 30, 1950. Getúlio Vargas, A Campanha Presidencial (São Paulo: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1951), pp. 597-598.

We do not, as has been insinuated, oppose the investment of foreign capital in Brazil. On the contrary, we welcome it. We are opposed to turning over our national resources and our reserves to the control of foreign companies in general. ...Let us speak plainly: anything which is vital to the national defense, anything which constitutes the foundation of our sovereignty, cannot be given to foreign interests...

As early as November, 1946, Vargas stated in Porto Alegre:¹⁷

They cannot forgive me--these beneficiaries and defenders of trusts and monopolies that my government snatched from the hands of a foreign syndicate in order to restore them without onus to the national patrimony. ... Neither can the agents of foreign finance forgive me for establishing the state ownership of other mineral deposits of our rich soil.

This call to arms was picked up by the intellectuals, especially after Vargas' suicide and the note (allegedly composed by him) describing the foreign pressures exerted on him to rescind his nationalist economic policy.¹⁸ In the five years following his death the overwhelming majority of articles connected to foreign policy concerned these newly introduced themes, especially

¹⁷Getúlio Vargas, A Política Trabalhista no Brasil (São Paulo: Livraria José Olympio Editora; 1950), p. 55.

¹⁸For the complete text of the note see The New York Times, 1954. Curiously, the intellectuals did not pick up a neutralist theme that Vargas had outlined in September, 1950. He said: "To cooperate in a system tending to balance the forces of the militarily weaker countries with the two major powers that history has known--here is the gigantic task that is incumbent on the diplomacy of all nations."

the problem of the state oil monopoly, Petrobrás.¹⁹ From 1954 to 1968, at least 30 books and 65 journal articles have appeared on the subject of foreign investment.

When Vargas promoted economic nationalism, the intellectuals followed suit. Beginning with the 1960 Presidential campaign, a similar vignette was acted out by Jânio Quadros and the intellectuals. Quadros proposed a new theme for Brazilian diplomacy and the foreign policy analysts picked it up and discussed it with vigor.

The Quadros initiatives concerned Afro-Asia and the anti-colonial struggle. He issued his first proclamation on the subject on May 12, 1960 to the Republican Party convention. He argued that Brazil could no longer maintain its timid position vis-a-vis the development of Africa and Asia since free access to these areas existed. Brazil could not remain a simple member of the South American community. Not even primus inter pares would

He continued: "The existence of such great risks and the extensive identity of interests ought to carry the non-militarized countries to a solid and indestructible union. Only with the formation of a nucleus of nations, powerful and cohesive, will we be sure that we will receive respect for our rights always... The moment to launch the bases for this balancing force is the present." From a speech in Niteroi, September 3, 1950. Getúlio Vargas, A Companhia Presidencial, p. 299.

¹⁹The books and articles on Petrobrás alone account for over one-third of the "anti-imperialist" literature in this period.

do.²⁰ Two weeks later he expanded his theme. He found:²¹ "The general lines of Brazilian diplomacy follow Victorian molds ... we ought to be more dynamic." In regard to Africa he stated:²²

...because of the characteristic of its economy, its racial origins, and the sentiments of its people, it behooves Brazil to assume a position of first importance in the awakening of the Afro-Asian world. Unfortunately, Brazilian diplomacy is losing...the opportunities of this solemn hour. The great states that are born in Asia and Africa need to find in the international maturity of Brazil the spirit they lack for this inevitable emancipation so that it may be accomplished in the shortest time possible.

Quadros endlessly repeated these themes during and after the campaign. As a result (in part at least), the focus of attention shifted away from the getulista subjects. The literature on foreign investment dropped sharply, but the 1960 to 1965 period produced at least 19 books and 11 journal articles on the Afro-Asian subject. In the previous ten years there had been only two books devoted to this area.²³ Again it is clear that the

²⁰ Globo, Rio de Janeiro, Maio 12, 1960. Quoted from José Honório Rodrigues, "La Política Internacional del Brasil y Africa" FORO Internacional (Mexico City) pp. 316-317. (Março 1964), pp. 316-317.

²¹ Globo, May 31, 1960. Quoted from Rodrigues, Ibid., p. 317.

²² Ibid.

²³ A similar, but smaller spate of books and articles came after President Kubitschek announced his Operação Pan-Americana program. I did not find anything remotely resembling this policy before the presidential initiative.

intellectuals derived material for debate and analysis from the current political leader.

It is apparent from these two periods in Brazil that the role of the thinker in the area of foreign policy is a peculiar one. Intellectuals simply are not the originators of new policy ideas, but are rather the commentators on policy trends already outlined. The relationship between the political leader and the intellectual will be dealt with at greater length later. For now it is sufficient to make note of this aspect of their character.

The Vision of Brazilian Greatness

The very vastness of Brazil has inspired its intellectuals to work out lofty conceptions of their nation's future role in world politics. The earliest appeared in 1945 when Brazilians were feeling a legitimate pride in their contribution of troops, bases, and natural resources to the war effort.

In his book, Um Programa Polftica Exterior para o Brasil, Renato Castelo Branco envisioned a whole new role for his country. The author's basic premise was that the war had destroyed the realities of international life. Thus, in the Latin world, France was "reviled" for her ignominious defeat; Italy was "reduced to complete impotence" and Spain, Portugal, and Argentina with their fascist style politics were out of step with triumphant democracy. Thus through a process of elimination,

Brazil emerges in the Latin world, at least, as "the most authoritative voice which will be heard in the peace conferences."²⁴

Nevertheless, the author admits that Brazil is not yet a first rate military power, but he does assert that its material support to the Allied victory deserves high recognition. Furthermore, in terms of national power, he ranks Brazil with its population and natural resources barely touched by war as seventh surpassed only by the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, Canada, and perhaps France and China.²⁵

With this new prominence, Castelo Branco constructs a three tiered foreign policy. First, through ties of race, culture, and religion, Brazil is linked to the Latin world. Brazil should not only be a leader of this "bloc" but should stimulate immigration and increase its trade and cultural exchanges as a buffer to the country's large German and Japanese communities.²⁶

Second, Brazil belongs to the Anglo-Saxon world because of similar political institutions. Further, Brazil is dependent on their military and economic aid. On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxons, especially the North Americans, need Brazil: its raw materials, its bases,

²⁴Renato Castelo Branco, Uma Programa Política Exterior para o Brasil (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense Ltda., 1945). All quotes on p. 19. The author professionally was a poet and ethnographer.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 21-28.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 33-36.

and its stabilizing effect on volatile South America.²⁷

Third, Brazil is linked to South America. The war, for example, by disrupting traditional markets, revealed new markets in Latin America. He also sees signs of South American political solidarity in which surely Brazil can act as leader. Furthermore: "South America will always be in all circumstances our world, our geographic frontier, our continental organism."²⁸ Thus, on three levels, Brazil could establish a world wide presence--a presence that would be felt and which would be employed in establishing a lasting world peace.²⁹

Nearly fifteen years would pass before such thoughts of grandeur were again taken seriously by Brazilian intellectuals. At first, old ways of thinking had to be criticized before a scheme for an expanded diplomacy could be outlined. Paulo Duarte, editor of Anhembi, an influential journal of politics, did just that in 1958.

He first criticized the notion that Brazil's role in world politics had to be limited since its closeness to the United States prevented any radical departures. Duarte answered that a nation could only advance by breaking out of its "geographic milieu." He cited the push of the

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 37-43.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 49.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 17-18.

Greek city-states into Asia; Rome and the Arabs into the Mediterranean, and the United States into the Pacific.

The conservative rejoinder to this argument has been that the cited examples are irrelevant in today's world where a weak nation's foreign policy is strongly influenced by a powerful neighbor. Duarte replied that Canada and Yugoslavia, much smaller and much closer to great powers than Brazil, still maintained a relatively independent, and far-ranging foreign policy.³⁰

It also has been argued that new approaches in Brazilian foreign policy would mean leaving the old alliance and thus "falling into the Muscovite embrace." Duarte stoutly denied this, and challenged his opponents to explain how a new anti-colonialist posture could affect Brazil's "integral and sincere military alliance with the United States in case of a direct conflict with Russia."³¹

In general, Duarte asserted that Brazil's new foreign policy should be based on two unchanging principles: first, "highly moral objectives;" and second, national security.³² He argued further that these principles would be embodied in Brazil's "search for leadership over a bloc of countries /that is, the Afro-Asian bloc/ who are

³⁰Paulo Duarte, "Política Exterior Independente," Anhembi, (Rio de Janeiro) Fevereiro 1958, pp. 517-518.

³¹Ibid., p. 520.

³²Ibid., p. 522.

opposed to any type of oppression or intervention whether totalitarian or colonialist."³³ He concluded:³⁴

We will preserve our military alliance with the United States but at the same time we will reinforce our security by the prestige that we will gain from the understandings we make not only with the Afro-Asian countries, but also with those countries of the free world which view current events with less reactionary eyes...

Duarte was entering into unexplored territory, but after a short time, he would not find himself alone. Other visionary schemes were advanced with perhaps more programmatic content. One, in fact, was a revised version of an earlier idea--the concept of Brazil's special relationship with Portugal. It has been called the Luso-Brazilian Community, and in its present form, it is Brazil that takes the role of leader.

Its chief spokesman is Gilberto Freyre who argues that Brazil with its population and resources has become already the leader of the Portuguese speaking world:³⁵

...of a Luso-tropical system of civilization led in Europe by Portugal. This world may soon become a federation with a common citizenship and a number of other rights and responsibilities. ... It is interesting to note the

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Gilberto Freyre, New World in the Tropics, pp. 182-183. Freyre's concept of Brazilian leadership is far removed from the self-effacing role envisioned by João Neves da Fontoura in 1943 where Brazil was proud to be a mere "twig on the Lusitanian tree." Fontoura, Palavras aos Portugueses, p. 26.

growing tendency of the new generations in Portuguese India, Portuguese Africa, in the Cape Verde Islands, and to a lesser extent the Azores, to follow inspirations and suggestions from Brazil.

Freyre has another vision. This one springs from Brazil's "Luso-tropical" background. He asserts that Brazil alone has been successful in planting a "humane, Christian, and modern civilization" in a tropical area--a fact he claims which is being recognized and imitated by others.³⁶

In addition to the leadership by example, Brazil as a mixture of the European and the tropical can act as a mediator between the two worlds, reducing the friction that occurs between these two highly antagonistic civilizations.

Another and more limited vision concerns Brazil and its role in the Western Hemisphere. The notion usually assumes that in case the United States proves incapable of further leadership, Brazil will quickly snatch up the fallen standard. For some writers this has already happened. Plínio Rolim de Moura in 1959 argued:³⁷

America since the death of Roosevelt is without leadership. Although the Democrats may win the elections with Stevenson or

³⁶ Ibid., p. 7 and Gilberto Freyre, Brazil (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1963), pp. 23-24. To wit: "Brazil can contribute to the underdeveloped countries' integration in a new type of civilization, not sub-European, but one in which European values will be assimilated with the dynamic neo-African and neo-Asian cultural values." Ibid., p. 5.

³⁷ Plínio Rolim de Moura, O Líder da América Latina

Kennedy neither of them has the required dimensions that the historic moment in which we live requires.

...
America needs a leader and it seems that this leader cannot be found in the United States because they are too poisoned by prejudices and are controlled by business as the great Brazilian, Octavio Mangabeira, affirmed.

And further:³⁸

Today, the United States cannot help but be an isolated nation full of frustration with few friends which can only be kept by the weight of its gold.

Brazil, of course, shall supply the vital missing ingredient of leadership, according to Plínio, through the brilliance of Jânio Quadros whom he finds to be the correct combination of "Roosevelt, Lincoln, Lenin, and Charles Chaplin."³⁹ Even more, Quadros would be Fidel Castro without the paredon. This, of course, may be dismissed as extravagant campaign rhetoric but the idea expressed is one current in "visionary" schemes of Brazilian

(São Paulo: Editora e Distribuidora Universal, 1960)
pp. 117-118 and pp. 7-8.

³⁸Ibid., p. 8.

³⁹Ibid., p. 10. De Moura gives no further explanation of his reference to Chaplin. It can be conjectured that he chose Chaplin because he is viewed by Latin Americans as a great political figure as well as a great actor and comic. His anti-American statements in the 1930s and 1940s were probably responsible for this reputation.

intellectuals.⁴⁰ Another "limited" vision has been advanced by Colonel Golbery do Couto and refined by historian José Honório Rodrigues. Both argue from Brazil's basic security interests. Colonel Golbery argues:⁴¹

... We must take it upon ourselves to observe vigilantly what takes place along the whole west coast of Africa, for it is incumbent upon us by self-interest and even tradition to collaborate effectively in whatever manner is eventually decided best to preserve it from domination by aggressive imperialist forces.

And Rodrigues reiterates:⁴²

Truly we are a nation that ought to think intercontinentally; the South Atlantic conducts us to Africa, and everything links us to Africa--from the geographical similarities... to the historical processes and the economic interests. The South Atlantic unites us to nearly all of West Africa and suggests to us that a common international policy betters not only our state of protection and security, but also our economic alliances and friendships. We are, by our own position and extension in the South Atlantic, an intercontinental nation and a protagonist of international relations with the African world. Perhaps many think that this is not a world that counts... but in the United Nations and in the alliances of world security today this is not certain.

⁴⁰Some, like Constantino Paleologo in his O Brasil na América Latina (São Paulo: Edições O Cruzeiro, 1960), are content with smaller demonstrations of leadership. In Paleologo's case, it is the launching of a Brazilian published Latin American review in Spanish and distributed throughout the hemisphere, p. 49.

⁴¹Golbery do Couto Silva, Aspectos Geopolíticos do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1957) pp. 27-28.

⁴²José Honório Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 308, and J.H. Rodrigues, FORO Internacional, p. 314.

Both authors reason from geopolitical premises, but the result is Brazilian leadership if not virtual control of areas bordering the South Atlantic, especially West and Southwest Africa.⁴³

But to some intellectuals, Africa (or more precisely one part of it) is more than a member of the South Atlantic community. It is the vast expanse of the Afro-Asian world which holds hope for the foreign political future of Brazil: Adolpho Justo Bezerra de Menezes in his pioneer study (1955) makes the assumption that Brazil will be a world power in less than a century, or as he phrased it in his introduction:⁴⁴

We are certain that Brazilian hegemony will come with the same inevitability with which Harley's (sic) comet will make its next appearance in our sky: perhaps it may come later than this celestial visitor....

Menezes though believes there is much work ahead before Brazil emerges as a major actor in world politics. The

⁴³ Adolpho Justo Bezerra de Menezes argues: "The South American leadership. . .which constitutes an obsession for many of us would be recognized without effort. . .once we acquired political-diplomatic stature in Asia and Africa." Adolpho Justo Menezes, O Brasil e o Mundo Asia-Africano (2nd ed.; Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Ponghetti, Editores, 1960), p. 29.

⁴⁴ Adolpho Justo Bezerra de Menezes, O Brasil e o Mundo Asia-Africano (Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Ponghetti, Editores, 1956), p. 18.

problem of sheer ignorance of foreign areas is one. Even relatively near-by Africa is terra mirabilis:⁴⁵

Africa for the Brazilian is an immense region of swamps, of jungles, where Clark Gable or Gregory Peck on the pretext of hunting are going to weave an amorous intrigue with Ava Gardner.... It is also a highly mysterious region, a type of King Solomon's mines. The road is hazardous, full of ferocious animals, and of highly painted Negroes even more ferocious.

Nevertheless, with ignorance dispelled and other problems resolved, Brazil will soon achieve the leadership of the Third World that neither the United States with its racial prejudice and ties to British imperialism nor the Soviet Union with its moribund ideology can assume. But Brazil with its ethnic mixture "enjoys a privileged position to appease old hates and avoid formation of new ones." It again will act, according to Menezes, as the great mediator between white and colored, developed and underdeveloped, tropical and temperate.⁴⁶ Brazil will also be able "to help them, advocate for them and lead them for their own benefit."⁴⁷

The grandest (and concomitantly, the vaguest) role envisioned is that of a world power, perhaps the

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 50.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 319.

⁴⁷ Menezes, 2nd Edition, p. 29. Josue de Castro in the article "O Brasil eo Mundo Afro-Asiático," Revista Brasiliense, Julho-Agosto, 1961, pp. 9-15, argues this in similar terms: "Our mission... is to help construct

world power. This has been best articulated by an Army general, Antonio de Souza Junior:⁴⁸

No other country of the world equals it in possibilities. With a surface that is approximately half of South America, this vast territory introduces a nearly perfect geographic unity, a complete structural geophysical and political unity. In this immense country, there are not encountered any really inhospitable regions, there are no deserts, or steppes, nor chains of high mountains. Its potential useful or productive area is 90% of its total area.... From the demographic point of view it is admitted that the Brazilian territory could shelter 900 million inhabitants or 1,200 million according to some estimates. ...Mineral resources and energy potential of Brazil are immense and only now are beginning to be practically exploited. ...Without racial discrimination, without problems of alienated minorities, but on the contrary, united by same language, by the same political-social system, by the same traditions, Brazil is...the greatest Potential Power that is emerging.

General Souza has not been alone in his viewpoint. Pimental Gomes, for one, even predicts the date of Brazil's super power status: the year 2,000. His prose bristles with objectives to be seized, for example:⁴⁹

The position of Brazil in South America is sui generis. It is not repeated in any other

on the Atlantic a bridge of understanding and mutual help and solidarity and in this way contribute to the reconstruction of the world of tomorrow." p. 13.

⁴⁸General Antonio de Souza Junior, O Brasil e a Terceira Guerra Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1959), pp. 269-270.

⁴⁹Pimental Gomes, O Brasil entre as Cinco Maiores Potencias no Fim neste Século (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Leitura, 1964), pp. 15-16.

country, in any other continent. It occupies nearly half of the continent.... It has more usable land than all the other South American countries combined. It extends itself to...the Atlantic coast, the most important ocean. ... The Pacific is easily accessible. São Pedro and São Paulo, Fernando de Noronha, Trindade, Martim Vaz are lonely sentinals in the Atlantic, precious points of support in peace and war. We need Ascension, St. Helena, Tristão da Cunha, Gough, and Bouvet. Cape Verde could be a Brazilian state. It could have its advantages. Perhaps an honorable agreement might be possible with Portugal. And a slice of the Antarctic should come to us... We ought to claim it immediately.

And in case the reader misses the point, Gomes extends this thought in his next book:⁵⁰

There are no friendships among nations. ...It was always so. John Foster Dulles said on one occasion..."The United States has no friends: it has interests." Also the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, and France, the Germanies, Italy only have interests. It should not be. But unfortunately it is. Brazil therefore has to act in the same way. International aid...is based on the interests of the countries that give it even though they seem absolutely disinterested. It would not be just for a people to pay taxes and to sacrifice themselves in order to make another people great. Only a madman would believe that. Unfortunately in Brazil...there are some who still believe this.

This single-minded realpolitik ends with the recommendation that Brazil adopt a policy "entirely Brazilian" though the commitments to the Western world should not be entirely forgotten.⁵¹

⁵⁰Pimental Gomes, Porque não Somos uma Grande Potencia (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965), p. 126.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 144. De Gaulle's France is cited as an

It might be added, however, that not everyone is excited by this or any grand vision of the future. Some prefer to continue along the traditional path. Camilo de Oliveira, for example, has criticized the "visionaries" in the following manner:⁵²

...foreign policy is not the creation of fantasy. It is derived from relations that the States maintain with each other and is determined by its political institutions, by its economic and commercial interests, its geography, its culture and by the reactions of the human group that inhabits them.

He has little use for those intellectuals who recommend a sweeping reappraisal (that is, abandonment) of Brazil's traditional policy and a search for new friends and allies.⁵³

Evidently it is a program. But this program is written on air.... It is equal to the absurdity of attempting to build an old house.

Nevertheless, the visions of national greatness are bold projections, and they are ones that will sway many in the coming decades. They are intoxicating and the effects are long lasting. It is significant that no Brazilian, not even a Camilo de Oliveira, has minimized the country's potential. Thus, while few may go to the

ideal model to emulate.

⁵²A. Camilo de Oliveira "Linhas Mestras da Política Exterior do Brasil" Digesto Econômico, (São Paulo) No. 143 (Septembro-October, 1958), p. 113.

⁵³Ibid., p. 130.

lengths of a General Souza or a Pimentel Gomes, even fewer deny their initial premises.

We have considered a number of visions of Brazil's future greatness in the world arena. They vary considerably in scope and detail, but they share one common assumption, namely that Brazil will play a part that exceeds its traditional role of seeking limited continental goals. The virtual agreement on this is even more significant since the range of political ideology represented by the visionaries ranges from conservative to radical. Brazil's expanding role then is not so much a matter of debate, but more a question of where and how to begin.

Brazilian Intellectuals on Area Policy

Having considered the general attitudes of intellectuals about Brazil, it is time to focus on specific proposals for particular geographic areas. The ones to be considered are: 1. the United States 2. Latin America 3. Afro-Asia 4. the Socialist Bloc 5. Portugal.

In general, the intellectual opinion is a counterweight to "traditional" policy in these areas, although the changes advocated range from modest to revolutionary. In order to make the contrast clear, each policy area will begin with a brief description of what Brazilians

consider to be their traditional foreign policy.⁵⁴

1. Brazil and the United States

There is little doubt that what has concerned Brazilians most--in the past as well as the present--is the definition of its relations with the United States. We have heard already from Eduardo Prado on this subject. Great Brazilian statesmen like Joaquim Nabuco and the Baron de Rio Branco were equally preoccupied with the growing North American giant. Out of this concern evolved a Brazilian policy toward the United States that was distinct from that of its Hispanic-American neighbors.

In general, cordial relations were maintained.⁵⁵ Perhaps because of its size, Brazil showed less fear of the United States--a fear that was palpable in the smaller

⁵⁴Traditional policy, in fact, has consisted of limited objectives. Its principal aim is to preserve the territorial status quo in Latin America by maintaining a balance of power, especially to the South, and by adjusting border problems peacefully. Vis-a-vis the United States and Europe, Brazil, as the weaker state, favored a peace policy based on arbitration of disputes. See José H. Rodrigues, "The Foundations of Brazil's Foreign Policy" International Affairs (London) July, 1962, pp. 324-338. See also Nelson de Souza Sampaio "The Foreign Policy of Brazil" in Foreign Policies in a World of Change, ed. by Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson. (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 616-641. Especially see pp. 626-627.

⁵⁵For evidence of this cordiality see Lawrence F. Hill, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1932), pp. 282-305.

"republicuetas." In addition, a sentiment had arisen that since Brazil was in but not of (that is, an integrated part of) South America, it could act as an interpreter and mediator between the United States and Spanish America.⁵⁶

Even recently one finds intellectuals who favor these traditional policies. For example, Mário Guimarães states in connection with the Monroe Doctrine that although it has not stopped European intervention completely, the independence of the Caribbean republics would have been far more precarious without the "resounding warning of Monroe."⁵⁷ As far as Brazil, Guimarães believes that "without the policy of the United States on the continent, we would have had to confront in isolation the expansionist plans of Nazism."⁵⁸

Carlos Lacerda, too, has proposed unreserved adherence to the American alliance.⁵⁹

⁵⁶See Henrique Valle, "Alguns Aspectos das Relações Brasil-Estados Unidos" RBPI, Dezembro, 1961, pp. 5-18.

⁵⁷Mário Guimarães, Política Exterior do Brasil: Atitude Conservadora e Não Inerte (San Jose, Costa Rica: n.p., 1956) pp. 32-33.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 33.

⁵⁹Carlos Lacerda, speech given at Praça da Bandeira, Rio de Janeiro, September 19, 1961 in O Poder das Ideias (Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1963) 2nd ed., p. 141.

It is necessary to say clearly that at the moment there is only one hope for peace on earth; it is that Russia does not become stronger than the United States and that the balance of forces may be favorable to those who desire peace. . . because they love life and their creator.

Any attempt to make Brazil neutral would not only weaken world peace, it would give an advantage to the totalitarian governments in their war against the freedom loving nations... To neutralize Brazil is to weaken the alliance and the resistance of America.

And further:⁶⁰

Thanks to the freedom protected by the American atomic bomb, it is very easy to use this freedom to protest against the bomb. With the dollars loaned by the American people, it is easy to talk of independence as a mere play on words.... It is easy to be indifferent to the fate of people (who suffer) the systematic violation of all human rights.

Most Brazilian intellectuals of the last decade have tended to criticize this policy and to suggest new ways of handling the United States. The proposed new policies have differed considerably in tone and content. One of the most common reactions to the United States is one of balanced criticism and constructive changes in policy. Henrique Valle, a former Secretary-General of Itamanati (the number two position in the foreign ministry) and director of the Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, believes the United States must accept

⁶⁰Carlos Lacerda, speech, May 5, 1962, in Ibid., p. 246.

a new Brazilian policy which will seek to lead the Latin American bloc instead of acting as an interpreter and mediator.⁶¹

Adolpho Justo Menezes, another diplomat, rounds out this balanced view of American leadership by including a comment on the Afro-Asian world. He argues that Brazil should follow America in its ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, but that it should no longer defer to its leadership when the United States approves of European colonialism.⁶² Nevertheless, in the final analysis of the American record, Menezes concludes:⁶³

To criticize an Imperial Rome, a Spain of Charles V, a Victorian England and...a Communist Russia...is a pure waste of time. The pride of such empires was and is of such an amount that any faculties of self-analysis and criticism were blinded.

Therefore, this trace of relative modesty encountered in the character of nearly all Americans, this laudable attitude of judging oneself the "nec plus ultra" will be able to give courage to the whole world, and it makes one hope that the hegemony of the United States...may come to represent the happiest period to date enjoyed by humanity despite ...its handicap of an absurd racial superiority.

Those who have adopted an intermediate position in regard to Brazil's attitude toward the United States have also dealt with the concept of neutralism. Roberto Campos, for example, has admitted that the policy of non-alignment has one attractive advantage: concessions can

⁶¹Henrique Valle, p. 11.

⁶²Menezes, 2nd edition, p. 329.

⁶³Ibid., p. 306.

be extracted from both sides and trade can be diversified.

Nevertheless Campos finds that those arguing for Brazilian neutrality have failed to think out their position. In the first place, they have not considered whether there is a "sufficient cultural, philosophical or religious tradition...which may impede the disfiguration of the national character of the neutralist nation...."⁶⁴ India and Egypt, he finds, possess a buffering religious tradition, but Brazil with its "superficial" Christianity does not.

Campos also argues that the neutralists have not considered the geopolitical problem that non-alignment presents. To be neutral requires sufficient distance from the power centers. This condition Brazil does happen to fulfill in contrast to Guatamala and Hungary. However, the third requirement for non-alignment Brazil does not fulfill. It is not the acknowledged leader of its region. Thus unlike Egypt and India, the countries surrounding Brazil do not fall under its cultural influence. On balance, Brazil does not possess enough of the requirements to carry out a policy of neutralism according to Campos.

⁶⁴Roberto Campos, "Sobre Conceito de Neutralismo," RBPI, No. 15 (Septembro 1961), p. 6.

Campos also argues that Brazilian policy-makers have to answer the very practical question of what they can expect to get from the Soviet Union. Russian resources are limited, and they are distributed to areas of immediate interest. Latin America is last on that list for it is neither a member of the socialist camp nor in peripheral contact, nor is it in an area of ideological compatibility like post-colonial Africa.

Campos concludes that on balance Brazil could never assume a position of ideological neutralism ("we are democratic, free enterprising, in the West's mold."). It could take up "tactical neutralism" or "selective alignment" which does not seek a systematic and symmetrical position between the two blocs, but simply changes from issue to issue depending on the benefits that might be accrued to satisfy Brazil's overriding national interest--economic development.⁶⁵

Brazilians, of course, are not divided between admirers and friendly critics of the United States. There are variations among the unfriendly critics as well. For example, some of those who are unfriendly do not condemn this country root and branch.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 6-8. And Roberto Campos, speech delivered to the Pan-American Society, December 19, 1962 and reprinted in Brazilian Bulletin, no. 424 (January 1963).

Marcio Alves, a journalist, asserts that while there are powerful reactionary groups whose headquarters are in the Pentagon, there also are liberal sectors that keep the United States from falling entirely from grace. Nevertheless, Alves who wrote during the Goulart regime, asserts that America is primarily responsible for the deterioration of relations. To improve them the United States must stop negotiating directly with state governors on aid loans, and the American ambassador must cease behaving like the Soviet ambassador to Poland.⁶⁶ Alves, however, despite his unflattering description of American society, advocates no fundamental shift in Brazilian foreign policy.

Some, of course, are radically critical of the United States. Claudio de Araujo Lima concentrates on the "decadence of American culture" and fears its infiltration into Brazil. He recommends that his country remain as isolated from the United States influence as possible.⁶⁷ For Roque Gadelha de Melo, the Cold War

⁶⁶Marcio Moreira Alves, A Velha Classe (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Arte Nova, 1964), pp. 81-83. The reference to aiding governors is criticizing the practice of U.S. AID officials to negotiate loans and grants with these officials directly in order to avoid the red tape of the Goulart regime. A favorite channel of funds were Governors Lacerda of Guanabara and Magalhaes Pinto of Minas Gerais.

⁶⁷Claudio de Araujo Lima, Imperialismo e Angústia (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1960). One aspect of American culture which he found particularly loathsome was its eating habits. Consider the hot

is a ploy on the part of the United States to squeeze out economic advantages from the frightened peoples of the underdeveloped world. Meanwhile, in case of real war, the United States would try to get Latin America to join the conflict. This, of course, must be resisted, as can be gathered in a series of rhetorical questions:⁶⁸

Is Pan-Americanism more important to us than our own survival?
Is it worth while to risk our annihilation by A-bombs and guided missiles only out of love or subservience to Yankee imperialism which is struggling with another imperialism?

The answers are obvious. Brazil clearly must break away from any commitments either to the United States or its Latin American neighbors.

Others do not need the threat of nuclear annihilation to back up their demands for independence from the United States. Limeira Tejo, a journalist, argued in 1966 that collaboration with the North Americans would

dog:

"The introductory operation of the hot dog which was so important in creating the new habit in the life of the carioca, that the makers of the sausages decided to open a special "house of diversions" in Cinelandia.... By Christmas of 1928 they opened the doors of the "Taverna" inaugurated at the height of the carioca summer and the new food was launched in an atmosphere of a carefree Bohemian gaiety with the best jazz band.... .../It/ was a process of establishing reflex conditioning applying...the stimulus of jazz and pretty girls associated with the stimulus of the North American sausages." Ibid., p. 29.

⁶⁸Roque Gadelha de Melo "Neutralidade do Brasil: Imperativo Constitucional" Revista Brasiliense (Rio de Janeiro) No. 22 (Março-Abril 1959), pp. 174-175.

inevitably lead to satellization. The reason for this is simple. The United States has an increasing need for raw materials. Since it has been barred from Asia and Africa, Brazil becomes the only major source available.⁶⁹

What kind of new commitments, if any, should Brazil make to replace the old ones? Unfortunately, this has not been answered, not even to the extent of suggesting that Brazil might align with the "non-aligned," for example, India, Egypt, Algeria. It is almost as if the intellectuals accepted the idea that once Brazil had declared itself independent, its status as a Great Power would be achieved, and there would be no need for alignment with anyone.⁷⁰

Otto Maria Carpeaux is concerned over Brazil's position in the inter-American system, especially the Organization of American States. On the occasion of the Punta del Este meeting dealing with the Cuban problem, he wrote in his newspaper column:⁷¹

The OAS has just condemned Communism, but it forgot the adjective. Russian, Chinese, Yugoslav and other Communisms exist. They are very

⁶⁹Limeira Tejo, "Brasil, País Satelite?" Cadernos Brasileiros (Rio de Janeiro) (Julho-Agosto, 1966), p. 28.

⁷⁰Limeira Tejo is not so unspoken on this point. He concludes his essay with the following: "To fulfill our destiny as a continental state we can never count on North American collaboration. In the first place, no one collaborates against his own interests. In the second place, history does not know of an imperial civilization that has been permitted to develop by deference of an imperialism that preceded it...." Ibid., p. 32.

⁷¹Otto Maria Carpeaux, O Brasil no Espelho do

different. One of the few common elements of these divergent regimes is the method of government: they do not consult or they only apparently consult the people. They are dictatorships, and so are the regimes in Honduras, Haiti, Guatamala, Ecuador, and Paraguay that the OAS did not condemn... Thus, that which is repugnant to the OAS is not dictatorship and that which is pleasing is not democracy... With relation to Communism and anti-Communism (we say) 'a plague on both your houses!' But why only these two? We don't wish to exclude from our friendly wish a third house--that of the OAS.

Carpeaux not only condemns the OAS, but suggests a way to reform it: exclude the United States from the Organization. But this, he adds, "will never be realized while the governing classes of Latin America continue as pensioners of the North American economy."⁷²

A much discussed aspect of relations with the United States already alluded to by Limeira Tejo, is the role of that country's private investments in Brazil. Foreign private investment has had a mixed welcome in the past. Sometimes it has been encouraged with few restrictions; at other times, the regulations have been so tight that new investment has virtually stopped. The range of intellectual opinion has reflected this ambivalence. The debate has raged for well over a decade and no doubt, was given its present impetus by the suicide note of Vargas that hinted darkly at foreign

Mundo (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1963), p. 93.

⁷²Ibid., p. 139.

investments leading him to his decision. The note proved as chameleon as Vargas himself as writers of widely varying opinion clothed themselves in the "getulista" colors.⁷³

Most of the discussion is on an emotional level and is not founded on an economic analysis of gains and losses.⁷⁴ On one side it may be Henrique Valle's affirmation:⁷⁵

. . .if we want--and I believe we all want--to accelerate economic development of the country, we have to resort to foreign capital, public or private, as an indispensable part of that acceleration. And we cannot deny that the United States is, more than any other country, in the best condition to supply our needs.

On the other side of the debate is J. Salgado Freire's tirade:⁷⁶

⁷³Vargas' own flexibility was legendary and is hinted at in this well known Brazilian anecdote. It is said that a fiercely anti-Vargas politician went to São Paulo to discuss the founding of a national anti-getulista union. "The organization must be a secret," he explained to a friend, "because if the President learned of it he would immediately join the movement." Related in J. Machado de Souza, Getúlio Vargas, Político e Estadista (Recife: Soc. Gráfica Impanema, 1958), p. 256.

⁷⁴There are, of course, exceptions. Academic intellectuals like Celso Furtado have discussed analytically the costs and consequences of foreign investment in Brazil. See his Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis, trans. by Suzette Macedo (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 119-121.

⁷⁵Valle, p. 15.

⁷⁶J. Salgado Freire, Para Onde Vai o Brasil?: Grandezas e Misérias do Nosso Desenvolvimento (Rio de

The majority of companies that today exploit us are North American.... The astronomical profits that leave our country, drawn from all our effort, impoverish us, make us paupers, debilitate us, and aggravate our misery considerably. (The capitalists) rob us, but they tell us that they are helping us; they make scandalous investments. . .with highly impertinent airs of philanthropy.

Less impassioned attitudes are quite difficult to find among Brazilian intellectuals; nevertheless they do exist. Some, like Roberto Pinto de Souza, can list advantages and disadvantages. He argues that foreign investment has four principal attractions: 1. it supplies additional liquid capital that cannot be squeezed out of national income 2. it strengthens the balance of payments 3. it increases the capacity to import 4. it adds to the technical know-how of the country. On the other hand, over the short run, 1. it may unsettle balance of payments accounts through sudden and heavy remittance of profits and 2. it may eliminate the local producer. On balance, Pinto de Souza believes since economic development is both slower and more painful, "every possibility that underdeveloped country encounters to increase foreign investment...ought to be weighed and considered with care."⁷⁷

Janeiro: Conquista, 1959), pp. 208-209 and pp. 212-213.

⁷⁷Roberto Pinto de Souza "Investimento Estrangeiro," Digesto Econômico, no. 139, Janeiro-Febrero 1959, pp. 10-11.

An unemotional, but more critical discussion of foreign investors has also been made. Marcio Alves argues that the control of the economy must be kept in the hands of Brazilians to preserve "the social security of the State." But economic liberalism draws no limit on the size of foreign investment. He points out too that present foreign companies have not been "Brazilianizing" themselves. The consequence is that all business decisions are made by outsiders. This may well interfere with Brazil's best interests, for example, in exports:⁷⁸

Many times products manufactured in Brazil by international companies and that could be sold in other countries of Latin America have their exporting curbed so that they do not compete with the goods of the home company.

Alves argues that governments can take prudent measures to avoid such difficulties. Some countries like France have placed restrictions on foreign investors without it being branded Castroite. Thus, there is a prudent middle way. He states in conclusion that if Brazil maintains order and a stable currency coupled with its large market and skilled labor force, foreign investment will flow in anyway making "immoderate concessions" unnecessary as well as wrong.⁷⁹

⁷⁸Marcio Alves, A Velha Classe, pp. 70-71.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 71.

Probably the most controversial aspect of foreign investment is profit remittances. On this question, there are only two opinions and precious little shading between them. The vehement critics of foreign capital make this their chief article of faith.

Maia Neto, for example, believes profit remittances to be merely colonial exploitation in a new form. The Portuguese earlier had exploited Brazil openly by reserving exclusive trade privileges for itself. Today, he charges, the modern colonialists (that is, the developed countries of the West) use more subtle but equally effective exploitative techniques. Now they move in with glib promises of progress, but proceed to help themselves to Brazil's riches.⁸⁰ Freire backs this point by citing data purporting to show foreign companies taking out in the form of profit remittances many times the original investment. He includes this table:⁸¹

⁸⁰Maia Neto, Brasil: Guerra Quente na América Latina (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965), pp. 40-41.

⁸¹J.S. Freire, Para Onde Vai, p. 210. As the reader may suspect, such data is open to question. No time period is indicated, no adjustment for inflation is indicated, nor is it explained how or where Professor Baleeiro got his statistics. The rate of remittance flow which was the central point under discussion is not shown by the table either.

Foreign Investment: Data from Deputy Aliomar
Baleeiro, professor of economics

	CAPITAL	PROFIT	PERCENTAGE
Companhia International Wagons	500,000	2,665,000	533%
International Brazilian Economic Corporation	1,000,000	10,418,000	1041%
Gardener Denver Western Hemisphere	93,000	1,832,000	1970
Bethlehem Brazilian Corporation	500,000	6,575,000	1315
Standard Brands of Bra- zil	400,000	17,392,000	4348
Lancashire General In- vestment	1,079,000	101,257,700	9375
Ford Products Company	375,000	7,250,000	1933

It does not really make much difference who is quoted or what data is used (or how it is obtained), the answer is nearly always the same--foreign investors are acting like suction pumps (bombas da sucção), siphoning off the incredible wealth of Brazil. This bloodletting only ceases when a strict profits remittance law is passed.⁸²

Roberto Campos has challenged the thesis of the anti-investment school. He observes that in Latin America there has always been a search for panaceas to explain

⁸²Caio Prado Junior "O Projecto de Lei de Remessa de Lucros" Revista Brasiliense, (Maio-Junho, 1962), p. 1-11.

and to overcome economic problems. Industrialization, agrarian reform, and stabilization of export prices have all been invoked in the past. Now in Brazil, according to Campos, the chief problem is remittance of profits. End this, the nationalists cry, and poverty will end in the country.⁸³

Even in the presidential campaign, the problem was mixed up with the fundamental questions. . . No one meanwhile seems to have given himself the task of finding out if the problem exists. Perhaps because it smacks of an ideological question if the facts are contrary. So much the worse for the facts. . . I am convinced that the only activity of the prosperous and organized research among us is the search for scapegoats.

Campos then produces his own data on profit remittances. He argues first that annual profit remittances do not equal 0.5% of the Gross Domestic Product. Therefore, remittances absorb less than 2% of the foreign exchange Brazil uses annually. If royalties are included the figure goes to 2.6%. If interest on loans is added the figure goes to 6%. Stopping remittances then would hardly help Brazil's foreign exchange drain. Meanwhile, restrictions may discourage new investment, thus damaging the balance of payments far more than it helps it.⁸⁴

⁸³Roberto Campos "Dove Si Grida Non e Vera Scienza..." Correio da Manha, Dezembro 4, 1960, p. 2. Reprinted in Roberto Campos A Moeda, o Governo e o Tempo (Rio de Janeiro: APEC Editôra, 1964), pp. 59-60.

⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 59-61.

He has also cited other evidence in his case for foreign investment. Campos pointed out that if the ultra-nationalists were correct, then São Paulo, "exploited by an enormous concentration of foreign capital, ought to be poor: Piauí...ought to be rich."⁸⁵ But, of course, this is not the case. In the same manner, the Netherlands, which has absorbed large amounts of foreign capital, is prosperous. On the other hand, Albania absorbs nothing and remains a showcase of poverty. Closer to home, Campos cites the example of 19th century Brazil which received only small amounts of outside investment and grew slowly, while the United States invited foreign capital and developed rapidly.⁸⁶

In conclusion, he adds:⁸⁷

I imagine that if an atomic bomb destroyed the North American suction pump, we would not become richer. Our leftists would have to find a new slogan to explain our underdevelopment.

However, Campos does not simply favor the status quo but has advocated measures to "Brazilianize" foreign investment. He, for example, believes that foreign firms should be compelled to sell open shares to Brazilians. Second, firms should be made to liquidate their debts before foreign exchange is granted. Third, income

⁸⁵ Roberto Campos, "A Imbecilidade dos 'Slogans'," Digesto Econômico (Janeiro-Febrero, 1963), p. 21.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

tax rates of foreign residents should be adjusted upward. Finally, anti-trust legislation should be passed against foreign and national monopolies to insure competition without punishing enterprise. But he adds, "Trusts are spoken of alot; they are discerned where they do not exist; there is attributed to them quite often an absolutely super-human power."⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 64-66. Cf. M. Ribeiro who wrote, "... capitalist monopoly is an affront to the dignity and to the sovereignty of the weak countries. We are seeing a whole continent in a state of poverty through the force of the capitalist concentration of the United States. Why? Because capital exercises a force of attraction identical to that of universal gravitation. It is so fabulous, this "X" force, that we have to take an opposite tack with velocity equal to "X" in order to escape its attraction." Moacyr Ribeiro, Jânio Deposto (Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1962), p. 150.

Even poems are written about trusts. In one entitled "The Jeeps and the Shoes" by Jamil Almansur Haddad we are told:

There is a suspicion about
That this progress is false
We send jeeps to China
But the Northeast stays shoeless.

Oh callous politicians
Don't you see the sadness
Of a naked and tired Northeast
But using more shoes surely
Means only more royalties
Will go to American Shoe

J.A. Haddad, Romanceiro Cubano (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1960), p. 222.

Eugenio Gudin, a professor of economics, and former Finance Minister, agrees largely with the Campos analysis of foreign investment, but he does advocate some restrictive measures. Above all, he has demanded that the special privileges given to the automobile industry (mostly foreign owned) be ended, especially the favorable exchange rate extended to imports needed by the industry. Gudin has also called for the government to end the practice whereby foreign companies virtually smuggle in materials with the complicity of government officials. Aside from these restrictions, though, Gudin favors free entrance and exit of capital as has occurred in the periods of rapid development for countries like Argentina, Mexico, and India.⁸⁹

Many Brazilian intellectuals in the course of debating policy questions shower personal abuse on their opponents. The group who favor tight restrictions on foreign capital have resorted especially to this technique. At times the charges are a bit vague. Dagóberto Salles, for example, has asserted that Brazilian defenders of American investment are launching "dense fogs of false economic science and adventurous

⁸⁹Eugenio Gudin, Análise de Problemas Brasileiros, 1958-1964 (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Agir Editora, 1965), pp. 330-331. The book is a collection of articles written for Rio's afternoon daily, O Globo.

programmatic declarations ... so that in the uproar, policies favorable to foreign interests would be adopted."⁹⁰ At times the charges become more harsh. Adalgisa Nery accuses Brazilian intellectuals of not having opinions on the dangers to national sovereignty. She adds:⁹¹

It happens that a majority of our fabulous cultivators of letters have government employment or profit from positions within the entreguista atmosphere and before the Fatherland comes one's convenience and well-being. It is much better to go against the interests of Brazil than to go against the interests of the possible patron because he gives them immediate facilities and compensations in exchange for silence and submission. ... The rottenness is so fetid that the winds themselves reject it and the suffocating emanations descend again to their starting point, making part of the atmosphere of public men in Brazil. We want to see if the people accompany these walking cadavers, or if the armed forces, organized for the defense of Brazilian integrity alone, attend in silence the bachanal of the entreguistas moved to action by United States dollars.

What precisely is an entreguista--a seller of one's country? Alberto Guerreiro Ramos finds that entreguistas are intellectuals who do not believe that the people are the directing force of Brazilian development. They do not believe the country can solve its

⁹⁰Dogoberto Salles, As Razões do Nacionalismo (São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1959), p. 165.

⁹¹Adalgisa Nery, ed., Sopram Os Ventos da Liberdade (São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1959). From an article entitled "Bacanal Entreguista," pp. 6-10, dated February 28, 1957.

own problems with its own resources. They insist that Brazil must be tied to the United States. They work for the success of "anti-national" undertakings, and they oppose any further steps of national emancipation.⁹² Occasionally the polemic turns to pure personal abuse. One nationalist turned on Roberto Campos:⁹³

So when in Brazil Roberto Campos (Bob Fields) proposes the ending of Petrobrás /the State oil monopoly/ and the concession on the part of sedimentary areas to national and foreign companies, he does not speak for himself: he hands on a message from the State Department, he transmits orders from (Ellis O.) Briggs.

Another turns on Eugenio Gudim who according to his critic is not a great economist, but a "doctor know-it-all" who has an opinion (usually mistaken) about everything. Furthermore, he is much too fond of foreigners. For example, he quotes them readily, and in one work he quoted only one source in Portuguese and this one was not Brazilian. Finally, he has numerous economic ties with foreign investors and is probably their respectable Brazilian front since they have appointed him

⁹²Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, O Problema Nacional do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Saga, 1960), pp. 252-253. The abrasiveness of the polemic includes more than intellectuals. Gondim de Fonseca in one of his milder moods scores Itamarati: "Our embassy in Washington will possess...some thirty officials perfumed, grotesque useless male ballet dancers that try to speak Portuguese with an accent to seem foreign." Gondim de Fonseca in Nery, ed., Sopram, in an article entitled "Os Antinacionalistas e a Proxima Ditura," Dezembro 27, 1958, p. 99.

⁹³Gondim de Fonseca in Nery, Sopram os Ventos, pp. 100-101.

as a board director.⁹⁴

Those under attack have not remained silent, however. Gustavo Corção has accused one of his critics of writing a book filled with "gross insults and evangelical citations," and giving evidence of a "mental retardation, a shrinking of the faculties, a simplification of reasoning that surpasses everything one can imagine."⁹⁵ Roberto Campos, in reply to a question on entreguismo countered:⁹⁶

Many people see in the epithet entreguista, with which we insult some of our greatest patriots and finest technicians, an example of bad faith. It is not even that. It is an example of simple stupidity.

In a more analytical mood, Campos has also said in a speech that the nationalist entreguista dichotomy must be rejected as fictitious and injurious. He argued that

⁹⁴J. Salgado Freire, Para Onde Vai, p. 275 and p. 284. Even Gudin's prose is suspect with its penchant for anglicisms and gallicisms! p. 279. Gudin, however, has not remained silent. He accuses his detractors of emotionalism and irrationality. Their ideology is "a hybrid of true Communism (and its partner state socialism), and a group of pliable innocents whose dominant characteristic is stupidity." Eugenio Gudin, Análise, p. 327.

⁹⁵Gustavo Corção "Nacionalismo" Digesto Econômico, (Novembre-Dezembre, 1958), p. 92. He doesn't spare the student organization, the UNE, either. They "demonstrate more concern for the tincans of an American firm than for the immoralities practiced here and beyond. Speak to them of the horrors that the Hungarian patriots suffered and they remain impassive. Speak to them of the Suez canal and they enter into anti-British convulsions." Ibid.

⁹⁶Roberto Campos in Horowitz, ed., Revolution in Brazil, pp. 360-361.

ot was far more profitable to distinguish among nationalists: pragmatic and operational on one hand and romantic and temperamental on the other. Campos classifies himself as a pragmatist, more willing to strengthen local enterprise than to rail against the foreigners. "I prefer to love my own country rather than to hate others."⁹⁷

No matter what terms are used, whether nationalist-entreguista or pragmatist-romantic, they remain dichotomies, and the split between Brazilian intellectuals on this segment of relations with the United States as well as other aspects will remain, if not widen in the future. The effect of this nationalist turmoil also will be seen on the policy-makers themselves.

2. Brazil and Latin America

Brazil traditionally has been in Latin America, but not really a part of it.⁹⁸ Rio Branco, the architect of his country's continental policy, complemented friendship with the United States with a policy of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of weak Uruguay and Paraguay against the encroachments of expansionist Argentina. Checking Argentina also meant

⁹⁷ Roberto Campos, A Moeda, o, Govern o, Tempo, p. 185. p. 185.

⁹⁸ See Luis Bastian Pinto, "A Política Exterior do Brasil na América Latina" RBPI, No. 8 (Dezembre 1959), p.

maintaining especially good relations with Chile since that country had its suspicions of Argentine intent too.⁹⁹ The Baron's policy had not gone through much change until Juscelino Kubitschek's Operação Panamericana which placed Brazil somewhat in the forefront of Latin American cooperation in seeking American development assistance.

The intellectuals' response to this presidential initiative was mixed.¹⁰⁰ Within Kubitschek's intellectual coterie there was, of course, the warmest of approval.¹⁰¹ This was reiterated by some of the professional diplomats. Garrido Torres, ex-director of SUMOC wrote:¹⁰²

54. He notes inter alia that until recently Brazilian delegates at international conferences always spoke French, never Spanish. Now they use English.

⁹⁹ José Honório Rodrigues, International Affairs, pp. 330-333.

¹⁰⁰ I have not discovered any intellectual advocating anything similar to Kubitschek's proposals especially in regard to Brazilian initiatives before the famous letter to President Eisenhower.

¹⁰¹ See Licurgo Costa's Uma Nova Política para as Américas--Doutrina Kubitschek e OPA (São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, 1960). Consider the following: "From the manifestations of his thought emerged a body of doctrine whose originality comes not only from its many new concepts, but also from the way he knew how to interlink ideas which until then were moving within their orbits giving them still a new richness and a surprising dynamic philosophy." p. 348.

¹⁰² Garrido Torres "Operação Pan-Americana: Uma Política a Formular" pp. 33-48, RBPI, Junho 1960, no. 10, p. 33. Torres, however, had reservations. He pointed out that OPA still "remains a proposal, an expression

/Operação Pan-Americana was an initiative which was...frank as well as cordial in which the President of Brazil in an hour of great inspiration pointed out to the Government of the Republic from the north the danger that was threatening the harmony of the hemisphere and warned it that inter-American relations were urgently demanding an objective appraisal in the light of its present problems.

Aside from this circle close to the President, criticism of Brazil's new bid for Latin American leadership was common. Eduardo Portella has stated the OPA was wrong from the beginning because it had based itself on the mistaken premise of a continental unity that never existed. Moreover, it assumed erroneously "a possible dialogue with the United States and Latin America in which Brazil was a mediator or an opportunistic intermediary..."¹⁰³

of sentiment, a state of spirit, a declaration of an invitation accepted in principle, by all the American governments, for joint action that is not planned in terms of methodical execution. .../I/t runs the risk, therefore, of confirming the rule of lyrical manifestos regarding economic cooperation in the hemisphere." p. 36.

¹⁰³Eduardo Portella, Política Externa e Povo Livre (São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1963), p. 19. Portella is a poet and literary critic who became an early supporter of Jânio Quadros' new foreign policy. Consequently he was elevated to being the first director of the semi-official Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos, now defunct. Regarding Portella's statement, Lourival Fontes, a Senator and old Vargas ally, made this even clearer: "We don't have in truth common problems, nor constant laws of evolution, nor uniformities nor analogies.... The Latin American countries are marked by radical divergencies, general differences, enormous disparities; oppositions and contradictions. The characteristics of cold, torrid and temperate climate and the varieties of race, white, black, aborigine or mestizo which divide us irreparably." Lourival Fontes, Missão ou Demissão (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio, 1961),

José Honório Rodrigues supplemented this criticism by charging that the OPA did actual damage to Brazil's interests through obscuring "the most important phenomenon of the world's historic process between 1958 and 1960: the African liberation. We lived alienated from the world's historic process...."¹⁰⁴

In addition, some like Paulo Duarte, have attacked the priority given to developing Latin American trade. He points out, for instance, that Brazil's exports are competitive not complementary with the rest of Latin America. Furthermore the size of the markets available in South America will never come close to those already existing in Japan and China. And as far as the comparison of distance is concerned, the Latin American transportation network is so bad that costs within Latin America nearly equal shipping costs to the Orient.¹⁰⁵

This condemnation of Brazil's one major initiative on the continent has left little in the way of policy recommendations made by Brazil's intellectuals. In fact, the only positive suggestion has been from Gilberto Freyre who has been previously alluded to. He foresees that Brazil is in an excellent position to play

45.

¹⁰⁴J.H. Rodrigues, FORO Internacional, pp. 314-315.

¹⁰⁵Paulo Duarte, "Política Externa Independente,"

the important role in South America of peacemaker in its neighbors' disputes. As an intra-continental mediator, Brazil possesses according to Freyre, all the necessary qualifications. It has personal interest with its common Iberic origin, its common tropicalness, but it is different enough with its Portuguese culture to be impartial in regard to intra-Hispanic rivalry.¹⁰⁶ Freyre's enthusiasm for this rather unglamorous role is apparently shared by no one else. Brazilian intellectuals, in short, have not seriously dwelt on Brazil's position in Latin America. This may be in part because of Brazil's traditional isolation, the overwhelming presence of the United States and the indifference of the Spanish-speaking countries. The result is either silence or pursuit of extracontinental schemes, perhaps illusory ones.

3. The Intellectuals and the Afro-Asian World

The glamour of distant places has indeed captured the imagination of Brazilian intellectuals. In fact,

Anhembi (Rio de Janeiro), No. 87 (Febreiro 1958), pp. 517-522.

¹⁰⁶Gilberto Freyre, Uma Política Transnacional de Cultura para o Brasil de Hoje (Rio de Janeiro: Edições da Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, 1960), pp. 53-54.

most of their foreign policy discussion beginning in 1960 has been an attempt to fit Brazil into this scheme of things rather than the more familiar Latin American context.¹⁰⁷ Their pushing out into new directions quite literally fills a void in traditional foreign policy.¹⁰⁸ Even José Honório, an historian intent on finding as many historical links between Brazil and Africa as possible, admits little contact after 1860. He notes with disappointment:¹⁰⁹

If the Empire had been forced to turn its back on Africa and to concern itself with the African only as a slave, the Republic pretended complete ignorance, not only because it did not have the power to pursue an independent policy to censure European colonialism, but also because it was controlled by theories of Anglo-Saxon white skin or European ancestry.

And what could be said for Africa was emphatically true for Asia--these areas simply played no part in Brazilian

¹⁰⁷Few share the critical outlook of Carlos Lacerda who has stated: "Anti-colonialism thus turns itself into a pretext to justify the intervention of a new imperialism..." and "...those that had nothing to say when Lumumba was bloodying the Congo and when his men were raping women and girls, seem to confound Lumumba with José Bonifácio, Fidel Castro with José Martí, or Mao Tse-Tung with Simon Bolivar, forgetting that the fundamental difference between one and the other is not scarcely of methods, it is above all of principles and of ends. While the latter fought for liberty, dignifying man, the others fight to suppress it..." Lacerda, p. 129.

¹⁰⁸This is not to say that the void actually needed to be filled. Indeed, it could be argued (but rarely is among Brazilian intellectuals) that opening new contacts in Africa and Asia are diversions of scarce resources which could be more profitably invested nearer home.

¹⁰⁹José H. Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 199.

foreign policy before 1960.

In fashioning a Brazilian policy toward Africa, the first order of business was to justify an interest in Africa and Asia.

The earliest comment tended to be quite cautious. Even the left-wing nationalist journal Anhembi stressed an interest in Africa based on natural security:¹¹⁰

Brazil cannot help but be interested in the events that will be occurring in Africa in the next decades, since a racist or Communist Africa would not be free of danger for the countries on the opposite side of the Atlantic.

Five years later, an interest in Africa could be justified on other grounds, for example, the conservative Professor Estanislaw Fishlowitz of the Institute of Political and Social Studies at Pontificia Universidade Católica in Rio de Janeiro summarized in one paragraph in 1960 what Brazilian intellectuals have formulated many times since then:¹¹¹

Brazil is... predestined to play a quite distinct role in the organization of the new Africa. It is, along with the United States, the only great country lacking any colonial heritage whatever; moreover, in contrast with North American democracy, it does not have any rigid ties of a political nature with the colonial powers except... the ties of traditional sentimental friendship with Portugal.¹¹² Our master doctrine of racial democracy assures us

¹¹⁰Unsigned article, "Destino Político da África Negra," Anhembi (Rio de Janeiro) No. 56 (Julho 1955), p. 231.

¹¹¹E. Fischlowitz, "Subidos para a 'Doutrina Africana' do Brasil" RBPI, Março, 1960, pp. 82-95. (p. 94).

¹¹²What has not been repeated from Dr. Fischlowitz's

beforehand that our eventual intervention in the destiny of the black continent will have the best reception possible. Neither can Brazil remain under this point of view indifferent to the notable contribution of the African element to the patrimony of the national culture.

It is all there: Brazil, the large country with a non-colonial, even an anti-colonial, tradition, composed of many races including the Negro who has helped form the national culture and who, like the other racial groups, has found a haven of racial democracy--an absence of racial prejudice. This country, with such splendid qualifications can, must, and will play a role in African if not Asian development. It is a theme that will be taken up repeatedly by Brazilian intellectuals.¹¹³

essay in his appraisal of colonialism. He finds it should not be indiscriminately condemned and that all colonial powers did set up a judicial order which defended personal and property rights and suppressed intertribal conflict and "the shameful slave trade and other abuses." Ibid., p. 89.

¹¹³See, for example, Amilcar Alencaste's Oswald Aranha: O Mundo Afro-Asiática e a Paz (Rio de Janeiro: Capa de Fortunata, 1961) pp. 78-80; Eduardo Portella, Africa: Colonos e Cumplices (Rio de Janeiro: Editorial Prado Ltda., 1961) pp. 88-89; and Marcio Alves, A Velha Classe, pp. 79-80. Not all Brazilians have shared in the general euphoria. Maria Leite Linhares of the University of Brazil is rather skeptical of Brazilian success in an African venture, and for three reasons. First, its much vaunted early links with Africa are based on the slave trade, about which Africans would rather forget and of which Brazilians should be ashamed; second, Brazilian miscegenation is utterly meaningless to Africans, who with few exceptions do not have a racially pluralistic society; third, Africans are not about to break ties with Europe--especially economic--and opt for Brazilian leadership. Maria Y. Leite Linhares, "Brazilian Foreign Policy and Africa " The World Today, December, 1962, pp. 532-

Occasionally, the basis of Afro-Brazilian intimacy is based on historic ties. José Honório Rodrigues particularly has developed this line of thought.¹¹⁴ He argues that for three centuries Brazil and West Africa enjoyed an intimate relationship in which Portugal hardly figured--a relationship that was ended and then forgotten by mid-nineteenth century. In Rodrigues' words:¹¹⁵

So Brazil was the center of a three-way commerce and was linked with Asia and Africa by trade in which Portugal took no part. This Brazilian-Afro-Asian triangle was established in the eighteenth century. It dissolved following our independence.

Besides the commerce in goods including, of course, slaves and cultural influences, Rodrigues recalls a heroic past in which a "Brazilian," Salvador Correia de Sa in 1648 led an expedition from Rio de Janeiro

540. (p. 538) For an American appraisal along similar lines, see Lawrence Nevins "Brazil and Africa," JIAS, January, 1964, pp. 121-123. Two particularly tart comments: "That techniques and vegetables also passed from one continent to another is very nice but entirely coincidental. There is little in the past over which a modern African can justifiably wax sentimental." p. 122. And in regard to African gratitude for Brazilian social democracy, Nevins adds: "...despite all the talk of tolerance, Negroes in Brazil are mostly tolerated at the bottom of society." p. 122.

¹¹⁴He is not alone. See also Artur Cezar Ferreira Reis (Professor of Social and Political History Pontificia Universidade Católica) "África e Brasil: Relações e Competições" RBPI, Junho, 1963, pp. 209-222.

¹¹⁵José Honório Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 28.

and recaptured Angola which had been usurped by the Dutch seven years earlier. Commerce again resumed with Angola more dependent on Brazil than ever--a dependency that included its source of governors.¹¹⁶

The symbol of Brazil as a liberator of an African state from European, that is, Dutch imperialism is certainly appealing to Brazilians, if not to Africans.

Little mention has been made of Asia specifically, and indeed, little intellectual effort is devoted to that area. While ties with Africa can be shown with small effort, Asia remains a bit removed even for the intellectuals. Nevertheless, a relationship is made on occasion. Alencastre finds Brazil's "economic physiognomy," the same as that in Asia, with both suffering "exploitation" of low prices for tropical raw materials. He also lists another link--the appearance of the Portuguese language (thanks to Portugal's colonialism) in Goa, Timor and Ceylon. He records the fact that 300 Portuguese words are imbedded in the Indonesian language.¹¹⁷ Menezes, too, lists connections with the east including Lebanese, Chinese, and Japanese migration to Brazil plus interchange of certain products, (for example, coffee for tea).¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 18-24.

¹¹⁷There are, of course, thousands of Dutch words in the language as well, a fact which has not noticeably endeared one country to the other. Alencastre, Oswaldo Aranha, pp. 84-88.

¹¹⁸Menezes, 2nd edition, pp. 17-27.

All of these links do seem remote, which probably explains why Brazilian intellectuals have not spent their energies on drawing up points of contact between Brazil and Asia.

With this justification of interest in Africa, (and to a lesser extent, Asia) established by a few intellectuals the next step is to suggest concrete policies toward these areas. Here again difficulties are encountered. What is often found in policy discussions is not so much whole new ideas as criticism of past official efforts. José Honório Rodrigues, for example, criticizes the Kubitschek regime for its lack of imagination:¹¹⁹

...Juscelino Kubitschek's government... limited itself to de jure recognition--nothing more; no encouraging message, no solidarity, no gesture, not to mention cooperation, as though we were ashamed of the springtime of African power; as though we were embarrassed by our common identity; as though it were possible to continue this dichotomy between a European elite which directs international policy and works to preserve the status quo and the Brazilian people, whose entry into the area of decision has just begun.

The Quadros administration was not free from criticism either. Rodrigues points out that a strong line on Angola was not taken at the UN General Assembly, but that the decision to pursue a trade agreement with

¹¹⁹ J.H. Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 310.

South Africa was made at the time of the Sharpesville killings.¹²⁰ The Goulart regime had its shortcomings too. In Santiago Dantas' inaugural speech as Foreign Minister, he made no mention of Africa per se although he did condemn colonialism,¹²¹ and, in general, it was too involved with internal politics to follow up the more promising initiatives of Jânio Quadros.¹²²

The intellectuals have offered much criticism of standing policy, but have made few practical suggestions for developing relations with Africa and Asia. The quality of the recommendations vary considerably. What, for example, is a person to do with a suggestion like this?¹²³

Our Afro-Asian policy ought to be elaborated from an eminently Brazilian perspective. And it ought to develop itself harmoniously through three aspects: the cultural, the political and the economic.

Under the first category, Brazil should promote "ample and systematic studies of the analogy of historical

¹²⁰J.H. Rodrigues, FORO Internacional, pp. 322-324.

¹²¹J.H. Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 327.

¹²²See E. Portella, Política Externa e Povo Livre, pp. 20-21.

¹²³E. Portella, África, p. 141.

situations of comparable backgrounds, analyzing the validity of Afro-Asian and Brazilian solutions."¹²⁴ Politically, the author suggests that Brazil could make itself useful by studying their legal systems and the legislation designed to produce a "social phenomenology for the Afro-Asians."¹²⁵

Finally, in economics, research on ways to increase trade is suggested as well as finding bases for technical assistance and future aid loans to the African countries by Brazil.¹²⁶

It should be noted that such aid schemes do not meet with everyone's approval. For example, the Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos' project to found a Brazilian staffed university in Togo was labelled "intellectual demagogy" by Paulo Duarte. He termed it a ridiculous undertaking since half of Brazil's population was illiterate and its universities were woefully inadequate.¹²⁷

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 141.

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 143. What Portella means by a "social phenomenology" is not clear since he does not bother to elaborate. The quote does help to indicate the vagueness of thought concerning this problem.

¹²⁶Ibid., pp. 143-144.

¹²⁷Paulo Duarte, "Uma Universidade do Brasil em África?" Anhembi (Rio de Janeiro) Maio 1962, pp. 553-554.

Adolpho Menezes, an experienced diplomat, had made a more concrete and less pretentiously stated list of policy suggestions. In the first, place, Menezes believes Brazil's policy-making process especially in these areas is defective from the beginning since its intelligence is collected second-hand from American, British, and French sources. Instead, Brazil should be sending social scientists to conduct research in Africa and Asia. Secondly, Menezes, writing in 1956, points out that Brazil at least since 1945 has had no President, Vice-President, Minister or influential legislator visit these areas. In addition, the excellent technique of decorating foreign dignitaries (except for King Farouk) has not been used. He adds with a Machiavalian touch: "Meanwhile, there exist leaders (Oriental and African), principally those of recently formed countries that are extremely sensitive to such honors."¹²⁸ Thirdly, Menezes believes that Brazil can reap high returns from small gifts of goods and money in cases of natural calamity: donations such as coffee and rice. He also recommends sending scholars and books to the new African universities and scholarships for African students.¹²⁹ Menezes too offers some public relations measures. He remarks that in two years in the Orient, he saw no Brazilian films--a

¹²⁸Menezes, Africa, 1st edition, p. 355.

¹²⁹Ibid., pp. 356-357.

deficiency, he believes, could be instantly corrected. Also Brazil could send its football teams on tour especially the clubs with black and mulatto ballplayers. He also proposes that Brazilian orchestras, dancers, and singers be sent to Asia and Africa, thus protecting "the paternity of the rhythms of our dances from the likes of Xavier Cugat and Stanley Black."¹³⁰

In the midst of the general euphoria about continental solidarity there is occasionally a sober note injected regarding the real problems facing Brazil in these countries. One problem mentioned is the competition between Brazil and Africa over similar export products. At times the advice is especially insipid, for example:¹³¹

.../competition/ should not spoil relations /and/ ... it should be carried out in the most active, at the same time, the most friendly co-participation possible, ... always in search of solutions for the complex problems which now confront the African peoples because these problems are not so very distant in their essence from ... Latin American development....

On other occasions, the problem is at least spelled out clearly as Ferreira Reis has done when he asks:¹³²

/How can relations be good/ if the African countries are our competitors and Brazilian exports to black Africa are insignificant?

¹³⁰Ibid., pp. 363-368.

¹³¹Fischlowitz, RBPI, p. 92.

¹³²Fischlowitz, RBPI, p. 221.

...Is it possible to sell them chemicals, textiles, pharmaceuticals, footwear, automobiles, jeeps and trucks...?

But even more rarely are solutions offered. The usual suggestions are embodied in the comments of José Honório Rodrigues:¹³³

Brazil's modest industrial exports can and must be expanded in the vast region of western Africa where our manufactured products would arrive free of colonialist, imperialist, and racist imputations. A drive to export chemical and pharmaceutical products, machinery, vehicles and accessories, rubber, wood, and mineral products, textiles and metals, sanitary articles of porcelain, and especially sewing machines and motor vehicles can help free us of dependence upon the export of primary products and accelerate our process of industrialization.

Brazilian intellectuals have not as yet worked out realistic strategies to sell in the African and Asian markets. Instead, they have preferred to construct theoretical bridges between Brazil and Africa rather than do the hard work of facing and resolving the real problems of conflict as well as expanding the areas of possible accord.

4. Brazil and Portugal

An increasingly bitter dispute has broken out within the intellectual community on Brazil's relationship to Portugal--a dispute which reflects the new concern for Africa, for Portugal and Africa can hardly be

¹³³J.H. Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, pp. 254-255.

separated as long as the old metropole holds on to her "overseas provinces."

Traditional policy was based largely on sentiment owing to the fact that aside from these considerations precious little diplomatic interaction occurred. Trade was not great and political cooperation rarely occurred. Brazilian intellectuals, during the Vargas era, for example, were left with such lofty flights of rhetoric as:¹³⁴

What characterizes the Luso-Brazilian policy is not competition but harmony, comprehension and understanding. Between us there is, perhaps more alive than in other peoples, the Christian sentiments of goodness, of tolerance, of humanity. And the world is witness to the boldness and the heroism of our race.

And:¹³⁵

.../nothing/ can...alter nor modify the unbreakable union between the old and glorious metropole and the land that was formerly the most splendid jewel from its crown and that continues to be the second home of the Lusitanian genius... The Portuguese world and Brazil never ceased to constitute only one sentimental, cultural and linguistic empire.

And finally:¹³⁶

Since the first days of independence, our foreign policy has moved between two unvarying constants--Luso-Brazilian brotherhood,

¹³⁴Pizarro Loureiro, Getúlio Vargas e a Política Luso-Brasileira, p. 157.

¹³⁵João Neves da Fontoura, Palavras aos Portugueses, pp. 25-26. From a speech given April 16, 1943 to the Federação das Associações Portuguesas do Brasil.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 138. From a speech given May 17, 1944.

source of our spiritual creation, and the commitments of defense of our hemisphere, this owing to the fact of our physical geography.

Only very occasionally in those days did a critical comment escape, and it took a sophisticated world traveler like Gilberto Amado to cast even a small doubt on the splendid Lusitanian inheritance. He felt that Brazilians needed to learn languages other than Portuguese if they were to excel in the sciences and in the major literatures.¹³⁷ Similarly, Luis Castilhos Goycochêa commented (in 1949) that although the countries do have historical ties that "cannot be destroyed by time, nor by reason," still Brazil continues to be more and more American and to look to the future while Portugal, with its traditionalist European view, continues to look back.¹³⁸

Today, the era of good feeling for Portugal is clearly over. Unqualified enthusiasm has practically disappeared since the intellectuals discovered that Luso-Brazilian interests may not coincide now that Brazil seems ready to play a larger role in world politics. Nevertheless, two broad schools of thought have developed in

¹³⁷Gilberto Amado, Espírito do Nosso Tempo (Rio de Janeiro, Ariel, Editora Ltda., 1932), pp. 79-80.

¹³⁸Luis Filipe de Castilhos Goycochêa, Dois Ensaíes (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1949), p. 42.

regard to Brazil's relationship with Portugal. Gilberto Freyre, leading one school, argues that Brazil owes its formation to Portugal and therefore, cannot deny its inheritance; J.H. Rodrigues disputes this contention, arguing that Brazil's culture is uniquely its own, its virtues not derived from the Portuguese.

Freyre asserts that Brazil's success as a civilization is attributable to the Lusitanian character. In the first place, the Portuguese demonstrated a knack for living in tropical areas an entire century before settling Brazil. Freyre suggests that this skill springs from the fact that Portugal lies suspended between Europe and Africa, belonging to neither as he explains in lush prose:¹³⁹

...with the African influence seething beneath the European and giving a sharp relish to sexual life, to alimentation, and to religion; with Moorish or Negro blood running throughout a great light-skinned mulatto population, when it is not the permanent strain, in regions that to this day are inhabited by a dark-skinned people; (sic) and with the hot and oleous air of Africa mitigating the Germanic harshness of institutions and cultural forms, corrupting the doctrinal and moral rigidity of the medieval Church, drawing the bones from Christianity, feudalism, Gothic architecture, canonic discipline, Visigoth law, the Latin tongue, and the very character of the people. It was Europe reigning without governing; it was Africa that governed.

Whatever it was, it contributed to the Portuguese success in the tropics which was not duplicated by other Europeans.

¹³⁹

Gilberto Freyre, Masters and Slaves, pp. 4-5.

Freyre cites an example of this failure when he tells of the Dutch in Brazil's Northeast. Among other things, they built houses in tropical Recife which were designed primarily to let in the sun and to keep out the snow. The Portuguese, on the other hand, adopted the veranda from the East Indies.¹⁴⁰ Other reasons for the success of the Portuguese include their attitude toward slaves--a more "suave" and humane approach which they apparently picked up from the Muslims. This, in turn, explains the Portuguese lack of racial prejudice--they simply could not ascribe superiority to a whiter skin with the advanced civilization of the dark-skinned Moors nearby. As a result, there was produced in Brazil an "ethnic and social democracy" which had already been a Portuguese tradition.¹⁴¹

José Honório Rodrigues vigorously challenges the Lusophile interpretation of Brazil's genetic background. In contrast to Freyre, Rodrigues flatly denies Portuguese adaptability in tropical areas. One area, the Hufla Plateau in Angola, is cited as proof by Freyre, but does not, according to Rodrigues, constitute a tropical area. Rather, it resembles the veldt of South Africa, which, of course,

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 26-27. See also pp. 16-18.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 104, p. 120, and p. 198.

was successfully settled by Dutchmen. Furthermore, instead of architectural adjustments to the new area, Rodrigues claims that the Portuguese plantations in Brazil and other colonies are replicas of those in Portugal and Madeira. In the real tropical areas with the exception of Brazil, the Portuguese were not notably successful.¹⁴² Furthermore, he feels that racial tolerance¹⁴³ and rapid miscegenation is not a Portuguese trait but a Brazilian one. In Africa, for example, after four centuries, the percentage of mixed bloods is less than two per cent. To Rodrigues:¹⁴⁴

The truth is that Portuguese colonization in Africa is completely alienated from the African people in its system of education, its policy, and its economics. Politically the Portuguese have little to offer, for they themselves are subject to a repressive regime.

And applying the final stroke, he asserts:¹⁴⁵

As one of the most under-developed countries in Europe, it neither formed native leadership

¹⁴²J.H. Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 112, and also p. 14. Freyre's discussion of the Hufla plateau can be found in his Aventura e Romance (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympica Editora, 1953), p. 399. See Alencastre, p. 80 on miscegenation figures.

¹⁴³Otto Maria Carpeaux more openly doubts Portuguese toleration by citing a new book of C.R. Boxer's, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415-1825 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), who in turn quotes a Governor of Angola who states: "White skin guarantees pureness of the soul." Other evidence: the Carmelites of Olinda (1686) permitted no colored in and the third order of St. Francis had the same regulation. Carpeaux, O Brasil, p. 78.

¹⁴⁴J.H. Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 270.

¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 260.

nor advanced the peoples under its domination with technology or social organization. It was unable to give because it had nothing to give. The Portuguese government believes in its colonial potency; whereas it is colonially impotent.

Finally, in regard to Brazil's success, he concludes that it could hardly be attributed to a people who had failed and are failing now elsewhere but rather should be credited to a people (that is, the Brazilians many of whom are not of Portuguese descent) that under the influence of a different environment and socio-political system became quite different from the original Portuguese settlers. He adds: "Even the Portuguese who returns to Portugal is not the same. He has bathed and been transformed in the American atmosphere."¹⁴⁶

These radically varying interpretations lead naturally to opposite policy recommendations for Portugal. An acceptance of Freyre's esteem for the Portuguese character usually results in Lusophile policies. Freyre himself argues:¹⁴⁷

...it would be idiotic for Brazil, as the potential leader of a possible confederacy of Portuguese-speaking peoples...to adopt the same indiscriminate policy of "anti-colonialism" in regard to Portuguese Africa as it is

¹⁴⁶Quote from Gilberto Amado, A Dança sobre o Abismo (Rio de Janeiro: Ariel Editora Limitada, 1932), pp. 124-125. J.H. Rodrigues cites this as evidence for this point. J.H. Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 299.

¹⁴⁷Gilberto Freyre "Misconceptions of Brazil," Foreign Affairs, April 1962, pp. 460-461.

now being followed by British and United States political leaders. Some Brazilians feel that there is a specifically Brazilian foreign policy to be followed. Most of the people of Portuguese Africa look to ethnically democratic Brazil as their natural leader--not to some sub-Nehru....

Adolpho Menezes, who shares Freyre's admiration of Portuguese genius,¹⁴⁸ also agrees that Portuguese colonialism is the "most adequate and the only one that will be able...to construct a bridge between Europe and the African volcano...."¹⁴⁹ What this means is that it would be poor form ("inconceivable" is his word) for Brazil to oppose Portugal in any international dispute in which she got involved. In fact, Brazil should immediately help the mother-country. Menezes imagines that Brazil's role eventually is "to soften, and to sweeten whatever measure--impetuous and reactionary--is taken by Portugal with relation to the peoples of Asia and Africa."¹⁵⁰ Menezes, however, even in 1955 added some

¹⁴⁸But Menezes does mention segregation is beginning to take place in the African provinces in order to attract South African tourists. Menezes, Africa, 2nd ed., p. 87.

¹⁴⁹Ibid., p. 94. He adds though that the nearness of the Boers in South Africa and the British in East Africa (written in 1955) might contaminate them. His answer is increased emigration from the Metropole, more assimilation, and a major increase in economic development. Ibid.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., p. 378. He also suggests that Brazil's involvement in Portuguese affairs would help internationalize the Brazilian mentality. He also proposes that Brazilian soldiers who were not all white could be used to help police Portuguese overseas territories. Ibid., pp. 378-379.

cautionary remarks. For example, he states:¹⁵¹

There is much love to be sure, but we have not arrived at a marriage, in a word: There is much communion between the peoples, but there does not exist yet a "Luso-Brazilian Community" between the Governments.

In addition, there are some obvious objections to a close partnership with Portugal. Why after all a union with a small country which offers no economic advantages and is repugnant to Asians and Africans? There are objections that Menezes believes must be taken into consideration by Brazil's policy makers.¹⁵²

General Antonio de Souza shares a number of Menezes' premises regarding the Community. He is impressed with the fact that it is not simply a sentimental yearning but that it is based on four centuries of cooperation. (He cites the joint struggle against the Dutch to recapture Angola.) Thus, the Community "would not be a fortuitous work of momentary convenience. ... It would not constitute itself only on an agreement among nations, but would result from...solid historical bases and worthy...

¹⁵¹Ibid., pp. 375-376. See also José Pedro Galvão de Sousa "Brasil e Portugal em Face do Despertar Afro-Asiático" Digesto Econômico, Setembro-October 1957, pp. 43-51.

¹⁵²Menezes, Africa, 1st ed., p. 376. His judgments have since become harsher. He notes some of the objectionable Portuguese labor practices in Africa and their inability to grant concessions to home rule. All in all, the Portuguese have gotten worse in the last five years and they are misusing the concept of the Luso-Brazilian concept. Furthermore, they are trying to moor Brazil to colonialism which is utterly unacceptable. See

to become a reality...."153 He recognizes the problems of such a Community. Thus while entering a far flung commonwealth would give Brazil stature, it would also involve Brazil in the problems of Goa, Macao, and the freedom movements in Africa.154 Furthermore, the Portuguese economy is weak, and although the Community would bestow privileges to its members, present trade is slight and export products between Brazil and Portugal (including her possessions) are competitive rather than complementary. But the General hopes it would open markets in Africa and Asia for Brazil's manufactured goods.155 Thus, on balance, the idea is worth trying. Meanwhile, close association with Portugal could not taint Brazil with colonialism because of its lack of imperialistic ambition, its anti-racism, and its respect for the sovereignty of other states--large and small.156

The other friendly critics of Portugal who include Roberto Campos and David Nasser believe the Portuguese

his revised edition, pp. 109-110 and pp. 353-355.

153 Antonio de Souza Junior, O Brasil e a Terceira Guerra Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1959), p. 141. For additional details of the Luso-Brazilian expedition against the Dutch in Angola see João Pandia Calogeras, A History of Brazil, trans. by Percy Alvin Martin (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1939), pp. 13-14.

154 Ibid., pp. 142-143.

155 Ibid., p. 139.

156 Ibid., pp. 144-145.

will have to free their dependencies as they did Brazil. But the transition should be made with as little bloodshed as possible in good Lusitanian tradition. Meanwhile, it is the rankest hypocrisy for Portugal to be criticized by the likes of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom with their Eastern European satellites, their Hawaiis and their Hong Kongs.¹⁵⁷ David Nasser has especially tart words for Brazilians who are hypercritical of Portugal:¹⁵⁸

These Brazilians that inveigh against Portugal are the same ones that defend Castro's Cuba.

There is not full freedom in Portugal; nevertheless it is wider than the kind of freedom that the Estado Novo gave us in Brazil. ... What I know is that we Brazilians of Vargas' generation cannot judge the Portuguese generation of Salazaar.

It should be added that even in these ranks there is a recently growing pessimism over Portugal's ability to adjust to the future. Waldir Freitas Oliveira, director of the Afro-Oriental Center of the University of Bahia, has found in Angola the growing possibility of racial violence. He stated in 1965 after a trip to the colony:¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷See Roberto Campos, Correio da Manhã, Setembro 24, 1961, and especially David Nasser, Portugal Meu Avozinho (Rio de Janeiro: Edições O Cruzeiro, 1965), pp. 16-17.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 24-25.

¹⁵⁹Waldir Freitas Oliveira, "Branços e Pretos em Angola," Afro-Asia (Bahia) No. 1 (Dezembro 1965), pp. 38-39.

Whites and blacks have an equal right to the country....I do not know if Portugal really wants to encourage the improvement of the native population of Angola to the social level of the whites. The way the Portuguese government is approaching the problem does not allow me to believe this. But even if she desires it, I am not sure she will be successful in the short time left....

There are thus few unconditional Lusophiles (in intellectual circles)¹⁶⁰ left in Brazil; but this does not mean Portugal is friendless. It simply indicates that the best she can expect is friendly criticism from the Brazilian intelligentsia.

Portugal now also gets much harsher criticism by those to whom David Nasser has already referred. Foremost in this group is José Honório Rodrigues. From his historically revisionist position on the nature of the Portuguese character stems a bitter polemic against any Brazilian sympathy for a Luso-Brazilian Community. Of this there can be no doubt when he charges:¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰Carlos Lacerda may be an exception. In a speech to the New York Cuban exile colony (October 15, 1961) he labels the Angolan revolutionaries as aggressors (along with their foreign benefactors) and leaves the decision making entirely to Portugal. The fact that the overseas territories are not contiguous is no argument since the distance from Lisbon to the African provinces is no further than from Washington to Honolulu. Lacerda, O Poder das Ideias, p. 293.

¹⁶¹J.H. Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 293.

Our relations with Portugal constitute a history of claims, protests, and difficulties that seem more like a list of grievances than a community of interests.

In the same vein is Paulo Duarte's attack on the "sentimentalist" notion that Brazil was a "province" and not a colony. It was a colony, he asserts, and Portugal's sole purpose was "to exploit the wealth, to impede the development of agriculture, industry and commerce, and, at the same time, to transform the Brazilians into mere slaves..."¹⁶²

So much for the past: as far as the present is concerned Rodrigues for one has equally passionate views:¹⁶³

...The grandiose plans of the Portuguese to press us into service are not purely the product of megalomaniac imagination; they are the result of that anachronistic thinking in support of the Community which gives first importance to Portugal and considers the Community indestructible because it is founded on a blood relationship re-enforced by four centuries of affection and communion. They are the result, too, of the thinking that holds we must never assume attitudes that are contrary to the old country or restrict the liberty with which it confuses its interests and ours.

In short, the Community concept is based, purely and simply, on sheer sentiment while foreign policy (to quote Palmerston) is based on national interest.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶²Paulo Duarte "Colonialismo Portugues," Anhembi (Rio de Janeiro), No. 115 (Junho 1960), pp. 134-135.

¹⁶³J.H. Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 295.

¹⁶⁴José Honório Rodrigues then favorably comments on the US-UK relationship which is close but unsentimental

The most damaging aspect of a Community relationship, of course, is the impact on Africa:¹⁶⁵

We cannot approach Africa arm in arm with Salazar. This would compromise us irremediably, not only with Portuguese Africa, but with all the new African nations, and our legitimate interest lies in seeing them free and prosperous; (for if present economic European predominance continues, so will greater competition for our products, without the industrial exchange that we are able to initiate free of colonialist, imperialist and racist restrictions.

What the Lusophobes want is independence of action vis-a-vis Portugal in regard to the latter's African territories. They are certain that, given a free hand, Brazil could gain much through direct contact.¹⁶⁶

Alvaro Lins, former ambassador to Portugal, recommends opening direct commercial and cultural relations with all the Portuguese colonies since Brazilians "are the legitimate heirs and natural substitutes of Portugal... once the countries achieve independence."¹⁶⁷ Lins recommends no further Brazilian contacts but he notes that not even these first steps have been taken.

with both parties retaining their freedom. Ibid., p. 298.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., p. 308. A sentiment which is shared by Eduardo Portella, Africa: Colonos e Cumplice, pp. 127-128.

¹⁶⁶Maria Archer, for example, contends: "To its people, in constant warfare against Salazarist colonialism, Brazil is considered a paragon of freedom, a socio-political polarization that fascinates them. And Brazil ignores them." Maria Archer, Brasil: Fronteira da África (São Paulo: Editora Felman-Aego, 1963), p. 5.

¹⁶⁷Alvaro Lins, Missão em Portugal (Rio de

Amilcar Alencastre probably best summarizes the Lusophobe attitudes:¹⁶⁸

Salazar's Portugal is a fascist regime; Salazar's Portugal has engaged in a disloyal competition with Brazil with the products from its colonies. ...Portugal is a tough negotiator that doesn't give any concessions to Brazil.

...As everyone knows, among the ancient Latin American universities, no one can include a single Brazilian university, and this, thanks to Portugal.

Today's Brazil is the exclusive work of Brazilian labor, of intelligence, of suffering and of spirit which arose because of antagonism to Portugal.

It is very clear that Brazil's intellectuals are badly split on the problem of Portugal. But it is also clear that those intellectuals who still feel warmly disposed to Portugal in some ways are not prepared to give her unstinting praise. All in some respects are critical. It is a matter of whether the criticism is that of the root and branch variety or whether it sees some redeemable features in the Lusitanian character. What Brazilian intellectuals of today are not prepared to do is give Portugal the almost fawning and sentimental tokens of affection that once were so fashionable.

5. Relations with the Soviet Bloc

Brazilian diplomacy has in the past had minimum

Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1960), pp. 275-276.

¹⁶⁸Alencastre, pp. 83-85.

contact with the Communist states. It was not until World War II at the height of the Allied esprit that Brazil established relations with the U.S.S.R. But this was a short lived arrangement ending in October 1947 when the Dutra government broke diplomatic relations, ostensibly over an insult to Brazil in a Soviet journal, but really stemming from activities of the local Brazilian Communist Party.¹⁶⁹ Relations remained in this state of suspended animation for almost 15 years. And the intellectuals remained quiet for nearly as long.

The latter days of the Kubitschek Administration with its development ethos stimulated a debate on new approaches to the Socialist Bloc, especially in regard to trade relations. Oswaldo Costa, editor of the radical left weekly O Seminário, provided the political rationale for expanding commercial ties. He argued that Brazil must trade with everyone: Communists, fascists, capitalists, because it is dangerous for one's sovereignty to depend on one market or one bloc of nations. He then added that Machiavellian note so often encountered in the neutralist literature:¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ José Maria Bello, A History of Modern Brazil (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966), trans. by James L. Taylor, p. 306 and p. 314.

¹⁷⁰ Oswaldo Costa "Relações com os Países Socialistas," O Seminário, Janeiro 2, 1958. Quoted in Adalgis Nery, Antologia Nacionalista: Brasileiros contra Brasil

...we ought to know how to play with the antagonists that oppose themselves, profiting from their contradictions of the moment to our unique and exclusive benefit. We cannot give the privilege of monopolizing our consumer market and dictating prices without competition to anyone...

Political objections have been raised of course to Soviet trade because of the possibility of its opening a floodgate of subversion and espionage. Fausto Bradeco, for one, charges that resuming economic and political relations with the Soviets would be "nothing but a trampoline, a legal means to introduce subversive ideas...."¹⁷¹ Furthermore, he argues against all contact with the Communist world: "It is through expositions, ballet and folklore groups, science, art and other things that innumerable nations on many continents, have been infiltrated, enslaved and deceived...."¹⁷²

There have been several replies advanced by the "pro-Soviet" intellectuals to these political objections. Costa unquestioningly accepts Russia's claims that it is willing to trade with the lesser developed countries "without getting any advantage, without wanting profits, nor privileges, nor raw materials" and "without asking that they participate in any bloc, that they change their

(São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1958), pp. 202-208; p. 205.

¹⁷¹ Fausto Bradesco, O Reatamento Econômico com a União Soviética (Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1962), p. 14.

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 25.

governments or modify their internal or external policy."¹⁷³ Others are a bit more sophisticated. Freire, for example, states that increased trade is vital, and the threat must be minimal since the United States, Western Europe and small, weak Uruguay all have trade and diplomatic relations with Russia.¹⁷⁴ Oswaldo Aranha also adds the argument that recognition carries no note of approval for the regime. Thus democratic Switzerland maintained relations with Nazi Germany, and so did Brazil with Peronist Argentina.¹⁷⁵ And he concluded: "Unfortunately we live in a world that is not molded according to our preferences..., but we must learn to confront its tragic reality without fear."¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, even granting that the Soviets are imperialistic, so at various times were the French, the Germans, and the Japanese; Brazil has traded with them all.

¹⁷³ Stated by Rachidov Charaf Rachidovitch, Chief Soviet Delegate to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 207-208.

¹⁷⁴ Dorian Jorge Freire, "Relações Brasil-União Soviética" Revista Brasiliense (Janeiro-Febrero, 1960), pp. 134-136.

¹⁷⁵ Oswaldo Aranha "Relações com a União Soviética," RBPI (Junho 1958), p. 21.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 20.

Imperialism, in short, is not transmitted by trade.¹⁷⁷

One final political note is sounded by Brazilian intellectuals. Some would approach the matter of trade with Russia as a test of national maturity since "the Brazilian people require that the Country reach adulthood and assume in the Concert of Europe and modern nations a position of detachment to escape from political provincialism... (a provincialism) that does not offer advantages to Brazil and attends only to the interests of well identified economic-financial groups."¹⁷⁸

The purely commercial aspects of trade with the Socialists have not been overlooked. Already in 1957 before any official contacts were made, Osmy Duarte Pereira outlined these exciting prospects:¹⁷⁹

If we wanted to have recourse to triangular operations with the USSR, Czechoslovakia,

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 231.

¹⁷⁸ Freire, "Relações Brasil-União Soviética" Revista Brasiliense, pp. 134-136.

¹⁷⁹ Osny Duarte Pereira "Invitemos os EEUU, Ampliando Nosso Comércio com os Países Socialistas" Novembre 21, 1957. Reprinted in Nery, Brasileiros Contra Brasil, pp. 153-154. In substantial agreement is Celso Barroco in "As Nossas Relações e o Real Interesse de Nosso Povo" Revista Brasiliense, Janeiro-Febrero, 1961, pp. 114-127. He adds that trade prospects, especially in coffee, are excellent because of the Soviet government's campaign against alcoholic beverages, "substituting for them according to declarations... a stimulating and non-prejudicial drink to its people." p. 127.

Rumania, Poland, or even to widen direct bartering with these last countries, the possibilities would become unlimited. It is sufficient to say that Poland offered to exchange a steel mill for minerals... By the same manner, we would acquire electric stations from the USSR; tire factories from Czechoslovakia; refineries and petroleum probes from Rumania; ...And enhance in 1,000 other ways the exchange of products...

The basis, of course, is the size of the socialist bloc-- a billion or so individuals--which Brazil has yet to tap.¹⁸⁰

The intellectual critics of renewed relations with the Communists have been fewer in number. Again it is Carlos Lacerda who is nearly alone in sounding the alarm:¹⁸¹

/Under/ the pretext of independence...the error of confiding in Russia as a supplier of capital and technical assistance will be repeated, despite the lessons that Nasser learned at his own expense... Without submission to Russia, there is no collaboration with Russia.

David Nasser, too, can occasionally deliver an emotional, not to say Churchillian, blast against the Kremlin:¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰J.R. Vasconcellos "Um Caminho Certo e Pacifico para o Progresso do Brasil" Revista Brasiliense, No. 36, 1961, pp. 126-131.

¹⁸¹Carlos Lacerda from an interview published in Manchete, Março, 1964. Reprinted in C. Lacerda, Palavras e Ação (Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1965), pp. 181-182. He is supported in his political arguments although less resoundingly by Guimarães, Política Exterior do Brasil, pp. 78-81. Regarding agents and infiltrators see Pedro Colombo, Quem Faz a Revolução No Brasil (São Paulo: L. Martins Editora, 1964), especially pp. 30-33.

¹⁸²David Nasser, A Revolução que Se Perdeu a Si Mesma: Diário de um Reporter (Rio de Janeiro: Edições o

Brazil is not going to be in South America the second and biggest Soviet conquest in the world. We are going to fight in each province, on each fazenda, in each city, in each barrio, in each highway, in each street; but we are not going to allow these puppets, manipulated by hands in Peking and Moscow, to transform us into a new Red China--a Red China in the flanks of the United States...

Sometimes economic problems are cited as hindrances to Brazilian trade with the Soviet bloc. José Testa points out, for example, that in 55 years of Brazilian trade with Eastern Europe (1902-1957) less trade was actually carried out than in one year with small countries like Denmark and Holland. Statistically, all of Eastern Europe in 1956 imported 204,000 sacks of coffee while Norway imported 368,000 sacks and Denmark 522,000 sacks. He thus implies that traditional trade patterns are not likely to change much, and that emphasis on new trade partners will cause neglect of old and tested customers. Senhor Testa also argues that Brazil, in selling coffee to the USSR, has no guarantee that the Soviets would not resell the coffee at lower prices to Brazil's clients. In conclusion he states:¹⁸³

Cruzeiro, 1965), p. 248. Nasser, although anti-Communist, is not a crude simplistic one. See his tart remarks directed at Admiral Carlos Penna Botta, for example, (author of A Política Externa Desastrosa de Jânio Quadros), pp. 56 and p. 107. For another naive anti-Communist tract see Antenor Santos de Oliveira, Voce Conhece o Comunismo? Mas Conhece Mesmo? (São Paulo: Editora ASO, n.d.). The author has also written a novel, short stories, natural history and children's books.

¹⁸³ José Testa, "Cinco Milhões Sacas de Café para a Rússia" Digesto Econômico, Março-Abril, 1959, p. 108.

We are suspicious. Other countries, more established politically and more diversified commercially will have their reasons.

David Nasser is even more blunt. The much ballyhooed trade with the Soviet Union has not yet justified the expense of keeping up trade missions. Meanwhile, Brazil is ignoring the real problems of African competition and EEC trade barriers. "It is," he charges, "an international policy of the rarest imbecility."¹⁸⁴ Whether it is or not, increased contacts with the Socialist bloc is a policy favored by a wide range of Brazilian intellectuals while opponents often only recommend caution rather than flat prohibition of all relations.

6. How Effective are the Intellectuals
and What is Their Role in the Future?

There are many factors hindering the effectiveness of Brazilian intellectuals in influencing foreign policy. First, as has been noted, is their recent interest in the subject. They simply have not concerned themselves with foreign policy long enough to be taken seriously by the actual foreign policy-makers. Second, the intellectuals themselves have been badly split along most of the issues which they confront. Third, it has been shown that in the past they have followed the leads

¹⁸⁴Nasser, A Revolução, pp. 93-94.

given by such leaders as Getúlio Vargas and Jânio Quadros and have not provided fresh ideas for these leaders. Fourth, owing to their inexperience, Brazilian intellectuals have tended to be somewhat impractical in their schemes, a characteristic of Brazilians in general,¹⁸⁵ thus they have not proposed much that is useful for the policy-maker even should he be sympathetic to the policy. Fifth, interest in foreign policy tends to be rather ephemeral. Since the 1964 revolution, for example, intellectuals have shown a marked decrease in their commentary on international affairs. This is in part because intellectuals have been harassed and have sometimes opted for "voluntary" exile, but the many who remained and continued to publish did not concern themselves with foreign policy. There were domestic problems that needed tending to and the boomlet in foreign policy studies faded like so many other intellectual fashions.

All of these factors add up to a rather dismal estimate of the importance of intellectuals. Yet this picture would be overdrawn if left at that. Intellectuals did play some role, especially in the years from 1960-1964. Because of the scarcity of these men and because of the lack of a solid public opinion to rely on,

¹⁸⁵ See Chapter II, p. 18.

policy-makers were sometimes influenced by the intellectuals. The nationalists, particularly since they were both shrill and persistent, could give the appearance that they represented the voice of Brazil. The pressure that they exerted kept wary administrations rather faithful in their pursuit of investment policies which were within the bounds that these intellectuals had outlined. No doubt Quadros' policy toward Africa was also sustained by the outpouring of intellectual enthusiasm that generally attended it. And certainly the remarkable shift away from pure Lusophile attitudes made by most Brazilian intellectuals in part made possible the new, more skeptical attitude toward the Portuguese. Thus, although their role is limited, it has not been entirely impotent.

As for the future, this, of course, is difficult to estimate. The suspicion is that with growing improvement of the educational system, intellectuals may play a gradually increasing role. It is likely that they will gain stature as they become more veteran commentators as well. However, their role will continue to be limited by their lack of unity, lack of originality and impractical outlook if these characteristics continue. The role, in short, will be concomitant with the responsibility and sophistication that they bring to the task.

CHAPTER IV

PRESSURE GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Interest in foreign policy outside of the small group of policy makers themselves is, in effect, a bossa nova in Brazil.¹ In the last decade, however, it is not only the intellectuals who have acquired a stake in the foreign policy process. In fact, a whole universe of interest groups have either turned to influencing foreign policy or have specifically organized to affect Brazil's international position. For convenience, they have each been labelled a "pressure group" and can be defined loosely as a shared-attitude group that makes "claims through or upon any of the institutions of government,"² that is, the President or the Foreign Ministry in our case.³ A loose definition to be sure, but deliberately so for it must accommodate "foreign policy groups" which range from the Communist Party to the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Despite the diversity, they are included under one general heading because they all make claims on the policy makers

¹It can be argued that it barely predates the dance's appearance in 1958.

²David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 37. Pp. 33-39 deal extensively with definitions.

³On occasions they may be directed at the military. See chapter 5, "The Military & Foreign Policy."

constitutionally appointed to make and execute foreign policy.

The diversity nevertheless is unwieldy, and therefore the foreign policy pressure groups have been subdivided for purposes of discussion. The first are the economic groups, whose principal function is to represent the economic interests of business and labor. Next are the ideological groups--students, anti-communist leagues, self-styled nationalist "frentes"--whose main purpose is to agitate for measures pretty much divorced from their immediate economic interests. Thirdly, there are the "institutional groups,"⁴ whose chief purpose is not political but who are involved in policy questions incidental to their main tasks. The clearest example is the Roman Catholic Church.

Economic Pressure Groups

The recent and rapid growth of Brazil's industrial sector no doubt accounts for the parallel increase in economic groups, especially in business associations. As part of the new economic elite, they have naturally taken a deep interest in politics. The policies involved, however, have been only those that immediately affect

⁴See Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), especially George Blanksten's essay on Latin America, pp. 455-531.

their economic interests. This has meant a notable absence of deep interest in foreign policy as such. Nevertheless, foreign policy does intrude now and then, especially when it has economic overtones; moreover, the interest in international policy seems to be increasing steadily.

Among the major commercial and manufacturing associations, three have been most concerned with foreign policy. Perhaps the most active group is the Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI), an association of large manufacturers whose headquarters is in São Paulo. This organization has branches throughout Brazil but the presidency and executive council are dominated by Paulistas.

The CNI has a long history (for Brazil) of promoting economic nationalism. In the 1940s the CNI, led by a group of its young research economists, opposed the concept of "balanced development" through orthodox fiscal and monetary policies advocated by government economists. Instead, they favored a rapid if not forced industrialization with a corollary lack of concern over the resultant inflation. Thus during the Kubitschek administration, the CNI vigorously supported the regime's industrialization plan.⁵ This tradition of strong economic nationalism, coupled with a focus on development,

⁵See Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 72, p. 89, and p. 168. Also see the first issue of Desenvolvimento e Conjuntura, the organ of the CNI, (São Paulo), No. 1 (Julho, 1957).

propelled the CNI into a concern for foreign influence on development, and eventually into a concern for foreign influence on development, and eventually into a concern for foreign policy in general. The earliest involvement was over Brazil's economic relations with the industrial west, especially the United States. Regarding foreign investment, the CNI espoused a highly pragmatic approach. Its spokesman argued that since the great problem of underdeveloped countries remained a lack of savings, any addition to national savings was good, including foreign investment. There was one major qualification, however. Outside capital should in no way be used to the detriment of Brazilian enterprise--a major caveat indeed since any serious competition from foreign owned firms could be construed as "detrimental."⁶

The CNI also offered its own conclusions regarding President Kubitschek's major foreign policy innovation--A Operacao Panamericana. Domestic response had been either an independent but luke-warm and passive acceptance, or the claque-like applause from members of the Presidential circle. The CNI, perhaps uniquely, carved out its own position. It pointed out the indifference with which the OPA was met, both in Brazil and in the United States and Europe. It also pointed

⁶Ibid., Editorial, "Bases de uma Política para o Desenvolvimento" pp. 5-15. Also Editorial, "A Nova Política Econômica: Uma Tentativa de Avaliação" Desenvolvimento Conjuntura, Janeiro, 1965, pp. 3-6.

out that the Operação was launched in the aftermath of the Nixon trip, primarily because that seemed the best opportunity to make an impact on the American government. President Kubitschek and his advisors had no specific ideas in mind at the time--it was a problem of getting the attention of the United States first, then worrying over possible pragmatic content.⁷ Despite this unflattering version of the OPA, a CNI spokesman has called it "a flag ... that will defend Latin America against the traditional practice of financial palliatives ... and bilateral accords."⁸

Later, during the early years of the Alliance for Progress, the CNI presented its own analysis of the United States' aid program. It came in response to the repeated charge of the Brazilian left that the Alliance was really a tool of American industry, used to introduce American goods at low prices and thus to capture new markets and, incidentally, to destroy Brazilian enterprise. In the first place, the CNI agreed that opening new markets would solve the problems of certain American industries and that these industries were trying to get the Alliance to bail them out of difficulty.

⁷Editorial, "As Possibilidades da OPA" Desenvolvimento Conjuntura, Setembro, 1960, pp. 7-15. This journal is identified on its title page as an official organ of the CNI.

⁸Ibid., p. 14.

But the CNI also added, "... micro-decisions of firms are subordinated to the macro-decisions of the American government."⁹ This means that the chief interest of the United States government is the development of Latin America and the consequent denial of the area to the Communists rather than the salvation of American industry. The CNI, nevertheless, indicated some concerns of its own over the Alliance. A major problem involves the threat to the Brazilian capital goods industry (which grew up in a period of exchange shortages) by Alliance financing of imported capital goods. The latter's sales can be financed on easy terms which the domestic industry cannot easily match. The result is that Brazilians would be using foreign exchange to buy American equipment already produced in Brazil. Although the CNI wished to blame no one, it did propose an Alliance fund to finance sales of Brazilian capital equipment, and added:¹⁰

... within a general planning of the Brazilian economy it is not difficult to detect and to neutralize the eventual pernicious effects of massive foreign financing.

In the CNI's comments on American policy, the United States has only been slightly touched, a

⁹Editorial, "A Aliança para o Progresso e o Dumping" Desenvolvimento Conjuntura, Maio, 1962, p. 3.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 6

surprising silence from such an avowed nationalistic group. The CNI, however, has been less charitable toward Western Europe, especially the members of the EEC. It has long considered the Community a "severe threat" to the foreign trade position of Latin America, especially Brazil. The chief irritant has been the Common Market's discriminatory trade policies favoring former African possessions--policies which affect some 35-40% of Brazil's exports.¹¹ This threat, according to the CNI, has legitimately spurred Brazilians to replace trade losses in Western Europe with new markets in Eastern Europe.¹²

The whole question of relations with the Socialist bloc, of course, has been immensely controversial in Brazil. The CNI joined the debate early and insisted on discussing the problem without recourse to ideological fervor. In response to a trade accord signed in the Kubitschek administration, it expressed approval, and added:¹³

The meaning of this act is obviously not in the initial volume of trade, but it does represent ... an opening for the Brazilian economy with a market of large potential.

¹¹For example, see "O Mercado Comum Europeu" Desenvolvimento Conjuntura, Outubro, 1962, pp. 47-56.

¹²"Resultados e Perspectivas de Pagamentos do Brasil com Países Socialistas" Desenvolvimento Conjuntura, Julho, 1963, pp. 16-22.

¹³"O Comércio com a Rússia" Desenvolvimento Conjuntura, Janeiro, 1960, pp. 67-72. See also "Política de Comércio com a 'Cortina de Ferro'" Desenvolvimento

Considering the strong concentration of Brazil's foreign trade, in which 80% of exports are composed of some three or four products sent to a half-dozen markets, the initiation of direct exchange with the Soviet economy shows, therefore, a manifestation of a renovating current in our trade policy.

Thus the CNI continued its foreign policy advice on the Socialist bloc with the same straight-forward what's-good-for-Brazilian-development criterion it applied to other countries.

This criterion is also apparent in its position on the Afro-Asian countries. In a press interview the Director of CNI, Newton Pereira, urged closer ties with Asia and Africa in order to meet the ambitious goal of doubling the volume of Brazil's foreign trade in five years.¹⁴ He thus supported the Quadros approach to Africa:¹⁵

...Brazil, upon adopting recently an independent position in the face of colonialism, laid the bases of a lucid approach to the African people. With this new policy, not only correct in principle, it has created the possibility of a useful understanding in the economic realm with the independent African peoples.

The endorsement of anti-colonialism by the CNI also leads it to the problem of Portugal. It has never used the rhetoric of Luso-Brazilian friendship, that is,

Conjuntura, Junho, 1962, pp. 47-56.

¹⁴Quoted in Política e Negócio, 10 Setembro, 1962, p. 44.

¹⁵"O Pan-Americanismo, Sua Evolução e o Brasil" Desenvolvimento Conjuntura, Maio, 1962, pp. 62-71. p. 71.

Brazilian support of Portugal in Africa, but has assumed eventual independence for the Portuguese colonies, and a consequent Brazilian responsibility for keeping them viable.¹⁶

Thus, the CNI over the last decade has managed to endorse or criticize Brazilian foreign policy on a wide range of subjects. It was an early supporter of economic nationalism, and in recent years this has led the CNI to take a position on foreign policy questions. Toward the United States the CNI has generally been favorable though cautious, while the European Common Market is regarded with deep suspicion. Trade with Eastern Europe and Afro-Asia is encouraged. There is no real ideological commitment to any bloc of nations on the part of CNI, but rather there is a simple economic calculus which favors any policy that will increase trade and promote development.

The CNI, of course, is not alone among business groups in offering its views on foreign policy. Another Sao Paulo based group--the Confederação Nacional do Comércio--is also concerned although its efforts are less pronounced. In general, it presents a more cautious line

¹⁶See "Algumas Reflexões sobre a África" Desenvolvimento Conjuntura, Outubro, 1962, pp. 57-63. Also "Visão Panorâmica e Análise Crítica do Ano de 1961" Desenvolvimento Conjuntura, Fevereiro, 1962, pp. 86-95.

and unlike CNI cannot be identified with the earlier economic nationalism in Brazil.¹⁷ It thus has given unqualified support for foreign investment:¹⁸

...recently, we sustained a struggle without quarter against the various proposals inspired by Jacobin ideas which are trying to reduce drastically the rights of foreign capital--in particular in regard to repatriation of profits.

This is the position of principle invariably taken by CNC since its foundation 20 years ago until the present.

A second foreign policy concern has been that of trade relations with the Soviet Union. Its attitudes are somewhat ambivalent. During the early 1960s when the issue was most widely debated, the President of CNC, Charles Edgar Moritz, reported after a trip to Communist China:¹⁹

As a businessman...I undertook the long trip as a public service, aiming at gathering, with impartiality and practicality, elements that might permit us to reach an opinion about the trade problems that constituted the object of the mission.

¹⁷In fact regular contributors to the monthly publication of its Technical Council, Carta Mensal, like Eugenio Gudin, Octavio Bulhões and Glycon de Paiva are economists of the neo-liberal school which the CNI in the past has criticized.

¹⁸CNC Mensário, editorial, Abril 1966, p. 1. See also Herculano Borges da Fonseca "Política do Capital Estrangeiro" a speech given August 13, 1964 at the weekly meeting of the CNC Technical Council, printed in Carta Mensal, Setembro 1964. Nevertheless CNC did protest Guanabara's Governor Sette Camara's scheme to finance two Hilton Hotels with Brazilian banks. CNC claimed it was unfair to Brazilian enterprise. Jornal do Brasil, Maio 18, 1960, p. 9.

¹⁹Charles Edgar Moritz, "Impressões de uma

This attitude of fairmindedness gave an objective tone to a report nearly devoid of ideological considerations. Although he remarked that as a Christian, a democrat, and an entrepreneur, he saw nothing to change his convictions, he added that Brazil must adopt an aggressive trade policy in these Eastern markets.²⁰ Later, in May of 1962, the CNC executive council issued a press release urging a sharp increase in trade through an extension of the one year accords to five years. The CNC then appeared to concur with the CNI, at least on economic relations with the Communist countries.²¹

The CNC has broached one more foreign policy question: Brazil's relations with Africa. Again, the issue has been considered strictly from an economic point of view. The CNC has used anti-colonialist rhetoric, but while no support for Portugal has been announced, it has not been condemned either. Portugal is simply

Viagem ao Leste" Carta Mensal, Setembro, 1961, pp. 25-31, p. 25.

²⁰Ibid., p. 31. See also his statement to the press supporting the trade mission to the Chinese Peoples Republic in Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 8, 1961, p. 9.

²¹There is room for dissent in the CNC, however. The CNC monthly journal, Carta Mensal, published in July an article by a CNC economist, Oswaldo Benjamin de Azevedo, criticizing trade relations with the East. On economic grounds he argues that the amount of trade potential is small, that the countries involved do not purchase Brazilian goods with hard currencies, and that the choice of Socialist goods is limited. In conclusion, he adds a political note by quoting Lenin's "the day that the capitalist world begins doing business with us, it will initiate the financing of its own destruction." See Carta Mensal, Julho, 1962, pp. 21-36, p. 36.

not mentioned in this context.²²

In a straight forward (and thorough) fashion it has dealt with the problem of trade possibilities on the dark continent. The CNC Mensário, for example, published a report written in cooperation with Itamarati's African division. After offering some hope for increased trade with Africa, it proceeds to detail some significant degree of non-complementarity between the economies. Both compete in coffee, cacao, manganese, and iron. Nevertheless, Brazil can import African oil, copper, aluminum, natural rubber and other primary products which amount to some \$250 million in the Brazilian balance of trade. More important, Brazil's export prospects are even brighter. It can export manufactured and semi-manufactured goods including processed foodstuffs. There is, however, another problem. African trade is now monopolized by European import-export firms which assures the former metropole continued advantages. In addition, the EEC trade preferential area, covering 18 African countries and giving Common Market products a distinct advantage, impedes Brazilian trade. An even greater restriction

²²The single instance in which Portuguese Africa is mentioned deals with possible trade arrangements for Angolan oil. In CNC Mensário, Julho-Agosto, 1966, pp. 33-35. A letter written to Foreign Minister Juracy Magalhaes from Cunha Bueno, a federal deputy and member of the CNC.

to trade is the fragile nature of the economies of the new African states; low purchasing power, and scarcity of exchange for imports are universal except in the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and the Congo, Leopoldville. Finally, independent Africa has sparked East and West trade interest and the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan are adding to the competition difficulties.

The report concludes that even with these restrictions trade is possible with Nigeria, the Congo, Senegal, and East Africa. But the tone is clear: it does not indulge in fantasies that list Brazil's great advantages in Africa because of its racial democracy. This sober, matter-of-fact, if not gloomy, analysis of trade prospects, the CNC--Itamarati report, is concluded with a number of very practical suggestions to exporters, including the following: the quoting of prices in dollars, pounds, or francs rather than cruzeiros, the sending of permanent Brazilian representatives to avoid dependence on metropole firms, and the entering of trade fairs and exhibitions in African cities. It adds finally: "...Brazil, despite being considered sympathetically, is nearly unknown in the African countries."²³

The CNC then seems even more narrowly concerned with economic questions in foreign policy than does the

²³ CNC Mensario, Janeiro-Febrero, 1965, pp. 47-52, p. 52. See also Paul Cocito, "Missão Comercial Brasileira a África Ocidental" CNC Mensário, Janeiro, 1966, pp. 13-57.

CNI. The CNC has no roots in economic nationalism and is more enthusiastic in its support for foreign investment. Economic relations with the Soviet bloc are also favored. The CNC's approach to Africa is a wary one, not on political grounds, but on practical considerations. In general, the policies of the CNC are more deliberate and more cautious than those of the CNI.

The last major business group, the Confederacao das Associações Comerciais is the oldest trade association in Brazil. It also is the most conservative in its outlook. The original Associação Comercial was founded in Rio de Janeiro by the Baron de Iboioca in 1901. During the next five decades other members were added throughout Brazil. By 1961, the original parent association was changed to the Confederação das Associações Comerciais (CAC). It was hoped that this move toward "decentralization," that is, freedom from control by the Associação Comercial in Rio would allow more effective handling of local problems.²⁴ Nevertheless, the decision making on national (including, of course, foreign) policy is still very much in the hands of the parent association in Rio. This is insured by the CAC's tradition of having as its president

²⁴See the Confederation's organ, Revista das Classes Produtores (RCP), Junho, 1964, pp. 63-64 and "Criada a Confederação das Associações Comerciais" RCP, Setembro, 1963, p. 24.

the elected president of the Rio Association.²⁵ The presidential election, incidentally, is never a contested affair. The candidate is selected by the current president, his vice-presidents, and the executive council from their own number. In such fashion is the iron law of oligarchy observed.²⁶

The Associação Comercial, too, has taken a position on a wide number of foreign policy questions. On foreign investment it criticized the Goulart regime for seeking legislation that restricted the remittance of profits.²⁷ When those restrictions were removed by Castello Branco, the Associação's President Rui Gomes de Almeida was enthusiastic:²⁸

The courageous and patriotic attitude of your Excellency, deaf to the complaints of professional demagogues and monopolistic groups, will certainly represent the re-initiation of foreign participation in national development, a collaboration that without doubt will mean, above all, bigger and better possibilities of employment for Brazilian workers...

In addition, the Associação Comercial has been

²⁵Editorial, "Continuadade de Pensamento e Rumos na Sucessão da Casa de Mauá" Revista das Classes Produtores, Maio, 1965, pp. 8-9.

²⁶While, of course, the Association leadership calls this method "indisputably democratic," it also recognizes (more realistically) that such continuismo avoids a "clash of antagonisms" and, more important, provides continuity in policy. Ibid., p. 8.

²⁷Reported in Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 23, 1962, p. 3.

²⁸Revista das Classes Produtores, Setembro, 1964, pp. 10-11.

gratuitously pro-American in sentiment. An editorial of the Associação on the death of John Kennedy exemplifies this:²⁹

Kennedy was the atlas who sustained on his shoulders the Free World...he struggled with the weight of the problems that agitate the peoples still free of the Communist yoke.

His memory and his example ought to be engraved like letters on bronze on the minds of Brazilians that love freedom - the freedom that he so loved and defended - so that we do not fall asleep for an instant in the defense of our democratic institutions.

And the editorial on Lyndon Johnson's 1965 inaugural address compares the generosity and pacifist sentiments of the United States with threats of Communist leaders against the Western world.³⁰

Anti-Soviet sentiment, in addition, is not limited to comparisons favorable to the West. On the issue of Brazilian relations with the Soviet bloc, the Associação Comercial has not agreed with the CNI or CNC. In regard to trade relations, there has clearly been internal debate. One member of the executive council, José Luis de Oliveira, opposed, for example, trade with the Chinese Peoples Republic.³¹ Another member, João

²⁹ Revista das Classes Produtoras, Dezembro, 1963, pp. 10-11.

³⁰ Revista das Classes Produtoras, Janeiro, 1965, pp. 6-7.

³¹ Revista das Classes Produtoras, Abril, 1961, p. 39. Opinion stated at an Executive Council session March 1, 1961.

Alberto Leite Barbosa, revealed that the Soviet Union made millions of dollars by buying Cuban³² sugar at a fixed low price, and then selling it at inflated world prices. Barbosa concluded:³³

The major exploiter of the world continues to be the USSR, /and/ we ought to take note of this since so many discern exploitation ends in the cooperation existing between Brazil and our allies of the Western world.

On the other hand, more official opinion within the Associação through the editorial page of the Revista das Classes Produtores, has given very cautious approval to establishing limited trade agreements without giving authorization for the expansion of these accords.³⁴

On the issue of diplomatic recognition, the Associação Comêrcial was adamant. It utterly opposed any resumption of relations with the Soviet Union. In one editorial it argued that maintaining diplomatic relations

³²Fidel Castro has been called "The Mussolini of the Antilles" in an editorial in Revista das Classes Produtores, Maio, 1961, p. 4.

³³Revista das Classes Produtores, Julho, 1963, p. 28. From an Executive Council session June 26, 1963.

³⁴See, for example, "Editorial Missão João Dantas e Conjuntura Internacional," RCP, Julho 1961, p. 1, and RCP, Agosto 1961, p. 72, for a speech of Raul de Goes "A Margem do Intercâmbio Brasil--URSS." Goes besides a federal deputy is a longtime member of the Associação's Executive Council and editor of RCP.

would be a threat to Brazil's national security. In reply to the argument that even the anti-Communist United States maintains contact, the editorial argues that while there is no climate for Communism in the United States, favorable conditions do exist in Brazil.³⁵ In short, the Associação recognizes at best a limited degree of commercial relations with the Soviet bloc, but opposes any broadening of that contact.

While expressions of policy toward the Soviet Union by the Association's leadership are fairly common, attitudes toward Africa or the Third World clearly are not. In fact, exactly one reference to black, sub-saharan Africa has been found. This sole selection nevertheless is intrinsically interesting in revealing the attitude of the Associação Comercial. At the weekly meeting of the Executive Council (March 1965), Leopoldino Miranda Freire gave an account of his contacts with the Foreign Ministry and some business groups who were engaged in the joint planning of a trade mission to sub-saharan Africa, scheduled for the following month. Senhor Freire, slated to be a member of that mission, then gave a bleak account of trade prospects. In the first place, he spoke of the troubles of the trade mission itself--for example, the lack of preparation. Sample: its

³⁵"Democracia em Perigo," RCP, Dezembro, 1961, p. 1.

members while enthusiastic over the idea of offering Brazilian manufactured goods, had given no thought to imports from Africa.³⁶ Although, even if they had, it would not make much difference according to Leopoldino Freire. Nearly all African products of interest to the Brazilian importer, it was pointed out, can be gotten from LAFTA members on more favorable terms. As a final touch, the speaker noted that the facilities that the Brazilian government had set up to finance the export of capital goods to Africa through the African development bank had awakened no interest among its members.³⁷ A singularly discouraging report indeed--and from a member of a trade mission which had yet to leave for Africa! The contrast between this and the CNI's enthusiasm over independent Africa is obvious and need not be belabored.

At the same time, the Associação Comercial is unabashedly pro-Portuguese. While other groups pass over this question at best in discrete silence, the Associação feels it necessary to identify itself

³⁶A matter of keen interest to the Associação's members since for many years it has numbered among its members Rio's biggest import merchants. See Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 85.

³⁷From RCP, Abril 1965, Executive Council session March 10, 1965, p. 57. The Associação thought so little of the trade mission as a whole that they never published the results of its trip.

regularly with the Mother Country. One item may be quoted. The Associação's then President, António Carlos Osório, received approval from the Executive Council to send the following message to the Portuguese government on a day of national celebration:³⁸

On this day of glory and celebration for the noble Portuguese nation, I, as President of ... the Associação Comercial do Rio de Janeiro and in the name of the members of this organization, present to your excellency congratulations on the occurrence of the /holiday/ which has such meaning for our country--the fruit of the great Christian and civilizing example of the Portuguese people.

This may, of course, be passed off as a bit of Brazilian rhetoric which they have a weakness for (though significantly not indulged in by the CNI or the CNC). But there is more. The Associação has also given at least indirect support for Portuguese policy in Africa. At an Executive Council session (August 1963), a member of the Associação, Danilo Nunes, in a long speech made a skillful apology for Portugal. As a preamble, he denied any link with the Portuguese colony. Thus as an "independent" observer, he scored recent Brazilian moves against Portugal, carried out principally in the United

³⁸RCP, Julho 1966, Executive Council Session, June 8, 1966. For another sample see RCP, Junho 1964, p. 42 which features a reprint of Voz de Portugal (Junho 14, 1964), an account of Portugal Day sponsored by the Federação das Associações Portuguesas in Rio which consisted of speeches on Luso-Brazilian friendship.

Nations.³⁹

...even if Portugal might not be right, even if Portugal were guilty in relation to its overseas lands, even if its attitudes were out of date and might represent violence of a certain form, Brazil would not have the right of leading a movement against Portugal nor of launching a frontal accusation against the Portuguese government.

Senhor Nunes, however, did not keep his attitude toward Portuguese African policy in the subjunctive any further. In the first place, he considers the UNO Commission's definition of colonialism, that is, the exercise of sovereignty by a country over an area not territorially contiguous. Nunes rejects the validity of this definition and points to the United States' unquestioned rights of sovereignty over Alaska and Hawaii. He also notes Pakistan's division into two parts. Nunes then deals with the charge that the Portuguese have control over a racial group different from themselves, which in itself constitutes colonialism, by citing the racially diverse United States, especially Hawaii and Alaska. Finally, he rejects the charge that Portugal has failed in its civilizing mission by recounting the

³⁹From RCP, Setembro 1963, Executive Council session, August 14, 1963. Speech entitled "Verdade sobre Portugal e as Províncias de Ultramar" pp. 12-22. Quote on p. 12. Senhor Nunes, a member of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, had just returned from Portugal. Since the Associação has never invited anyone of different views, it may be assumed that the speaker's sentiments pretty well speak for the entire membership.

wealth of the African capital cities and the recent spurt of economic growth.⁴⁰ He adds, too, that the mark of a colony is its ruthless exploitation for the benefit of the metropole, but that in Portugal's case it is the opposite: "Portugal is weakening herself to promote the development of Angola and Mozambique."⁴¹ The defense of Portuguese legitimacy in Africa could not be more thorough.

The contrast between the Associação Comercial and the other two groups is striking. In the first place, of course, there are the more conservative positions of the Association. Secondly, while the CNI and the CNC almost always base their positions in the economic self-interest of its members, the Associação Comercial goes beyond economics and ventures remarks on a variety of purely political subjects ranging from the Free World vs. Communism to the splendid Portuguese mission of civilizing Africa. The Associação's uniqueness can in part be explained by the make-up of its membership. Historically it has been associated with importers and merchants specializing in import products.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 14-16.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 17 for another expression of support for Portugal in Africa, see Revista das Classes Produtoras, Agosto, 1963, p. 46 which reprints an essay of Alves Dinheiro published in O Globo, 17 Junho, 1963 and entitled "O Milagre Lusiada na Obra Civilizadora do Ultra Mar?" One quote says: "Portugal in its eternal historic purpose is Europeanizing Africa...it is the work of a small nation without the help of a great

In the past they had opposed industrialization since Brazilian goods would in the long run displace the merchandise they were importing. Furthermore, in the short run government supported schemes for import substitution would make use of protectionist measures like import quotas and tight exchange restrictions. These would drastically cut into the import business. The core of the Association then determined the policy, despite the fact that many members of the group were merchants who handled goods which were almost always domestically produced. As Skidmore pointed out, these merchants simply followed the lead of those opposing industrialization.⁴² Once this pattern of anti-industrialization became fixed, economic nationalism could never develop as it did in the CNI, and the conservative values of a pre-war Brazil remained: identity with the West, including Portugal; hostility for the Communist bloc; and skepticism over the value of contacts with the new nations in Africa. This stands in contrast to the other groups' enthusiasm over relations with the Socialist camp, their criticism of the West, especially the EEC, their lack of commitment to Portugal, and their interest in Africa as a new and profitable trade partner.

The policy positions of the three confederations

people, of a nation alone and of a people alone, of Portugal."

⁴²Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 85.

have been treated at some length--and with reason. They represent the opinion on a wide range of issues of a considerable portion of the business elite. Yet they are by no means alone in foreign policy articulation. Other, smaller business groups occasionally present their views on questions of immediate interest. The Sindicato da Indústria de Matérias-Primas para Inseticidas e Fertilizantes and the Associação Brasileira da Indústria Química e de Produtos Derivados, for example, expressed outrage in a telegram to President Costa e Silva at the "flagrant and continued" dumping practices of presumably American producers of soluble phosphates.⁴³ The Federação das Associações Durais do Estado de São Paulo (FARESP), which represents, among others, the majority of the state's coffee planters, announced as early as August of 1959 its full support for the renewal of relations with the Communist countries.⁴⁴ And the Federação do Comércio Atacadista (Wholesalers) of Rio urged President Kubitschek in 1958 to open trade relations immediately with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. None of these groups, nor similar ones, expresses concern for anything other than their immediate economic interests. Thus, their articulation is more narrow and more sporadic than the larger groups.

⁴³Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 10, 1967, p. 12.

⁴⁴Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 21, 1959, p. 4.

The foreign policy positions of the business sector have been detailed, but what of their techniques to implement them? Despite the differences in policy, their methods are remarkably similar. The most common practice is that of addressing a letter or telegram to the President--or, in the case of legislation, to the Congress. The CNI, for example, sent numerous communications from its President (in this instance, Haroldo Correa Cavalcanti, a São Paulo industrialist) to the Chamber of Deputies on draft legislation which would refuse official guarantees to foreign capital invested in firms in which 20% or more of its capital was in foreign hands.⁴⁵ Less direct methods of influence include flattery. Again the CNI in 1958 gave its badge of "industrial merit" to President Juscelino Kubitschek for his regime's support of industrialization⁴⁶--the first, and apparently the last time that this award was given.

Groups, at times, attempt to amplify their voices by joining together into articulating "Councils" or Command centers. In 1959, the Conselho Superior das Classes Produtores (CONCLAP) was organized to express the interests of its members--these included the Associação Comercial, the Centro Industrial do Rio de Janeiro and

⁴⁵Desenvolvimento Conjuntura, Junho, 1964, pp. 91-92.

⁴⁶"Notas e Comentários" Desenvolvimento Conjuntura,

the Associação dos Empregados (Employees) do Comércio among others. Although each group was to share in the rotating presidency, it became clear that it was pretty much the creature of the Associação Comercial, the most politically experienced and largest of the member groups since CONCLAPs first president was the Associação's President, Rui de Almeida, and since its headquarters were at Casa da Mauá--the Associação's home base.⁴⁷

Another such joint effort proved less permanent. In March of 1964, when Brazil was on the brink of social turmoil, the Comando Nacional das Classes Produtores was founded. The membership included the CAC, the CNI, the CNC and the Confederação Rural Brasileira. All condemned "the capitulation of the government before a plan of national subversion."⁴⁸ The April revolution curtailed any further activity of the Comando Nacional although agreement on foreign policy might have proved

Octubre, 1958, pp. 108-109.

⁴⁷Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 20, 1959, p. 9. CONCLAP not surprisingly has echoed the Associação's political views--for example, after the Goulart regime extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in November, 1961, CONCLAP sent a sharp protest to Brasilia charging that it was a strange decision "when Brazil was paying homage to those who were buried in its defense, victims of Soviet agents." The quote had reference to the 26th anniversary of an attempted Communist coup which involved the death of a number of army officers. Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 25, 1961, p. 3.

⁴⁸See RCP, Março 1964, "Criado pela Aclamação: O Comando Nacional das Classes Produtores" pp. 18-22.

impossible because of the members' divergent views.

Another method of influence is group membership on work committees, trade missions, and official delegations to international economic conferences. Both the CNC and the CNI were members of a National Committee to study LAFTA which was sponsored by Itamarati in August of 1960. The Committee, which was to make an analysis of the trade ramifications of the Montevideo Treaty, was to function within the Foreign Ministry and was led by the chief of Itamarati's Economic Department, Edmundo Barbosa da Silva.⁴⁹ The private groups were in a perfect position to place their members' products on the list of goods exempt from regional competition.

On trade missions, for example, the CNI was a member of the 1963 group sent to Southeast Asia, and the CNI and the CNC were part of the delegation to Cuba in 1961.⁵⁰ Finally, the CNI, the CNC and the Confederação Nacional da Agricultura were members of the delegation that attended the Kennedy Round negotiations held in Geneva.⁵¹

Another method used by business groups is regular

⁴⁹Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 4, 1960, p. 5. Government agencies represented were the Tariff Policy Council, BNDE, SUMOC, and Foreign Trade Council (CACEX). Their assigned task was to suggest which products could be allowed to compete.

⁵⁰Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 17, 1963, p. 11. Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 13, 1961, p. 4.

⁵¹Interview, Arturo Reis Ferreira, Director of the

contacts with foreign ministry officials. Fernando Mibielli, a member of the Associação Comercial's Foreign Trade Committee, met Itamarati's Ambassador Dias Carneiro in order to discuss trade with Eastern Europe.⁵² The Associação has sponsored lunches for Foreign Ministry officials, including one for the then Foreign Minister Vasco Leitão da Cunha in which methods to increase foreign trade were exchanged.⁵³ Cooperation by groups, however, is not limited to the Foreign Ministry. The Confederação Rural Brasileira, whose members include coffee growers, works closely with the Instituto Brasileiro do Cafe, which is responsible for the policy presented at world conferences on coffee production.⁵⁴

The techniques previously described are the familiar ones of open politics. The question now is: do these groups use more covert methods to bring about favorable foreign policy decisions? This has been

School of Sociology and Politics of Pontificia Universidade Católica, July 12, 1967.

⁵²Jornal do Brasil, Abril 6, 1962, p. 8. Mibielli apparently was not impressed for in a statement after the meeting he listed five problems of trade with the East which included their lack of spare parts and technical assistance, delays in shipments, absence of price guarantees on goods, poor quality of Russian oil, and lack of variety of exports (wheat, oil).

⁵³RCP, Novembre 1964, p. 22.

⁵⁴RCP, Junho 1961, "Manifestam-se os Cafeicultores Favorais a Nova Política do Café," p. 13.

charged by some observers although their reliability is doubtful since they are ascribing tactics to political enemies. The columnist Maurítimo Meira, in the leftist daily Última Hora, reported that business groups were attempting to modify the Goulart profit remittance proposals through covert pressure exerted on "important figures in the government."⁵⁵ In Brazil, where the political elite remains small and where extended family and face-to-face contact means so much, such personal and informal techniques are quite likely although their use is by no means restricted to conservative business groups.

Among these economic groups we have seen a similarity in organization but some divergence in foreign policy positions. It must also be remarked that interest in foreign policy per se is a fairly recent concern and it still receives far less attention than domestic policy. Furthermore, with the exception of the Associação Comércial of Rio, the groups' positions on foreign policy matters are strictly limited to the expression of individual economic self-interest. They nearly all remained, for example, aloof (at least overtly and officially) from the larger political questions of Quadros' independent foreign policy. Where it meant new markets there was interest; when it turned to questions about "neutralism" as opposed to "independence"

⁵⁵ Maurítimo Meira "Brasilia Informa," Última Hora, Agosto 22, 1962, p. 4.

for Brazil in world diplomacy, the interest slackened.

The importance of business groups can easily be exaggerated. Articulation of demands cannot, be automatically equated with influence. Business groups have in the past exercised some influence especially when they felt that the regime was damaging their basic interests--domestic or foreign. But, in more normal times business groups are less motivated and consequently their impact on policy-making diminishes.

This does not mean they cease playing a role, although it is a different one that political scientists have come to expect from political interest groups. For example, in influencing the Foreign Ministry, the economic interest groups have been reluctant to engage in pressure politics. Moreover, it has been the Itamarati which has been largely responsible for the contacts that have been maintained between itself and the groups. It can be argued, in fact, that it has been the Foreign Ministry, not the interest groups that have inspired the conferences between the two. Although policy has probably been pretty well formulated by the Foreign Ministry before the contact with the nation's business leaders, the conferences do add a legitimacy to the Ministry's decisions. This aspect of reverse influence will be examined in greater detail in Chapter IX.

Labor

The role of business groups in foreign policy making is limited to be sure, but not as limited as Brazilian labor unions. Their consideration, however, is important since they are the only means of expression by something like a mass of people. Yet even this expression has been highly distorted because of the nature of organized labor in Brazil. Before Getúlio Vargas' Estado Novo the sindicato movement barely existed. When it sprang to life in the early 1940s it did so under government supervision. Methods of control were devised. Only unions approved by the Labor Ministry were legal. The regime's agents were placed in leadership positions and financial control was guaranteed since union operating funds were distributed by the government.⁵⁶ This corporatist structure was not changed by later administrations even though the previous regime's labor leaders might be purged.⁵⁷

This lack of independence perhaps accounts for the absence until recently, of labor union positions on

⁵⁶

Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 40.

⁵⁷

Ibid., pp. 113-114.

foreign policy. As late as 1958, for example, during the First National Conference of Labor Unions, the issues discussed were strictly of the bread and butter type.⁵⁸ This was to change soon. By 1960, after ten years of nationalist agitation, organized labor began moving into foreign policy questions. During the Third National Congress held in August, 1960, for example, the delegates approved an all purpose resolution:⁵⁹

We are struggling for a nationalist and independent policy in defense of the national interests and we fight for the establishment and widening of trade relations with all countries--independent of whatever regime it is--taking into account only the mutual benefit, and principally the interests of Brazil. We also are opposed to the alienation of any part of the national territory; we are for the strengthening of solidarity among the peoples and workers of Latin America in the struggle against the monopolies of the United States; and we are for the national sovereignty of each country.

These themes, recognition of Communist regimes and anti-capitalism (usually American), were routine items in labor union national meetings and Congresses after 1960. Other items, such as favoring strict controls on foreign investment and possibly "neutralism" in foreign policy, also were frequently invoked.⁶⁰ After the Cuban

⁵⁸Text of resolutions printed in Última Hora, Março 31, 1958, p. 8.

⁵⁹Full text in Novos Rumos (Communist weekly) Agosto 19-25, 1960, p. 2.

⁶⁰See the resolutions of I Encontro Nacional de Dirigentes Sindicais reported in Novos Rumos Fevereiro 24,

revolution, expressions of support and ringing statements on self-determination and non-intervention also were heard.⁶¹

These resolutions were, in nearly every case, carefully tailored to suit the needs of the contemporary regime's foreign policy. The coordination, however, could become even more overt. During the tenure of Foreign Minister San Thiago Dantas, encounters were arranged at Itamarati to "solicit" labor leader opinion in foreign policy,⁶² and Dantas in turn addressed labor-sponsored rallies. On June 5 a member of the Foreign Ministry addressed for the first time some 3,000 workers at the Palácio Metalúrgico and announced that Brazilian diplomats were "now identified with the people in the struggle for the national interest."⁶³

During the regimes which used organized labor as

Março 2, 1960, p. 3., and those of II Encontro, Novos Rumos, Maio 19-25, 1961, p. 2.

⁶¹See the resolution of the II Encontro Sindical Nacional reported in Última Hora, Maio 22, 1961, p. 2.

⁶²Personal interview with Geraldo Heráclito Lima, presently Chief, Division of Eastern Europe, Itamarati, December 5, 1967.

⁶³Details in Última Hora, Junho 5 and 6, 1962, p. 9 and p. 2. CNTI President, Dante Pelacani, in turn, proclaimed a general strike against the golpistas "sworn enemies of our march to economic and political independence."

a political prop, the unions acted as sounding boards for foreign policy. After the April 1964 revolution, the labor confederation, the CNTI and its Comando Geral, were dissolved although individual unions continued to exist. Significantly enough, in the resolutions of the remaining groups foreign policy matters are not dealt with at all. Resolutions now again deal with economic issues as before 1960.⁶⁴ Organized labor therefore has not in fact provided a means of foreign policy articulation for those who are outside the political arena. It cannot even be said to have provided a general pressure on policy makers since any expression of opinion through its bureaucracy was designed to aid one part of the elite at the latter's order.

Ideological Groups

In this category are loosely grouped a number of organizations whose primary purpose is not to represent the economic interests of their members but their ideological convictions. Some of these groups have proved ephemeral; others are of a more durable nature.

One of the latter was the União Nacional de Estudantes, the National Student Union (UNE). Its origin, like that of organized labor, was during the

⁶⁴See the Resolutions of II Conferência Nacional de Dirigentes Sindicais, reported in Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 14 and 16, 1967, p. 20 and p. 3 respectively.

Estado Novo. The UNE was subsidized initially by the Ministry of Education and later received funds from Petrobrás and from the President's office during the Goulart regime. Meanwhile, the leadership had fallen into the hands of either the Communists or radical leftists, who often were more extreme than the doctrinaire Marxist-Leninists.⁶⁵

The positions of the UNE, although representing a minority of student opinion,⁶⁶ are not difficult to decipher. In a resolution at the XXII (1959) Congress it was affirmed that Brazilian foreign policy ought to be based on "absolute independence in relation to other governments." Colonialism was repudiated and diplomatic relations were urged with everyone, especially the Socialist countries.⁶⁷ The positions changed little

⁶⁵Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, pp. 279-280.

⁶⁶Although the UNE was supposed to voice the political convictions of Brazil's university students, an American social scientist concluded, after extensive interviews in nine universities, that only 15% of all students could be labelled "active" in their attitude toward politics. Of that minority only 3% were described as conservative, 7% moderate reformist, and 5% revolutionary. Bryant Wedge, Problems in Dialogue: Brazilian University Students and the United States (Institute for the Study of National Behavior: Princeton, 1965), pp. 154-155. Quoted in Skidmore, Politics, p. 399.

⁶⁷Reported in Novos Rumos, Julho 31-Agosto 6, 1959, p. 7.

either in extent or depth during the following years, with the single exception of the Cuban revolution.

Techniques too were limited: convention resolutions, an occasional telegram to the President, a single rally after the Bay of Pigs crisis,⁶⁸ and on one occasion violence.⁶⁹

Even this limited activity in foreign policy by the UNE was cut short in April, 1964 when the new government labelled the Ministry of Education's subsidy illegal, and then ordered the UNE disbanded.⁷⁰

At present remnants of the UNE engage in clandestine activity--even in a convention held in the summer of 1967 "somewhere" in the interior of Minas Gerais.

There is also now a "legal" student organization which takes political positions (sometimes in opposition to the government) but which as yet has been reluctant to

⁶⁸Details in Jornal do Brasil, Abril 19, 1961, p. 5. The UNE in Rio managed to muster 500 workers and students before the Teatro Municipal for the pro-Cuban rally although it could not get out a statement for the press.

⁶⁹Students in Recife at the University's Law School invited Senhora Celia de Guevara (mother of Cuba's late Minister of Industries) for an on-campus lecture. School authorities refused permission. The students proceeded anyway. In mid-lecture, the administration retaliated by cutting the lights. The UNE-led students responded with a strike, occupied the Law Building and appealed for further support. President Quadros called in units of the 4th army and reinforcements from the South. After seventeen days the students left the Law Building without getting any support except at the University of São Paulo. Details in Hispanic American Report, Agosto, 1961, pp. 555-556.

⁷⁰Hispanic American Report, September, 1964, p. 659.

express positions on foreign policy.

The mentors of the students, the academic intellectuals, have en masse been even more reluctant to involve themselves in foreign policy. In fact, only one instance is on record. At a meeting of the União Brasileira dos Escritores in São Paulo in June, 1962, Foreign Minister San Thiago Dantas asserted:⁷¹ "Brazil has no need to opt between Washington and Moscow but should choose a path that will take it to its destiny." The statement was made in explaining Brazil's política externa independente. Considering San Thiago Dantas' penchant for "popularizing" foreign policy, it is not difficult to discern exactly who urged the confrontation between policy maker and intellectual.

Also, on what may be loosely described as the left, were such ephemeral groups as the Liga Nacionalista Brasileira (LNB) and the Frente Nacional de Apoio a Cuba. The first's principal activity was drumming up support for Marechal Henrique Teixeira Lott.⁷² The Frente Nacional (FNAC), in a full-page advertisement in Última

⁷¹Reported in Jornal do Brasil, Junho 8, 1962, p. 4. The writers, after the speech, expressed vociferous approval of its content and of the regime's international position.

⁷²The ineptness of the LNB can be demonstrated by the performance of its Ladies Auxiliary at a political rally. They were responsible for singing the "Hino do Marechal" whose lyrics inter alia included one description of candidate Lott as having "a chest of steel...the

Hora in February, 1963, announced that it was being founded to defend the principles of self-determination of peoples. It expressed the hope of uniting pro-Cuba groups for a Conference of National and Continental Solidarity with Cuba, to be held in Rio in March.⁷³ The meeting was held--not in Rio, but in Niteroi--owing to Governor Lacerda's prohibition of the meeting anywhere in Guanabara state.⁷⁴ However, FNAC was no longer heard from after the Solidarity Conference.

The left has never had a monopoly in founding ideological groups. Perhaps the oldest in the other camp was Resistência Democrática which was founded in the twilight of the Estado Novo and resurrected again at the end of the Goulart regime to fight the government's pro-Communist drift in domestic and foreign policy.⁷⁵ Another group is the Brazilian Anti-Communist

powerful...the invincible Marshall Lott." Apparently none of the ladies knew it except the song leader who sang it four times. The rehearsal was supposed to continue the following Saturday at the Radio Maria Auditorium. The rehearsal and the rally were never held. See Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 12, 1959, p. 4 and 10.

⁷³Última Hora, Fevereiro 2, 1963, p. 5.

⁷⁴Última Hora, Março 27, 1963, p. 11. Foremost in the anti-Lacerda protest was the UNE and Marxist intellectuals Caio Prado, Jr. and Jamil Halmansur Haddad. The anti-Castro Cuban Revolutionary Council responded with a full-page advertisement in Última Hora, consisting of a long list of Cubans shot by the Castro government. Última Hora, Março 30, 1963, p. 11.

⁷⁵See Hispanic American Report, January, 1962,

Crusade led (it seems perpetually) by Admiral Penna Botto. The identity of its single foreign policy objective is not difficult to discern. The vehemence with which it is pursued, however, is unusual. In one critique of government policy, for example, the Admiral charged:

This timidity of our government in regard to the Communist question is one of the reflections of its foreign policy--indecisive, and badly oriented, patterned on what interests the Soviet Union most at the moment--"peaceful coexistence."

That blast was not directed at the administration of João Goulart or even Jânio Quadros, but at the government of Marshall Humberto Castello Branco.

A less emphatic but equally conservative group, a product of the libertarian, anti-getulista movement, is the Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática (IBAD). In radio broadcasts and newspaper advertisements, IBAD expressed a more sober anti-Communism and opposed the reflex anti-Americanism of the left wing nationalists. In one broadcast in March 1963 it supported Ambassador Lincoln Gordon's statement to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Communist infiltration was increasing in the Brazilian government. IBAD's spokesman criticized the nationalists who did not deny the charge but continued to support national sovereignty.

p. 1044.

76
Statement in Jornal do Comércio, Maio 11, 1965,

It even questioned the sincerity of their nationalism "since the same ones maintained a strange silence when the French came here to fish for our lobsters: among them our professional anti-Americans."⁷⁷

Occasionally the tactics of some anti-Communist groups turn to violence. One of them, the mysterious Movimento Anti-Communita (MAC) engaged in a flurry of attacks on "subversive groups" in January of 1962. It first machine-gunned UNE headquarters in Rio and struck again 48 hours later by painting "We shoot Communists" on São Paulo's city hall. Before beginning their ideological homicide MAC members were arrested by agents of the Departimento de Ordem Político e Social (Brazil's secret police), and the movement's activities came to a halt.⁷⁸

Whether left or right, overt or clandestine, shrill or reasonable, skillful or inept, these groups tend to be ephemeral, and limited to a few issues. In no case is there a well-developed set of policy demands. And their influence on foreign policy makers seems doubtful. Indeed, they may be the objects of official

p. 3.

⁷⁷Reprinted in Jornal do Brasil, Março 24, 1963, p. 3.

⁷⁸Jornal do Brasil, Janeiro 7, Janeiro 9, and Janeiro 13, 1962. MAC's other best known activity was planting a bomb at the Soviet trade exposition at the São Cristovão grounds in Rio in June, 1961. See Hispanic American Report, August, 1961.

manipulation rather than the reverse.⁷⁹

The Church

The Roman Catholic Church in Brazil has never had the political power that is ascribed to it in many Spanish-American states.⁸⁰ Yet it would be a great mistake to assume that the Church or, more exactly, individual clergy have no influence in policy making including foreign policy. The emphasis on the individual cleric is an essential point because the Brazilian Church has broken into a number of factions in the last decade, each with its differing political position.⁸¹

The most outspoken churchman in foreign policy has been Rio de Janeiro's conservative Cardinal, Dom Jaime Câmara. Dom Jaime has always been a vigorous opponent of Communism, and has made pronouncements in the name of the

⁷⁹One type of group has not been discussed and perhaps is worth a few lines. In a country like Brazil it is not surprising to find ethnic groups. The Portuguese Club has already been mentioned. In addition, the Confederação Israelita has asked Brazilian support for Israel, and President Stamatis Constantin Iatropoulo of the Greek Community appealed to the Brazilian government to support Greece in its dispute with Turkey over Cyprus. See Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 25, 1967, p. 2.

⁸⁰John Lloyd Meham, Church & State in Latin America; A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp. 261-283.

⁸¹Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 232 and 247. See also François Houtart and Emile Pin, The Church and the Latin American Revolution, translated by Gilbert Barth (New York: Sheed and Ward Co., 1965), p. 216.

the Church although he was not Brazil's senior cleric. This has been especially the case when the Cardinal spoke (apparently ex cathedra) on resuming relations with the Soviet Union. He stated: "The Church intends to make itself clear, the Church maintains the same opinion against resuming relations with the Soviet Union--diplomatic or commercial."⁸²

Because of his position and the comparative frequency of his remarks on foreign policy, Brazilian officials have paid considerable attention to Dom Jaime Câmara. Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos, for example, made a habit of visiting him at least once a year for a foreign policy briefing. As a member of a conservative and devout Minas Gerais family, Afonso Arinos had much success in softening Dom Jaime's intransigence. After their first meeting at the beginning of the Quadros Administration, the Cardinal was persuaded to endorse the President's "independent foreign policy." More exactly,

⁸²Reported in Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 12, 1959, p. 4. Other Churchmen like Dom Vicente Scherer, Archbishop of Porto Alegre, were equally opposed to recognition. He stated: "How can we commemorate the victims of 1935 while nearly on the same day the Government lets into the country...those cowardly murderers." Dom Vicente, however, also made clear that his was a personal opinion, not the Church's official position. Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 25, 1961, p. 4. The then leader of the Church in Brazil the Cardinal Primate and Archbishop of Bahia, Dom Alvaro Augusto da Silva also was critical of the decision, but refused to speak for the Church as a whole. His personal position though was clear: "Brazil ought not sell its nationhood, its honor, its independence, and even its Church and Christian tradition for a plateful of lentils." Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 26, 1961,

he stated in a communique after the meeting that he understood the regime's approaches to the Socialist bloc were done with "good intentions" and were not the result of leftist pressure. He added that he believed that President Quadros only wished to affirm Brazilian sovereignty while the left wanted only to weaken ties with the West.⁸³

It was reported soon after that Foreign Ministry officials were delighted over the Cardinal's statement, and expressed hope that his endorsement of the new foreign policy would head off any campaign by Catholic circles to thwart it.⁸⁴

Afonso Arinos' diplomatic skill, however, did not completely win over the Cardinal. In May of 1961, Dom Jaime Câmara criticized the Foreign Minister's position on Cuba finding it "a dangerous word game" and "a betrayal of the Latin American peoples."⁸⁵

During the Goulart regime, the Cardinal was even less reserved about its foreign policy. He labelled it at one point as "two-faced" and "dangerous." In order

p. 20.

⁸³Jornal do Brasil, Fevereiro 12, 1961, p. 4.

⁸⁴Ultima Hora, Fevereiro, 10, 1961, p. 5.

⁸⁵Diplomat Arinos' reply was less than diplomatic: "I do not wish to comment on the Cardinal's interview since he is a friend whose opinion I respect. But I am forced to admit, in view of his declarations, that he is badly informed on the matter of international politics. The position of Brazil does not correspond to the neutralism adopted by other countries. And in relation to Cuba, it is the same pursued by nearly all the Latin

to overcome the effects of the clergyman's opposition, Foreign Minister San Thiago Dantas attempted a complicated maneuver. First, he flew to Rome, and received a papal endorsement of Brazil's foreign policy. Meanwhile, in Brazil, he ordered the acting Foreign Minister, Renato Archer to see the Papal Nuncio and to ask him precisely where and why the Church disagreed with Brazil's foreign policy. The papal delegate replied that Dom Jaime Câmara's opinions were strictly his own and not that of the Church; furthermore, he offered to repeat this to President Goulart in order to end speculation on the Church's position.⁸⁶ The press, however, was not willing to let it go at that. Except for the scrupulously unbiased Jornal do Brasil reports began to appear which said that Archer had also asked the Papal Nuncio to silence the Cardinal.

A political storm immediately broke out. Rio's Cardinal stated: "No pressure intending to transform the Church of Brazil into a Church of silence will succeed."⁸⁷ In addition, Dom Jaime Câmara took the opportunity to launch the Aliança Eleitoral pela Família, a political movement designed to influence the 1962 elections.⁸⁸

American nations." Quoted in Última Hora, Maio 12, 1961, p. 4.

⁸⁶Jornal do Brasil, Maio 28, 1962, p. 1., and also the "Coisas da Política" on p. 3 of the issue of Jornal do Brasil.

⁸⁷Hispanic-American Report, August 1962, p. 559.

⁸⁸Jornal do Brasil, Maio 30, 1962, p. 5.

This new group had no direct connection with foreign policy, but in the manifesto of the Aliança, Communism was defined as Brazil's great danger.⁸⁹

Whether Brazilians regarded Dom Jaime's opinions as personal or as representing those of the Church is probably an irrelevant question. What is important is that Brazilian policy-makers sought to either mollify or outmaneuver a senior clergyman who represented a major current in Roman Catholic thought. But are there other currents within the Church? There are indeed, but connections with foreign policy are tenuous or infrequent. A broader-based, more intellectual position can be found at Rio's Catholic University--Pontificia Universidade Católica. In its journal Síntese: Política Econômica Social positions on foreign policy are occasionally included in articles and an occasional editorial. Dom Agnelo Rossi, Bishop of Barra do Pirai, for example, found that the current wave of nationalism on the international scene was generated by inequities in the world economy in which underdeveloped countries were dependent on markets controlled by powerful financial groups. In this situation, the Bishop found it perfectly just to seek economic independence, one guarantee of political independence. Unfortunately, in Brazil, nationalism was distorted and acquired an "ideological content;" it did not affirm the "grandeur and independence of

⁸⁹Ibid.

Brazil," but espoused the negative policies of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Americanism. In conclusion, the Bishop asserted first that Brazil needs properly controlled foreign assistance and that the xenophobic nationalism which impedes it is absurd and harmful. Second, although reaction to the "unjust pretensions of foreign economic imperialism" of the West may be understandable, it is nevertheless naive to think that Soviet imperialism would treat Brazil any better. And finally, the Bishop expressed support for a Brazilian nationalism that seeks economic and political independence "within the requirements of international cooperation."⁹⁰

Meanwhile, the reform-minded "progressive" wing of the Catholic Church has largely avoided foreign policy questions. While conservative bishops criticized portions of the "independent foreign policy," liberal clerics contented themselves with statements on domestic policy. There are a few exceptions. Dom Helder Câmara, leader of the reformist bishops, struck a nationalist note by condemning the Ministry of Education's proposed accord with United States AID. He cited the evidence of North American history:⁹¹

⁹⁰Dom Agnello Rossi "A Igreja e o Nacionalismo" Síntese (Rio de Janeiro), no. 17 (Julho-Septembro, 1960) pp. 29-33. The author, besides his Bishopric, is Professor of Philosophy at Catholic University of Campinas and Vice-Rector. He is author of four books, including The Philosophy of Communism.

⁹¹Dom Helder Câmara in a speech given to students

/It/shows that no people is permitted to subordinate its education and culture to the way of thinking of other powers.

Dom Helder's position received further support from the Bishop of Salvador, Dom Valfredo Teppe, who agreed with his colleague's analysis since the accord would "injure our sovereignty by giving decision-making power to the Americans."⁹²

The Roman Church in Brazil deals, then, rather circumspectly with foreign policy. Since the hierarchy is split in its political opinions--a tendency of the last decade which is likely to continue--no official Church opinion is possible on controversial foreign policy questions. Nevertheless, official policy makers have shown great concern in winning the support of critical churchmen, or at least in neutralizing that opinion by appealing to their ecclesiastical superiors. Thus, while the support of the higher clergy is hardly decisive in any policy question, it is not to be ignored either.

Conclusion

Political interest groups are of fairly recent origin in Brazil. Their concern over foreign policy is even more recent. The most active and perhaps the most influential are the economic groups, that is, industrial

at the Federal University of the Amazon in Manaus. Quoted in Última Hora, Setembro 10, 1967, p. 2.

⁹²Dom Valfredo Teppe, quoted in Jornal do Brasil,

and trade confederations. The business groups, however, vary in their outlook. On the one hand, the São Paulo-based Confederação Nacional das Indústrias which represents large manufacturers has tended to be interested in expansion of Brazilian contacts, political and economic, in the non-Western world. At the other end of the spectrum is the Associação Comercial led by a group of Rio import-export merchants whose views are more traditional. They favor continuing good relations with the Western community (especially the United States and Portugal), have little interest in Africa, and are overtly hostile toward the Communist countries.

The influence of Brazilian business groups varies considerably, both among themselves and from regime to regime. Usually they are most successful when they lobby for a specific economic interest. They do this most effectively by participating in trade missions and by being part of official delegations to international trade conferences like UNCTAD. It is usually the case that the Foreign Ministry welcomes their interest and expertise in sorting out Brazil's position. On the business groups, the CNI has been the most successful; every regime since the Kubitschek administration has endorsed its policy of trade relations with all countries.

Playing a lesser role are such groups as the labor and student unions and the more ephemeral "single issue" organizations like the Brazilian Anti-Communist Crusade (Cruzada Anti-Comunista Brasileira). All have attempted to exert their influence on foreign policy, but it is often the case that they (especially labor) have acted at the behest of policy makers. Their role then has been less consistent than that of the economic groups which have a clear stake in foreign, especially trade policy.

The Church plays a somewhat different role. In Brazil, the hierarchy is split on political issues. In the past the most outspoken cleric has been the conservative Cardinal of Rio de Janeiro. Strategically placed, his views have been taken the most seriously by policy-makers. The Cardinal's influence has not been decisive although both the Quadros and Goulart regimes were careful to preserve good relations with the Church.

In general, pressure groups interested in foreign policy but outside the government, are not numerous nor extremely vigorous in pressing their claims. Nevertheless, their activities have increased considerably over the last decade. Their effectiveness has probably increased more slowly. But it is certain that as Brazil's relations with the outside grow and become more complex, Brazilian interest groups will raise more issues and make more demands on the makers of foreign policy.

CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING

The military is no small factor in the foreign policy-making process in Brazil. Historian John Johnson has said of the 1930 revolution that it was the event which propelled "the armed forces into the center of Brazilian politics, and the locus of power has resided in them ever since."¹ He goes on to say:²

More significantly, perhaps, within the last decade the representatives of the armed forces again have become increasingly prone to take public positions on policy conflicts rather than being content to arbitrate the differences that arise from civilian debate.

This certainly is nothing new for a continent which literally pioneered the techniques and nuances of military politics. Nor is military involvement in politics in Brazil a simple, straightforward process. There are at least three major factions in the armed forces. Each has its own viewpoints on domestic and foreign policy, and its own ideas on how to impose these views on civilian officials. The military has acquired even

¹ John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 206.

² Ibid. Others would disagree with that judgment. Nelson Werneck Sodré, for example, states the army became

greater importance since the 1964 revolution and the coming to power of quasi-military regimes. In addition, there is every prospect for similar regimes in the future.

It is the purpose of this chapter to unravel the factions within the armed forces by tracing their historical development. With this background, focal points of power within the armed forces can then be revealed and examination can be made of the following questions: Who makes policy decisions? How are they carried out? What effects will these decisions have on Brazilian foreign policy in the future?

Development of Factionalism

Two of the three present factions in the Brazilian military³ were well on their way to consolidation by 1950. However, two catalytic events of that year--Getúlio Vargas' winning the presidential election and the outbreak of the Korean War--set forces into motion that gave these

involved in politics immediately after independence--supporting republican and even egalitarian movements. Their effectiveness, he states, was limited however by the landed oligarchy and their local militias until the army's prestige rose because of the Paraguayan war. Nelson Werneck Sodré, História Militar do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965), pp. 135-233. José Maria Bello argues that the military became political shortly before the overthrow of the Emperor. See his History of Modern Brazil (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966), trans. by James Taylor, pp. 42-45. Johnson's statement, however, reminds us that modern Brazilian politics dates from the 1930 revolution and military involvement in the political process since that date has been continuous.

³The military in this context, in fact, means the

latent military groupings a sudden new cohesion. The groups were further solidified by an angry debate which arose over the development of Brazilian natural resources. Moreover, it was after 1950 that military involvement in the policy-making process became a day-to-day, almost routine affair. Previously, the military alternated long periods of neutral behavior with outbursts of unpredictable and often destructive interference in policy. The dovetailing of these two factors in the military--the establishment of firm factions and the abandonment of political neutrality--began a new era in Brazilian foreign policy making.

Getúlio Vargas, responsible for so much else in modern Brazilian politics, encouraged the nascent factionalism by appointing as his Minister of War, the highly controversial Estillac Leal--an old Vargas supporter and an ardent nationalist.⁴ The General had, in May of 1950, also won a sharply contested race (complete with

Army, which has an overwhelming amount of power compared to the Navy and the Air Force.

⁴In 1945, Estillac Leal had shown support for the pro-Vargas Queremista movement which wanted Getúlio Vargas to remain in power while the constitution was being written. See Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 104 and José Maria Bello, A History of Modern Brazil, 1889-1964 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966), trans. by James Taylor, pp. 307-308.

ideological overtones) for the presidency of the prestigious Clube Militar.⁵ General Estillac then proceeded to pack the Clube's directorate with highly nationalistic junior officers who favored such measures as state intervention in the economy for the sake of economic (that is, industrial) development, and the redistribution of income to favor the poor.⁶

The second major event that served to crystallize the military groups was the United States' entry into the Korean conflict. In the July issue of the Clube's new nationalist Revista do Clube Militar (RCM), an unsigned article appeared accusing the United States of intervention into a civil war situation in Korea--one which had been instigated by the United States in the first place. The article further recommended that Brazil remain strictly

⁵The Clube Militar, founded in 1887, is ostensibly a recreational and mutual benefit society for Army officers. (The Navy and the Air Force have similar clubs.) It was founded, in fact, so that the military could articulate on such issues of the 19th century as slavery and republicanism. Later, in the 1920s, the Clube became a forum of tenetismo, a program of reform espoused by junior officers. During the Vargas' years, 1930-1945, the Clube was kept under close watch and political expression was minimal. By 1950 it was again in the midst of political turmoil. See John J. Johnson, Military and Society, pp. 219-220.

⁶See the Revista do Clube Militar, Julho, 1950, especially its editorial "O Significado de uma Vitória," pp. 3-4, which stresses the Armed Forces role in defending the national patrimony against foreign interests.

neutral over the issue.⁷

The reaction was immediate. Werneck Sodr , then an officer on the Revista staff, records an impressive list of letters of protest from officers stationed in every corner of Brazil which were sent directly to the Clube headquarters in Rio.⁸ Other protests were sent to newspapers. One such communication protested the "Russophilic tendencies in the Korean article" and was published in the prestigious Estado do S o Paulo.⁹ The immediate result within the military was a suspension of the RCM in mid-December 1950.¹⁰ In addition, at the end of December, a number of the Clube's directorate, including the editor of the RCM, were transferred to distant

⁷"Cr nica Internacional: Considera es sobre a Guerra no Coreia" Revista do Clube Militar, Julho, 1950, pp. 75-80. See also (General) Nelson Werneck Sodr , Mem rias de um Soldado (Rio de Janeiro: Civiliza o Brasileira, 1967), pp. 310-320. General Sodr , a Marxist scholar and left-wing nationalist who was a member of the Revista's directorate, gives the most detailed account of the article's publication and the subsequent uproar. Interestingly enough, Werneck Sodr  still claims that he does not know who the actual author was. Some observers suspect him of authorship; certainly his reluctance to admit anything shows the extreme touchiness of the subject even today, nearly two decades later. See especially p. 321 of his memoirs.

⁸One dated October 31 stated: "...it is strange that our Revista ...has published under its auspices an article ... which outlines such a course in the present international emergency. ...I believe, Mr. President /Estillac Leal/, that this attitude on the part of our Revista needs to be reconsidered, as well as the...liberty of thought among the members of the Clube Militar." The author: Huberto de Alencar Castello Branco. Quoted in Werneck Sodr , Mem rias, pp. 317-318.

⁹Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 105.

¹⁰Ibid.

garrison posts.¹¹

Before the crackdown, however, the RCM nationalists had one more round to fire. The issue was the development of Brazil's petroleum resources, and it also touched on foreign policy. Like the comments on the Korean War, an article signed only by "Captain X," appeared in the RCM's July issue analyzing a pre-Vargas draft law on petroleum which did not establish a state monopoly on the search for and exploitation of oil. The article vigorously denounced the proposed legislation for giving away the national resources to foreign oil trusts.¹² Other statements of a similar nature followed until the magazine's suspension,¹³ and six more like-minded articles appeared after the suspension was lifted in April of 1951.¹⁴

¹¹Werneck Sodré, Memórias, pp. 348-349.

¹²Captain X "Comentários a Margem do Anteprojeto de Estatuto do Petróleo" RCM, Julho, 1950, pp. 63-71. This article was actually the second of a three-part series with the same title--the first, appearing in January 1950, contented itself with an uncontroversial canvassing of previous legislation.

¹³Ibid., /Part 3/, August, 1950, pp. 113-121. Also Moacyr Paixão "Captiães Estrangeiros Dominam a Economia Nacional" RCM, Outubro, 1950, pp. 25-30. This was a reprint from Digesto Econômico, Setembro 1950.

¹⁴The articles printed after the lifting of the ban included: R. Descartes Garcia Paula "Petróleo e Minas Estratégica" RCM, Abril 1951, pp. 58-74. Julio Horta Barbosa (Vice-President of the Clube) "O Problema do Petróleo" RCM, Maio 1951, pp. 35-45. Reprint of a speech given in São Gonçalo, state of Rio de Janeiro, June 10, 1948. Captain Ernesto Gurgel do Amaral "O Petróleo e Nosso mas os Dolares são para os Americanos e Ingleses" RCM, Julho-Agosto, 1951, pp. 37-40.

All of the articles took a strong nationalist position by scoring the machinations of the international trusts--usually American owned. As the articles began to pile up in 1951, the polemic became increasingly bitter. Skidmore observed:

The controversy between the nationalists and the anti-Communists continued through 1951. By early 1952 the language of the controversy between the two factions had become abusive. The nationalist officers accused their opponents of being entreguistas, a favorite epithet which radical nationalists used in order to ridicule their opposition.¹⁶ It carried the overtone of treason. The opposition countered by accusing the nationalist wing of collaborating with 'demagogues' and 'agitators,' who were consciously or unconsciously serving the interests of international Communism.

Although the debate was acrimonious, in the strictest sense of the word it was not a debate at all. The left-wing nationalists concentrated on the popular issue of national control of domestic resources; the conservatives kept to the issues of anti-Communism and anti-demagogy. Thus, although the two sides were usually talking past each other, the argument continued to rage. As Skidmore noted, "The debate became so bitter and the

Colonel Salvador Benevides "Os Trustes Estrangeiros e a RCM" RCM, Julho-Agosto, 1951, pp. 48-52.

General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho "O Anteprojeto de Estatuto do Petróleo," RCM, Setembro-October, 1951, pp. 18-25.

General Carnauba "O Petróleo e o Clube Militar" (Interview) Novembro-Dezembre, 1951, pp. 128-129.

¹⁵Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 106.

¹⁶Entreguista is taken from the Portuguese verb

opposition gained such ground that Estillac Leal was forced to resign the War Ministry in March 1952."¹⁷

The resignation of the War Minister did not end the feud. It did not even finish Estillac Leal's career in the Army. As incumbent President of the Clube Militar, he was persuaded to run in opposition to an aroused and organized group of conservative officers led by Generals Alcides Etchegoyen and Nelson de Melo.¹⁸ The result was an overwhelming defeat for the radical nationalists with General Etchegoyen outstripping Estillac Leal by nearly a two to one majority. The setback, however, proved only temporary for the nationalists. By now they had hardened into a clearly defined and unified faction. Their opposition, too, had organized itself and was intent on keeping their control over the Clube Militar and the key command positions. The Brazilian Army had been polarized into two factions, each with memories of battles won and entregar, to give or to hand over.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Their organization was the Cruzada Democrática whose philosophy was indicated by its honorary president Eduardo Gomes in a statement made in April 1952: "As nationalists, we shall not compromise with any foreign influences which are incompatible with the self-respect and honor of our citizens, who are anxious to direct their own destinies; nor shall we compromise with those who wish to destroy the established legal order and our Christian way of life..." See O Estado de São Paulo, April 20, 1952. Quoted in Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 364⁽ⁿ⁾.

lost--battles which had involved much more than issues of personality. The military officers were now moved by questions of ideology, and competing political and economic philosophies tend to promote cliques which perpetuate themselves.

Neither the conclusion of the Korean War, nor the passage of nationalist petroleum legislation--the two issues which had split the Army so badly--was able to heal the wounds of factionalism. In an atmosphere of internal crisis during the spring of 1954 (an anti-Vargas coalition had been formed), the nationalist faction was again defeated by the conservatives in the Clube Militar elections. And in the next two years, despite the rapidly changing domestic political scene,¹⁹ the struggle between the factions in the Army had not resolved itself. The nationalists kept up their attack on the entreguistas while their opponents repeated their warnings about jacobinism and Communism. The more moderate of the conservative officers, however, by the mid-fifties had secured control of the military journals and were thus able to expound their views at some length and in public. The editorial page of the RCM during those years, for example, would issue statements such as the following:²⁰

¹⁹Events in those years included the suicide of Vargas, the "preventive" coup of War Minister Henrique Lott, and the inauguration of Juscelino Kubitschek.

²⁰Editorial entitled "Alerta," RCM, Janeiro-Março 1956, p. 4.

It is necessary to say that the influence of this distressing climate /i.e., Communism/ does not leave our own armed forces unscathed-- /forces/ which until recently felt the ominous influx of the red threat in our own Clube Militar. Communists, and their innocent but useful helpers, took advantage of a just, nationalist spirit in the military and placed it at the service of agitation.

Conservative control of the Clube and of the military command itself did not prove to be permanent. In fact, the conservatives lost the 1956 elections²¹ to a moderate nationalist, Segadas Vianna. The defeat can be ascribed to their fall from the graces of the Minister of War, General Teixeira Lott,²² whose power was nearly supreme after the successful "preventive" coup which he staged in November of 1955. And under his protection, the nationalists, or at least the more moderate nationalists like Segadas, continued to win elections until the 1964 Revolution.

While the nationalists were winning Clube Militar control and enjoying some success in acquiring command positions, the more conservative officers, under the stress of defeat, began breaking into factions among

²¹Clube elections are always held in April of an even numbered year.

²²One of the Clube directors, Colonel Jurandir Manede, had provoked the Minister's rage by delivering a flattering eulogy at the funeral of General Canrobert Pereira da Costa, President of the Clube Militar, and an arch enemy of Vargas. The eulogy made political remarks which violated Lott's policy of no political statements by military officers. See Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, pp. 150-151 and Jornal do Brasil, Maio 21, 1958, p. 9.

themselves. On the one hand were the moderates, who were soon labelled the Sorbonne group,²³ led by Humberto Castello Branco. They maintained a pro-Western, anti-Communist stance, but did not scorn the notion of developmental nationalism. The other group, rooted in the more conservative elements that had made up the old Cruzada Democrática, stressed a rigid anti-Communism especially in regard to domestic politics. Furthermore, they rejected nationalist rhetoric on internal matters as demagogogy.

Effect of Factionalism on Foreign Policy

Thus by 1964, three military factions had evolved, and they are still very much a part of Brazilian politics. With this background, we can now focus on each major faction in the military. Who are they, what kind of power do they have, how do they use their influence, and what position do they favor for Brazil's foreign policy? Above all, it is necessary to pinpoint the role that they play in the policy-making process itself and to determine perhaps if they will continue to influence that process in the future. It should be added that faction members are not identical in their political opinions. Nor does an officer necessarily

²³The label referred to their tendency to have been trained abroad, particularly in France. See p.188 of this chapter.

hold a lifetime membership in one group. He may not belong to any group; he may switch allegiances. Nevertheless, the great body of officers who have any political ideas at all do align themselves with one of the established factions. Furthermore, shared beliefs often can be associated with shared experiences in their military careers. Both beliefs and experiences will now be examined in greater detail for each of the political groups within the Brazilian Armed Forces.

The Nationalists

Background: Nationalism is, of course, endemic in any army. As sworn defenders of the nation's sovereignty, military men assume this type of rhetoric more easily than any other group. In Brazil, a type of nationalism coupled with desire for reform has roots within the Armed Forces that go back to the last years of the Empire.²⁴ In the 1920s, a very pronounced example of this type of nationalism was directed by junior officers who were intent on rapid change fired by intense patriotism. Their activities have been labelled the tenente movement.²⁵

²⁴Men of the Armed Forces held lively debates on issues such as slavery in Brazil. C.H. Haring, Empire in Brazil (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), p. 102.

²⁵See Robert Alexander, "Brazilian 'Tenentismo'" Hispanic-American Historical Review, no. 36 (May 1956) pp. 229-242, for more details. It is ironic that the tenente leaders like Eduardo Gomes and Juracy Malgahães

Knowing these forerunners in Brazilian history, it is no surprise that in the ideological ferment of the post-war period young nationalist officers began making their opinions known. But it was not until 1950 with the installation of the Vargas regime that such opinion could have an outlet. What did these officers have in common? In the first place, they tended at that time to be junior officers. They also shared a generally pro-Vargas attitude. Unsurprisingly, a good many of them came from Vargas' home state, Rio Grande do Sul. Prominent left wing nationalist officers who also were gauchos included Nelson Werneck Sodré, and Jair Dantas Ribeiro.²⁶ Those officers who were not originally from Rio Grande received their political socialization in the III Army based in the state's capital, Porto Alegre.²⁷ It should

would so vigorously oppose the nationalist officers of the 1950s and 1960s.

²⁶Rio Grande do Sul has also produced some of Brazil's most radical and successful politicians: Vargas, João Goulart, and his brother-in-law Lionel Brizolla. Gauche officers were not always united with this group. Nestor Penha Brasil, who was commander of the III Army and a gauche, lost his post after a quarrel with the state's governor Lionel Brizolla.

²⁷The III Army's political radicalness was a widely known fact. Of course, Goulart insured the III Army's loyalty by regularly staffing it with the most nationalist officers he could find. Nevertheless, it had an endogenous radicalness--a fact which stirred a good deal of controversy. The leftist Última Hora, Junho 5, 1963 recounted a rightist plot in which the Brazilian and Argentine 'gorilas' were to provoke a border skirmish which would occupy the III Army while

be pointed out that these officers, almost without exception, did not serve in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (1944-1945); nor did they receive additional training from foreign officers. Their careers were entirely Brazilian based.

Ideology: This kind of home-grown officer quite naturally had a restricted political philosophy. They espoused a highly charged nationalism which, of course, had its implications for foreign policy. In the first place, such nationalism encouraged an economic xenophobia. Foreign investors were simply not to be trusted. Even more, they were not to be allowed in the country at all. General Valério Braga stated it succinctly: "...to give the foreign trusts the right to exploit our oil would constitute the monstrous crime of treason to our country."²⁸ Nationalist officers, however, were not content merely to sing the praises of Petrobrás, the state oil monopoly. They lobbied vigorously for state monopolies of electrical energy and atomic minerals in order to prevent foreign (that is, American) control.²⁹

the remainder of the troops carried out a coup d'etat against Goulart.

²⁸General Valério Braga, "Importância do Monopólio Estatal do Petróleo Para o Progresso do Brasil" RCM, no. 144 (no month given) 1957, p. 38.

²⁹See, for example, Naval Captain Primo Nunes de Andrade, "Os Militares na Empolgante Batalha do Desenvolvimento" RCM, Junho-Septembro, 1956, pp. 17-20.

The nationalist faction occasionally considered other, somewhat broader questions of foreign policy. Nelson Werneck Sodré, who comes the closest to being the intellectual of this group, had elaborated on the post-war international scene. He argued that the cold war has been a product of North American propaganda. It has been, in fact, the United States which has divided the world into the "Christian West" and the "Communist East," and which is defending the former by keeping military forces on every continent and by using the threat of atomic weapons. Sodré charged that in this scheme the United States has allowed no neutrals, so that war was inevitable between the two sides. Peace and the Soviet Union's doctrine of peaceful coexistence was looked on by the United States as a tactic to gain time and to subvert the gullible. Meanwhile, the United States financed the economic recovery of Western Europe, turned its countries into satellites, and armed them so that they could become an effective barrier to so-called Communist expansion. Sodré added that the United States wanted Latin America to be servile so that huge profits could be made from that continent in order to finance the former's world wide "defense" system. In short, "North American imperialism, which economically and politically oppresses the dependent nations, constitutes a major threat to world peace."³⁰

³⁰Werneck Sodré, Memórias, pp. 332-333.

Few nationalist officers were as vociferous in their opinions as Werneck Sodré. And even he expressed his views in the relative safety of his memoirs. Although the nationalist faction shared Sodré's outlook, after the extreme controversy generated by Captain X's article on the Korean War, they preferred other less controversial themes.

They were not idle, however. Jânio Quadros's new "independent foreign policy" gave many of them an opportunity to voice their full support. General Osvino Alves, Commander of the First Army, announced that he would back the new policy, which he classified as a move "that the government considered necessary in order to attain for Brazil a position of independence..."³¹

And on occasion, nationalist officers risked censure. The nationalist directorate of the Clube Militar in April of 1961 sent a telegram of congratulations to President Quadros on his announcement of the resumption of relations with Communist countries.³²

And what of Brazil's future place in world politics? Nationalists had their view on that also. It was

³¹General Osvino Alves in a speech reported in the Jornal do Brasil, Maio 29, 1962, p. 3. In the same speech, Última Hora, Maio 29, 1962, p. 4, reported that the General also vigorously denounced the rightists who had attempted to establish a dictatorship after the resignation of Quadros under the guise of combatting Communism.

³²Conservative Minister of War Odílio Denys placed the officers under house arrest for forty-eight

perhaps put most succinctly in an editorial of RCM which stated:³³

The truth is that Brazil cannot stop. It will have to accomplish its historic destiny, and by the end of the century it will become a great power. Then Brazil and her people will definitely be free and respected.

Techniques: As Army officers with definite opinions which directly and indirectly touched on foreign policy, the nationalists also had their particular methods of influencing the course of policy-making. In general it can be said that the nationalists did not apply direct pressure on the legally constituted decision makers. Their principal thrust was the political socialization of the armed forces. This was attempted primarily by capturing control of the Clube Militar every two years (they were, by and large, successful in this attempt), and by using its organs of publicity to expound nationalist doctrines. In the first issue of the RCM, which was nationalist controlled, the editors announced their purpose. For them the Clube was not a society for recreation or for mutual benefit; it was a "vigilant and active organ," fighting for the "consolidation of our economic independence." In order to achieve this

hours. See Jornal do Brasil, Abril 5, 1961, p. 4, and Abril 26, 1961, p. 4.

³³RCM, Outubro-Dezembre, 1960, pp. 2-3.

independence, it was their primary duty to shape the opinions of the officer corps, "a homogenous body of men whose spirit was unalterably and decidedly committed to the defense and progress of the country."³⁴ In later years, the nationalists would refute the charge that the Clube was merely a labor union intent solely on raising officers' salaries, and would again emphasize that the organization's role was to foster discussion of national problems, including foreign policy, among officers.³⁵

In addition to shaping political opinion among the Clube's membership, nationalist officers established contracts with civilian left wing leaders. Sergio Magalhães, a leader of the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), was invited to speak at a Clube meeting on profit remittances by foreign investors. Predictably, Magalhães denounced the North American trusts and was reported to have been greeted with heavy applause from the attending generals and colonels.³⁶

Arrangements were made for leftist officers to attend courses offered by the Instituto Superior Estudos

³⁴Editorial, "O Significado de uma Vitória" RCM, Julho, 1950, pp. 3-4.

³⁵Editorial, "Nem Sindicato, Nem Clube Recreativo," RCM, Julho-Agosto, 1955, pp. 3-4.

³⁶Jornal do Brasil, Agosto, 19, 1954, p. 4.

Brasileiros (ISEB), an organization dedicated to Marxist studies of the "Brazilian reality."³⁷ Civilians were also invited to publish essays in the RCM. In such an essay, Amilcar Alencastre, a vigorous supporter of the política externa independente, outlined his views on a new policy for Africa.³⁸

These tactics appear innocent enough--a bit of mutual indoctrination among like-minded people--but some did not view them as harmless. According to conservative Major General Maurell Filho in a statement made in late 1962, left wing nationalist officers were destroying the "cohesion and unity" of the Armed Forces. They were doing so by actively collaborating with the "leaders of labor groups, some of...Communist tendencies, in organizing strikes and public demonstrations with the aim of constraining the executive and legislative branches of the government in the exercise of their constitutional prerogatives."³⁹ Since the General was speaking in the

³⁷The RCM, no. 146 (no month given) 1957 lists ten officers (two colonels, four majors, and four captains) who were selected by the Clube to attend the Curso Regular given by ISEB.

³⁸Amilcar Alencastre, "A Nova África" RCM, Outubro-Dezembre, 1960, pp. 18-22. His principal thesis was that since Brazil was anti-racist and had an African heritage, it had, or could have, a special relationship with Africa, particularly the West African nations which were geographically closer than the United States, Mexico, or even Ecuador.

³⁹Hispanic-American Review, January 1963, p. 1059.

context of the Cuban missile crisis, the foreign policy implications of his objections to left wing military and civilian cooperation may be surmised, although they are difficult to prove.⁴⁰

Effectiveness: There is, of course, the question of influence in foreign policy-making. The Brazilian left, at least until April 1964, seemed confident of their strength. Batista de Paula, for example, a columnist for Última Hora, was enthusiastic about the abilities of the "new Armed Forces." On one occasion he wrote:⁴¹

We ought to thank God that we have an advanced officer corps, enlightened and politically educated sergeants, and now even a body of officers composed of young

⁴⁰Occasionally, a high ranking, leftist officer would make his foreign policy views known, but always in a quasi-legal fashion. General Osmino Alves, then Commander of the Rio-based First Army, met Foreign Minister San Thiago Dantas after the second Punta del Este Conference (concerned with Cuba). General Alves pointed out that he had met the Foreign Minister for two reasons: To show that Dantas was not defending his own views, but those of the government including the men responsible for national security; and to show that Dantas had performed his task brilliantly. "Coisas da Política" Jornal do Brasil, Fevereiro 2, 1962, p. 3.

⁴¹Batista de Paula, "Plantão Militar" Última Hora, Julho 10, 1962, p. 11. His estimate of the Clube Militar was equally enthusiastic. "...the Clube Militar is a nationalist institution...and its force has always been employed to the benefit of the patriotic objectives of the nation...the venerable institution on Avenida Rio Branco will never be a recreation club, a pastime for ping pong players." Última Hora, Maio 7, 1962, p. 13.

men from all social classes...

Here there are no gorilas to defend the /reactionary/interests, because the voice of the people is always louder in the barracks, on the bases, and on the ships.

Many, with similar political views, shared this optimism, at least until the April Revolution. Was this mere self-deception on the part of the left? It is not unlikely that it was. The leftist officers, in fact, spent relatively little time on trying directly to influence national policy, including foreign.

As has been seen, they really were intent on the gradual political socialization of the officer corps; therefore, they concentrated on control of the Clube Militar and on use of the Clube as a focal point for their propaganda. Whether they would have extended their activities to include more direct means of influencing foreign policy is difficult to say. The 1964 Revolution, of course, rendered the nationalists powerless. A more complete understanding of the strengths which they had accumulated prior to the revolution, however, can be gained from examination of their ideological rivals.

The Moderates

An analysis of the political beliefs and techniques of this group of officers is actually a character sketch of the men who seized power in 1964. Although the nationalists had many characteristics in common, they still

remained somewhat diverse in their backgrounds and even in their political opinions; the moderates on the other hand possess striking similarities in career patterns and also in political ideas. And unlike the nationalists, their views on foreign policy are considerably more developed.

Background: Who are these men and what do they have in common? There are three characteristics that mark the moderate officers. In the first place, many have actual combat experience, having served in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) in World War II. Second, these officers are noted for their impressive educational credits. Many have received foreign training, with the French Ecole Superior de Guerre being a particular favorite. At home these same officers have usually attended, either as a member of the faculty or as a student, Brazil's Escola Superior da Guerra.⁴² Third, the moderate officers' careers are usually marked by long service on the General Staff (estado maior), in contrast to the left wing officer who has been relegated to one of the field armies, or at best has had a brief stint at headquarters.

Of a dozen selected moderate officers, ten belonged to FEB, eight were attached to the Escola Superior (five of these had also attended the French school), and all twelve had served on the General Staff, usually for

⁴²Humberto Castello Branco, in many ways the

prolonged periods of time.⁴³ The shared experiences of combat with Allied armies, the relatively high levels of education, often gained abroad, and the continued contact with one another at staff headquarters were all important in shaping the thinking and the actions of these officers.

Ideology: Perhaps the most striking characteristic of these officers is the range and depth of their opinion on foreign policy. Colonel Carlos de Meira Mattos, a member of FEB and long attached to the Army General Staff, described in a systematic manner the foundation of the moderate faction's foreign policy outlook.⁴⁴

Meira Mattos asserted that the guide lines of foreign policy are founded on: 1) the historic roots of a nation's formation 2) its geographic placement 3) the authentic aspirations of its people. Brazil's

classic moderate officer, was the head of ESG for a number of years.

⁴³Information on career backgrounds was taken from the Almanaque do Exército, (Ministério da Guerra: Rio de Janeiro, 1964). The officers selected are Humberto Castello Branco, Jose Campos de Aração, Augusto Muniz de Aragão, Aurelio de Lyra Tavares, Carlos de Meira Mattos, Ademar de Queiroz, Nelson de Melo, Jurandir de Bizarria Manede, Walter de Menezes Pais, Newton Fontoura, Nestor Penha Brasil and José Machado Lopes.

⁴⁴Carlos de Meira Mattos, Projeção Mundial do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1959) Selections were printed in the Boletim de Informação, Julho 1961, pp. 14-18. The Boletim was a publication of the Army General Staff and remained under the control of moderate officers. Naturally, it reflected their opinions.

roots, he contended, are three. First, Brazil was founded by Portugal which gave it a Latin and Christian culture. Second, independence was inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution--liberalism and political rationalism. Third, Brazil's political institutions are influenced by North American representative democracy. These roots, he argued, have made Brazil a Latin, Lusitanian Christian country whose political ideals are liberty and representative democracy.⁴⁵

This particular blend led Meira Mattos to the following judgments on the shape of Brazilian foreign policy:⁴⁶

This synthesis leads inevitably to the Western side. To look outside of the Western world for a political model would be a violent break with our ethnic, religious, cultural, and sentimental origins. Therefore, no doubt remains: we are Western by reason of our political origin and by the ...force of our spiritual aspirations.

So it seems to me that one of the great lines of our foreign policy ought to be fidelity to the West. We ought to integrate ourselves into the Western alliance, to be more and more hopeful for its perfection as a culture and a civilization, and to fortify it with our support.

And regarding the East-West split he added, "Our position is already taken. Our attitude ought to be in

A good deal of it was interpretative and considerable space was devoted to foreign policy discussion. Other less productive FEB officers writing for publication included Amyr Borges Fortes, Rafael Danton Teixeira, Octavio Medeiros, Hernani D'Aguiar, and Nelson Carvalho. They appeared in primarily Mensário de Cultura Militar and especially A Defesa Nacional.

⁴⁵Meira Mattos, Projeção Mundial, pp. 14-15.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 14-15.

favor of a courageous and enlightened struggle."⁴⁷

As far as the rest of the world is concerned, Meira Mattos felt that after the West, Brazil should look to Africa, especially those countries on the Atlantic shore. He qualified this by calling for a "constructive Luso-Brazilian Community." And he ended⁴⁸ by reemphasizing Brazil's origins.

Our people have a Latin soul, tempered with a small dose of African blood, and a little of the dryness and suspicion of the Tupi. In our mixture, the white blood of Latin origin predominates abundantly.

Meira Mattos sketched out the themes that have inspired the moderate officers; others have filled in with more detail. The attachment to the West is perhaps clearest in the writing of Colonel Golbery do Couto e Silva:⁴⁹

...the West lives and persists in us, in our past and in our present, in our blood and in our muscles, in our hearts and in our nerves, in the ideals for which we struggle and in the interests which we defend, in the technical knowledge that arms us, in the science that nourishes our spirit, in the faith that strengthens the soul, in the books that we read, in the words that we speak, in the hymns we sing, in the prayers we say...

On a more analytical level, however, he qualified Brazil's attachment to the West. He pointed out that the

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 18. For those who have lived in Brazil it is not at all clear that the "white blood predominates abundantly," except in the higher social classes. But then upper class Brazilians manage very well in insulating themselves from those at the bottom.

⁴⁹ Colonel Golbery do Couto e Silva, "Problemas

West needs Brazil: its resources, its human potential, and its geographic position in the South Atlantic.⁵⁰ He also shrewdly added that although Brazil needs the West, the West cannot take his country for granted. It must be willing to help Brazil to overcome its poverty in order to resist the appeals of Communism; Western assistance cannot be confined to sermons on the advantages of free enterprise.⁵¹

Meira Mattos, in another article, expanded this notion of reciprocal obligation. Writing at the time of the X Inter-American Conference in Caracas, Mattos advised the Brazilian delegates not to ignore the fact that the United States' economic policy toward Latin America had been unjust. Specifically, he charged that during the war a price ceiling was placed on Latin American exports to the United States while the price ceiling was removed for United States products to Latin America. He concluded by stating that since Western

da América Latina: O Brasil e a Defesa do Ocidente" A Defesa Nacional, Fevereiro 1959, pp. 123-128, p. 128. The author was a member of FEB, has attended the Escola Superior da Guerra and the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is a member of the Instituto Brasileiro de Geopolítica, and was, until his retirement, with the General Staff of the Army.

⁵⁰Colonel Golbery do Couto e Silva, "Problemas da América Latina: O Brasil e a Defesa do Ocidente" A Defesa Nacional, Abril 1959, p. 114.

⁵¹Ibid.

Europe had recovered from the war, it was time for the North Americans "to give concrete proof that Pan-Americanism is not a rhetorical expression."⁵²

On the sensitive issue of foreign investment in Brazil, the bete noire of the nationalists, the Febistas have been considerably more tolerant. The military journal A Defesa Nacional, in an editorial, stated that it was in favor of foreign capital because it improved living conditions; therefore, it urged policy-makers to take the measures necessary to attract outside investment, and to achieve monetary stability.⁵³ The Boletim de Informaçôes published by the Army General Staff has pointed out that the actual amount of investment has been only part of the gain to Brazil. In addition, foreign capital has brought the latest technology, and this technology has "represented without a doubt a very important role in the increase of productivity within the Brazilian economy--the effects surpass the merely literal amount of realized investments."⁵⁴

⁵²Carlos de Meira Mattos, "Mosáico Internacional" RCM, Janeiro-Febrero 1954, pp. 49-50. The Clube Militar in these years was controlled by the moderate-conservative officers.

⁵³A Defesa Nacional, Setembro 1955, p. 107.

⁵⁴Boletim de Informaçôes, Agosto 1958, p. 5.

Later, after the Revolution of 1964, the moderate officers were to defend with vigor the Castello Branco regime from charges of entreguismo. Again it was the Boletim de Informaçoes which argued that the change in the investment law would not make Brazil a vassal to foreign corporations, but would create a good investment climate that would encourage a reinvestment of profits. It added that in 1965 Brazil had the lowest remittance rates in Latin America, 1.9% compared to 6.9% in Mexico, 4.2% in Argentina, and 7.7% in Peru.⁵⁵

What of Febista attitude toward the socialist camp? The feeling in most Latin militaries is that of a primitive anti-Communism. The only general consequence of the attitude is that anyone opposing the regime of the day is labelled a Communist and is repressed on that charge. FEB officers, however, hold somewhat more complex attitudes.

The thrust of their anti-Communism has not been directed at domestic opposition, but at the Soviet Union. Lt. Colonel José de Sa Martins in a typical warning stated:⁵⁶

To speak of revolutionary strategy in the world picture is to speak of the strategy that the Soviet Union follows to conquer the world.

⁵⁵"Capital Estrangeiro no Brasil" Boletim de Informaçoes, Novembre 1966, pp. 23-25. See Chapter VII, pp. 272-274 for discussion of remittance limitations.

⁵⁶Lt. Colonel José de Sa Martins, "A Strategia Revolucionaria no Quadro Mundial" A Defesa Nacional, Janeiro 1963, p. 3 and p. 14.

The Soviet Union is, in reality, an imperialist State: its program of expansion counts on the collaboration of the Communist parties from all countries. Every triumph of the Soviet Union is a triumph of international Communism; every victory of international Communism is also one for the Soviet Union.

...
We ought then to be alert in order to oppose the imperialist action of the Soviet Union, action which in our country is being intensified since Brazil is one of its great objectives...

On the issue of recognition of the Soviet Union many Febista officers were initially opposed.⁵⁷ Others, like Colonel Lucídio de Arruda, were cautious. He did not want to judge the government's decision to resume relations, especially since most countries had already made the resumption. But he added that the Soviet Union was still "a declared enemy of the system under which we live," and he recommended a policy of vigilance.⁵⁸

The moderate officers also had their own views on the Caribbean. In regard to Cuba, for example, Carlos Meira Mattos argued in 1961:⁵⁹

To accept passively the installation of a powerful agent of Moscow and Peking /in Cuba/ means to renounce a priori the purpose

⁵⁷Castello Branco for one was opposed, but after assuming power he did not break relations with the Soviet Union, and, in fact, negotiated a loan of \$200 million. See

⁵⁸Colonel Lucídio de Arruda, "Relações com a URSS" Mensário de Cultura Militar, Março-Abril 1962, pp. 117-124, p. 117. The Mensário was another publication of the Army General Staff in which foreign policy issues, especially in regard to the Soviet bloc, were discussed.

⁵⁹Carlos de Meira Mattos, "Caribe--O 'Punctum

of self-defense. The control of the Panama Canal by anti-democratic power will represent a military defeat of unforeseeable consequences for the Free World.

Brazil has immense responsibilities in the politico-strategic framework of the Caribbean. It ought to influence the other American nations with the weight of its continental size /so that/ they would take notice of the danger that borders them, and acting in conjunction with the ideas and principles of the OAS, would impose peace and security in the Antilles.

And later when an inter-American police force was set up in the Dominican Republic, an editorial in A Defesa Nacional stated:⁶⁰

Now our country, faithful to its international commitments, sent a detachment of troops to the Dominican Republic in order to add its forces to those of brother peoples in a mission of peace, and in order to restore tranquility to that country.

...
A Defesa Nacional, on the occasion of our participation in the inter-American army of the OAS, organized to end the internal conflict in the Dominican Republic, expresses its vote of confidence in that international organization and hopes that it...can always bring peace and security to the American family.

One more issue involving the East-West split may be cited, and that is the problem of arms control and disarmament. In the Boletim de Informações an unsigned article recalled the failures and even the dangers attending disarmament. It cited the peace talk of the

Dolens' da Política Continental" A Defesa Nacional, Agosto 1961, p. 77.

⁶⁰Editorial, A Defesa Nacional, Julho-Agosto, 1965, pp. 3-5, p. 5.

1930s which only weakened France and England while the totalitarian powers, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, continued their military buildup. The present day disarmament rhetoric is no more to be trusted. There are those who prefer peace at the price of liberty, and who support the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament. However, the article argued, such a proposal must be examined without passion and with extreme care in the light of past experience.⁶¹

The Febista officers, however, were not solely occupied with the grand questions of war and peace. They have also focused on more specific problems. In the last decade, the one which has received the most attention is the question of Africa. In typical fashion they have not looked upon that continent as one of unlimited promise for Brazilian diplomacy, nor have they completely ignored it as the other factions in the armed forces have.

Africa has been dealt with on a number of levels. In the first place, it has been analyzed as a trade partner and competitor. Colonel Carlos Meira Mattos has written the most extensively on this subject among the moderate officers. He argued that Africa, as an economic rival is "highly prejudicial to Brazil's

⁶¹"O Mito Desarmamento" Boletim de Informações, Agosto, 1962, pp. 5-6.

foreign trade," and that this fact must be recognized.⁶²
He added:⁶³

The economic development of Africa will represent for us a sudden loss of European and North American markets for our classic export products, since Africa can produce similar substitutes with a much cheaper labor force...

Mattos, however, was not willing to leave it there. He argued for more contacts with Africa so that at a later time it would not confront Brazil and be seen as an "uncomfortable and dangerous neighbor."⁶⁴ Closer to the point perhaps, Mattos also suggested that the African market might be ideal for Brazilian industrial goods, and that the trade rivalry aspect might be eased if Brazil depended less on primary products exports through a more rapid industrialization.⁶⁵ Colonel Aryton Salgueiro Freitas essentially agreed with Meira Mattos' analysis. He added that Brazil could create

⁶²Carlos de Meira Mattos, "O Brasil e o Despertar Afro-Asiático" A Defesa Nacional, Junho 1960, p. 114.

⁶³Ibid., p. 116. A slightly more optimistic note was struck by Alcio Chagas Nogueira who played down the problem of trade competition and stressed similarities between Brazil and Africa which could add to mutual understanding. His argument, however, is considerably less rigorous than that of Meira Mattos. Alcio Chagas Nogueira, "Possibilidades de Intercâmbio entre o Brasil e o Mundo Afro-Asiático" A Defesa Nacional, Maio 1961, pp. 173-175.

⁶⁴Mattos, A Defesa Nacional, p. 118.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 116-118.

sympathy and perhaps future markets in Africa through the lending of technical assistance to these countries.⁶⁶

An article in the Boletim de Informações analyzed trade prospects in more detail. It stated initially:⁶⁷

Although it may be more frequently thought of as a great potential market for Brazilian products, and at present it may be seen predominantly as a strong competitor for us in certain primary products, the truth is that we already have good trade penetration in various African countries. Another fact worthy of note is that some of our principal items exported /to African countries/ are those--like coffee and cacao--whose world markets are being disputed by us and by /other/ African producers.

It then went on to say that primary product exports went to Morocco, South Africa, the Sudan, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, former French West Africa and Rhodesia, and that these markets could be expanded through an aggressive trade policy.

Brazilian military intellectuals have gone beyond the economic problems and the prospects of trade with

⁶⁶Colonel Aryton Salgueiro Freitas, "O Brasil e os Estados Africanos" A Defesa Nacional, Junho-Julho 1961, pp. 127-128. Colonel Salgueiro was a member of the FEB First Fighter Group in Italy during World War II. See Manuel Thomaz Castello Branco, O Brasil na II Grande Guerra (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1960), p. 614.

⁶⁷Boletim de Informações, Fevereiro 1960, p. 27. An unsigned article in A Defesa Nacional ("Possibilidades Comerciais do Brasil na África Oriental Britânica: Kenya, Tanganyika, e Uganda") Junho-Julho, 1961, pp. 117-119, stressed the same point and suggested that more efficient sales methods be used including advertising. It also recommended that certain export items like drugs and sewing

Africa, however, and have concentrated a great deal of attention on the diplomatic aspects of contact with Africa. Meira Mattos, for example, has envisioned a mediatory role for Brazil. "We can carry out an important task of the true Western mission--the task of attempting to dissipate the anti-Western reactions of Afro-Asia."⁶⁸ Brazil, he felt, is in an especially good position to do this because of her traditional anti-colonialism and her lack of racism.

But on a more realistic level, Meira Mattos was prepared to face the problem of Portuguese colonialism, at least in part. He suggested that the Portuguese foothold in Africa might in fact be turned to Brazil's advantage since it would provide a natural opening, but he left the exact formula for doing so to Itamarati.⁶⁹

A more recent essay (unsigned) in A Defesa Nacional went into the problem more deeply. It acknowledged that Portugal was in serious trouble in Africa. Much of the blame, it argued, could be attributed to Lisbon's insistence on controlling everything from the center. This had the unfortunate result of omitting any training in African self-government. The article suggested that Brazil act as mediator and conciliator, and in some

machines be stressed instead of textiles which were too competitive.

⁶⁸ Carlos de Meira Mattos, "O Brasil e o Despertar Afro-Asiático," p. 118.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

fashion assist Portugal and her colonies to redefine their relationship. The article noted pessimistically however that the Portuguese, after losing Goa, were not likely to follow a more liberal policy. Nevertheless, Brazil should make the effort.⁷⁰

Brazil's relationship with Portugal, and indeed Africa, is also the theme of a rather grandiose scheme drawn up by Carlos Meira Mattos. After describing the size and wealth of the world's Portuguese speaking areas,⁷¹ he stated, "Distance disappears as an obstacle to the approach of these territories situated on opposite shores of the Atlantic Ocean."⁷² Furthermore, according to his reading of world history, the future seemed to indicate that nation-states would be replaced by communities which were linked by similar traditions, ideology or interests.

To those who had argued that Brazil would make it alone as a world power, Colonel Mattos replied that few Brazilians shared this opinion; in fact, it was an opinion held more often by foreigners.⁷³ In contrast,

⁷⁰"Portugal na África" A Defesa Nacional, Janeiro-
Fevereiro 1962, pp. 63-65.

⁷¹Size, 10,650,000 square kilometers, larger than China and second only to the Soviet Union. Population, 85,000,000, more than any European country with the exception of the USSR. Carlos Meira Mattos, Boletim de Informações, Julho 1961, pp. 19-21.

⁷²Ibid., p. 20.

⁷³He cites Adolph Berle, Tides of Crisis and the Frenchman Tibor Mende, Entre la Peur et l'Espoir. Ibid.,

what he had in mind was a union of Brazil and Portugal "in a transcendental politico-strategic enterprise" which would become one of the multi-national, multi-racial units that Arnold Toynbee had envisioned as the future great powers. Mattos added, "This immense community, with bases in four continents, would have as a collective force two very powerful factors--cultural and linguistic unity."

The final problem, that of Portuguese colonialism, he tackled more directly. "The task of influencing Portuguese diplomacy to form a community of free and satisfied peoples /in Africa/ would fall to Brazil. In any other form it /the Luso-Brazilian Community/ would be unreal and ephemeral." And on this he hoped to rest Brazil's African diplomacy:⁷⁴

Through the Luso-Brazilian Community we could approach the new African nations, offering them our experience as a young nation with a recent colonial past which is just leaving the underdeveloped phase, which has not been burdened with racial problems, and which is interested in trade and economic ties with its neighbors across the Atlantic Ocean.

However, Portugal continued to carry on as she always had, and as time passed this outline of future

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 21.

Brazilian prospects in Africa seemed more and more naive and unlikely. Nevertheless, the vision of a Portugal transformed through the idealism of Brazil continued to capture the imagination of those moderates who could neither reject Portugal nor accept her as she was.

Humberto Castello Branco, as President of Brazil, addressed himself to this problem on several occasions. In a speech given to the new foreign service officers he stated:⁷⁵

Perhaps the solution resides in the gradual formation of an Afro-Luso-Brazilian community in which the Brazilian presence might economically fortify the system. Any realistic policy of de-colonialization cannot refuse to recognize the problem of Portugal or the dangers of a premature Portuguese disengagement /from Africa/"

And in a press interview given October 30, 1964, he noted:⁷⁶

In relation to Portuguese overseas policy, Brazil reconfirms its position on self-determination /for the Portuguese colonies/, making clear its conviction that Portugal will know how to resolve its problems in the spirit of its own historic traditions-- traditions that presided over the formation of the Brazilian national soul...

Castello Branco seems to be saying that Brazil could not endorse Portuguese colonialism, but could hope that

⁷⁵From a speech at Itamarati to the graduating diplomats, reprinted in Textos e Declarações sobre Política Externa (published by the Ministério das Relações Exteriores), Julho 31, 1964, p. 12.

⁷⁶Quoted in Revista Brasileira de Política

Portugal would do for Africa what it did for Brazil-- allow independence since there seemed to be no other rational choice. Castello Branco's views of Brazil's role in Portuguese-African relations, expressed in 1964 and 1965, are considerably less optimistic than those of Meira Mattos and other moderates expressed several years earlier. There was, indeed, a general trend among moderates to temper their hopes with the passing years. This was no doubt a result of the intransigence of the Portuguese who showed no eagerness to act on Brazilian suggestions. In fact, in 1965, they had not even allowed a Brazilian trade consulate to be set up in Luanda, Angola.

Techniques and Effectiveness: Any group of officers who have as wide a range of opinions on foreign policy as the Febistas did would naturally attempt to influence policy. In the case of the moderate officers, the techniques changed with their coming to power. After April 1, 1964, they literally had one of their own men in a position to formulate their ideas into policy. We, however, are interested in the methods which they employed before the acquisition of direct power.

In the first place, they were not quite as passive as the leftist officers. While the leftists were more or less satisfied with their control of the Clube

Internacional, Março 1965, pp. 88-89.

Militar, the FEB officers sought to obtain many points of influence within the military world. Of prime value was the Escola Superior da Guerra, founded in fact by moderate officers after the war (August 20, 1949). The school was established so that officers and civilians could participate in seminars dealing with problems involved in national security.⁷⁷

The ESG was given much credit for the success of the 1964 Revolution. Major Arnaldo Machado da Veiga, an officer then attached to the Army Chief of Staff, argued that the ESG took the lead in a "patriotic campaign of democratic preaching that would awaken the nation and the people to a correct understanding of the gravity of the Brazilian situation."⁷⁸ He added that even more importantly, ESG pronouncements made a great impact on the Army's Command School and on the Army Chief of Staff itself. From there, the pronouncements were "rebroadcast" to other military schools, arsenals, garrisons, etc.⁷⁹

The success of the moderates was obvious except within the Clube Militar. In the late fifties and early sixties the moderate officers split with the conservatives

⁷⁷Umberto Peregrino, "O Pensamento da Escola Superior de Guerra" Cadernos Brasileiros, Novembre-Dezembre 1966, pp. 29-38.

⁷⁸Major Arnaldo José Machado da Veiga, "O Exército e a Revolução Democrática de 31 Março 1964" A Defesa Nacional, Julho-Agosto 1965, pp. 51-59, and p. 58.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 58.

of the Cruzada Democrática and attempted to run their own candidates for Clube officers. What happened in the 1958 Clube elections was fairly typical of those electoral contests. Castello Branco himself was the candidate for Clube President. The election was spirited, but Castello's blue ticket lost to the nationalists' yellow ticket 8,972 to 7,697. The moderate officers were far from satisfied with their showing. They claimed that the officers who voted for their ticket faced reprisals from the pro-nationalist Minister of War Teixeira Lott.⁸⁰ Furthermore, the moderate officers charged that since the balloting was not secret (that is, the officer voted in the presence of others), the local commandant knew precisely who had voted for whom. This they contended made the voting officer, who is often married, has children, and has bought a house, "think twice before voting against a ticket that represents in the last analysis the thought of the government,"⁸¹ The result was a

⁸⁰Paradoxically, Marshall Lott was a member of the FEB. His nationalist tendencies, however, were carefully circumscribed. For example, as a candidate for president in the 1960 elections, he drew cheers from his nationalist (including Communist) supporters when he called for a limitation on profit remittances of foreign companies in Brazil (Novos Rumos, Março 20-26, 1959, p. 1) and when he criticized the United States for its policy toward the underdeveloped world. (Ultima Hora, Agosto 7, 1958, pp. 25-26). However, the nationalists disapproved of his inconsistency in refusing to retie relations with the Soviet Union. (Novos Rumos, Julho 24-30, 1959, p. 1).

⁸¹Quoted in Jornal do Brasil, Maio 23, 1958, p. 4. There were other complaints about the electoral process: 1. The Minister of War made a thousand sergeants into

deep and abiding distrust of the Clube Militar by the moderate officers. After the 1964 Revolution, it was not surprising that the new government took the Clube out of politics. Candidates for office were no longer allowed to discuss political issues, and although in 1964 there were three tickets, they were so similar in outlook that General Cordeiro de Farias announced a plan to have only one candidate. He reasoned that since the three candidates "represent the same thought, that is, democratic, there is no reason why a single ticket cannot be presented, uniting the whole military family and avoiding an unnecessary fight."⁸² The dullness of the campaign was also reflected in the low turnout of voting officers⁸³--a turnout which no doubt pleased the

second lieutenants in 1957. These obliging new junior officers were of course eligible to vote. 2. Army communications were used to endorse the yellow ticket. 3. National radio was used to disclose returns from the interior (favorable to the yellows), putting psychological pressure on Rio officers. 4. Four hundred naval officers were not allowed to vote on a technicality. 5. The yellow ticket was given government funds for campaign costs.

⁸²Quoted in Jornal do Brasil, Maio 9, 1964, p. 5.

⁸³The winner, Muniz de Aragão, explained the abstention (two-thirds of the officers in Rio did not vote) with this statement: "Before, two tickets always ran, identified with pink nationalism and with democracy. This provoked the radicalization of the membership and was a great boost to the competition. This time the three tickets categorically do not present antagonistic ideologies, which diminished the interest of the Clube's membership. Also, the adoption of the secret ballot, which obliged the election to be held in a few special places...This can be corrected for the

revolutionary officers. The coup de grace to the Clube Militar as a political institution came when the Revista do Clube Militar, the little journal which in the past had set off so many controversies, was suspended in 1965 and was replaced a full year later by a drab, eight page monthly, Notícias de Clube Militar, which printed nothing of any political interest.⁸⁴

The moderate officers were extremely influential in the area of foreign policy. As members of the FEB, they automatically had great prestige and preference in advancement. Thus they were soon in positions of power. Since many of them had advanced military educations, they were often editors of military journals and were able to control the political content. High position also meant being attached to the Army schools as faculty members, and here too they could mold the opinions of young officers. Finally, they were in a position to be members of the Army General Staff, and could be close to the political action in Rio.

next election by distributing the voting boxes to all units of the armed forces." Statement in Última Hora, Maio 22, 1964, p. 3. Incidentally, Muniz de Aragão, after serving his term as President of the Clube, stepped into the position of Minister of Education in 1966. See Jornal do Brasil, Setembro 10, 1966, p. 4.

⁸⁴I have checked all copies of the Notícias from its initial appearance until March, 1967. As an aside, although the publications of the Clube Militar have avoided all political comment or even political information, the old FEB controlled journals have continued with their usual format.

The result was that at any time when civilian and military met to discuss foreign policy, the moderates were able to be there to articulate their position. For example, at a seminar-discussion held at the Escola Superior da Guerra, in the presence of Itamarati officials and the military aide of President Kubitschek, General Castello Branco (then head of the ESG) stated his opposition to resuming relations with the Soviet Union.⁸⁵ Such an opinion, no doubt, was a clear signal to President Kubitschek to pursue his policy with utmost caution, which he did.

The only attempt at influence at which the moderates clearly failed was in the electoral competition within the Clube Militar; their control of the Brazilian armed forces, however, was never in doubt. And furthermore, despite the radicalness of the rhetoric of the politica externa independente in the years 1961-1964, the government's actions on the whole were not particularly revolutionary. The dampening effect of the highly placed FEB officers was no doubt in large part responsible.

The Linha Dura

One last faction of the military, the so-called linha dura (literally, hard line) has evoked more comment

⁸⁵The principal speaker was former Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha who spoke for recognition. In Jornal do Brasil, Maio 18, 1958, p. 4.

and less firm information than any political phenomenon in contemporary Brazil. And yet their power is unquestionable, for they were able to prevent Castello Branco from choosing his own successor (possibly another Febista); instead he had to accept Arturo Costa e Silva, who, if he belonged to any faction, belonged to the linha dura.⁸⁶ The precise extent of their power, even their membership and beliefs is still somewhat obscure. Nevertheless, a beginning can be made to clarify the little that is known of this Army clique.

Background: Who belongs to the linha dura? This is not an easy question to answer. One method is to use a rough process of elimination. Thus, if a senior military officer (that is, colonel and above) has not served in FEB, has not expressed left-wing nationalist opinions, and has not been politically apathetic, then he may very well be in the linha dura.⁸⁷ This hypothesis does yield some insights into the nature of these officers. In general, they have never served outside of Brazil nor have they been known for their pursuit of advanced study, at home

⁸⁶There is good evidence to suggest that he never belonged to any group. His actions as President and his disagreements with the hard line officers on matters of state (for example, the closing of Congress) do not really suggest a commitment to any faction's ideology.

⁸⁷This leaves the problem of the junior officers too young to be in the FEB and too cautious to be leftist at this time. Their political beliefs are still largely unknown, but research is now being carried out on this particular aspect of Brazilian politics.

or abroad. The linha dura officers tend to fall into the rank of colonel. Without combat service to propel them upwards in the military, and without the political favoritism of the João Goulart regime, these officers have managed only very slowly to work their way up the ranks.⁸⁸

Older more senior officers have also been identified with the linha dura including, of course, President Costa e Silva. Among them are Odýlio Denys, Oswaldo Cordeiro Farias, Gabrielo Grum Moss, Sylvio Heck and Carlos Penna Boto.⁸⁹ These senior officers were not really members of a well integrated group, but belonged to an older class of officers who held on to their conservative opinions, and who acted on them as individuals rather than as representatives of a faction within the

⁸⁸Colonels Francisco Boaventura, Helio Lemos, Almerindo Raposo, and Rui Castro have all been identified as key members of the linha dura by the Brazilian press. See Jornal do Brasil, Setembro 20, 1967, p. 3; Tribuna da Imprensa, Setembro 21, 1967, p. 3; Correio da Manhã, Outubro 5, 1967, p. 1. This last article stated that these same Colonels were forming the Green Lance Group (Grupo Lança Verde) which would combat those that would betray the revolution. On the same day the Minister of War, Lira Tavares (a Febista), prohibited under penalty of "rigorous punishment" any political comment by any military officer. Correio da Manhã, Outubro 5, 1967, p. 1.

⁸⁹General Denys and Grum Moss, plus Admiral Sylvio Heck were Chiefs of Staff under Jânio Quadros, and they refused to allow João Goulart to succeed to power. Cordeiro Farias, a member of FEB, but a man of more extreme views, felt, for example, that World War III was inevitable and that the Christian West must win. Admiral Penna Boto is noted for his long standing

military.⁹⁰ In general, the linha dura must be viewed as a group of officers who have more or less coalesced since the 1964 Revolution, but a group which is "still evolving and is still without organizational form..."⁹¹

Ideology: Unscrambling the linha dura ideology is nearly as difficult as identifying and characterizing its members. The difficulty becomes even greater when attempting to analyze the group's foreign policy ideas. The linha dura officers, not noted for their high degree of articulation, have had little to say that is directly relevant to foreign policy.

Attitudes can be inferred, however, from their general ideology regarding the conduct of domestic affairs. The linha dura was one particular faction of the military that was spawned by the 1964 Revolution. In general, these officers were the most vigorous in their desire to purge Brazil of the old corrupt style of politics. Their motto was never to return to the old forms under any circumstances. The result has been a sudden restiveness on their part whenever there have been hints

presidency of the Brazilian Anti-Communist Crusade.

⁹⁰See, for example, the actions of Generals Denys, Grum Moss and Heck in the presidential succession crisis of 1961. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, pp. 206-216.

⁹¹Wilson Figueiredo, "A Retirada da Linha Dura" Jornal do Brasil, Outubro 22-23, 1967, p. 6. This Sunday supplement article is perhaps the best informed short piece on the linha dura.

of returning the power of the political life of the nation to the old politicians.⁹²

At the root of the linha dura's preoccupation with ridding Brazil of the old political style is a tense, volatile nationalism. The old politicians are despised because they have sought personal gain while Brazil should have been achieving greatness. The betrayal of Brazil's grandeur by the petty has proven unbearable to officers nurtured in the conviction that their country is potentially a super power with her own claim to special dignity.

This type of nationalism, of course, has its effects on their foreign policy attitudes. In any situation in which the dignity and sovereignty of Brazil is called into question, the linha dura officers will vigorously lobby for nationalist measures. This may well involve actions directed at Western countries, including the United States. There is evidence to suggest that during the Brazilian-American conflict over the importation of instant coffee into the United States,

⁹²This was especially true after the state elections of 1965 when linha dura officers wanted to void a number of the elections. They did not get everything that they wanted, but they were able to get a candidate to succeed Castello Branco who was their choice and not his. The restiveness was also apparent when the frente ampla was beginning to arouse interest. See Wilson Figueiredo, Jornal do Brasil, p. 6. They were of course in the forefront of the military outrage directed at the Brazilian Congress for permitting Moreira Alves to remain undisciplined for his insults to the

it was the linha dura which placed pressures on the President and the Foreign Ministry not to make any concessions in the negotiations.⁹³

To be sure the linha dura officers periodically employ catch phrases such as "defending the Western Christian world against atheistic and Eastern Communism," but their only real anti-Communism is directed at the domestic Communist threat.⁹⁴ Thus, the members of the linha dura, unlike the Febistas, do not look upon the Western community as a regularly interacting system of nation-states open to negotiation for mutual resolution of problems, but as a group of discrete countries vying with each other for commercial and political advantages. And it is for Brazil to assert her presence without apology or withdrawal.

armed forces. See Frances M. Foland, "The Prospects for Brazil," The New Leader, January 20, 1969, pp. 5-8.

⁹³Berilo Dantas, Última Hora, Novembre 13, 1967, p. 2. The instant coffee dispute revolved around the building of two instant coffee plants in Brazil (with United States' aid). At the International Coffee Agreement negotiations in London, the Brazilians announced that they would sell instant coffee below the world price. The State Department, representing the interests of domestic coffee processors, protested. Pressures within Brazil began building quickly for the government to avoid compromise with the Americans on the issue.

⁹⁴Helio Jaguaribe, "A Renúncia do Presidente Quadros e Crise Política Brasileira" Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais (Rio de Janeiro), No. 1 (Novembre 1961), pp. 272-311. The author details the attitudes of one officer, Cordeiro Farias.

Techniques and Effectiveness: Linha dura techniques are not especially subtle. They have not bothered to inculcate their viewpoints from points of power within the military structure. Rather, they have attempted to force their opinions on policy makers, and occasionally they have succeeded in imposing their wishes. It may be said, however, that their success has been mainly in the area of domestic policy. They have helped to prevent the return of civilians to complete control, and indeed, have steadily whittled down civilian participation in power since the Revolution of 1964. In foreign policy, their efforts have been impositions upon those in power of their own highly nationalistic viewpoint, as various issues have arisen. This pattern seems likely to continue unless the linha dura becomes a more defined and cohesive faction of the military.

Conclusions

The Brazilian military was directly involved in policy-making long before 1964. It is not likely that it will withdraw in the future. Participation in decision-making has extended itself into the field of foreign policy. This in part because of the blurred line between foreign policy and national security. The latter topic, of course, is the armed forces' raison d'etre, and the

most ardent anti-militarist would not deny them that interest. However, the Brazilian military's interest in foreign affairs goes beyond even the broadest definition of national security. The military has in short become one more factor in the general process of foreign policy decision making.

The Brazilian military has not been a politically homogenous body--far from it. In the last two decades, three distinct groups of politicized officers have emerged. Each faction varies considerably in regard to its members' backgrounds, its views on foreign policy, and the methods by which it seeks to impose its ideas on the formally responsible decision makers. In 1964, two of these factions virtually eliminated the third (the left wing nationalists) through forced retirement of scores of officers. It is unlikely that this group will return to a position of influence in the near future.

The surviving military factions should flourish, however. But they have found themselves in conflict which no doubt will continue. The clashes that have occurred have usually been connected with domestic policy although they have their differences on foreign policy as well. How acute these differences will become, and who will emerge in the dominant position cannot be stated with great certainty. It can be said, however, that

the military will continue to be a force to reckon with in foreign policy making, and that civilian decision makers, if they wish to retain control over policy will have to continue to recognize the military's role. If they are alert to their opportunities they may even profitably exploit intra- and inter-service rivalries in order to maximize their power over shaping Brazil's course in the international community.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONGRESS: THE SOMETIME CRITIC

The Brazilian Congress has virtually ceased to exist.¹ Yet it was at one time part of the foreign policy-making process. That alone makes it worth study. Moreover, the Brazilian Congress may pick up where it left off, and its part in making foreign policy will continue to evolve.

It should be stated that the role of the Congress was not large, certainly not decisive in the

¹ On September 4, 1968, Deputy Moreira Alves, a member of the opposition party, announced on the floor of the Chamber that Brazil's "military leaders .. are practicing violence and maintaining this country under a regime of oppression." His specific recommendation was a civilian boycott of the parades on Independence Day, September 7. The reaction in military circles was one of bitter resentment. The government, at first hesitant, then under pressure, asked the Congress to waive Alves' immunity so that he could be placed on trial for endangering the national security. With all the skill at its command, the Congress managed to delay the vote until adjournment time. President Costa e Silva convened an emergency session in November, and to everyone's surprise the Congress on December 12 refused the Presidential request. It was "recessed" for an indefinite period on the following day by decree. Frances M. Foland, "The Prospects for Brazil," The New Leader, Jan. 20, 1969, pp. 5-8. Recently, the Congress was convened to approve the transfer of power from the stricken Chief Executive, Arturo Costa e Silva to General Emilio Garrastazu Medici--former commander of the III Army. The selection of Medici was made, in fact, by the service chiefs with Congress playing the small part of legitimator. It should be pointed out, however, that the Brazilian military still feels it is necessary for

conduct of foreign affairs. Yet like so many other groups in Brazilian political life, the Congress in the last fifteen years had begun to test its power in this area. And in the future, Brazilian foreign policy may well be influenced by the country's legislators.

This chapter proposes to study how the Brazilian Congress has organized itself for the consideration of foreign affairs. Next, the formal constitutional powers of the Congress in regard to foreign policy will be outlined. Third, the actual usage of these powers along with the more informally based rights and privileges of the legislature will be examined. Fourth, the evolution of the Congressional influence will be considered with an evaluation of the role of the Congress as an active participant in the arena of foreign policy-making.

Organization

Like most legislatures the Brazilian Congress has organized itself into committees in order to expedite its work. And like most, both houses had committees dealing especially with foreign affairs. In the Senate this body was the Foreign Relations Committee (Comissão das Relações Exteriores). In the Chamber of Deputies it went by various names, including the Committee on Diplomacy and ultimately, the Foreign Relations

the Congress to perform this role. See the Boletim Especial, October 27 through October 31, 1969 and Gabriel Almond, Comparative Politics, pp. 137-138.

Committee². The Committees varied in size, but they usually numbered about ten. All members, including the chairman, were selected formally by vote of the whole chamber. In practice they were selected through arrangement of the party leaders before the convening of the session of Congress.³

Committee membership tended to vary considerably in composition from Congress to Congress since no attempt was made to operate it on the basis of the seniority system.⁴ Unlike his American counterpart, a Brazilian legislator did not join a committee and then slowly work his way up to a powerful chairmanship. A Chairman in one session of the Congress may not even have been a member of the Committee in the previous session. Thus Chairmen were chosen on criteria other

² Boletim Especial (Brazilian Embassy: Washington, D.C.) March 29, 1967, p. 2. Also Jornal do Brasil, Maio 23, 1958, p. 9.

³ Jornal do Brasil, Março 21, 1963.

⁴ This was especially true of the Foreign Relations Committee. Occasionally, other committees which sometime considered matters of foreign policy, like the National Security Committee of the Chamber, had similar variation but their membership generally remained more stable. Their stability is probably a reflection of the interests of Brazilian Congressmen and their constituencies. Since foreign policy, as will be seen later in this chapter, has not always been a major concern of the Congress, Committees dealing exclusively with foreign affairs tend to be peripheral. Domestic issues are of greater importance and prestige.

than seniority. The selection may have been based on the reputation of the legislator for his expertise in foreign matters. It may be that a favor was owed to the Chairman designate. In any case, membership and chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committees tended to be ephemeral.

In addition to the Foreign Relations Committees proper, semi-permanent inter-party groupings of Deputies and Senators would take more than a casual interest in foreign policy. Since the Brazilian parties were heterogeneous ideologically, similar-minded men from a number of parties would coalesce for political action. The right wing Ação Democrática announced in November 1961 its desire to have Foreign Minister San Thiago Dantas answer questions concerning Brazil's refusal in the OAS to vote for a motion recognizing the dangers of Communist subversion in Latin America. Deputy Dirceu Cardoso, chairman of the group, stated: "He ought to express clearly whether our position continues to favor the Western bloc."⁵ And the Frente Nacionalista could always be counted on to denounce in routine fashion any treaty with the United States or any fresh concession to foreign investment in Brazil. The formal power of these two groups, other than influencing the opinion of the Congress, was limited.

⁵ Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 18, 1961, p. 3

The Constitutional Powers

The Brazilian Congress wielded considerable power in the running of foreign relations by virtue of the Constitution.⁶ Most of this power, it might be added, resided in the Senate. In the first place, the Senate had the power under Articles 63, 66 and 102 of the 1946 Constitution⁷ to advise and consent on a large range of subjects. All treaties and conventions⁸ had to be approved by the Senate; it declared war and made peace, approved ambassadorial

⁶ For commentary on constitutional powers, see J. H. Rodrigues, Interesse Nacional, pp. 85-86. For 1967 constitution see Osny Duarte Pereira, ed., A Constituição do Brasil, 1967, (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1967), pp. 416-467. A certain amount of confusion is caused by referring to the Congress' "constitutional powers". In fact, since 1946 the country has had two constitutions which in turn have been modified enormously by supplementary provisions. The most important to the Congress have been the 1946 constitution, that constitution as modified by act of Congress after the resignation of Jânio Quadros, and the 1967 Constitution.

⁷ The 1946 Constitution was effective from 1946-1967 with the exception of the period August 1961 - January 1963. In 1961 extensive revisions were made which were recalled in 1963. In April, 1964 changes were again made, but these did not alter the Senate's power in regard to foreign policy.

⁸ The terms "treaties and conventions" is the language used by Article 87, section 7 of the 1946 constitution. These terms have come to mean in diplomatic practice the most formal of agreements of a contractual nature made between states and organizations of state, and are often used interchangeably. There is now a tendency among experts to apply the term "convention" to multi-lateral agreements of a technical nature. Treaties and conventions may be contrasted to the more informal protocols and modus vivendi which rarely require

appointments and permitted the transfer and stationing of foreign troops.⁹ The power of the Chamber to influence foreign policy, on the other hand, was limited to legislation which affected such policy.

This legislative power, however, was broad enough to involve both the Chamber and the Senate deeply in foreign affairs. There has been, first of all, the budgetary power. The President and the Foreign Ministry have had to make yearly requests from Congress for the funds necessary to conduct the external affairs of Brazil. The budget is legally subject to criticism and revision by both houses. The Chamber acts on the budget first although its power over it is equal to the Senate's. Secondly, the Congress may pass particular legislative acts which affect foreign policy. The power of Congress to pass legislation is limited by the fact that the President must, by constitutional provision, introduce all legislation except that which involves the internal

formal ratification of a legislature. See Biswanath Sen, A Diplomat's Handbook of International Law and Practice, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 439-461. Also Ernest Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (4th ed.; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), pp. 324-327.

⁹ Carlos A. Dunshee de Abranches, "A Política Exterior do Senado" Jornal do Brasil, April 27, 1963, p. 6. The author also argues that the judiciary can involve itself in foreign policy. He cites the example of the court's action against the Brazilian Communist

affairs of Congress. Thus, the bill which reorganized Itamarati in 1961 was originated in the Foreign Ministry. The President introduced it into Congress, and Congress ratified it. The re-structuring of Itamarati is by law the responsibility of the Congress. Nevertheless, the President must introduce such legislation. In this particular bill the Foreign Ministry was divided along geographical zones rather than along the functional political and economic sectors.¹⁰ In addition, the bill raised the legal number of functionaries which were allowed at Itamarati. It also provided that further legislation would have to be passed in order to expand the personnel again.¹¹

Party in 1946-47 which no doubt had a small part in the deterioration of Soviet-Brazilian relations up to and including the diplomatic break in 1947. I believe, however, that the author would be hard put to name another incident in which the court had some control over foreign policy. The truth is, the judiciary's role is small enough in Brazil as a whole, and on foreign policy it is microscopic. I have for this reason excluded an extended analysis of the court's function in foreign policy-making.

¹⁰ See Chapter VIII, p. for discussion of this bill. See also Chapter VII, p. .

¹¹ Jornal do Brasil, Maio 20, 1961, p. 4. How the Foreign Ministry can legally seek more personnel now that the Congress has been suspended is one of those knotty problems that arise when a political system is no longer predictable. A suitable jeito no doubt will be found by the Brazilians. See Chapter VIII, p. 79-84 for a discussion of personnel recruitment problems within Itamarati.

Another piece of legislation to affect foreign relations was the profit remittance law of August 1964. The new regime, of course, very much wanted this law in order to encourage investment flow and thus ease a balance of payments crisis.¹² The bill, which removed limits on remittances¹³ and permitted reinvested profits to be considered as part of the original capital base for calculating future repatriation of profits, was only narrowly passed by the Chamber,¹⁴ 152-146.

Thirdly, the Congress may, in some cases, create policy through omission of action. The legislators, up to their "recess" in 1968, had yet to approve a foreign investment guarantee law, introduced by the President, which protected the investor from inconvertibility, expropriation, and revolution. The Congress in fact after three years had not even brought it to a vote.

12

There was considerable interaction between the President and the Congress on this bill. See Chapter VII, p. 273, for details.

13

Except if the government declares an exchange crisis (a rather common occurrence in Brazil), then a 10% limit applies. That is, no more than 10% of the capital base may be remitted in one year.

14

Hispanic American Report, October 4, 1964, p. 760.

The Use of Power: Formal and Informal

These are the formal powers, and on paper they are considerable. They certainly are not inferior to the United States Senate which has quite a lively role in policy-making. But the central question is: What use is made of the formal powers? Are they employed vigorously or are advise and consent mere formalities?

The initial impression is the latter. One sometimes runs into evidence such as the following. A certain M. Vladimir do Amaral Murtinho, Chief of the Congressional Relations Service of the Foreign Ministry, issued his year-end report on the "accomplishments" of Congress in the foreign policy area. He was happy to report that a new record had been set. First, there was the examination and approval of no less than 52 treaties and conventions.¹⁵ Second, the Senate had also approved of 32 chiefs of mission - roughly half of the total number of Brazil's ambassadors.¹⁶ Such industry is no doubt admirable

¹⁵ This seemingly high number is because, unlike the United States, many international agreements of a less formal nature are not taken care of by "executive agreements". Thus, approval of rather minor conventions is necessary. This, however, is expedited by the fact that an approving vote only requires a simple majority of those legislators present. Among the 52 "treaties" were such items as agreements on protection of workers dealing with ion radiation and exchanges of publications. Ibid.

¹⁶ Quoted in Itamaraty, Janeiro, 1965, p. 6, the

in a narrower sense, but it does cause doubt as to whether the legislature is playing a creative role in foreign policy-making when their sole distinction seems to be how much they approve in less and less time.

This, however, is too hasty a judgement. The role of Congress is in fact more complicated than that. The formal powers of the Congress (really the Senate), have been wielded with considerable influence, but only at certain times in the last two decades. Their greatest use has been in periods of sharp innovation in foreign policy by the executive. This was confined to the few months of the Quadros movement, a period of time during the Goulart regime, and the first unsettling weeks of the Castello Branco administration.

Under Quadros, of course, the Brazilian Congress faced the new independent foreign policy. A number of its aspects were indeed unsettling for the conservative and even moderate Congressmen. One point of irritation was Quadros' wholesale (for a Brazilian chief executive) appointment of non-career ambassadors. In fact, the appointment of a close friend and early supporter of

house organ of the Foreign Ministry, Janeiro, 1956, p. 6. This valuable little journal, unfortunately published only intermittently, is full of the gossipy bits about the Ministry and its foreign policy-making that cannot be found elsewhere. The high number of ambassadors needing confirmation is because of Itamarati's practice of rotating ambassadors every two years.

Jânio Quadros to the ambassadorial spot in Bonn caused a furor. The appointee was a journalist with definite neutralist leanings, and the result was an astonishingly negative vote on confirmation - almost unique in Brazilian diplomatic history.¹⁷

And even in far less controversial cases the Senate became aggressive, at least when non-career diplomats were being considered. The case of Raimundo de Sousa Dantas, journalist and aide of Jânio Quadros, was an example of this. Sousa Dantas had been selected for the post in Accra, Ghana. He also would have been Brazil's first black ambassador. What he received from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was a grilling for two hours with a number of hostile questions. He received their approval by a 7 to 1 vote and was later confirmed by 30 to 18 count in plenary session - not an overwhelming majority, but the biggest one received by a non-career appointment.¹⁸

¹⁷ Carlos Abranches considered it a spectacular show of opposition to Quadros' policy rather than a normal use of Senate power. Perhaps this is true, but it confirms the present thesis that Congress' power only came into play at moments of stress. See his article: Abranches, Jornal do Brasil, Abril 27, 1963, p. 6

¹⁸ Perhaps an indication of his relative success can be seen in his willingness to be co-opted into the system. He said after his confirmation: "I feel honored in serving Itamarati ... I love its traditions without prejudice to its renovating spirit. In both, I will find inspiration" Quoted in Jornal do Brasil, Julho 13, 1961, p. 4. Ironically perhaps, Sousa Dantas'

The whole problem of non-career appointments (made in the first place because Jânio Quadros wanted to be assured that his new diplomacy was not being modified by the smooth talking professionals) required the Chief Executive and Itamarati to make a vigorous appeal to Congress. Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos, himself a moderate in most things and, a friend of many in the Senate, went regularly to the Senate chamber to defend the new appointments policy. He invariably cooled tempers and swung votes, but he was met with hostile questions. Without Afonso Arinos' careful cultivation it is likely that Jânio Quadros would have run into even more trouble.¹⁹

stay in Ghana was a very unhappy one as he later reported; it was only years later that he wanted to return to Africa at all, and then only briefly to attend the Negro Arts Festival in Dakar, Senegal. See Raimundo Sousa Dantas "Miragem Africana" Cadernos Brasileiros, Janeiro-Febreiro, 1964, pp. 5-19.

¹⁹ For details of one of those occasions, see Jornal do Brasil, Maio 17, 1961, p. 3, Maio 18, 1961, p. 3, and Maio 20, 1961, p. 4. Afonso Arinos suggested (as a solution to the problem caused by the legal requirement that no more than 10% of Brazil's ambassadors be non-career) that the number of personnel be increased at Itamarati--a number that is also fixed by act of Congress. Here Arinos quite cleverly pointed out that one of the reasons for Quadros' appointment of amateurs was that the Foreign Ministry simply did not have enough warm bodies to fill the new ambassadorial posts being established in Asia and Africa. Arinos' implication had more than a share of truth to it, but Jânio also wanted men of his choosing in the new spots since much of the success of his foreign policy depended on close ties with the new countries.

Approval of ambassadors was not the only Senate responsibility that rose above the routine. There was the matter of treaty approval. This particularly became a matter of controversy under João Goulart over the new trade and diplomatic accords signed with the Communist countries. The fact that Goulart had been on a trade mission to Communist China at the time of Quadros' resignation spurred talk of him being a "crypto-Communist."²⁰ The result was much unhappiness and delay over approving these treaties during his administration. A leader of the opposition, Raimundo Padilha, a powerful Deputy with a long term interest in foreign policy, and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee led in demanding a wholesale review of the cultural accords with Eastern European countries. Padilha stated that since Brazil was a member of the free world, he did not believe that his country should send any student to a nation where freedom of inquiry did not exist. What would be the effect of sending Brazilians to study in Communist countries? He first demanded a justification from Itamarati's Cultural Division. The Ministry, however,

²⁰Goulart's most influential foreign minister, San Thiago Dantas, would not escape that appellation either. In fact, it was pinned on him by Deputy Eurípedes Cardoso Menezes who accused him of being an "authentic spokesman of the Kremlin." A spokesman for Itamarati denied it. Jornal do Brasil, Maio 16, 1962,

pointed out that no answer to that question could be made since the conventions had not been approved by Congress and the exchange program had not gone into effect. The accords had indeed been signed in 1961 by the Foreign Ministry, but the Senate had not ratified them. Apparently Deputy Padilha found this hardly to his satisfaction and the cultural treaties have not yet been approved after over seven years.²¹ And much could be said of other commercial and diplomatic treaties and conventions signed initially by the foreign office but remaining unratified by Congress.

If an unhappy Congress could block the efforts of the regime in power to make new approaches to the East, it could surely do the same for approaches to the West. Under Castello Branco, a much desired piece of legislation, which would change the profits remittance law in order to encourage new North American and Western European investment, was barely passed in the Chamber by six votes. And there were many cries of outrage at the passage. In addition, a bill to guarantee foreign investment has yet to be approved by the Congress.²²

p. 4.

²¹Details in Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 31, 1963, p. 5.

²²This despite the fact that the Congress' most vociferous nationalists (at least on the left) had been purged shortly after the 1964 Revolution.

No regime has been able to escape the displeasure of the Congress if its sense of propriety has been offended. The formal powers could be and have been exercised. The use of these powers, however, is by no means a routine action on the part of the Deputies and Senators; rather, their use is limited to situations of crisis, and particularly when the Congress feels itself challenged. Nevertheless, the result has been a fairly serious involvement by the Congress in the making of foreign policy.

In addition to these formal powers, the Brazilian Congress has in the last two decades assumed some extra powers; extra, that is, to any legal document. They are, or rather were, powers that were generally agreed to by other agencies involved in the making of foreign policy.

There was first the powers to recommend. This had only been recently developed and was infrequently practiced. Yet it was the germ of an attitude that in time could acquire significance. Already in 1960, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on its own initiative recommended that Brazil break diplomatic relations with Trujillo's Dominican Republic because of an invasion of Brazilian chancery grounds there by secret police. The police, in pursuit of four Dominicans seeking political asylum, shot and killed two of the men and wounded the

rest inside the embassy gate. The Senate protest and recommendation to the Foreign Minister carried no legal weight, but it created public outrage. and Itamarati, in fact, did issue a protest and withdrew ambassador Jaime de Barros Gomes for "consultations."²³

Another power is that of investigation. Brazil's Congress, either through the established committees or through ad hoc commissions, was wielding this power more and more before 1968. At times the investigations infringed on foreign policy. This usually took the form of a committee investigation of foreign investment. Until the Revolution of 1964 these were often chaired by ambitious, nationalistic Deputies intent on proving the iniquities of the international trusts and monopolies.²⁴ Investigation of other foreign policy problems, however, was not developed at all by the Congress except in a peripheral manner.

These two recently developed powers--recommendation and investigation--are a part of the growing tendency of Congress to challenge the power of the President.

²³Details in the Hispanic-American Report, September 1960, p. 454.

²⁴Congressmen Sergio Magalhães and Gabriel Passos come immediately to mind. The latter for his efforts was made Minister of Mines and Energy under Quadros and then promptly died. A typical ad hoc committee was one established in July 1960 to investigate Hanna Mining Corporation's bid to work the Rio Doce iron deposits. Hanna's claim that mining would provide 1,000

This tendency has been discussed in relation to several periods of turmoil in recent Brazilian history. Quadros' appointment of non-career ambassadors aroused the ire of Congress; the approval of treaties with Communist countries under Goulart was controversial; and the narrow passage of the profits remittance law under Castello Branco indicated the Congress' willingness to conflict with the President in times of challenge. The powers of investigation and recommendation, however, infringe on Presidential power in less turbulent times. Although these tools have not been used extensively to date, the Congress has shown an obvious ability to thwart the President when they disapproved of his actions.

One major issue thrashed out in the early 1960s, and again an example of the interaction of Congress and President, was the question of responsibility. How much did the executive owe to the legislature? Technically, according to Janio Quadros, the Congress could be legally ignored. This was usually the case, especially in foreign affairs, and the Congress accepted its passivity as a given. Quadros' foreign policy shook many out of this lethargy, but it was not until the succession of

jobs and eventually \$200,000,000 in export earnings was drowned out by the nationalist furor over depletion of natural resources. A nine-man Congressional committee was established and the findings were predictably nationalistic. See Hispanic-American Report, September, 1960, p. 454.

João Goulart to the Presidency that the Congress was in a position to act.

One of the stipulations of those who opposed Goulart was that he could only be allowed to be President if his powers were reduced and his cabinet made responsible to the Congress. A vote of no confidence could force the resignation of the offending minister. Under this system cabinet officers were forced to justify their policies to the Congress. Thus for the first time, the Congress had the power to scrutinize foreign policy, and the power to express active dis-²⁵approval of both the policy and the President.

That power was used. As a carry-over from the Quadros period, João Goulart's independent minded Foreign Minister, San Thiago Dantas, roused the ire of more than one moderate-conservative legislator. He was called repeatedly to testify and to defend his foreign policy-- toward Cuba, the Soviet Union, disarmament, and Portugal. And this is only a partial list. Relations between the Congress and the Foreign Minister had so deteriorated

25

During the brief regime of Jânio Quadros, Congress was also inviting the Foreign Minister to justify his policies. Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos' testimony regarding the appointment of non-career ambassadors has already been mentioned. On another occasion, after the Foreign Relations Committee sent a telegram "requesting" his appearance, Arinos defended Quadros' Cuban policy after Castro's then recent assertion that Cuba was a Socialist republic. Such appearances were not compulsory and Congress had little control over foreign policy-making at this time, but it was a beginning. See

especially between him and the Chamber, that for the first time, the Brazilian Congress had to consider a motion of censure on a matter of foreign policy. After some 50 signatures had been gathered by Deputy Eurípedes Cardoso in the Chamber of Deputies the censure leaders were so confident of success that they asserted that once the motion was passed the entire cabinet would be under moral obligation to ask for a motion of confidence. It was reasoned that since the cabinet as a whole had supported the foreign policy of Dantas, especially in regard to Cuba, they should therefore be subject to the censure power of Congress.²⁶

The motion was not successful. It was defeated 131-44. No doubt the sheer audacity of the Congress in so blatantly interfering in the conduct of foreign affairs, coupled with some adroit backpeddling on the part of Dantas, led to the lopsided margin of victory. But the Congress, in this case, the Chamber of Deputies, had issued a warning.

The Congress did not hold this power for long.

Última Hora, Maio 5, 1961, p. 4.

²⁶For a complete record of San Thiago Dantas' appearances before the Congress and his less than cordial welcome, see Francisco Clementino San Thiago Dantas, Política Exterior Independente (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1962). Ironically enough, San Thiago Dantas was a former Deputy from Rio Grande do Sul. For accounts of the censure motion see Jornal do Brasil, Fevereiro 16, 1962, p. 3, and Última Hora, Maio 30, 1962,

In a plebiscite held in January, 1963, President Goulart had his full presidential powers restored under the 1946 Constitution. But Foreign Ministers were still called up to justify their policy decisions. Even more career officials, including diplomats in the field, were asked questions. In the early months of 1963, some eight ambassadors were questioned, including Alves de Sousa (France), who was grilled for twelve hours on the so-called lobster war.²⁷ Roberto Campos received similar treatment in regard to the deterioration of United States-Brazilian relations. The men of Itamarati could no longer remain as aloof from the legislators as they once had.²⁸

In its last years, the Congress, though of course under restraint, showed some of the same interest in foreign policy which it manifested in the early 1960s. For one thing, the Foreign Minister paid his courtesy calls to the Congress even though they tended to be meetings with the party leaders.²⁹ For another, the Senate carried out its constitutional duties with perhaps as much

p. 2.

²⁷See Chapter VII, p.269 for complete discussion of this "war."

²⁸José Rafael Fernandes, "Itamarati está com Congresso: rigor na política exterior," Jornal do Brasil, Junho 9, 1963, p. 20.

²⁹See, for example, Boletim Especial, Março 1967,

care as it had in the Quadros-Goulart years. For example, it approved the treaty to "de-nuclearize" Latin America, but it warned the administration that this treaty was only a first step in a problem that appeared to be without a viable solution.³⁰

And officials from Itamarati were still being requested to testify on the nature of Brazilian policy. When the government of Juan Carlos Ongania of Argentina claimed that its territorial rights extended two hundred miles from the shore, Deputy Ademar Ghisi of Santa Catarina had the Foreign Relations Committee invite the Foreign Minister to explain: whether Itamarati had protested, what the Argentine reaction had been, and if there had been no protest, why not?³¹

Yet the interest and influence of the Congress in foreign policy, especially after 1964, can easily be exaggerated. Far more common perhaps in the last few years were men like Vierra de Melo, the leader of the MDB (the opposition party), hailing the government's

p. 1, for an account of Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto's visit to the Senate.

³⁰ Statement made by Deputy Daniel Faraco of Rio Grande do Sul and reported in Jornal do Brasil, Setembro 14, 1967, p. 11.

³¹ Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 2, 1967, p. 15. Meanwhile the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Rademaker came out in opposition to Deputy Adilio Viana's scheme to claim a similar two hundred miles. The Admiral's reason was that patrolling an additional 188 miles of

handling of the border dispute with Paraguay. In his speech he added that Itamarati's policy was "firm, serene, and right on the mark." In conclusion, he praised Foreign Minister Juraci Magalhães for his exhaustive report on the issue submitted to the Senate.³²

There is one serious problem though that the Congress has encountered--a problem which must be resolved if any of its power (especially its informal power) can be significantly employed. It is the question of information. Traditionally, of course, the conduct of foreign affairs has been the responsibility of the President and the high officials of Itamarati. The Congress, however, with its wakening interest could only perform credibly if it possessed the information relevant to the policy. This basic issue first came up during the last two years of the Kubitschek regime. The Chamber of Deputies' Committee for Foreign Relations voted to ask the President for copies of a confidential Itamarati study on resuming relations with the Soviet Union. The Committee, led by an aggressive chairman, demanded that the information be forwarded and denied that the administration could withhold the report on the grounds sea was beyond the resources of the Brazilian navy.

³²Quoted from Boletim Especial, Maio 31, 1966, p. 1.

that it was a secret matter. The chairman, Rafael Correa de Oliveira, also threatened to bring the Foreign Minister before his committee for questioning if President Kubitschek did not forward the desired information. The President after some delay gave his approval.³³

The Congress has so far been treated as a group, whether the entire body, a party grouping, or a committee is acting. Individuals, however, act alone on foreign policy questions, and sometimes with influence. Usually their action takes the form of long speeches delivered on the floor of the Chamber of the Senate. Lourival Fontes, long time senator and close friend of Getúlio Vargas, habitually delivered speeches on foreign policy. They commonly were anti-American as the one he gave in July of 1959 accusing the United States of "plundering" the hemisphere, intervening in Guatamala, sending Marines to the Caribbean, "sinister meddling" in Argentine and Venezuelan oil, and engaging in "deliberate aggravation" of Brazil's coffee crisis.³⁴

³³According to J.H. Rodrigues, this was a common occurrence during the Empire. He reports that on one occasion Senator Pimenta Bueno, Marques de São Vicente, protested the government's policy of secrecy during a period of crisis (1864) with Great Britain. He stated: I require that the Government send to the Senate, as quickly as it judges possible, copies of the notes and documents that arrived with your knowledge concerning the offer of mediation made by the Portuguese government in our present dispute with England." J.H. Rodrigues, Interesse Nacional e Politica Externa (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1966), p. 85.

³⁴Speech summarized in the Hispanic-American Report,

Individual legislators, of course, still did that sort of thing even in the last years of the Congress. Mario Martins, Senator from Guanabara and a member of the opposition party Movimento Democrática Brasileiro, revealed in December of 1967 that the Pentagon had hatched a plan which would place one-third of the United States population in the Amazon in the event of atomic war. The Senator said that in order to counter the American plan it was necessary to settle in that region immediately, "but not with any military solution." He suggested that the government enlist popular support and "place the youth in the vanguard of the campaign."³⁵

Deputy Evaldo Pinto of São Paulo, in another speech and in the name of the leadership of the MDB, analyzed the areas of conflict that are damaging the relations between the United States and Brazil. He mentioned the instant coffee dispute, the question over transport of cargo with Brazilian ships, and the problem of the nuclear treaty. In all three, the Deputy charged

September, 1959, p. 406. In similar manner Senator Lino de Matos went on record in support of resuming trade relations with the Soviet bloc in order to overcome Brazil's growing trade deficit. Hispanic-American Report, August, 1959, pp. 352-353. Elroy Dutra, a Deputy from Guanabara, had his entire speech attacking Pan-Americanism and its "Brazilian puppets" reprinted in Última Hora, Agosto 30, 1960, p. 10.

³⁵Jornal do Brasil, Dezembro 15, 1967, p. 4.

that "Brazil cannot continue ceding always, acquiescing and harming its development, committing the patrimony of future generations."³⁶

Evolution of Influence and Evaluation

The role of the lone Congressman making a protest (usually against the United States) has changed very little. But what of the Congress itself? The answer is not simple. In the first place, it is not a question of smooth evolution in which the Congress takes a more and more active part in making or even influencing foreign policy. Under Kubitschek the Congress first awoke to the possibilities, but showed no great zeal for them. The challenge of new foreign policy initiatives, first under Quadros and then during the first half of João Goulart's regime, evoked enthusiasm of the nationalists and the despair of the remaining legislators. For the first time the constitutional powers were wielded with decision and the informal powers were expanded. Under Goulart's parliamentary system, the Congress had immense authority and only retreated from a vote of no confidence on a question of foreign policy at the last instant.

36

Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 24, 1967, p. 4.

The Revolution, of course, clipped the wings of the nationalists, and its foreign policy was generally agreeable to the remaining legislators. However, Congress still retained some of the methods it had developed when challenged by the President. This continued under the Costa e Silva regime and probably would have developed more and more with the great number of controversial foreign policy issues that arose. But the life of the Congress was cut short in December of 1968. Whether it will prove a phoenix and whether it will be the same bird if it does arise from the ashes is a question for prophecy and not political science.

One topic should not be neglected and that is the Congress' sense of itself. Were there legislators who thought about what the role of the legislature should be (as opposed to what it was already)? The answer is yes, and this should be briefly explored.

In March of 1963 a new Congress convened, and, inter alia, a new Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was elected. Jefferson de Aguiar was not an ordinary chairman, and his first proposal was extraordinary. He suggested a subcommittee be set up to study the complete reorganization of his committee. He asserted that the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee had inspired him and he hoped that his committee could be modeled after it.

Furthermore, he had four specific tasks that he wanted to see the committee handle in that session. First, he wished to study the activities of trade offices and consulates.³⁷ Second, he wanted to examine embassy activities to improve their efficiency, especially in finding ways to improve Brazilian propaganda.³⁸ Third, he wanted to study the cultural exchange programs that were under the auspices of Itamarati. And finally, he wished to scrutinize the ambassadors' reports for the first time.³⁹

In addition, there were other projects on his mind. He foresaw that since the Senate had a good deal of formal power, it should extend it by discussing all the great themes of Brazilian foreign policy. It should also register its approval/disapproval during the debates on the budget. In fact, he wished to use the budgetary power to force the Foreign Ministry to spell out in

³⁷The result of this investigation was an overhauling of the system by Itamarati in the next few years. Unproductive consulates especially were closed.

³⁸Again, Itamarati began a study program to revise procedures as a result of this inquiry.

³⁹See Jornal do Brasil, Março 21, 1963, p. 4. A measure of the seriousness with which Itamarati took this Congressional renaissance was the publication of Jefferson de Aguiar's ideas in the semi-official Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Março 1963, p. 109.

detail its plans and ideas before it received its funds.⁴⁰

The full development of its power under an aggressive chairman like de Aguiar may well have pushed the Congress into the heart of the foreign policy-making process. It was interrupted, however, by the Revolution. But it does show that a forceful personality may make the difference in the role that the Congress may play in the future.⁴¹

⁴⁰Jornal do Brasil, Março 21, 1963, p. 4.

⁴¹The intellectuals' response to the role of Congress is interesting in that, with one exception, it has never been discussed. The one exception, José Honório Rodrigues states quite baldly that he for one would not like the Congress to play an active role at all. He wishes it to limit itself to a discussion of the budget. Foreign policy, he asserts, is an expression of the national interest, yet the Congress, especially the Senate, is only capable of representing narrow sectional and class interests. Also, it engages in mere oppositional spirit rather than being creative. J.H. Rodrigues, Interesse Nacional, pp. 86-87.

CHAPTER VII

THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

The Brazilian President, like his North American counterpart, is both Chief of State and Chief Executive. That is to say, under the Brazilian Constitution, the President has both the ceremonial function and the actual power to run the government, and this includes the making of foreign policy. His formal power over foreign policy, in fact, has been great (see Article 87 of the 1946 Constitution, for example), but his actual influence has traditionally been somewhat less.

The abstention from the task of foreign policy making has its roots in the Empire. Nominally, the Emperor was responsible for creating foreign policy, but the actual work was carried out by the Minister of State and the Council of State. Only if there were serious disagreements between the Minister (who functioned as a Prime Minister) and the Council would the matter be referred to the Emperor.¹

This practice of salutary neglect on the part of the Chief of State continued in the Republic.

¹ José Honório Rodrigues, Interesse Nacional, p. 40.

Foreign affairs were first dominated by Foreign Minister Barão Rio Branco who served for twelve years in that capacity, and who handled foreign policy matters for four different presidents. No President could hope to compete with him or with his handpicked staff. The competence of the Foreign Ministry established by the Baron continued for many years, and the Ministry remained the center of foreign policy making. The Chief Executive played only a minimal role.²

The role of the President, as performer of the most routine of functions in the area of foreign affairs, began to change in substance with Juscelino Kubitschek. A man of many enthusiasms (industrialization, Brasilia, his presidential campaign in 1965), he would have been out of character if he had neglected foreign affairs. But he remained very much in character, and used both the formal and informal powers of his office to enhance the foreign policy making responsibility of the President.³

Foreign policy became paramount under Jânio Quadros, and his influence was so great (even after only seven

²Ibid., p. 42.

³Kubitschek, however, only began playing an activist role in the last half of his administration, when he felt more secure in his office and had less to fear in regard to the possibility of a coup d'etat. The preoccupation with domestic politics and its dangers probably prevented other men, like Getúlio Vargas, from taking a more aggressive part in foreign policy.

months in office) that a man of strictly domestic interests like João Goulart did not return the Presidency completely to its more passive stance of earlier times. An active role was even more suited for Castello Branco who had clear ideas on foreign policy, and even Costa e Silva, who apparently has few foreign policy goals himself, tries to keep as much power over the shape of foreign policy as possible.

What are the presidential powers in matters of foreign policy and how have they been developed by each of the Presidents? How effective are these powers in the creation and implementation of policy? What have been the limitations on the President's effectiveness? What will the future role of the President be? These questions are best answered by examining each of the major presidential powers in turn and by exploring the use of these powers (where possible) under each President-- Kubitschek, Quadros, Goulart, Castello Branco and Costa e Silva. The basic areas of presidential power include policy innovations, ceremonial function, management of pressure groups, resolution of international crises, and initiation of legislation.

Policy Innovation

The newest and most dramatic of the presidential powers is that of policy innovation. With this power it is the President who outlines new and sometimes radical

departures for Brazilian foreign policy. This is in fact the kind of policy making initiative on the grand scale that only the President can sponsor. The Foreign Ministry, preoccupied with the day-to-day business of diplomacy and administration, rarely can engage in this activity. Nor does it have the political following which a President, especially a popular or recently elected one, has.

Many observers have assumed that it was Jânio Quadros who first used this presidential power in Brazilian history. The assumption is incorrect, for in many ways, Juscelino Kubitschek deserves that honor. He was the first to encourage trade relations with the Communist bloc, and he wanted Brazil to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Quadros added other innovations after Kubitschek.

Perhaps Kubitschek's biggest innovation (certainly the most publicized was his Operação Panamericana, his own idea from beginning to end. And the idea was quite a departure from traditional Brazilian diplomacy. Formerly, the policy-makers at Itamarati had been content to keep Brazil rather aloof from Latin America as a whole. But Kubitschek changed this with his letter to President Eisenhower in June of 1958. In it he expounded his

plans for Operation Panamerica. In August of the same year he reiterated his ideas:⁴

In this troubled post-war era, the world finds itself embroiled in a gigantic ideological, political, and economic conflict .. between the democratic nations .. and the oligarchies that are guided by a pseudo-scientific conception of life ...

We learned in the last world war that with fifth column infiltration a country can be conquered before the war begins. I need not persist with this point since you are well versed in concepts of national security ...

In order to resist this slow and persistent infiltration successfully ... the West ought to turn itself into a group of nations that are securely structured, that rest on solid bases of a healthy political system and a prospering economy.

But, according to the President, "this is not the picture that confronts us" at the present time in the Western world.⁵ He proceeded to outline what he had in mind to achieve such solidarity:⁶

A great effort, it seems to me, is needed in order to preserve and reinforce the unity of the continent. This implies in my view nothing less than a re-examination of the bases on which the relations among the countries of our hemisphere rest. We need a precise study of the physiology of the Pan-American system.

⁴ President Kubitschek's speech to the officers of the armed forces, August 17, 1958. Reprinted in RBPI, Dezebren 1958, pp. 102-106.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

President Kubitschek asserted that this commitment to a new Pan-Americanism was the right of each nation, large or small. Nevertheless, because of Brazil's geographic and demographic size, and because of her growing political maturity, she should "assume, in the concert of nations, the affirmative role that is incumbent upon her."⁷ He wanted Brazil to undertake a new authority in the Pan-American system. Naturally, the United States would have a large role in the new union, but Kubitschek saw Brazil as the intellectual leader and assigned to her the task of analyzing the problems of the Americas and suggesting solutions. In his words: "We wish to carry out the job together with the United States, and not to remain indefinitely confined to a passive position."⁸

Of course, precisely what problems Brazil was to study and what types of solutions she might offer was always a bit vague. This reflected one aspect of O.P.A.--the big idea of a man eager in part for international recognition and domestic prestige.⁹ Nevertheless, ambiguous as it was, the idea was unique in recent

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ To be sure, the goals were spelled out in the aide memoire of August 9, 1958 written by the Foreign Ministry for the benefit of the President. They were: "preservation for private property and free enterprise, defense of all areas that affect the security of the free world." And economically, "the most rapid development of the economic power of Latin America .. in order to facilitate its contribution to the defense of the West." RBPI, Dezembro, 1958, p. 119.

Brazilian diplomacy. Never before had a chief executive of that country launched a policy of hemispheric import.

There is no question that Jânio Quadros' approach to foreign policy was the most spectacular use of the presidential power of policy innovation. His concern for new approaches preceded, of course, his inauguration. For example, in Western Europe in press interviews in 1959 he called for a revamping of United States-Brazilian relations (he called them "unfortunate"), and for resumption ("the most rapid possible") of diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union.¹⁰ Quadros' innovative power, however, was diminished by a reluctant Congress. Under both Quadros and Goulart there was resistance to approval of treaties

¹⁰Hispanic-American Report, September 1959, pp. 405-406. Quadros, of course, has been given special credit by some as particularly creative, or at least innovative, in his attitudes toward the Communist countries. This would be a slight to Jusceline Kubitschek for in his byzantine way he too pushed for contacts with the East. Insiders have stated that Kubitschek's January 1959 speech to the graduates of the Rio Branco Institute included an appeal to the Russians to accept Western proposals for disarmament, but that disarmament was not the primary concern. It is said that the President reasoned that an appeal called for a reply. (Previously, Kubitschek had refused to talk to the Soviets when Khrushchev sent a letter of New Year's greeting because he feared domestic and possible United States reaction.) The appeal seemed an acceptable way to communicate with the Russians.

It was also felt that Kubitschek was angry at the United States for recognizing President Frondizi as the Latin leader of the OPA. He hoped that contacts with the Soviet Union might make the United States appreciate Brazil a little more. Thus his moves, while indeed subtle, were still heading in the direction of a new policy regarding the Soviet Union and its allies. See Jornal do Brasil, Janeiro 25, 1959, p. 4. It might be added that trade contacts were established under Kubitschek some ten months later. Hispanic-American Report, January 1960,

with the Communist countries.¹¹

The new approach came out best in Quadros' concern for Africa. He made it in fact an area of high priority for Brazilian diplomacy, which, it need hardly be said, was scarcely so before. In his words:¹²

Our country should become the link, the bridge between Africa and the West, since we are so intimately bound to both peoples. As long as we can give the nations of the Black Continent an example of complete absence of racial prejudice, and an example of progress that has not undermined the principles of freedom, we shall be contributing to the effective integration of an entire continent into our system.

This contribution, he added, would be a radical break with the past:¹³

For many years Brazil made the mistake of supporting European colonialism in the United Nations. This attitude--which is only now fading--gave rise to a justified mistrust of Brazil. Misinformed circles, /within Brazil/, overly impressed with

p. 632.

¹¹For details of this conflict see Chapter VI, pp. 230-231.

¹²Jânio Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, October, 1961, p. 24.

¹³Ibid., p. 25. Again we cannot ignore Juscelino Kubitschek, whose own work, quiet but innovative, helped to set the stage for Jânio Quadros. In the last part of his regime, Kubitschek called for a closer cooperation with the Afro-Asian bloc in the fight to overcome underdevelopment. Specifically, he had diplomatic missions established in Morocco, Tunis, Jordan, Ceylon, South Vietnam, Malaya, Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea, and he initiated discussions with Ghana and Cambodia. See Kubitschek's Message to Congress (March 15) for 1959 and 1960 in RBPI, Junho, 1959, p. 91, and Junho, 1960, p. 97.

European patterns of behavior, contributed to a mistake which must be attributed to more to a disregard for the deeper commitments of our country than to political malice.

Furthermore, Quadros added that his administration would approach relations with the African states with "humility," knowing that Brazil could not offer "significant material help." He hoped that with the similar environments of the two areas an exchange of technicians might prove useful.¹⁴ President Quadros backed up these remarks with action. For one thing, he ordered a series of measures designed to implement his new approach to Africa (and to a lesser extent, Asia). These included the participation in African fairs held at Tunis, Algiers, Casablanca, and Lagos. He arranged for a direct air and sea link to Ghana.¹⁵ He decreed the creation of the Institute of Afro-Asian Studies which was to be directly subordinate to the President. Its goals were to stimulate studies of the third world, and to promote intellectual contacts between Brazil and Africa through cultural exchanges.¹⁶ Finally, he ordered a new policy regarding

¹⁴Jânio Quadros, Message to Congress, RBPI, Junho, 1961, p. 130.

¹⁵Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 5, 1961, p. 4.

¹⁶RBPI, Junho 1961, pp. 194-196. The Institute, which has now virtually ceased to exist, was to be run by a Council of Eight chosen by the President. They were to represent the President, the Foreign Ministry, the Minister of Education, the University of Brazil, the University of São Paulo, the University of Minas Gerais, the Instituto Joaquim Nabuco, and the University of

Brazil's attitude toward Portuguese colonialism. When the Angolan question arose in the United Nations, Itamarati ordered its delegate to abstain on the vote. Quadros hurriedly withdrew this order and initiated an investigation into the Treaty of Consultation and Friendship between Brazil and Portugal to see if Brazil was allowed to vote for sanctions against Portugal. Officials were shocked.¹⁷

These presidential innovations were exactly that. They were not the product of the Foreign Ministry which were then given the presidential veneer of approval. They were the result of the imaginative thinking of the President and perhaps his close personal advisors. The ideas were also watched over by the President and were not delegated to the authorities who might have handled them. Under both Kubitschek and Quadros, the innovative power of the President was in the forefront.

Such was not the case with the next three Chief Executives. The power of presidential initiation of policy was not altogether unused, but it was not used with the dramatic flair of Quadros. João Goulart was not by nature a man interested in foreign affairs. His expertise was in domestic, rather than foreign, intrigue. Nevertheless, he did continue along some of the lines of his

Bahia. The Council remained, however, very much a creature of the President.

¹⁷In the phrase of the officials at the Foreign Ministry, the "matter was very delicate." See Jornal do

predecessor, and he encouraged the belief that he too was fostering the new, independent foreign policy.

There were, however, some Goulartian twists. Whether it reflected his own early collaboration with Vargas, or his desire to please the nationalist left, Goulart began making moves to expropriate foreign companies. The most controversial of these expropriations was that of the Canadian owned Companhia Telefônica Brasileira. The final plan (which received President Kennedy's eventual approval) was that the company would be repaid by means of a medium term loan with part of that money to be reinvested in some sector of the Brazilian economy.¹⁸ Although this measure was hardly a revolutionary one, it was the first time that the Federal government had stepped in on an expropriation move.¹⁹

The revolutionary regime of Humberto Castello Branco gave an opportunity to a man who had definite ideas on foreign policy. It was Castello Branco in fact who analyzed the independent policy and announced the new guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy. In a speech to the new diplomats given at Palácio Itamarati (July 31, 1964), Brasil, Abril 5, 1961, p. 4.

¹⁸Details are found in the Hispanic-American Report, June, 1962, p. 366.

¹⁹Earlier, the Governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Lionel Brizzola, had expropriated the State's power and light company.

President Castello Branco stated that the term "independent foreign policy" had lost its usefulness as a descriptive term owing to its increasing ambiguity.

Any foreign policy, he asserted, needed to be prefaced with a statement of the limits placed on it. He went on to say:²⁰

In the present context of a bi-polar confrontation, with the radical political and ideological gap existing between the two centers, the preservation of independence presupposes the acceptance of a certain degree of inter-dependence in the military, economic, or political field.

Militarily this means that no country outside of the United States or the Soviet Union can defend itself alone. "Defense has to be associative."²¹ What does this mean to Brazil?²²

In the case of Brazilian foreign policy, we cannot forget that we have made a basic choice--cultural and political fidelity to the Western democratic system.

And in regard to Brazilian independence:²³

Within the general outlines of this choice, our independence will manifest itself in the gauging of each specific problem strictly in terms of the national interest. A margin is left for commercial, technical, and financial relations with the Socialist countries since this will not invalidate our basic option.

²⁰Humberto Castello Branco, Speech appearing in the Textos e Declarações sobre Política Externa, put out by the Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), p. 9.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

In practice this support for the Western community that Castello Branco announced meant Brazil's contributing troops to the Inter-American Force in the Dominican Republic.²⁴ This certainly would have been rejected by both Presidents Quadros and Goulart. It also manifested itself in the decisive break with Communist Cuba in both the matter of diplomatic and trade relations.²⁵ On the other hand, his not ruling out contracts with the Socialist world meant that after lengthy negotiations in Moscow Roberto Campos arranged for a \$200 million credit for a mammoth hydroelectric project in São Paulo. It also meant that trade accords with Eastern Europe would be continued and if possible expanded considerably.²⁶

As President, Castello Branco reordered his country's foreign policy by spelling out more precisely the nature of Brazil's independence, and in this way he used the innovative power of his office. The use of this same power has not been at all prominent in the regime of Artur Costa e Silva. As a career officer, Costa e Silva had never participated with the FEB officers in their keen

²⁴Jornal do Brasil, Maio 4, 1965, p. 3; Jornal do Brasil, Maio 6, 1965, p. 3; Jornal do Brasil, Maio 16, 1965, p. 8; Jornal do Brasil, Maio 20, 1965, p. 3.

²⁵Hispanic-American Report, July 1964, pp. 463-464.

²⁶Última Hora, Maio 16, 1964, p. 2.

interest in foreign affairs. He has no record of attending either the Escola Superior da Guerra or any of the various command schools of the general staff. As a consequence, his innovative power in foreign policy making has been practically nil. Much of it has been surrendered to the Foreign Minister and to Itamarati.²⁷

The Power of Ceremony

The President has other means by which policy can be affected. They are certainly less dramatic than the launching of an ambitious new program; nevertheless, they are very real powers. One of these is the traditional ceremonial function of a Chief of State. This function, of course, has been performed in the past by Brazilian Presidents, but since Kubitschek it has been used more and more to back up new departures in foreign policy.

Juscelino Kubitschek performed these tasks with zest. On the occasion of a state visit by the President (the Chief of State) of Portugal, General Francisco Higinio Craveiro Lopes, Kubitschek pushed his pet Luso-Brazilian Community scheme.²⁸

Brazilians will never stop welcoming the Portuguese as brothers, as blood brothers and as comrades who feel themselves bound by something stronger than the tie of

²⁷This will be explored in greater depth in the next chapter.

²⁸Speech reprinted in RBPI, Março, 1958, p. 166. The

language--a communion of moral and spiritual values ... a humane comprehension of things, a style of life. Portuguese and Brazilians have only one soul and our desire for union is especially strong on the international plane...

And three years later, in a state visit to Portugal, Kubitschek ratified the "Treaty of Friendship and Understanding;" his speeches stressed the inevitability of intimate Luso-Brazilian relations. There was criticism from Brazilian intellectuals and from the press, but the President ignored it; he also ignored the problem of Portugal's role in Africa.²⁹ On the other hand, Kubitschek welcomed the opportunity to meet with a delegation from the independent African states to discuss their problems and their relations with Brazil.³⁰

As with so many other things, Jânio Quadros made the ceremonial aspects of foreign policy extremely controversial. He welcomed such third world figures as President Sukarno of Indonesia (and at the same time, refused to invite President Kennedy); he bestowed a medal on Cuban Minister of Industries, Ernesto Guevara; he managed to insult a personal envoy of the President of the United States. speech was made on June 11, 1957.

²⁹Hispanic-American Report, October 1960, pp. 504-505 and p. 566.

³⁰From Kubitschek's Message to Congress, March 15, 1959. In RBPI, Junho 1959, p. 94.

States.³¹ These gratuitous acts, of course, gave evidence of Brazil's new independent foreign policy.

João Goulart used his ceremonial power to alter the course of foreign policy. The best example of this is his trip to the United States in April, 1962. Up to that point relations between the two countries were seriously deteriorating, and the Kennedy administration's enthusiasm for Goulart as a reformer had noticeably diminished.

Goulart, in the course of his visit reaffirmed inter-American principles including support for LAFTA and for foreign investment. He told the United States Congress that Brazil was independent but not neutral, and that it "unconditionally supported the democratic principles which unite the people of the West."³² He added at a later news conference that he personally found the Castro government obnoxious owing to its totalitarian nature. By saying the correct things within the setting of an official visit to the United States, President Goulart hoped to achieve his primary purpose--improvement

31

See Jornal do Brasil, Dezembro 31, 1961, p. 4. See also John Hickey, "The Day Mr. Berle Talked with Mr. Quadros" Inter-American Economic Affairs, Summer 1961, pp. 58-71.

32

Hispanic-American Report, June, 1962, p. 362. Goulart visited Mexico immediately after his American visit and took the opportunity to reaffirm his independent foreign policy in a joint communique with President Adolfo Lopez Mateos whose regime had also maintained an independent policy vis-a-vis the United States in regard to Cuba. See The New York Times, April 10, 1962, p. 3, and April 11, 1962, p. 3.

of relations and acquisition of funds for Brazilian development. In his words:³³

If the plan /of the Alliance for Progress/ requires that the Latin American countries undertake extremely rigid economic and social programs to arrest certain factors of instability, severe complications may arise which will set back, rather than spur development. These difficulties will increase if the Alliance for Progress does not reflect above all a spirit of confidence and mutual respect.

In other words, Goulart felt that the United States should not insist on rigid control over the use of funds, but should have confidence in Brazil to manage them; he felt that this management was especially important in the depressed North East of Brazil. At the conclusion of the visit, the funds were turned over to the Brazilians with no strings attached. The first installment was for \$131 million.³⁴

Castello Branco, on the other hand, was not, nor did he pretend to be, a personable Chief Executive. He did have his share of important state visitors, however, including Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal. The Senghor visit brought about closer ties with that West African country through the loan of Brazilian university professors and some technical aid.³⁵

33

Hispanic-American Report, June, 1962, p. 362.

34

Ibid.

35

See Hispanic-American Report, November 1964, p. 853. A Senegalese team was to study cattle raising techniques in Brazil.

The Management of Pressure Groups

The Brazilian President, in any policy-making capacity, is primarily a balancer of pressure group demands. His role requires that he aggregate these diverse demands into some kind of consistent policy. Since there are no well-developed intermediary institutions in Brazil, such as political parties or even state and local governments, the demands come to the President unfiltered.^{35a}

President Kubitschek was perhaps the most adept in this role; he was able to manipulate pressure groups well enough to achieve his own goals. One of his foreign policy plans was to increase trade, and eventually to establish diplomatic relations, with the Communist bloc. These aims were staunchly opposed by the majority of the Church hierarchy, by the military, by members of his party, and by the press. It is not surprising that he refused to acknowledge the New Year's greeting from Premier Khrushchev in 1959. What he did do, as previously mentioned, was to make an appeal for disarmament some three weeks later, hoping that such an

35a

To the extent the Foreign Ministry assists the President in filtering some pressure group demands, see Chapter VIII, pp. 345-347.

appeal would receive an answer.³⁶ This was one way to communicate with the Soviet Union without angering the groups who opposed a more open contact. Meanwhile, Oswaldo Aranha, a diplomat, former President of the General Assembly, and a staunch advocate of relations with all nations, paid a visit to the Soviet Union. Although Aranha insisted that he traveled in an official capacity, President Kubitschek would only affirm that his trip was as a private citizen.³⁷

To overcome the resistance of so many sectors, President Kubitschek welcomed the support of the nationalists and of the businessmen who desired the profits that would come from commerce with the Communist bloc. To disarm the military, Kubitschek aired the entire matter with the National Security Council, which of course included the chief of each military branch as well as the Minister of Defense. The astute President managed within five months to get approval for resuming trade relations, but not diplomatic ties. Also, trade negotiations would have to be pursued through intermediaries and not by direct contact.³⁸ It was enough for Kubitschek.

³⁶See footnote 10 p. 252.

³⁷See Jornal do Brasil, Janeiro 25, 1959, p. 4. It is likely that Aranha's trip was a trial balloon. Apparently the President did not feel the political winds were favorable enough for his open endorsement.

³⁸Jornal do Brasil, Junho 25, 1959, p. 1.

The President was capable of even more adept management of opposing groups. In August, 1959, a cabinet crisis ensued when the left wing nationalists of the PTB, a party which supported Kubitschek, demanded firmer policies against the United States. Kubitschek needed PTB support, but he did not want to alienate the United States or pro-American groups in Brazil. He began to make wholesale shifts in his cabinet. The President replaced a nationalist Minister of Transportation (Admiral Lucio Meira) with a former ambassador to the United States who was anti-PTB (Ernani Amxaral Peixoto). However, Admiral Meira was appointed to the sensitive position of President of the National Development Bank (BNDE), replacing Roberto Campos who had enraged the nationalists by suggesting that United States private capital should assist Petrobrás in the location and exploitation of oil. The new Foreign Minister in Kubitschek's cabinet was Horácio Lafer, a pro-American who replaced the more strident Francisco Negrão de Lima. Finally, the key post of Finance Minister went to Sebastião Pães de Almeida, a nationalist, but one who favored anti-inflationary policies. This appointment was seen as a concession to the I.M.F. which Kubitschek had earlier defied, arousing general enthusiasm among the nationalists.³⁹

At the same time President Kubitschek managed to continue a verbal resistance to the I.M.F.; for example,

³⁹Hispanic-American Report, September 1959, p. 406.

during the cabinet changes, the President found time to address the Clube Militar which at that time was in the hands of nationalist officers. His topic was the administration's resistance to the encroachments of the International Monetary Fund.⁴⁰

President Quadros was considerably less adept at handling the complex pressures brought to bear on him by highly motivated groups. A case in point is his management of the National Security Council. President Kubitschek always placed great importance in at least formally consulting this body of military and civilian officials. He never blatantly ignored their advice. Quadros, on the other hand, pointedly ignored the N.S.C. The Council, which strongly opposed diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, was not approached by the President for discussion of this issue. Quadros' lack of attention to such bureaucratic niceties may well have reinforced the opposition of the Council. Opportunity for placation was lost, anti-Soviet sentiment grew stronger, and there was considerable discontent in military circles.⁴¹

Jânio Quadros, although not as adept as some Presidents, was nevertheless capable of handling certain situations with appropriate restraint. At the time of the exile invasion of Cuba, Quadros neither supported nor

⁴⁰Novos Rumos, Julho 24-30, 1959, p. 2.

⁴¹Ultima Hora, Fevereiro 9, 1961, p. 4, and Fevereiro 16, 1961, p. 4.

attacked the movement. He understood that opposition to the invasion would anger the Brazilian military. On the other hand, support for the invasion would undermine his whole independent foreign policy and lose for him the support of the left wing nationalists.⁴² The result was a studied silence on the part of the usually ebullient Jânio Quadros.

There is no serious doubt that João Goulart in his prime could balance and manipulate diverse pressures with considerable skill. Like Kubitschek, Goulart was adept at piecing together a cabinet that usually managed to please everyone in some way, and the third Council of Ministers of July 1962 was such a cabinet. The Prime Minister designate was Francisco Brochado da Rocha, a former Minister of Justice for Rio Grande do Sul and a confidante of the radical, violently anti-American Lionel Brizola. On the other hand, the new Foreign Minister was Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, Jânio Quadros' ex-Foreign Minister. Arinos was identified as a supporter of an independent foreign policy, but his background was conservative, balanced and not xenophobic. He held especially friendly feelings toward the United States.

⁴²Details in Hispanic-American Report, June, 1961, pp. 366-368. As a result of presidential silence, the reactions in Brazil to this event were mild. A few rather badly attended rallies were held. At one in Rio de Janeiro, Communist Party chief Luis Carlos Prestes was prevented from speaking by a howling mob of anti-Communists. A left wing nationalist speaker in São Paulo was pelted with rotten eggs. Not even a USIS

And finally, Goulart selected as Finance Minister, Walter Moreira Salles, a former ambassador to the United States and an advocate of fiscal responsibility and foreign investment.⁴³

On another occasion, President Goulart fired Labor Minister João Pinheiro after the latter's refusal to retract his televised accusations that Lincoln Gordon and Roberto Campos had attempted to establish a "financial dictatorship" in Brazil. The moment had been an awkward one for such pyrotechnics since the President was on the verge of sending a mission to Washington to re-negotiate loan repayments scheduled for 1963. However, Pinheiro's dismissal was not an abrupt act of Presidential anger. Goulart first called in the nation's labor leaders to seek their approval, which they gave. Pinheiro was left muttering that his resignation was "nothing more than a sordid blow by the government to improve its standing with the I.M.F."⁴⁴ He was probably right.

Resolution of International Crises

At times the Brazilian President must face various immediate crises. The domestic kind, of course, are endemic

Library was burned down--the usual sequitur of such occurrences.

⁴³Hispanic-American Report, September 1962, p. 657.

⁴⁴Hispanic-American Report, February 1963, p. 1162. Apparently Brizola's suggested solution to the crisis--namely, the cancelling of all trade relations with the United States--was not viewed as practicable. Lionel

in the political system. But on occasions, the crises are essentially foreign policy problems. When they are, it is the President, with perhaps the assistance of the Foreign Minister, who is expected to manage the problem. President Goulart, no doubt, faced the greatest of these crises--the "lobster war" with France. The dispute had long been simmering, but suddenly in mid-1962 it erupted with uncommon violence. The Brazilian Navy moved to arrest French fishing boats which were working within Brazilian territorial waters. The French government, however, did not reply with a conciliatory apology. Instead, warships were ordered to the area to protect the fishing fleet. It was not until the personal intervention of President Goulart, and his initiation of an exchange of letters with General DeGaulle, that the issue was satisfactorily resolved. The French fishing fleet exited.⁴⁵

Brizola was the ex-governor of Rio Grande do Sul and brother-in-law to Goulart. He was noted for his anti-Americanism.

⁴⁵See Hispanic-American Report, April 1963, pp. 179-180, and May 1963, p. 302. Also Vladimir R. de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil (Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C.: 1968), p. 155. The issue was a complex problem involving international law and marine biology. On January 30 the Brazilian Navy stopped three French fishing vessels off of Recife charging that they were fishing on the continental shelf. Citing the 1958 Geneva accord, the Brazilians claimed that they had an exclusive right to all resources on and under the shelf. Since the spiny lobster crawled on the shelf it was thus technically Brazilian fauna. The French disputed the claim that the spiny lobster was a crawling crustacean. Instead they insisted that the spiny lobster was a

Sometimes an international crisis is of the President's own making. Jânio Quadros seemed a specialist in this regard. When President Kennedy's special representative Adolph Berle came to see Quadros in March 1961, Quadros created a small crisis. The President postponed the scheduled meeting with Berle in order to fly to Rio for a funeral; however, he did have time for the director of Prensa Latina, the Cuban news agency. When Quadros did talk to Berle, he did not invite the Foreign Minister to the conference as was customary.

The talks did not go well. In the middle of them, Quadros announced that he had extended an invitation to President Tito for a state visit. Within the conference, views were exchanged, but no final joint communique was issued. Although the talks were described as "cordial" by the Americans, they did not wish to discuss details. Perhaps a more realistic estimate of the talks was one Brazilian aide's comment that at least

swimming animal and therefore was subject to French nets along with other deep sea fish.

The legal arguments were backed up with naval might; the Brazilians sent four destroyers and eventually a cruiser; the French countered with a destroyer and were rumored to be moving in units from the Mediterranean fleet to reinforce the fisherman. At this critical juncture the Presidents conferred, but the Brazilians stuck to their position of no negotiations until the fishing and war vessels were withdrawn. The French complied on March 9. Subsequent negotiations substantiated the Brazilian interpretation of the ambulatory methods of the spiny backed lobster.

"they did not throw bricks at each other."⁴⁶ A small furor within Brazil arose over the talks and there was considerable irritation among American officials over Quadros' gratuitous insults. The President in this case, rather than resolve a sudden crisis, demonstrated that he himself could provoke a rapid deterioration in relations with another country.

As a result of the widespread condemnation, and disapproval by much of the Congress, Quadros backed off by stating in his March 15 Message to Congress that he believed in "relations of sincere collaboration with the United States in the defense of the democratic and social progress of the Americas." And he added:⁴⁷

The ideological position of Brazil is Western, and it will not change. But Brazil's role as a native member of the free world also implies a duty to assume a more affirmative and independent international position without ignoring previous commitments.

With that carefully wrought statement President Quadros managed to solve his self-created international crisis.

Initiation of Legislation

Another power which the President has over the shaping of foreign policy lies in his role as initiator

⁴⁶John Hickey, Inter-American Economic Affairs, pp. 58-71. Hickey's research was based on press reports from the New York Times, the Associated Press, United Press, and in Brazil, the Estado de São Paulo and Diario de Notícias.

⁴⁷Hispanic-American Report, May 1961, p. 263.

of legislation. Like the United States it is the Chief Executive in Brazil who presents the Congress with prepared legislation which the latter may or may not ratify. The Congress cannot initiate measures of its own according to Article 67. In Brazil, the President's power is even greater with foreign policy matters. It is he, and he alone, who begins the legislative process. Juscelino Kubitschek introduced legislation that provided major changes in the organization of Itamarati.⁴⁸ The Congress, as has been noted, has not been merely a rubber stamp in these matters; for instance, it took almost four years before the Itamarati legislation was passed. Nevertheless, it was the President who had the draft law drawn up under his personal direction.⁴⁹

Jânio Quadros also managed to introduce legislation with a foreign policy impact, but the outcome was to depend on João Goulart. In his first and last Message to Congress, President Quadros sought the support of left

⁴⁸See Chapter VIII, p. 299 in this paper.

⁴⁹See RBPI, Setembro 1959, p. 92. Besides the change over from functional to geographic areas within the Foreign Ministry, the legislation also established that an Itamarati representative of senior rank would act as a congressional liaison. In addition, diplomatic recruitment was no longer to be confined to Rio de Janeiro. Other principal cities would be included by holding entrance examinations there. A monthly stipend was established for students so that they could devote full time to their studies.

wing nationalists by declaring that it was time for "immediate discipline of all profit remittances, which are at an immoderate level..."⁵⁰

It was not until Jânio Quadros had been out of office for nearly three months that the Chamber of Deputies complied with his request and passed a stiff profit remittance law. The most radical feature of the draft law was the provision for treatment of reinvested profits. Under the bill, they were to be excluded from incorporation into the capital base; only a percentage of the capital base was allowed to be repatriated per year, and no more. The nationalists rejoiced and the business community, foreign and domestic, trembled.

The Senate amended the bill, however, taking out some of the sting of the original. But the Chamber refused to compromise, and since it had the power to pass the original version the second time, it did so. The bill was presented to Goulart in undiluted form. The President wavered; he had initially favored the Senate version, but had failed to pressure the Chamber into a compromise. In the end he signed the profit remittance control into law. In this instance, it was a case of the President losing control of the legislation which had been introduced.⁵¹ Nevertheless, a President with

⁵⁰From Jânio Quadros, Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, Março 15, 1961, p. 85. Quoted in Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 400.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 227-228.

a clear notion of what he wants can affect the making of foreign policy through the introduction of legislative measures.

Conclusions

The Brazilian President enjoys a wide assortment of policy-making powers. In a formal sense he is the Chief of State and Chief Executive, and under both of the recent constitutions he is given specific and wide ranging powers. He can conclude treaties, initiate legislation, appoint the Foreign Minister, and be commander in chief of the armed forces. All of these bear directly on foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the President has not been a vigorous participant in the foreign policy-making system in the past. Only in the last decade have several Presidents used their powers extensively. In doing so, he has influenced policy in four areas. As a policy innovator he has possessed the prestige and power to initiate new foreign policy programs which were new and sometimes even radical departures from the past. He has also influenced policy by being the responsible officer in times of international crisis. He also affects policy by drawing up legislation which may modify both the conduct and substance of Brazilian foreign policy.

The President also may influence policy by carrying out his ceremonial duties as Chief of State. Juscelino Kubitschek committed his country to close

support of Portugal by merely welcoming every opportunity to visit or be visited by the Portuguese. And finally the President in influencing policy may do so by the handling and manipulating of associational group pressures. The latter often aim their demands at him since he is more accessible than the somewhat aloof Foreign Ministry. In any case, the President in recent years has become the focal point of foreign policy far more than in the past. This will likely continue in the future.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY: LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

Brazil's Foreign Office (the Itamarati) is at the very heart of the foreign policy-making process.¹ Since it is the legal and formal Ministry responsible for the conduct of the nation's affairs, this should not be surprising to anyone. Yet, foreign policy today is not the comparatively simple operation it was a century ago. It has been widely noted that Foreign Offices around the world are beginning to lose their hold of the reins of policy-making. The United States State Department is often cited as an example.²

Yet Itamarati today still remains very much at the center of Brazil's foreign policy-making. On this point both friends and critics of the Ministry agree. And they have little choice. Itamarati traditionally has taken the major responsibility, often with little or no executive control, for creating Brazil's foreign

¹The Foreign Ministry's semi-official name "Itamarati" is derived from its headquarters in downtown Rio de Janeiro, the Palácio Itamaraty, formerly owned by the Barão de Itamaraty. In order to compound the confusion, the new Foreign Ministry building in Brasilia (as yet unoccupied) after much debate will also be called Itamarati.

²Burton M. Sapin, The Making of United States

policy.³

It has been in the middle of the process since the Empire when Foreign Ministers and their small staffs carried out the external business of Brazil without much direction or interference from the Emperor--even in times of crisis.⁴

Furthermore, in the early, formative period of the Republic, the Baron of Rio Branco was Foreign Minister under no less than four presidents, and performed so capably that he had little need or desire for supervision.⁵ Moreover, the Baron insured the perpetuation of the Foreign Office's influence by carefully selecting his subordinates and eventual successors. Thus, from the Visconde Uruguai (who incidentally held the position on three occasions) through the Baron of Rio Branco to today's professional diplomats, Itamarati has radiated an aura of competence and control in handling foreign affairs.⁶

Two very different observers seem to sum up

Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1966), pp. 15-19.

³J.H. Rodrigues, Interesse Nacional, pp. 40-42.

⁴See C.H. Haring's Empire in Brazil (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968) for his account of the so-called "Christie Affair" which eventually led to a break in diplomatic relations with Great Britain, but in which the Foreign Minister played the key policy-making role, not the Emperor. pp. 92-93.

⁵J.H. Rodrigues, Interesse Nacional, p. 42.

⁶Ibid., p. 40.

Itamarati best. First, Hernane Tavares de Sa:⁷

To these international conferences, the Itamarati brings a sense of balance, dignity, and competence on the whole higher than in the government it represents. As a result, Brazil has acquired on the international scene a prestige that is not as great as it should have, but is probably more than it justly deserves at this stage.

And complementing this warm tribute, is a more disparaging view of the Foreign Ministry made by José Honório Rodrigues:⁸

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a closed institution where all the departmental chiefs in all fields must be career diplomats. Up to now it has sought only in a limited way, if at all, the advice, and counsel of specialists in national or international affairs who could furnish information to policy-makers.

Here then are the themes that arise from practically any discussion of Itamarati--favorable or unfavorable.⁹ On the one hand, competence, integrity, a certain aristocratic approach toward world affairs. On the other, the suggestion that Itamarati is closed, aloof, self-sufficient and unapproachable.

The extent to which these characteristics are

⁷Hernane Tavares de Sa, Brazilians: People of Tomorrow (New York: The John Day Co., 1947), p. 225.

⁸J.H. Rodrigues, Interesse Nacional, p. 41. Rodrigues also charges that until recently, an appointment to a career position was based on o sistema do pistolão, that is, "pull" rather than merit. He admits that this practice is now changing. Ibid., p. 41.

⁹For critical comments see Vamireh Chacon, Qual a Política Externa Conveniente ao Brasil? (Rio de Janeiro:

true will be examined as well as their influence on the actual conduct of foreign policy. In so doing, we shall examine the following: 1. the role of the Foreign Minister, especially his relation to the men of Itamarati; 2. the organization of the Ministry; 3. the method of recruitment of diplomatic personnel; 4. the tasks which the Ministry carries out; 5. the internal politics of the Ministry; 6. its relations with interest groups and government agencies; 7. Itamarati's effectiveness in carrying out its mission, as well as an analysis of its own limitations and of its future prospects as the chief instrument in foreign policy-making.

Role of the Foreign Minister

At the top of the organizational pyramid is the Foreign Minister. His formal role is that of chief foreign policy advisor to the President. His actual role in foreign policy-making varies considerably from minister to minister. Even his term of office is unpredictable. The Baron of Rio Branco maintained his position as Foreign Minister through four presidential administrations.¹⁰ On the other hand, Evandro Lins e Silva was in office less than two months.¹¹ The

Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1963), p. 17. Mario Alves, A Velha Classe, pp. 79-80; Edmundo M. Genofre, Pasaporte para Moscou (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Sedegra, 1959), pp. 7-9.

¹⁰J.H. Rodrigues, Interesse Nacional, p. 40.

¹¹Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 10, 1963, p. 3.

experience, capability, power and influence on foreign policy of each Foreign Minister has varied in much the same way.

Since the Kubitschek administration--a period of little more than a dozen years--no less than eleven foreign ministers have been installed at Itamarati.¹² What kind of background do these men have? What powers have they wielded? What relationship have they enjoyed with the professional diplomats? What has been the consistent role of the Foreign Minister in policy-making?

1. Background

It may be said with considerable certainty that the modern Brazilian Foreign Minister is not chosen by the President on the basis of his special expertise in foreign affairs. Of the eleven only two have been professional diplomats.¹³ The background of the remaining nine is somewhat varied. They include three law professors, two diplomats, a soldier, and a former mayor of Rio

¹²They are in chronological order: José Carlos de Macedo Soares; Francisco Negrão de Lima; Horácio Lafer; Alfonso Arinos de Mello Franco; Francisco de San Thiago Dantas; Hermes Lima, Evandro Lins e Silva, José Augusto Araujo Castro, Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Juraci Magalhães, José de Magalhães Pinto.

¹³Even the two professionals were appointed on political grounds. First, Araujo Castro, a member of Itamarati since 1940 was selected by President Goulart because of the bad feeling in the Congress over his highly political choice of Evandro Lins e Silva, an ambitious man who immediately upon taking office as Foreign Minister began lobbying for a spot on the Supreme Court, and

de Janeiro. Despite this apparent diversity, there is a common thread running through most of their careers with, of course, the exception of the diplomats. They had all become influential politicians. Negrão Lima has been a deputy to the Minas Gerais Assembly and a Minister of Justice (and now the present Governor of Guanabara). Horácio Lafer was a PSD (Partido Social Democrática) federal deputy, a member of the Chamber's Foreign Relations Committee, and a Minister of Housing. Afonso Arinos was a UDN senator and Chairman of that body's Foreign Relations Committee. San Thiago Dantas, in addition to being Finance Minister, was a PTB leader and a member of the Chamber's Foreign Relations Committee. Hermes Lima was chairman of the Socialist Party and was the Prime Minister during the Parliamentary regime from 1961 to 1963. Lins e Silva was Goulart's chief political advisor, and later became a member of the Supreme Court. Juraci Magalhães has been a Governor and Senator from Bahia plus a Minister of Justice and a presidential candidate. The current Foreign Minister, Magalhães Pinto has been a member of the Chamber of Deputies and a

succeeded. Araujo Castro's appointment was meant to redeem the President's integrity in the eyes of the Senate. Secondly, Vasco Leitão da Cunha, also a career diplomat, was made Foreign Minister by Castello Branco largely because Leitão da Cunha was one of the few men the new President knew well who was competent in foreign affairs. Their friendship dated back to the diplomat's posting in wartime Italy while Castello Branco was a member of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force.

Governor of Minas Gerais.

As powerful politicians, these men were spokesmen, if not outright leaders, of the political parties: Arinos de Mello Franco, Juraci Magalhães, and Magalhães Pinto of the UDN; San Thiago Dantas of the PTB; and Horácio Lafer of the PSD. And as influential party politicians, they became prime prospects for appointment to a President's cabinet. In Brazilian politics, especially before the 1964 revolution, multi-party politics created the need for party coalitions to form a national majority. Goulart, for example, as a leader of the PTB always included several PSD politicians in his cabinet in order to maintain the old PTB-PSD alliance against the conservative UDN. And since the Foreign Ministry was one of the more prestigious posts, it naturally tended to be given to a man who could bring a considerable amount of support to the regime. It might be added that this practice is still continued today. President Costa e Silva's appointment of Magalhães Pinto for example was primarily designed to attract the support of moderate-conservative civilian groups.

Political prestige was not the only general qualification for being chosen Foreign Minister. Quite often, the men selected had in some way been involved in foreign policy.¹⁴ Negrão Lima and Juraci Magalhães

¹⁴An outstanding exception to this rule was Evandro Lins e Silva. A law professor and close political

had been ambassadors (though not professional diplomats) before assuming the office of Foreign Minister. Afonso Arinos was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. Horácio Lafer, San Thiago Dantas, and Magalhães Pinto were all members of the Chamber's Foreign Relations Committee. Thus, a large majority of these men have had at least some contact with foreign affairs prior to accepting the Foreign Minister's post. But it must be stressed that in the majority of the cases the selection was based primarily on domestic political considerations rather than on the candidate's expertise in external affairs.

2. Powers

With these backgrounds in mind, we may now examine the powers of the Foreign Minister in shaping and controlling foreign policy. What are his responsibilities, and how does his experience influence them?

advisor to Goulart, Lins e Silva had apparently no special interest in foreign affairs. (He had, however, briefly advised Brazil's United Nations' delegation on legal matters.) Nevertheless, he did serve a special political interest for Goulart. Lins e Silva had no political base of his own and thus was dependent (and therefore trustworthy) on the President. As Foreign Minister, he would, it was thought, balance Goulart's then recent appointment of Carvalho Pinto, a powerful, independent politician from São Paulo, to the important post of Finance Minister. See Jornal do Brasil, Junho 18, 1963, p. 3, and Junho 26, 1963, p. 4. An indication of his possible uncertainty in the new position is seen in the fact that Lins e Silva gave a luncheon for journalists and invited them to contribute their ideas on foreign policy--a unique event in the history of the Foreign

The Brazilian Foreign Minister is, first of all, the formal policy advisor of the President. As advisor, he usually concentrates on the major and most sensitive of issues while remaining policy problems are left to the professional diplomats of Itamarati. For example, relations with the United States have the highest priority and invariably receive the full attention of the Foreign Minister and the President. In this area, they discuss the problems, call up whatever advice they feel necessary, and make the decisions.¹⁵

Thus, the Foreign Minister is in a position to exert considerable influence in certain areas of foreign policy. Depending on his background and experience, he may use this power more or less freely. As examples, it is well worth examining two incidents from the Ministry of Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco. First, at a banquet given for President-elect Quadros by visiting President Oswaldo Dórticos in late 1960, the Cuban chief executive proposed that Brazil in the coming year should support and attend a meeting of neutral governments. Arinos

Ministry. Jornal do Brasil, Julho 11, 1963. The press had very little time to take him up on his suggestion since the new Foreign Minister quit his post for the Supreme Court the following month. Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 6, 1963, p. 3, and Agosto 9, 1963, p.4.

¹⁵Interview with Jom Azulão, assistant, to the Chief of the North American Division, Itamarati, December 6, 1967. This division as a consequence is left with analyzing political trends in the United States (and now to some extent Canada) and is not involved in policy-making.

replied first and stated that Brazil could not support nor participate in such a meeting because it would find itself submerged in a multitude of Afro-Asian states which were newly independent, and thus had interests which were different from Brazil's. Later, according to Arinos, Jânio Quadros expressed warm agreement with this position.¹⁶

The second incident occurred six months later, and again it concerned the highly sensitive issue of Cuba. President Quadros had become somewhat apprehensive about the course of the Cuban Revolution. He therefore instructed his Foreign Minister to draft a letter to Fidel Castro which was to express Brazil's concern with Cuba's drift to totalitarianism and dependence on the Soviet Union. Arinos then wrote the letter. In it he commented that the Cuban Revolution, while embodying the future course of Latin American societies, was at the same time needlessly "disfiguring itself" by becoming rigid and doctrinaire. He noted that Cuba's doctrines were increasingly "corresponding to a closed ideology and to the specific conditions of an immense country /that is, the Soviet Union/ completely different from ours."¹⁷

¹⁶ Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, "Política Externa" Digesto Económico, Novembre-Dezembre 1964, pp. 19-20.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 20.

When the letter was presented for Quadros' signature, the President readily agreed with its contents, but hesitated in sending it out of fear of Cuban misinterpretation. Jânio Quadros simply did not want to be accused in public of being a stalking horse of international capitalism. He did agree apparently to Arinos's suggestion, that this "friendly warning" be conveyed verbally to the Cubans by the Brazilian ambassador, Vasco Leitão da Cunha.¹⁸

The Foreign Minister, of course, has tasks other than advising the President on matters of high policy. He is quite often, for example, the man expected to perform the ceremonial functions in lieu of the President. Thus, he may travel abroad and formally sign trade and cultural exchange agreements as Macedo Soares did in Montevideo in January of 1957.¹⁹ Or he may be on hand to welcome distinguished foreign guests as Afonso Arinos did with Adlai Stevenson.²⁰

The Foreign Minister may give added impact to a

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 20-21.

¹⁹Itamaraty, Janeiro 31, 1957, p. 1.

²⁰Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco, Discurso de Saudação a Adlai Stevenson (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1961). Or he may not be on hand as was the case when President Quadros met President Kennedy's special representative Adolph Berle. In this case trouble ensued, and the meeting sorely lacked the mediating influence of the Foreign Minister. See above, pp. 260-261.

foreign policy position by appearing at international conferences when high national interests seem at stake. Thus, as part of President Kubitschek's campaign to promote the OPA, his Foreign Minister, Horácio Lafer argued before the OAS Council in Washington, and later at the Bogota meeting, that the continent needed a new policy in order to overcome poverty and prevent radical social revolution.²¹

The Foreign Minister may also be used as an instrument of domestic policy. Jânio Quadros, in his campaign to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, found Afonso Arinos especially valuable in persuading conservative clergy to give their approval. The Foreign Minister was even able to get the Papal Nuncio to sign an aide-memoire which stated that the Roman Catholic Church approved of any foreign policy whose object was world peace--an indirect, but valuable support for the foreign policy being pursued by Jânio Quadros. Later the Foreign Minister sent a personal telegram regarding Brazil's independent policy to the Vatican which received a warm response from Cardinal Tardini, Secretary of State, to the Holy See.²²

The Foreign Minister, of course, has a continuing interest in his position in domestic politics. As a

²¹Hispanic-American Report, May 1960, p. 210.

²²Luiz Orlando Carneiro, "Jânio Venceu em Seis

practicing politician he must spend some time in advancing his own political career. Thus, just after moving into his new job at Itamarati, Evandro Lins e Silva was sounding out key legislators on his proposed nomination to the Supreme Court.²³ And the current Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto must deny from time to time his imminent declaration of candidacy for one office or another. Even the repeated questions and denials indicate the assumption that the Foreign Minister is now expected to abstain from seeking another office.²⁴

The Foreign Minister, of course, has some direct control over Itamarati. Although it is not customary, he may choose his own Secretary-General--the second in command at the Ministry, and always a professional diplomat. He may also pick the divisional chiefs,²⁵ but this is rare; the usual method is that the Foreign Minister is

Meses Resistencia de 15 Anos ao Reatamento com a URSS,"
Jornal do Brasil, Julho 27, 1961, p. 4.

²³Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 6, 1963, p. 3. He did receive Senate approval although it was a close vote. Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 9, 1963, p. 4.

²⁴Boletim Especial, Outubro 17, 1967, No. 195, p. 1. He said at the moment he was not a candidate for the Presidency or the governorship of Minas Gerais. The selection of Costa e Silva's successor then was still rather far in the future.

²⁵Lins e Silva, for example, after talking with the senior diplomats, made several changes including the appointment of a new Secretary-General. Not all the appointments were well received, however. Reported in Jornal do Brasil, Julho 14, 1963.

presented with suggestions for these positions made by diplomats serving on a Promotion Committee.²⁶

The Foreign Minister may also, if he chooses, meet with his subordinates in order to discuss policy problems directly. This is not customary, however, and most Ministers allow the Secretary-General to collect the professional opinions and to bring them to him in the form of recommendations.²⁷

Not the least of a Foreign Minister's powers lies in his role as an ex-Minister. Brazil has many such men. Their sheer number, however, mitigates against their having much influence individually. Still, the influence can be seen. The most common form that this takes is in the publication of books and articles. João Neves da Fontoura, Foreign Minister under Getúlio Vargas, outlined his ideas on foreign policy in his memoirs; he also stirred a controversy by criticizing Vargas for his unseemly meddling in diplomacy.²⁸ José Carlos de Macedo Soares released his collected public statements after

²⁶Interview with Geraldo de Heráclito Lima.

²⁷San Thiago Dantas, for example, called together the heads of mission for the East European countries for an informal session on future policy in the area. Jornal do Brasil, Fevereiro 21, 1962, p. 4, and Fevereiro 22, 1962, p. 3. This kind of meeting, however, is extremely rare.

²⁸João Neves da Fontoura, Depoimentos de um Ex-Ministro (Rio de Janeiro: Organização Simões Editora, 1957). He was especially indignant over Vargas' alleged private correspondence with President Peron regarding the possible formation of an ABC bloc--Argentina, Brazil and Chile--which would be directed against the United States,

he left the Ministry in 1958.²⁹ Afonso Arinos, however, has been the most prolific of former Foreign Ministers with books, articles, and speeches on foreign policy.³⁰

On a few occasions, former Ministers have acted collectively. In January of 1962, for example, four of them--Horácio Lafer, João Neves de Fontoura, Vicente Rão and José de Macedo Soares--signed a manifesto criticizing the Cuban policy of President Goulart and San Thiago Dantas. On the even of the Punta del Este meeting devoted to this subject, they declared:³¹

If...we want to maintain the OAS and block the invasion of Communism, we have to find at Punta del Este a solution that will preserve the unity of our Republics, renew our faith in Democracy and Liberty, and reject totalitarianism, which by definition is contrary to the spirit of the peoples of the New World....

The problem created by the Communization of Cuba is not resolved by the simple enunciation of general principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty.

pp. 44-48. John W.F. Dulles in Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1967) states his charges are without apparent foundation, but were a part of an anti-Vargas smear led by Tribuna da Imprensa, the newspaper of Carlos Lacerda, p. 317.

²⁹ José Carlos de Macedo Soares, Conceitos da Solidaridade Continental (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1959).

³⁰ Among them are A Alma do Tempo (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, Janeiro, 1961), first in a series of memoirs; "Brasil-França," Digesto Econômico, Julho-Agosto, 1963, pp. 119-124; "Co-existência Interna," Digesto Econômico, Setembro-October, 1963, pp. 23-30.

³¹ Jornal do Brasil, Janeiro 18, 1962, p. 5.

The text, which appeared in the Jornal do Brasil, continued by pointing out that Fidel Castro had already flatly rejected democracy, and, in addition, that he was prepared to destroy it throughout the continent. A do-nothing policy, the ex-Ministers declared, was not sufficient. The Latin American states, with Brazil's full support, should collectively break diplomatic relations with the Cubans.³²

It should be added that this type of criticism is not the normal function of former Foreign Ministers. It is much more common for them to give routine support to the current policy (no matter what it may be) and to insist that present policy is only a logical development of their own decisions at Itamarati. For example, at a lunch given by Foreign Minister San Thiago Dantas in November of 1961 (scarcely two months before the January manifesto) João Neves de Fontoura stated that he favored the current policy, including the resumption of relations with the Soviet Union. He added that it was during his ministry that the first preliminary contacts had been made with the Russians.³³

³² Ibid.

³³ Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 1, 1961, p. 4. Other ex-Ministers at the luncheon were Raul Fernandes, Horácio Lafer, Ciro de Freitas, Maurício Nabuco, Antonio Camilo de Oliveira and Vasco Leitão da Cunha. Let it be said that their opinions on contemporary foreign policy were not recorded.

Three years later, Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco, in a commentary on General Castello Branco's foreign policy (conventionally described as a reversal or at least deflection of the política externa independente of Jânio Quadros,³⁴ stated his approval of the new foreign policy and added that the new regime was, in fact, following the lines of policy he had established as Foreign Minister in 1961. Afonso Arinos did add, however, that the "techniques" were different, and that these should be revised by the Government. But he did not elaborate further on this point.³⁵

Thus ex-Foreign Ministers may often have an active interest in foreign affairs, and they may also keep up their contacts with Itamarati. They frequently publicize their opinion on policy, although it may be only in support of the regime-of-the-day.

3. Effectiveness

How does the Foreign Minister use the powers which have been described? What influence does he have in making foreign policy as a whole? The answer varies considerably from Minister to Minister. But it depends

³⁴See for example all three issues of Política Externa Independente, Maio 1965, Agosto 1965, Janeiro 1966, a journal devoted to reviving a "national and independent" foreign policy.

³⁵Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco, "Política Externa," Digesto Econômico, p. 29. He did criticize the regime's decision to send troops to the Dominican Republic although he did it with circumspection: "I am not here

on four major factors. First, of course, it varies with the character of the Minister. If the Foreign Minister has a strong personality and ideas to match it, then his control over policy is rather great. Magalhães Pinto, for example, with long experience as an innovative politician, has carried over these characteristics to his new position.

The strength of the Foreign Minister also depends on his previous knowledge of foreign affairs. If it is considerable, as was the case with Afonso Arinos, his own self-confidence in his judgments is usually high. If it is not, then he is forced to seek the advice of the professional diplomat and the guidance of the President.

His influence too depends on his length of stay in office. Foreign Ministers of recent date have not stayed in office for long. No one has remained in office, for example, more than two years and some have stayed considerably less: Afonso Arinos seven months, Hermes Lima five, and Lins e Silva less than two months. During these brief terms of office, even a competent Minister scarcely has time to leave his imprint on Brazilian foreign policy.

making an attack on the Government that I support; I am not attacking the United States which I admire; I am making a speech in defense of a national position that I consider inalienable, immoveable... namely self-determination and non-intervention." Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco, "A Intervenção em São Domingo," p. 28.

His importance too is dependent on the character of the President. If the latter is strong-minded and innovative in foreign policy then even the boldest Foreign Minister may find his influence far from dominant. If the President is content to let others handle foreign affairs then the Foreign Minister, even a normally weak one, can have a far greater impact on policy-making.

A final, and extremely important consideration is the informal position which the Minister holds within the regime. If he is a close, personal advisor of the President in addition to being his formal advisor then his influence is greater. Evandro Lins e Silva, for example, had been Goulart's chief political advisor before accepting the post of Foreign Minister. If he had remained in the position longer his influence, no doubt, would have been greater, other things being equal. However, in the turmoil of domestic politics, quite often the Foreign Minister appointee is selected on the basis of the political support he can add to the regime. If it is a coalition government (and they usually were--at least until 1964), the Foreign Minister may not even belong to the President's party (as was the case with Hermes Lima). Therefore, as a possible political rival, the Foreign Minister could never be quite accepted in full confidence by the President. And thus his influence over Presidential decisions, and over foreign policy in general became limited.

The Foreign Minister has many functions to perform and his effectiveness is dependent on his character, his knowledge, the presidential assertiveness in policy-making, and the Foreign Minister's relationship with the Chief Executive. But it must be stressed that even if these factors favor a Foreign Minister, his role is limited. For example, after consulting with the President, appearing before Congress (in Brasilia), granting press interviews, engaging in ceremonial functions, travelling abroad, and looking after his own political career, the Foreign Minister may find little time to engage in day-to-day control of the Ministry (located still in Rio de Janeiro). Thus these factors alone may act as a considerable disadvantage, even for the man of talent. These considerations plus the universal lack of time in office constrains the modern Brazilian Foreign Minister from being a vigorous policy shaper in the mold of the Baron of Rio Branco.

Organization of the Foreign Ministry

The structure of the Ministry's bureaucracy has remained basically the same throughout the years of the Empire as well as of the Republic. It has nearly always been organized along functional lines.³⁶ Thus,

³⁶However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Secretaria de Estado dos Negocios Exrangeiros) of 1842 was organized basically into three geographic sections directly

according to the decree law of 1859, the reorganized Foreign Ministry was to be divided into four principal sections. There was a fifth "Central Section" (Seção Central) which was directly subordinate to the Foreign Minister and his first assistant, a career official who carried the title Director-General.³⁷ The main business of foreign policy was carried out by the first three sections. The First Section dealt with communications of a political nature with other nations, intelligence gathering, and the negotiation of all non-trade treaties and accords. The Second Section handled all economic affairs and dealt with Brazilian consulates. It also took care of that important task of the 19th century--immigration. The remaining two sections dealt largely with administrative chores: Section Three filed correspondence, treaties, etc.,

subordinate to the Minister, plus an office of administration and a section for archives. The first principal section (Primeira Seção) dealt with all matters involving the British and French. Second Section dealt with the rest of Europe, and Section Three handled American business only. See the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, (Evolução do Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Rio de Janeiro, n.d.), pp. 5-6.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 12-21. The Central Section dealt mainly with matters of protocol rather than of policy. The Director-General was its acting chief. It also undertook all business dealings with legislature, acting as liaison between the Ministry and that august body. pp. 14-15. Incidentally, the Ministry just before the reform decree was allowed a grand total of eight officials and five clerks plus an archivist. The smallness of the staff was cause for much complaint at the time, and it is a problem that has vexed Brazilian foreign ministries since including the present one. See below, p. 352, and Ibid., pp. 5-6.

and issued passports; Section Four handled internal administration.³⁸

The 1859 arrangement was to receive many modifications through the years. For example, in 1893 the old Central Section was turned into the First Section and the others were moved down a notch in number.³⁹ In 1918, the Ministry was reorganized into two grand "directorates," one dealing with political and economic matters (with, of course, the proper sub-divisions), and the second taking care of household administration, including the archives.⁴⁰

The Foreign Ministry continued to receive "re-organizations" and readjustments, but the basic outlines remained the same until very recently. Thus at mid-century Itamarati was divided into four major departments:

1. Political and Cultural, which included political, cultural, and ceremonial divisions plus a special section for international agencies and conferences, and another for border demarcations
2. Economic
3. Administrative, with divisions for personnel, supplies, publications, archives, and budget.
4. The Consular

³⁸Ibid., pp. 12-21.

³⁹Ibid., p. 43. The Baron of Rio Branco who was in charge of the 1904 reorganization, stressed in his report that the problems of the Foreign Ministry were not solved by shifting boxes around on an organizational chart. The key problem was the lack of personnel which he felt was "harming the good progress of some services and making impossible the execution of others." Ibid., pp. 51-52.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 100.

and Passport Service. The structure, in short, was still highly functional as it had been since the 1850s.⁴¹

After World War II, this century-old method of handling foreign affairs was beginning to show signs of obsolescence, and the first sounds of dissatisfaction were expressed by Foreign Minister João Neves de Fontoura who appointed a special committee in 1947 to examine the problem. It brought out a detailed report, but meanwhile João Neves had left Itamarati; the recommendations were allowed to collect dust in the Archives Division.⁴²

The post-war era, with its highly intricate patterns of international interaction, exerted increasing pressure on the rather old-fashioned structure of Itamarati. The functional approach, for example, left many organizational anomalies. With the growing number of dealings with international agencies, it became mandatory to establish a section handling that business.

⁴¹Itamaraty, Fevereiro 15, 1957, pp. 10-11. By this time, the Director-General had been designated as the Secretary-General, but his function remained unchanged.

⁴²An account of João Neves' committee can be found in Jornal do Brasil, Setembro 22, 1963, p. 21. Ironically, it was the Neves' reform in 1946 which earlier had made the Foreign Ministry entirely functional in its organizational set-up for the first time that now was causing the problems. The Director-General became in fact the number two man in the Ministry since his jurisdiction extended over all the major divisions, not simply the department handling protocol and (later)

Unfortunately, since it did not clearly belong to any one existing division, it was made semi-independent, but was subject to the control of the two principal policy-making divisions: Political and Economic. Needless to say the new section did not function well.

There were other problems as well. The placement of cultural affairs within the Political Division was not successful since it really had no organic reason for being there. Also functionalism could not provide for a planning body that could be easily coordinated with the other divisions.⁴³

These and other difficulties moved the men of Itamarati in the late 1950s to set up another study group on reform. In 1958 they recommended to then Foreign Minister Francisco Negrão de Lima that the functional approach be discarded, that political and economic matters be fused, and that policy-making sections be organized according to the geographic areas. Administration, consular, and other more prosaic tasks would be left to separate divisions. The report also recommended the formation of a policy planning committee, composed of top diplomats, immediately sub-ordinated to the Secretary-General. The ideas were accepted nearly

administration.

⁴³Ibid., p. 21, and Evolução do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, pp. 178-180.

in toto by the Foreign Minister and the draft law on Itamarati's reorganization was submitted to the Congress in April of 1959.⁴⁴

More than two years later, the reform and re-organization bill became law.⁴⁵ Principally, it attempted to do away with the functionalist approach to organization--but not entirely. Geographic divisions were now the heart of the policy-making process--but a separate division for Economic Affairs was retained. (The implications of this shall be discussed later, see below p. 18.) In addition, the policy-making business was separated from the administrative side of Itamarati. The latter was to be divided into a Department of Administration, a Department of Consular and Immigration Affairs, a Department of Legal Affairs, a Ceremonial Division, and the Border Demarcation Service. No longer would policy-makers be responsible for overseeing the routine tasks of the passport division or the frontier section.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Jornal do Brasil, Setembro 22, 1963, p. 21.

⁴⁵To be exact on July 14, 1961, which of course meant that it took effect under a new (Quadros) administration. Incidentally, although the bill spent over two years within the Congress, little of the draft law was changed. The Chamber, however, did make some alterations in regard to promotions and in regard to the re-organization of the personnel department. The Senate made no changes. In fairness to the Congress, the bill was long and of an extremely technical nature. Moreover, both houses showed their interest in the bill by establishing special study sub-committees of their Foreign Relations Committee. Ibid., p. 21, and Jornal do Brasil, Junho 5, 1959, p. 5.

⁴⁶Jornal do Brasil, Setembro 22, 1963, p. 21.

The position of the Secretary-General, in the past only theoretically the number two man in the Foreign Ministry, was strengthened. Previously his job had been to oversee the administrative side of Itamarati, allowing the Foreign Minister to deal exclusively with policy matters. Now the Secretary-General was involved directly in making policy too. A Secretariat of Foreign Affairs was established which was to be a kind of collegiate body composed of the Secretary-General and four Assistant Secretary-Generals,⁴⁷ and was supposed to be responsible for making and co-ordination of all foreign policy.⁴⁸

At that time too an entirely new section was created--the Division of Trade Information and Propaganda, which was to expand enormously the amount of information on Brazil available to importers and exporters abroad.⁴⁹

Since the major re-organization of 1961 some smaller changes have come to Itamarati. Usually these have been additions rather than rearrangements. For example, with the growing number of trade arrangements

⁴⁷They were the chiefs of the following divisions: Inter-American Policy; Europe and International Agencies; Africa, Asia, and Oceania; Economic Policy. See Luiz O. Carneiro, Jornal do Brasil, Maio 21, 1961, p. 4.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 4. What happened to that concept of policy-making will be discussed below. See p. 360 .

⁴⁹Jornal do Brasil, Maio 17, 1961, p. 11 .

with Eastern Europe, a new co-ordinating committee was formed which eventually was labelled COLESTE--Comissão de Comércio com a Europa.⁵⁰

COLESTE was to co-ordinate the negotiation of all trade accords with Eastern Europe; it was to prepare technical reports for the Brazilian delegation of mixed trade commissions with Eastern Europe;⁵¹ and it was to encourage interest in trade with Eastern Europe on the part of Brazilian private firms.⁵²

The geographic divisions within the Foreign Ministry have changed several times. Now, for example, there are seven Assistant Secretary-Generals whose divisions are: American Affairs; Western Europe; Eastern Europe; Africa; Near East; Asia (including Oceania); and Economic Affairs.⁵³

Thus, Itamarati for more than a century has engaged in numerous organizational reforms. It must be noted first that these changes have largely been internally generated and not imposed from the outside. In addition, the

⁵⁰Formerly Grupo de Coordenação de Comércio com os Países Socialistas da Europa Oriental. It is headed by the chief of the Eastern European division. Interview, Geraldo de Heráclito Lima.

⁵¹The commissions were set up by the trade agreements between Brazil and the individual Eastern European countries. They consisted of experts located in each capital who were responsible for working out the complicated details involved in trading with a monopolistic state trading company.

⁵²Boletim Especial, Fevereiro 7, 1968, No. 27, p. 1.

⁵³Interview, Victor Jose Silveira, Geraldo de

reforms have increased steadily the power of the Secretary-General (formerly the Director-General) the highest ranking professional diplomat in the Ministry. At first, the Foreign Minister was clearly the dominating position in the Foreign Office while the Secretary-General was purely an administrative officer. Now his office has evolved into a policy-making one, and the Foreign Minister has become largely dependent on him for advice on substance and procedure. Finally, the organizational reforms have attempted to make the Ministry more efficient in its handling of foreign affairs by clearly separating policy-making from the routine chores of administration, passport approval, etc. The reforms, too, have opted for the geographic approach (as is the case with most modern Foreign Offices) rather than a strictly functional one. This, however, has not been completely implemented. In general, however, the Foreign Ministry itself has freely adopted its organizational structure in order to maintain, if not increase its hold on foreign policy-making.

The Tasks of Itamarati

All Foreign Ministries, of course, perform the tasks associated with the work of diplomacy. In this century, however, the precise, neatly laid out duties

Heráclito Lima, and Christian Whitaker.

of traditional diplomacy have changed considerably. Nation-states today interact with each other more often and on a wider range of subject matter than was the case 25 years ago. This has allowed more and more governmental agencies to participate in the foreign policy-making process unless the old line agency, the Foreign Office, is able to handle the new roles assigned to it by twentieth century international relations.⁵⁴ In this section, we shall be looking at the range and depth of Itamarati's job. An evaluation of its effectiveness will be reserved for a later section.

In the first place, Brazil's Foreign Ministry performs all the tasks of traditional diplomacy. They are four-fold. First, it must negotiate with other countries on matters of treaties. This, of course, includes all the multi-lateral talks which are so prevalent today, especially in matters of an economic nature. Second, it must gather intelligence for policy-makers. Third, it must represent Brazil in the narrow sense of the word in

⁵⁴Massimo Bonanni, an Italian political scientist, for example, has found the foreign offices of Western Europe challenged in policy-making by the special expertise of the Ministries of Defense, and Treasury, and even by Agriculture, Foreign Trade and Industry, and Interior. What has happened is "each individual act comes up to involve the whole political sphere, the whole administration and every individual, thereby enormously increasing the number of participants in the international political game and creating profound innovations in the traditional decisional structure." And he concludes: "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is increasingly becoming just the spokesman for decisions which have been made elsewhere and sometimes

the international community. Finally, it must engage in consular activities.⁵⁵

1. Negotiation of Treaties and Conventions

The first task is perhaps the most complicated and requires the highest amount of professional skill. Direct negotiations with other governments has been the oldest, best known item on the diplomat's agenda. But recently it has become fashionable, as diplomatic historian Harold Nicolson has pointed out, to assert that the diplomat in the field no longer has a genuinely creative role since the home office, or better, the Chief Executive can impose a day-to-day direction because of the development of instant communication. This reduces the ambassador and his staff to an expensive, but decorative messenger service.⁵⁶

This charge, however, bears some second thought. In the first place, Nicolson has observed:⁵⁷

other Ministries even represent it on the international scene. The functions of this Ministry are still an open question." Massimo Bonanni "New International Policy Makers" Lo Spettatore Internazionale (English edition) May-June 1967, p. 185 and p. 209. The extent to which this is true will be discussed, see below, p. 351.

⁵⁵Lincoln Gordon "The Development of United States Representation Overseas," pp. 11-12 in The Representation of the United States Abroad (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).

⁵⁶Harold Nicolson Diplomacy (2nd ed., London: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 74-75.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 75.

It would be an exaggeration...to contend that the modern ambassador is, in comparison to his predecessors in the eighteenth century, no more than a clerk at the end of the telephone. In the first place most of the eighteenth century envoys were so terrified of committing their governments or of having their notes and actions repudiated, that they preferred to take no action at all. We remember the sensational ambassadors of the pre-telegraph days such as Malmsbury, and Elliot, Stratford Canning and Bulwer.... But we forget the other long succession of drab envoys, too timid to take the initiative, too exiled to be very happy, too lazy even to write a report.

And he adds that diplomacy, in a world where personality still counts in a nation's foreign affairs, must be "rightly executed" by the man on the spot--a man who possesses "experience, integrity and intelligence," copious quantities of "good-temper and courage," and who is not moved by emotion or prejudice. Moreover:⁵⁸

...who is profoundly modest in all his dealings, who is guided only by a sense of public duty, and who understands the perils of cleverness and the virtues of reason, moderation, discretion, patience and tact. Mere telephone clerks are not, in so far as I am aware, expected to display all these difficult qualities at once.

Perhaps, Nicolson, a professional diplomat himself, has overdrawn the importance of today's diplomat, but it is a useful counter-thesis to a widespread, but rarely scrutinized position. Furthermore, at Itamarati, pride is taken in the fact that the man in the field has

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 75-76.

a wide latitude in making decisions with the home office holding the lightest of reins.⁵⁹

It might also be added that the professional diplomat today (and this is especially true for Itamarati) handles the majority of treaty negotiations. Thus while the Foreign Minister, and even the Brazilian President may oversee the writing of the major documents, the "bread and butter" agreements are worked out from beginning to end by the professional corps.

For example, the first trade mission sent to the Soviet Union in November 1959 was led by Edmundo Barbosa da Silva, Chief of the Economics Division. The role of the professional was further strengthened in 1960 by the creation of a Mixed Executive Committee with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro and Moscow. The Committee was composed of diplomats who would implement the trade agreement which had been reached in 1959.⁶⁰ A similar procedure was used in drawing up a trade accord with Poland in 1963.⁶¹

It is not simply in the world of international

⁵⁹Interview, Geraldo de Heráclito Lima, Chief, East European Affairs Division.

⁶⁰See RBPI, Março, 1960, pp. 166-168. The principal objectives for the Brazilians were: first, to establish a trade arrangement which would reduce imports from dollar areas; second, to exchange surplus coffee for much needed petroleum; third, to purchase oil drilling equipment on a long term basis.

⁶¹RBPI, Março 1963, pp. 123-127. The principal negotiator for Brazil was Aluisio Regis Bittencourt, the Assistant Secretary-General for East Europe and Asian Affairs. A Hungarian mission was sent out at this time too with less successful results. Ibid., pp. 126-127.

economics that the diplomat wields his influence. Elaborate cultural arrangements too require his skill. For example, the final arrangement of the Brazilian-French Accord of 1967 was entirely the work of the West European Division of Itamarati. This elaborate thirty-page document was signed by the respective Foreign Ministers in January of that year, and besides presenting the usual trade concessions, it also provided for a new cultural exchange program. French government scholarships for Brazilians to study in France were increased significantly; young French college instructors could go to Brazil in lieu of their military service; and language personnel would be exchanged in order to increase the knowledge of French and Portuguese in the two countries. Other measures provided for an exchange of films, television programs, and artist groups such as the Comedie Francaise.⁶²

2. Intelligence and Research

The second task of traditional diplomacy is that of intelligence gathering. This may be defined as the "securing and reporting home of information on foreign events, conditions, trends, and prospects of interest to the home government."⁶³ The scope of this activity

⁶²Ata Final da Comissão Mista Franco-Brasileira (Mimeographed) passim.

⁶³Barnett, p. 10.

has increased enormously in the last half-century. Today Itamarati, like all Foreign Offices, must collect data on a wide range of subjects including political, economic, military, and technological. The demand, no doubt, goes beyond the capacity of all Ministries except perhaps a favored few, but it is significant that Itamarati, at least, has kept this function largely within its control. Outside experts are not generally used or consulted as historian José Honório Rodrigues has complained; thus the task is left exclusively to the professional insiders.⁶⁴

Moreover, once the raw data has been collected and sent to Rio de Janeiro (soon to Brasilia), members of the diplomatic corps analyze it for themselves in study groups which are also not accessible to the outsider. Occasionally such a study group can be the focal point of controversy. In January 1959, a Foreign Ministry study report, which flatly contradicted the recommendations of the National Development Bank (BNDE) on oil exploitation in Bolivia by Brazil, was sent to President Kubitschek. The Bank had recommended the use of foreign (that is, American) technical assistance since Brazil lacked the resources to fill its contract with Bolivia. The Foreign Ministry instead opted for a "nationalist solution," which meant that there would be no foreign

⁶⁴J.H. Rodrigues, Interesse Nacional, p. 41.

capital employed, and that operations would be placed on a longer range basis. Itamarati got what it wanted (with congressional support).⁶⁵

3. Representation Abroad

The third traditional duty of the professional diplomat is to represent his nation in the narrow sense of the word. This may involve everything from the new Brazilian Ambassador presenting his credentials to the United States government,⁶⁶ to the defusing of a tense bi-lateral crisis as was the case with the "Lobster War" with France,⁶⁷ or the border dispute with Paraguay. It may mean resolving a ticklish problem of international law involving a neighboring country.⁶⁸ In any case, in all of these matters which do involve professional expertise, Itamarati's diplomats represent the Brazilian

⁶⁵The controversy had been going on for some years, ever since the Robore district of Bolivia was found to have oil. Since then Brazilians have been careful to distinguish between imperialism and the friendly assistance which it is rendering Bolivia on this matter. The controversy came into the open, however, only in January 1959. See Jornal do Brasil, Janeiro 15, 1959, p. 9, and Janeiro 18, 1959, p. 4.

⁶⁶See the Boletim Especial, Fevereiro 21, 1969 in which the new Ambassador, Mario Gibson Barboza presented his credentials to President Nixon. In proper diplomatic style, the Ambassador explained his mission, praised the previous Ambassador, Vasco Leitão da Cunha, and expressed satisfaction at the current status of American-Brazilian relations. And, as is mandatory on these occasions, no mention of specifics was made.

⁶⁷See previous chapter, pp. 269-270.

⁶⁸Recently, Itamaraty requested that the

point of view.

One form of representation that has increased enormously in the last twenty-five years is that of dealing with international organizations. Although Brazil withdrew from the League of Nations in 1926, it has made up for this diplomatic gaffe with sustained and deep involvement in the United Nations.⁶⁹

Also professional diplomats, like Augusto Frederico Schmidt, have been influential at inter-American meetings. At the Bogota conference of 1960 he pushed Brazil's OPA aggressively. He charged, for example, that the new United States' proposals were a "short-term palliative...made on the spur of the moment under the pressure of the Cuban crisis."⁷⁰ In comparison to President Kubitschek's proposal for \$10 billion in aid money to be distributed over a two-decade period, the Newport proposals of President Eisenhower made previous to the Bogota meeting were utterly inadequate.⁷¹ Schmidt,

Uruguayan government return a criminal who had escaped to that country. The fugitive, however, in the meantime had asked and was granted political asylum. The embassy in Montevideo protested and asked that the decision be reviewed. See Boletim Especial, Fevereiro 14, 1969, p. 1, No. 32.

⁶⁹ José Maria Bello, A History of Modern Brazil, 1889-1964, trans. by James L. Taylor (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 255.

⁷⁰ Hispanic-American Report, November 1960, p. 657.

⁷¹ The so-called Newport proposals were issued to the press by President Eisenhower in July 1960 at Newport, Rhode Island. In general they endorsed "social progress" programs like agrarian reform, and promised to increase

moreover, proposed policies to substitute for the American program. These included broad economic surveys, a common market, and price stabilization plans for primary products.⁷²

At the United Nations, Brazilian diplomats have taken an interest in disarmament, and peace-keeping missions, issues in which middle-sized powers can and must participate owing to the mutual suspicion of the superpowers. Brazil has also been active in the "perennial questions" that exercise the membership, for example, South Africa.

In June of 1964, Ambassador Geraldo de Carvalho Silos argued before the Security Council that it was not difficult to prove South Africa's violations of commitments made by her in signing the U.N. Charter. It was difficult, however, "within the imperfect framework of the world community" to adopt actions that would solve the problem.⁷³ He recommended among other measures that an educational program be set up for South Africans in exile, and that the U.N. Committee of Experts be asked to study the possibility of economic sanctions and to

the loan funds available to Latin America. See Department of State Bulletin, August 1, 1960, pp. 166-170.

⁷² Ibid., p. 657.

⁷³ RBPI, Junho 1964, p. 353.

recommend those which would be viable.⁷⁴

4. Consular Affairs

The fourth traditional duty is that concerning consular affairs. This involves the most routine of chores such as approving passports and visas, and assisting nationals in foreign countries. The other side of this duty, however, is not or rather should not be routine. It deals with trade promotion which Brazil as an underdeveloped country can ill afford to neglect. In recent years, it has become more and more fashionable to treat this aspect of diplomacy as paramount within Itamarati. At the present, it probably has reached its apex; the current President Costa e Silva repeatedly mentions the "Diplomacy of Prosperity." He feels that the first task of the Government, including the Foreign Ministry, is to overcome poverty,⁷⁵ and his diplomacia da prosperidade is calculated to achieve this end. The plan is a vague one. Generally, Costa e Silva wishes to see Itamarati more active in the promotion of trade and in the acquisition of technological expertise for Brazil. But beyond the rhetoric, what is the Foreign Ministry doing to promote Brazilian prosperity?

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 354.

⁷⁵See for example, the Boletim Especial, Junho 16, 1967, No. 111, p. 1.

Juraci Magalhaes, Foreign Minister in 1966-67, and himself a member of private corporation boards, announced in May 1966 that "Itamarati is more and more an institution at the service of Brazilian businessmen..."⁷⁶

He went on to say:⁷⁷

The Office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Affairs, with its divisions of Financial Policy, Transport and Communications, and Trade Promotion, is one of the most active sectors in our Ministry; it has the complete collaboration of diverse geographic sectors, of the Consular Department, and of the competent services of the House, as well as the extensive network of diplomatic missions, and joint delegations to the international organs...

Specifically, he listed seven services performed by Itamarati in the commercial area. First it assisted in the negotiation for any loan necessary to carry out foreign activities, and it helped importers to find the best quality merchandise. Second, it attempted to get better prices for Brazilian exports through the negotiation of international commodity agreements. Third, it sought better routes for Brazilian air transport. Fourth, it pushed Latin American trade liberalization vigorously. Fifth, it promoted Brazilian presence in world trade fairs.⁷⁸

⁷⁶From a speech quoted in Jornal do Brasil, Maio 5, 1966, p. 11.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Itamarati has recently released a set of criteria for entering trade fairs. They include the conditions of the local market which will be determined by the

Sixth, it defended Brazil's private enterprise when it was hurt in foreign markets by the dumping practices of other countries. Finally, through the local research of its embassies, the Foreign Ministry attempted to look for new markets for exports. Magalhães ended with the slogan, "the good ambassador and the good consul are those that sell well."⁷⁹

Juraci Magalhães may well have added that the Foreign Ministry has established diplomatic relations with some countries for no other reason than that of watching a trade competitor. For example, alone of the East African countries, Kenya was chosen to have an embassy. In polite diplomatic language the embassy was arranged to continue the dialogue between Brazil and Kenya on the problem of coffee. In more blunt language, one Brazilian diplomat said that it was to keep an eye on the Kenyans, and if necessary to apply pressure before the international coffee conference began.⁸⁰

Itamarati has also worked on the reform of the local embassy. Entrance to the fair will depend on the possibilities which the fair offers for the expansion of export markets for specialized products of Brazil. It must be in Brazil's political interest to participate in the fair, and the object and atmosphere of the event must not clash with the general outlines of Brazilian foreign policy. The initiative for entering the fair belongs to the private company, but all expositions will be directed by Itamarati's Division of Propaganda and Trade Expansion. See Boletim Especial, Junho 16, 1967, p. 1.

⁷⁹Jornal do Brasil, Maio 5, 1966, p. 11.

⁸⁰See Boletim Especial, Julho 5, 1967, p. 1.

Consular service in order to make it a more effective trade promotion service. The head of the research team, Paulo Leão de Moura, stated that radical changes would be made.⁸¹ A definitive report from this group has not yet appeared.

It seems then that since the Kubitschek regime, the priorities of Itamarati have been changing. Because of internal and external pressures the chief tasks are no longer confined to the traditional concerns of diplomacy, but are becoming more and more commercial. What older diplomats thought of Juraci's remark that the good diplomat was a good salesman cannot be known for certain. But it is significant that it was said at all. It is also significant that an increasing number of Itamarati's research task forces, reform measures, and coordination groups (like COLESTE) revolve around trade promotion. Costa e Silva's "Diplomacy of Prosperity" is more than a slogan, it is an on-going realization that Brazil is desperately poor and that she needs every economic resource which is available.

5. Propaganda

Besides the traditional tasks of diplomacy, one other function has become a fixed part of international

⁸¹de Moura had played a leading role in opening trade relations with the Communist bloc. See Boletim Especial, Abril 19, 1967, p. 1 and Agosto 11, 1967, p. 2.

discourse since World War I. Harold Nicholson, writing in 1939, called it a "new and serious problem of modern diplomacy."⁸² He was speaking of propaganda. He went on to say that "in the days of the old diplomacy it would have been regarded as an act of unthinkable vulgarity to appeal to the common people upon any issue of international policy."⁸³ And Nicholson makes it quite clear that he more or less shares this feeling. Therefore, he is happy to conclude that although a few lies were told by the British in World War I, that sturdy, innately truthful race spends no sums on propaganda (as of 1939). Rather, sums are granted to the British Council whose sole purpose is "to make British life and thought more widely known abroad, to encourage the study of the English language, and to render available abroad current British contributions to literature, science or the fine arts."⁸⁴

The Brazilians seem to have adopted the British model for winning friends and thus influencing governments. No money is spent on propaganda as such. The Division of Propaganda and Trade Promotion has to do

⁸²Nicholson, p. 168.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 172. Paradoxically perhaps it was the British statesman Lord Canning who first recognized "the fatal artillery of popular excitation," and it was the rather more crafty Prince Metternich who disputed Canning's observation although he was said to be much worried about it. See Nicholson, Diplomacy, p. 168.

with product information rather than propaganda in Nicholson's sense of the word. However, it does have a Division of Cultural and Intellectual Cooperation. This Division's functions are of the gentlemanly sort. The most important is the providing of scholarships to foreign students for study in Brazil.⁸⁵ In 1960, for example, sixty-nine were granted (and since then the number has substantially increased). The largest share went to Latin American countries: Argentina 9, Colombia, 6, Bolivia 8, Paraguay 9, Peru 6, and Chile and Uruguay 3 each. Western Europe had a total of 9 and Asia and Africa had 5 together. The United States also received 5.⁸⁶

Since then the priorities have shifted a bit. Much more attention has been paid to Western Europe, especially Great Britain, Germany, and most recently France. Africa too has received a good deal of interest after a disappointing start under the Quadros' regime. A special effort has been made to recruit Angolan and Mozambique students. The United States allotment has declined however--no doubt under the assumption that

⁸⁵The author was financed in part by a Foreign Ministry cultural grant, and can attest to the efficiency of the program even though the Itamarati personnel were in the midst of moving their offices.

⁸⁶List from Jornal do Brasil, Fevereiro 12, 1961, p. 4. Mexico, Central American and the Caribbean received the rest--six in number.

American students can find their own way down, and usually do.

Itamarati has recently begun a program in which Brazilian soccer teams would be sent on exhibition tours under the sponsorship of the Foreign Ministry. A special report was sent to the President which outlined the measures that should be taken to expedite such missions. They included financial assistance, special passports, exemption from tourist taxes, handling of advertising of all exhibitions, and assistance in arranging matches. In Foreign Minister José de Magalhães words, Itamarati was at the service of fute-
bol because to be so was "to serve the people."⁸⁷

6. Summary

Itamarati performs the traditional tasks of diplomacy competently and at times with vigor. The negotiation of treaties, the gathering of intelligence, the representation of Brazil to the outside world, and the fulfillment of consular duties has been the core of Itamarati's activities. Recently, it also has recognized the importance of propaganda especially in trade promotion. It is these functions that Itamarati performs

⁸⁷

Boletim Especial, Octubre 20, 1961, p. 1.

with the freest hand. Both outside groups and the President and Congress have made it a practice to defer to it in these areas, and this deferment has continued to the present day. It seems unlikely that the Foreign Ministry will be strongly challenged in the future as to whom should make policy decisions in these areas. Itamarati, it seems, shall reign supreme over the traditional tasks of diplomacy.

CHAPTER IX

FOREIGN MINISTRY, PERSONNEL, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEMS

Recruitment and Outlook of Itamarati Personnel

Who are the men and women of Itamarati? Where do they come from? How does their background affect their political outlook?

The Foreign Ministry's critics have long charged it with assuming aristocratic airs because of its selection of young diplomats from the old, wealthy Carrioca families. They feel that if Brazil is ever to have a popular democratic foreign policy radical changes have to be made. Its friends on the other hand, claim that Itamarati recruitment is based on merit alone, and has nothing to do with family connections. If a young man (or woman) can pass the competitive exams, then he may acquire a place in the Instituto Rio Branco. There he receives two years of advanced training usually after university training in subjects relating to the profession of diplomacy, for example, diplomatic history, international law, economics, and modern foreign languages. After those two years and further examinations the graduate of the Institute becomes a junior diplomat in

Brazil's Foreign Service.

In this section, we shall be examining the reality of Itamarati's recruitment program and how it differs from the views of its critics and its apologists. Furthermore, we shall analyze the effect (if any) which the type of recruiting has on the outlook, that is the politics, of the Itamarati diplomats.

1. Recruitment Practices

Not even the staunchest friend of the Foreign Ministry will argue that before 1945 appointments were made on the basis of merit. They were quite literally made on the basis of pull (pistalão). This, of course, does not deny that able men were admitted to the Ministry. It does, however, show that they got there not on their objective merits, but on their political and social connections.¹

This arrangement was theoretically changed when the Instituto Rio Branco was established by decree in April of 1945. The Institute was to provide "a course of preparation for the incoming Ministry officials...to perfect those officials ...in the discharge of their responsibilities."²

¹J.H. Rodrigues, Interesse Nacional, p. 41.

²Evolução do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, p. 171.

Until more recently there was also a color barrier at Itamarati. This tended to be true as well of the officer class of the armed forces, especially the Navy and the Air Force. The discrimination was a result of the desire to present Brazil to the world as a "European" country rather than a racially mixed one.³

This policy seemed pretty much in effect as late as 1959 when the Sociedade dos Homens de Cor (the Society of Colored Men), not at all a militant organization, sent a telegram to the President via the Minister of War in protest against the Foreign Ministry's color discrimination. Itamarati issued a note denying it to be sure, but Foreign Minister Horácio Lafer sent a strong recommendation to "the responsible authorities of the Instituto Rio Branco that they be sure that no Brazilian may be prevented from entering the diplomatic service because of racial prejudice." He added:⁴

The Ministry of Foreign Relations considers such prejudice a true crime against the fundamentals of the Brazilian conscience,

³Evidence cited by Nelson de Sousa Sampaio, "The Foreign Policy of Brazil" in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth E. Thompson, Foreign Policies in a World of Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 622. Gilberto Freyre, usually a solid defender of Brazilian institutions, wrote in his previously cited New World in the Tropics in 1959: "Probably Itamarati--the Brazilian Foreign Ministry--remains the last great fortress of Brazilian 'racism' or 'aryanism' as well as of Brazilian belief that public office is an exclusive privilege of white men." p. 10.

⁴Reported in Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 8, 1959, p. 5. There is no apparent record of the Society's

and will take the most energetic measures if some case by chance arises which acts contrary to these values.

But there is little doubt that the problem did exist since two years later President Jânio Quadros gave new instructions regarding the elimination of all forms of racial prejudice at Itamarati, no matter how small or subtle.⁵ And even today, through personal observation, it seems obvious that there are few if any blacks (including mulattoes) working at the Ministry, except in menial positions.⁶

Another problem already cited has been that of Itamarati's recruitment from prominent Rio de Janeiro families. There has been some evidence to substantiate this. For example, until 1958, the examinations to enter the Rio Branco Institute were given only in Rio de Janeiro. Naturally this imposed a great hardship on any possible candidate who lived outside the city. President Kubitschek, however, sought to overcome this handicap by establishing other testing centers in São Paulo, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, and Recife. Thus, in 1959, the first occasion on which this procedure was put into

response to the Foreign Minister's note.

⁵Nelson de Sousa Sampaio, Foreign Policies, p. 622.

⁶The reasons for this discrimination shall be discussed below, see p. . Gilberto Freyre, who admits prejudice in the past, wrote (in 1959) that Itamarati had changed its policy, but cited the name of only one mulatto in the service. Gilberto Freyre, New World

practice preliminary data showed that of the 344 candidates 52% took the examination in Rio, 23% in São Paulo, 9% in Porto Alegre, 8% in Belo Horizonte, and 6% in Recife. Despite this rather impressive distribution of the examinees, Rio de Janeiro still had 80% of those who passed while Belo Horizonte got 8%, São Paulo and Porto Alegre a meager 7% a piece, and Recife 2%. In the years since then, the percentages have remained about the same although now there is an apparent tendency for Itamarati officers to come from the North and Northeast. The prosperous far south (São Paulo and below) still contributes only a relatively small number to the Foreign Service.⁷

While the data is far from complete there is reason to believe that even after the Ministry completes its transfer to Brasilia, there will be a proportionately higher number of cariocas in the Foreign Ministry. And, of course, those that entered the Ministry before 1958 (most of whom were from Rio de Janeiro) will be in the Tropics, p. 10.

⁷Data comes from Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 13, 13, 1959, p. 8. The information on the influx from the Northeast is based on the observations of Geraúldo de Heráclito Lima, First Secretary and Chief of the East European Division. He himself is a nordestino. Professor Tullio Ascarelli, an Italian sociologist, has stated: "Bureaucrats, journalists, men of letters, and political agitators come mostly from the North; businessmen, principally from the South." Quoted in Gilberto Freyre, Brazil, p. 33. Freyre also has observed that younger Army officers are tending to come from the

holding the positions of power for at least two more decades. This is especially true since most Brazilian Foreign Service Officers remain with Itamarati until their retirement. Thus the recent trends will not have any policy-making impact for some years.

This regional bias in Itamarati recruitment, however, should not surprise the close observer of Brazilian history and society. In fact, since the late eighteenth century, the city of Rio de Janeiro has been the outward looking city in Brazil. It was the political capital and principal seaport. This means that a group of people, whether they were merchants or diplomats, have associated themselves with the business of contacts with foreigners. It is Rio de Janeiro then that has by tradition the people who are most fluent in foreign languages, and who have had, perhaps because of their fathers' professions, early exposure to foreign travel. It is the carioca who is most likely to have studied abroad. (This may also be a function of the poor higher education available in Rio compared to São Paulo, and even to Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre.) All of these historical factors have added up to the seeming disproportion in the Foreign Ministry, and it is likely to continue.⁸

north. Thus the whole range of public offices are being occupied by the northerners while the South retains its interest and orientation in the private sectors of society. pp. 33-34.

⁸The effect on foreign policy will be discussed below, see p. 330.

What of the second part of the accusation of Itamarati's critics--that the wealthy receive the positions, and that the middle and lower classes are excluded. In a sense this is true, and hardly unavoidable unless a rather severe price is paid. It is naturally true anywhere, but especially true where education is still limited to a few. In order to pass the difficult entrance examinations one must be well-educated, and to be well-educated costs money. (The public universities are not equal in quality to the private schools, and especially not to North American and European universities.)⁹ Therefore, only the moderately wealthy in most cases send their children to schools which will give them the proper preparation.

There are, of course, exceptions; some of them are famous ones. Roberto Campos, for example, is the son of relatively poor parents from the Matto Grosso. He studied for the priesthood on a scholarship in a provincial school, changed his mind, passed the Foreign Ministry exams and began a brilliant career in the Ministry. The singularly talented individual, however, is still the exception that proves the rule.¹⁰

Here it might be pointed out that the relative

⁹The University of São Paulo may be an exception to this statement.

¹⁰Interview, Geraldo de Heráclito Lima.

insufficiency of non-whites in Itamarati is explained at least in part by the fact that in Brazil (as in most countries) the higher the socio-economic class, the fewer the dark skinned. Therefore, even if all prejudice were removed from the Foreign Ministry, the number of successful applicants among black students would still be low.¹¹ This applies equally well to lower-class white candidates. Not only do they come from more culturally deprived homes, but they rarely have financial access to the scarce educational resources available in Brazil.

Finally, it might be added to this brief social commentary on Itamarati, that the phenomenon of "diplomatic families" is probably true in part. This, however, is not the gross nepotism that it might appear to the cynical observer. It represents an obvious fact of life. Off-spring of diplomats have been acculturated in an environment of foreign travel, foreign languages, and foreign education which helps to ensure their success with the entrance examinations. As long as Itamarati makes heavy demands for foreign language competence (a requirement which the United States Foreign Service dropped some time ago) it will be children of diplomats

¹¹Socio-economic discrimination therefore is operative in Itamarati. But it does not explain all or even nearly all of Brazilian racial prejudice. A good deal of it is purely racial. See as evidence the study in Realidade, Narciso Kalili and Odacir de Mattos, "Racismo: EUA e Brasil-Existe Preconceito de Cor no Brasil," Outubro, 1967, pp. 35-52.

who succeed on that point alone. This one requirement, by and large, tends to restrict successful candidates to those who have been brought up in an atmosphere that can only be provided by a certain social class.

2. Outlook of Itamarati Personnel

A final question must be asked. What effect has this recruitment pattern had on the policy outlook of Itamarati? First, it can be said that although the social class backgrounds are quite similar, political opinions can at times be diverse.

For example, the younger officers now appear more "nationalistic" in their outlook than their seniors. Older diplomats contend that while nationalism is not necessarily diluted with age, a diplomat's perspective changes, and his vision broadens. He becomes a "member of the club" to use one diplomat's phrase, and he learns to modify the more radical opinions of his youth. It might be added that the strictly hierarchical, highly disciplined structure of the Foreign Ministry prevents youthful dissent from having influence. Thus, it may be said that the strong dissenter has little choice but to join the club.

The system of recruitment and discipline, plus the institutional aura of respect for tradition and the "spirit of Itamarati," has produced a distinct Foreign Ministry outlook on international affairs. It is

nationalist without stridence; it wishes to preserve good relations with old friends but favors expanded contacts with others even if they prove to be enemies of the old partners. It wants Brazil to play a larger role on the world scene, but it does not exaggerate its present prospects for world power. Internally, it means adapting the old structures to meet new needs without engaging in radical renovations. The Foreign Ministry exemplifies, in short, what one diplomat called "a spirit of tradition without moss."

This outlook can be seen in a comparison of two professional diplomats serving radically different regimes as Foreign Minister. The first, Araujo Castro, served as Foreign Minister in the most radical period of the Goulart regime (August 1963-April 1964). The second, Vasco Leitão da Cunha, headed Itamarati in the year after the April Revolution. Yet Araujo Castro and Leitão da Cunha expressed viewpoints which hardly differed although the regimes they served did.

For example, in an interview with Diário de Notícias, Araujo Castro made a carefully balanced statement. He found that Brazil was going through an ideological phase which other nations had passed through decades earlier. He added:¹²

...the extreme right in Brazil is kilometers to the right of the Pentagon, and the extreme

¹²Itamaraty, Janeiro 1964, pp. 9-10.

left is kilometers to the left of the Kremlin. If some of our more extreme ideologies of the left and of the right had influence on the diplomatic action of the USSR and the United States-- which fortunately they don't--then the world long ago would have turned into a heap of ruins.

And he concluded: "A foreign policy, to be truly independent, has to be independent from pressures of immaturity and radicalism."¹³ This was a clear warning to the left (and to a much lesser extent to the far right) in Brazil that militant slogans were not welcome at Itamarati.

In an interview with Manchete, Araujo Castro set down the fundamental themes of Brazil's foreign policy: development, disarmament, and de-colonialization. In the meantime, the Foreign Minister found the position of "neutralism or non-alignment" for Brazil unacceptable for these catch-words were irrelevant to the previously announced themes. "...Brazil is looking for an authentic position, suitable to its problems...and refuses to place its foreign policy in impractical positions..."¹⁴

Thus even during a regime that had itself become increasingly ideological, Araujo Castro, a product of Itamarati, refused to adopt the strident gestures and rhetoric of the regime, but kept within the limits of the Itamarati outlook.¹⁵

¹³Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁵Although Araujo Castro was removed as Foreign

The next Foreign Minister Leitão da Cunha, although serving an entirely different regime, could express a similar outlook. Development, disarmament, and de-colonialization were not repudiated. The only new policy was a specific verbal commitment to the West which Araujo Castro did not (or could not) make. On the other hand, the new commitment to the West did not mean a diminution in contacts with the East. In fact, they were to increase. "We want good and honest business with all peoples of the world. .../E/veryone avidly pursues markets all over the world. And in this all the world's governments coincide, capitalist, socialist, Marxist-Leninist, etc. The great reality in the world these days is trade. Everyone wants to trade."¹⁶

Thus, a common thread runs through these statements. Both, and especially Araujo Castro, are intent on trimming away any tendency for ideology--any ideology--to control policy. Both dwelt on the practical needs of Brazil, and on how foreign policy should meet those needs. Both represent the mainstream of Itamarati thought and practice: the acceptance of the need for change and adjustment in foreign policy, but a refusal to launch or approve radical shifts in program.

Minister after the Revolution, he was not dismissed or "retired" from the foreign service. Since 1964 he has had several ambassadorial posts including the prestigious United Nations post.

¹⁶Quoted in RBPI, Setembro 1964, p. 593.

Internal Politics of the Ministry

Itamarati is an aloof institution. It attempts, usually successfully, to convey the image of a group of professionals intent on their work, and doing it with the least internal friction possible. What disagreements there are among its members are carefully kept from the inquiring press and public. Only on occasion do internal squabbles leak, and then only in extremely abbreviated form. This tight security net contrasts with that of the Brazilian military where differences on political matters are the gossip of the country. Moreover, what is leaked to the press or even published in the military's own journals is highly specific and usually quite accurate.¹⁷

The seeming absence of internal politics at the Foreign Ministry is partly true. At Itamarati, men are fond of saying that the Ministry is a club--an exclusive one at that--and that membership in it demands the observation of certain forms. One of these is that it is improper to continue disputing a policy decision made by one's colleagues and superiors. And, of course, it is totally out of bounds to reveal the nature of the debate to outsiders.

These conventions, however, explain just so much of Itamarati's character. There are disputes, and they

¹⁷See Chapter V, especially pp. 168-177.

are usually resolved by means other than appeals to good sportsmanship. The controversies can be divided into two broad categories. First, there are those which are essentially arguments with the Foreign Ministry's constitutional superiors, that is, with the President and his Foreign Minister.¹⁸ At times, of course, there is a pro-presidential faction within Itamarati, but essentially this type is a dispute with outsiders. Second, there is the purely internal debate, carried on entirely within the confines of the Ministry with few or no outsiders involved.

The first type of disagreement, although no more frequent, has the virtue of appearing openly and more often. For example, in 1959 when Juscelino Kubitschek was pushing his policy of resuming trade and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the chief of the Political Department, Odete de Carvalho e Souza, let it be known that she saw "no new element" in the issue, and that she firmly opposed the President's stated intentions on this matter.¹⁹ It seems in retrospect that her objection was

¹⁸The Foreign Minister is usually a personal choice of the President. Rarely is he a professional diplomat. See p. 280. of this chapter.

¹⁹Foreign Minister Horácio Lafer, who had just been appointed to his post, and who replaced the cautious Negrão de Lima, asserted that his first task was that of resuming relations with the Soviet Union. He had no comment to make on the reported opposition to this within Itamarati. Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 2, 1959, p. 4, and Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 21, 1959, p. 4.

largely responsible for the delay in resumption of relations, at least until her retirement.²⁰

On the other hand, the head of the Economics Division, Edmundo Barbosa Lima, did not seem to oppose trade contacts, but in fact welcomed them. It is then not so difficult to understand Juscelino Kubitschek's relative ease in establishing trade agreements although he was unable to resume diplomatic relations.²¹

The best known and most acrimonious dispute involving internal politics happened in the short regime of Jânio Quadros. It began with a trade mission appointed personally by the President, and led by a non-diplomat, João Dantas, early supporter of Quadros and publisher of the ultra-nationalistic Últimas Notícias, a Rio afternoon daily. Dantas proved very industrious. In East Germany he had signed a trade protocol within a few

²⁰See especially Última Hora, Março 12, 1959, p. 3, and Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 21, 1959, p. 4. Odete de Carvalho was the first woman to attain a major position in the Ministry.

²¹Hispanic-American Report, March, 1959, p. 62. The specific incident which revealed the political alignments was President Kubitschek's temporary decision to break off negotiations on a barter agreement (cocoa for petroleum) with the Soviets. The decision to drop the negotiations was represented by the press as a victory for the then Foreign Minister Francisco Negrão de Lima, and a setback for the presidential advisors Augusto Frederico Schmidt and Edmundo Barbosa de Silva. The decision though was economic rather than political. Kubitschek feared that the Russians would dump cocoa on the market at reduced prices--a trick they had pulled before with primary products for which they had no immediate use. Also the first sample shipments of Russian oil had proved unrefinable. The problems, however, were only temporary,

days of his arrival.²² His action provoked an instant reaction among West German officials in Bonn. And since Brazil was negotiating the re-schedulement of its debt with that Government, the matter became embarrassing.²³

Placed in this diplomatic difficulty, the Secretary-General of Itamarati, Vasco Leitão da Cunha, released an official note stating that João Dantas' protocol was neither official nor binding since he was traveling "in a strictly private and personal manner without having any power to sign any document in the name of the Brazilian government."²⁴

The following day the Secretary-General repeated his initial statement to the press, and took full responsibility for his action. In the meantime, much consternation was expressed in the Congress. Hermógenes Príncipe of Bahia, a Deputy and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, demanded to know from Itamarati whether João Dantas was or was not empowered to sign the protocol, and if not, who was guilty of this "grave and trade contacts continued to expand.

²² Hispanic-American Report, August 1961, p. 559.

²³ The negotiating team was led by economist Roberto Campos. Jornal do Brasil, Maio 31, 1961, p. 4.

²⁴ Jornal do Brasil, Maio 30, 1961, p. 1. The note apparently was issued without prior knowledge of the Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco. See also Hispanic-American Report, August 1961, p. 559.

irregularity" which "leaves our Nation in a ridiculous position...."²⁵ Who was indeed?

Meanwhile, the President was considerably alarmed. On the one hand Dantas had signed a document, which Quadros had specifically ordered him not to do. But on the other hand, he was a representative of the President's and to disown him as the Itamarati note implied would have been humiliating. Jânio Quadros' solution was to order the dismissal of Leitão da Cunha, and to send new instructions to João Dantas--again without consulting the Foreign Ministry.²⁶

Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister attempted to juggle with the contending theories concerning who was responsible for Dantas' actions in the German Democratic Republic. Afonso Arinos first advanced the thesis that Dantas had not had the power to sign the accords. He stated that the document merely espoused good intentions rather than being a legal contract, although the Foreign Minister did admit that he was not sure of the exact

²⁵Quoted in Jornal do Brasil, Maio 31, 1961, p. 4. Príncipe was a moderately conservative member of the PSD--Juscelino Kubitschek's party.

²⁶On top of that, Quadros let it be known that the new former Secretary-General was guilty of "professional jealousy" (ciume de carreira). Jornal do Brasil, Junho 1, 1961, p. 4. Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister had issued a statement to the press denying that Leitão da Cunha was being fired; however, he did admit that da Cunha was being considered for another position. See Última Hora, Junho 3, 1961, p. 4.

contents of the disputed document.²⁷

To straighten out the confusion, Afonso Arinos finally consulted Jânio Quadros, and in the course of their talks the Foreign Minister requested that the former Secretary-General be re-instated. He also urged the President to be understanding and tolerant. Quadros was supposed to have replied: "I am always disposed to understand and to tolerate the...attitudes of men. But this episode is intolerable."²⁸ He added that he felt Leitão da Cunha's note was an act of rank insubordination, that is, a direct challenge to his authority as Chief Executive. He concluded that from now on, he would make foreign policy "with or without Itamarati."²⁹

But the difficulty with West Germany could not be resolved by a shake-up at Itamaraty. On June 6, the Foreign Minister explained to the Senate that, in fact, no legally binding act had been signed by João Dantas with East Germany, although the President's representative was not acting in a private capacity as stated by the Secretary-General. The document was merely a

²⁷Jornal do Brasil, Junho 4, 1961, p. 3.

²⁸The President also darkly hinted that Leitão da Cunha's resistance was part of the Foreign Ministry's plot to sabotage his new independent foreign policy. The quotes are taken from sources close to the President and appeared in the highly reliable "Coisas da Política" column in the Jornal do Brasil, Junho 4, 1961, p. 3.

²⁹Ibid., p. 3.

simple record of the conversations--a joint communique that had been signed by both parties about possible future understandings between the two countries.³⁰ This artful compromise seemed to work.

A new version of the affair was released by the Foreign Ministry, now without Leitão da Cunha as Secretary-General.³¹ On the one hand, the Ministry continued to assuage West Germany by claiming that the protocol implied no recognition of East Germany; but on the other hand, it also stated that the former Secretary-General had been wrong in taking the responsibility to chastise a member of the President's official family. Those forces within Itamarati that had opposed the Secretary-General's outspokenness were vindicated--for

³⁰Jornal do Brasil, Junho 7, 1961, p. 4.

³¹Ambassador da Cunha had earlier been the center of a Foreign Ministry controversy in early 1960 when he had served as ambassador to Cuba. On a trip to Rio de Janeiro for consultations he let it be known to the press at the airport that Fidel Castro was converting Cuba into a beachhead for Communism in Latin America. Furthermore, he was intent on destroying hemispheric unity, on spreading hatred of the United States and on subverting Kubitschek's OPA. After a presumable dressing down from his Foreign Minister Horácio Lafer, the Ambassador denied or had denied for him that his earlier assertions had been official. He also denied leaving Cuba because of the worsening situation there. Nevertheless, the Ambassador was not to return for several weeks. Hispanic-American Report, April 1960, p. 136.

the moment.³² Meanwhile, there were reports that West Germany was not completely satisfied; nevertheless, the financial negotiations went on and were completed on favorable terms for Brazil. This may have been a measure of Roberto Campos' skill. But it may also have been a warning for the future to Brazilian foreign policy-makers. In this regard, it seemed to work. Contacts with East Germany never went beyond that initial point.³³

Itamarati had disputes which were confined entirely to its own ranks as well. Although reports of these are rare, a few do emerge. In one example, there was apparently some dissatisfaction over the Foreign Ministry of Vasco Leitão da Cunha during the presidency of Castello Branco. The rumor, as reported by Vision, had it that the unrest was due to the fact that the Foreign Minister was too heavily influenced by military thinking. The specific example pointed to was a supposed agreement made at a meeting between the armed forces of Argentina and Brazil on the problem of counter-insurgency. Some diplomats were upset because Itamarati had not been present at the meeting, but had allowed the military to

³²Vasco Leitão da Cunha would have his revenge. After the April Revolution, he was appointed Foreign Minister by Castello Branco (a wartime acquaintance-- Leitão da Cunha had been a consul in Naples), and he presided over a commission of inquiry to seek out Communist infiltration of Itamarati. See Jornal do Brasil, Maio 3, 1964, p. 19 and Maio 5, 1964, p. 5.

³³See Hispanic-American Report, April 1960,

make its decision and then had acquiesced. The pressure mounted in the wake of the military talks and the Foreign Minister became Ambassador to the United States. The man he replaced, Juraci Magalhães, was switched to the post of Foreign Minister.³⁴

Another Foreign Minister caused much unhappiness within the ranks of the Foreign Ministry also. San Thiago Dantas provoked much anger by inviting outsiders to participate in foreign policy-making. His invitation to trade union officials for lunch at the Foreign Ministry was especially provocative. Dantas encouraged them to pass foreign policy resolutions at their conferences,³⁵ and this advice was resented by professional diplomats. They felt that labor leaders should not be making pronouncements on subjects about which they knew nothing.³⁶

Other controversies which have been generated strictly among the professional are of long standing. A prime example of this is the role of planning within the Foreign Ministry. In 1960 under Roberto Campos, an economic planning unit was established. In 1967 a similar unit was established for political planning. Both

p. 136 and pp. 560-561.

³⁴Vision Letter, September 15, 1965, p. 3.

³⁵See Chapter IV, p. 150.

³⁶Interview with Geraldo Heráclito Lima, December 5, 1967. Senhor Lima dubbed Dantas' efforts farcical and cynical, and he regarded the whole period of that ministry as one of dark days for Itamarati.

have been the object of considerable debate. On the one hand, those favoring long-range planning have argued that if Brazil is to have an efficient, well-coordinated foreign policy, a body of men must be available to work full time (removed from the day-to-day routine of a foreign office) on the broad policy questions. The absence of planning in the past has been reflected in the Brazilian penchant for ad hoc solutions, determined on the basis of the time honored palpite (translated roughly, inspirational hunch) rather than by careful calculation.

Critics, however, point out the problems in centralized planning. In the first place, planning and analysis is already done to a large extent within each geographic division. Thus much duplication of effort is entailed. Furthermore, long-range planning quite often is an exercise in futility since policy can only be stated in the most general of terms, making it operationally infeasible. In addition, if the planning function were removed from the divisions, confusion would result, and some divisions would be left without work since analysis is their raison d'etre.³⁷

³⁷This is especially true for the North American Division, which has to allow major decisions to be made by the President and the Foreign Minister because of the extreme importance of this area. Interview with Jom Azulão, Member of the North American Division, Itamarati, December 6, 1967.

The result of the controversy has been that each division does largely what it wants to do in the planning area, with much of the actual research left to the Third Secretaries.³⁸ The policy planning bodies are left to operate on their own, isolated from the rest of Itamarati. Those who insist on the necessity of planning will keep these bodies alive even though their importance is limited by those who refuse to make use of their services.³⁹

The Foreign Ministry, despite these internal differences of opinion, has not allowed itself to be divided into permanent factions as has happened in the military. Above all, what controversies do exist are kept within the Ministry. Outsiders are not invited to comment or to speculate. Such interference would be considered bad form, and would clash with Itamarati's image--a body of trained, competent professionals carrying out the foreign policy of Brazil with little assistance from anyone, and competently reflecting the permanent interests of the country. This lofty depiction of one's role, of course, does much to insure internal discipline, and to safeguard against any "press leaks."

There is another matter which is at least an equally valid reason for the Ministry's unity.

³⁸ Foreign Service Officers are ranked as follows beginning at the bottom: Third Secretary, Second Secretary, First Secretary, Counciler (Minister, Second Class), Ambassador (Minister, First Class).

³⁹ Interview with Geraldo Heráclito Lima, Victor

Itamarati is very much a hierarchical institution. It is almost military in its conception of a chain of command running from the Foreign Minister (or the Secretary-General) to the newest Third Secretary. While policy memoranda may indeed flow up from the lower ranks, these suggestions are changed at will by the Itamarati leaders, and their judgments can never be questioned by their inferiors. It is the rare subordinate who does so, and the penalty usually is swift and distasteful--slow promotion, assignment to undesirable posts, and perhaps even dismissal.⁴⁰

The result is a disciplined organization; each member accepts the orders of his superior without the usual recourse of complaint and argumentation available to other civil servants. The effect of this discipline on Itamarati's competence will be weighed later.

Itamarati's Relations with Others

There is no question that the men of Itamarati have realized that to be at the center of foreign policy-making they must seek good relations with other groups and individuals who have some influence in Brazilian

José Silveira and Jom Azulão, December 5 and 6, 1967.

⁴⁰One diplomat related that his Chief had asked him to supply economic data in order to support a certain policy statement. The diplomat believed that the data would have to be greatly distorted in order to fit the pre-conceived policy. Therefore, he refused to supply the information. He admitted that the pressures placed on him were enormous, and in fact, the routine promotion

society. This kind of domestic good will has been managed on the whole rather well by the Ministry. Some of Itamarati's connections with the outside have already been discussed in other sections of this study, but they shall be reviewed and expanded with the Ministry's point of view kept in mind.

The Ministry's interaction with others can be conveniently divided into two categories: first, contact with those who are in the private sector; second, with those who are within the government.

The business community, as has been indicated, receives a considerable amount of attention. Various services, for example, are offered it by the Economics Affairs Division, such as bargaining for higher prices for exports at international commodity meetings, and promoting Brazilian products at world fairs.⁴¹ In addition, Itamarati, largely on its own, has invited trade-minded groups for round table discussions on economic matters of mutual interest, for example, expanded trade with Eastern Europe.⁴²

which he had expected did not come, nor did it at a later date.

⁴¹Mentioned by the then Foreign Minister Juraci Magalhães. See Jornal do Brasil, Maio 5, 1966, p. 11.

⁴²Ambassador Octávio Dias Carneiro, Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Affairs, Jornal do Brasil, Abril 10, 1962, p. 8. It is significant that the only major suggestion reported out of the meeting was the Ambassador's proposed plan to form a trade corporation similar to France's National Center for Foreign Trade. It

Itamarati also makes it a point to invite representatives of trade and manufacturer associations to all bi-lateral and multi-lateral negotiations.⁴³ For example, on the trade mission that was sent to Venezuela in order to redress the trade imbalance (Venezuela exported far more than she was importing from Brazil) there were representatives of the Confederação Nacional das Indústrias (CNI) and the Confederação Nacional do Comércio (CNC). In addition, beforehand their advice was sought on how best to balance the trade accounts.⁴⁴

This contact with business groups has clearly increased in the last ten years. But it can be easily exaggerated in importance. One diplomat, who has had much experience in trade problems, believes that most inter-action is still initiated by Itamarati. The

would have been composed of private groups plus key government personnel. Its job would have been to promote home products abroad, to work out trade agreements, and to arrange payments agreements with Socialist countries. Quoted in Jornal do Brasil, Abril 11, 1962, p. 4. What is significant, it could be argued, is that Itamarati's round table discussion was not so much designed to exchange opinions as it was to give an air of approval by the business community to the Foreign Ministry's trade promotion schemes.

⁴³Several such groups attended the Kennedy Round tariff reduction talks in Geneva and the UNCTAD meetings as well. Interview with Director of the School of Politics and Sociology at Pontificia Universidade Católica of Rio de Janeiro, July 12, 1967.

⁴⁴Venezuela was selling petroleum in large amounts to fill a need in Brazil. The unsurprising conclusion of the business groups was that Brazil should sell more manufactured goods to Venezuela. Primary products were not mentioned. Details in Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 6, 1959, p. 4.

manufacturers, according to him are not yet foreign trade conscious. They have been all too often mesmerized by Brazil's large internal market, and have forgotten the lessons of nineteenth century America which was an aggressive trading nation. In short the producers believe, according to the diplomat, that "they are Brazilians, but that the consumers are not," which is to say that the producers expect high tariff walls with the consumer paying higher prices for domestically produced goods. Meanwhile the manufacturer, satisfied with his high profit per unit performance, gives little thought to expansion and foreign markets. It is this attitude, the diplomat believes, that Itamarati must combat even at the risk of offending the private sector.⁴⁵

Itamarati has also sponsored the organization of mixed commissions of government representatives to study foreign policy questions. Many of them, like the Council of Foreign Trade, deal with economic problems. It was organized in 1960 after Itamarati had recommended its creation to President Kubitschek. The members of this body included the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Labor, the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, and its Economics Affairs Chief. The Council was to act as a co-ordinator of all Brazilian foreign trade policy,

⁴⁵ Interview with Geraldo Heraclito de Lima.

but it was designed at the time, according to inside commentary, to give Itamarati the central role in this area. Apparently, the Ministry had felt that it had only played a minor part in the sugar and coffee conferences held in the previous year, and it wanted to recapture the leadership, if not control of policy-making, on these subjects.⁴⁶

Itamarati often becomes involved in matters peripheral to foreign policy. For example, one of its members sits on the recently formed Study Group for the Development of the Amazon. Other members include the Ministers of Interior and Planning, the Chief of Staff for the Armed Forces, and the Director of the Amazon Development Bank. Although Itamarati clearly does not run this research group, it is a tribute to the Foreign Ministry's ability to be included in a group devoted to a subject which is primarily domestic in scope.⁴⁷

Itamarati can also undertake bi-lateral agreements with another branch of the bureaucracy. For example, in July 1967, it announced the signing of an agreement with the Banco do Brasil which would provide for utilization of the services of the Bank's foreign trade experts in diplomatic and consular missions.

⁴⁶ Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 5, 1959, pp. 5 and 10, and Jornal do Brasil, November 6, 1959, p. 11.

⁴⁷ Boletim Especial, Janeiro 22, 1968, p. 1.

These borrowed experts were to be under the control of the diplomatic Chief of Mission.⁴⁸

Probably Itamarati's most sensitive task of domestic diplomacy has been the maintenance of its relations with the military. The goal has been, of course, to keep good relations with the armed forces, and at the same time to keep firm control of foreign policy-making.

The forms of contact between the two groups vary considerably. Possibly the oldest and most frequently employed is Itamarati's use of available personnel to lecture at armed forces schools. For example, diplomats have taught classes in international law and world politics at the Army General Staff School in Rio de Janeiro. At a lunch offered by the school's director, General Reinaldo Melo de Almeida, for the retiring Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry Pio Correa, the mutual satisfaction of the teaching arrangement was apparent.⁴⁹ For Itamarati's part, this contact serves two purposes. It makes the military more sophisticated in international relations, and, it builds good will and respect for the expertise of the Foreign Ministry. The military is given the impression that foreign policy should be left to the professionals just as problems of

⁴⁸ Boletim Especial, Julho 21, 1967, p. 2.

⁴⁹ Boletim Especial, Abril 5, 1967, p. 1. Arrangements of a similar nature have been made with the Escola Superior da Guerra. Diplomats are encouraged to be part

national security are left to the experts, that is, the military.

Contacts, of course, exist on other levels. The Foreign Minister himself may engage in discussions with military figures outside of the regular, formal meetings of the President's Cabinet or the National Security Council. San Thiago Dantas especially enjoyed such contact. On one occasion, he lectured and answered questions for three hours at the Escola Superior da Guerra on Brazil's new foreign policy. According to the conservative Jornal do Brasil, his performance was rewarded with "enthusiastic applause."⁵⁰

In addition, high Foreign Ministry officials have joined discussion seminars with military strategists on national security problems.⁵¹ They have sought contact with the Armed Forces Chief of Staff in order to coordinate their positions at international conferences involving national and continental defense.⁵²

Foreign Ministry contacts with outside groups thus seem to benefit Itamarati as much or more as the groups. Yet these relationships have also placed foreign policy-making, even though on a very low level, within the grasp of the teaching staff, but they must do it on their own time and initiative. Interview with Geraldo Heráclito de Lima.

⁵⁰ Jornal do Brasil, Junho 12, 1962, p. 3.

⁵¹ Itamaraty, Janeiro 31, 1958, pp. 12-13.

⁵² Itamaraty, Maio 31, 1957, p. 148. In this

of groups never consulted before. It is true that Itamarati is the one which is reaching out quite often, but that contact may create habits of consulting with the Foreign Ministry within other groups, and this may lead to more and more self-generated contacts.

This contact, however, is not simply an exercise in public relations although this aspect is not overlooked by Itamarati. Especially in the matter of economic policy the Ministry has genuine need of the expertise of the technical councils attached to the manufacturer and commercial associations. In order to represent Brazil adequately at international trade and commodity conferences, knowledge of the needs of the private sector is absolutely necessary. The fact that close cooperation also maintains good relations between Itamarati and the business community cannot be overlooked, but it should not be over-emphasized.

Problems of the Foreign Ministry

Itamarati faces a number of serious problems which prevent it from achieving peak efficiency in foreign policy-making and execution. Unless these are overcome, it is likely that as Brazil's international affairs become more complicated, other agencies and groups will encroach

case it was for the South Atlantic Conference in Buenos Aires. The Service Chiefs and leading Foreign Ministry officials discussed joint strategy at Itamarati.

even more on the territory that the Foreign Ministry has long considered its own.

Probably the most serious and longstanding crisis is that of personnel. More precisely, it is the lack of qualified personnel to conduct the foreign affairs of the nation. For example, in 1961 Brazil had fifty-five posts of ambassadorial rank plus four delegations to international agencies. Nevertheless, it had only thirty-seven ambassadors available for those positions, with seven occupying home positions. That left a deficit of twenty-two men of ambassadorial rank.⁵³

Within Itamarati understaffing was also apparent. In the African Division there was one diplomat, a Second Secretary. In the Economics Department one man was responsible for Europe, Asia, Africa, and Oceania.⁵⁴ In one journalist's words: "Itamarati was not prepared to follow the pace of the present President in the matter of foreign policy..."⁵⁵ And with good reason. In the ten year period 1951-1961 the number of diplomatic personnel (465) had not changed since it was fixed by law.⁵⁶

⁵³Jornal do Brasil, Abril 12, 1961, p. 4.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 4.

⁵⁵Luiz Carneiro in Jornal do Brasil, Maio 21, 1961, p. 4.

⁵⁶These were divided into 46 ambassadors, 64 Ministers (second class), 105 First Secretaries, 120 Second Secretaries, and 130 Third Secretaries, Ibid., p. 4.

Since that date, the Congress has passed the Foreign Ministry reform act.⁵⁷ It provided for an increase of 127 Foreign Service Officers for a total of 592. This included nine Ambassadors, eighteen Ministers, thirty-five First Secretaries, thirty Second Secretaries, and thirty-five Third Secretaries.⁵⁸

This reform, much as it has helped the immediate crisis, has not nearly solved the overall problem. In the first place, some seven years have passed since the enactment of the new law. In that time Brazil's overseas business has steadily grown. Now there are sixty full-fledged embassies plus other diplomatic missions with new ones being added constantly. In the second place, even the number of positions allowed by law has not been filled. In 1968 there were only some 530 full time diplomat personnel available.⁵⁹ Finally, the number of men available for ambassadorial positions remains low. This is because of the promotion procedure. The new Ambassadors must be recruited from the rank of Minister. Of the seventy-odd Ministers, only those who have served

⁵⁷ See above, p. 299.

⁵⁸ Luiz Carneiro, p. 4.

⁵⁹ Interview, Geraldo de Heráclito Lima, December 5, 1967.

five years in that rank can be considered eligible for promotion. However, of those men roughly one-third are placed on the eligible list. In addition, a special promotion committee within Itamarati reduces the number even more. From this committee list, the Foreign Minister chooses a smaller number and among these the President may choose. The system is applicable for all promotions, but it demonstrates how few men become Ambassadors over the years. The result is that in 1968 the number of open positions was as large as ever with little likelihood that they shall be filled rapidly.⁶⁰

The problem of an understaffed headquarters remains too. For example, in 1967, Western Europe was covered by three diplomats: a Minister in charge of the division and his two assistants--one a First Secretary, and the other a Second Secretary. They were responsible for relations with no less than eighteen countries plus the Vatican.⁶¹

In the African Division, three diplomats are responsible for six countries, and in the Near East, two men handle relations with eight countries.⁶² The lack of personnel becomes obvious in the field also, where a

⁶⁰See Jornal do Brasil for promotion procedure, April 18, 1961, p. 4.

⁶¹Interview with Sergio Luiz de Souza Tapajos, Second Secretary in West European Division, December 5, 1967, and Victor José Silveira.

⁶²Interview with Christian Whitaker.

number of embassies are not staffed with a sufficiently experienced diplomat. The Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto, for example, in testimony to the Chamber's Foreign Relations Committee revealed that some ten diplomatic ambassadorships created in 1961 had not as yet (July 1967) been filled. He added that moreover, Brazil should increase the number it had already established, although the embassies in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tunisia did not as yet have ambassadors. Many consulates too were unfilled including Salisbury, Rhodesia, Beira, Mozambique, Bissau, Portuguese Guinea, Casablanca, Tangier, and Morocco.⁶³

Thus, both at home and in the field, Itamarati is shorthanded. It should be added in connection with this point that in addition to their regular desk duties, many diplomats, especially the senior men, are called upon to staff a number of working study groups devoted to research and policy recommendations on such diverse subjects as trade promotion, atomic energy and ministry reform.⁶⁴

Filling the "ambassadorial gap" can in part be achieved through the appointment of non-professionals directly by the President. Jânio Quadros was particularly fond of this device. And it does have its uses. In the first place, these men have a direct line to the President, and if it is a key mission, much bureaucratic red

⁶³Jornal do Brasil, Julho 30, 1967, p. 4.

⁶⁴Jornal do Brasil, Maio 21, 1961, p. 4. Boletim

tape can be eliminated. Also, in the case of the embassy in Washington, the Brazilian ambassador is chosen on the basis of his wide contacts with the American establishment, which often means that he is not a professional diplomat.⁶⁵ Finally, it has political value for it is an inexpensive way to pay off a political debt of the President.⁶⁶ However, the amateur diplomat can only in part fill the gap. The percentage of non-professionals is fixed by law. (The exact figure is 10% which means that currently only some half-dozen appointees can be made outside the foreign service.) In addition, the Congress in the past has proven reluctant to give their approval to the amateur, and Itamarati has not encouraged their appointment either--with obvious reason.

A second problem is closely connected to the previous. It is the lack of special expertise. Specialization is not encouraged at Itamarati. With too few men to cover many positions, the pattern has been a constant shifting of men from area to area. A diplomat's assignment is usually for two years, but his following position may be in a wholly different part of the world. Furthermore,

Especial, Dezembro 23, 1966, p. 1.

⁶⁵ Interview, Jom Azulão.

⁶⁶ It has been pointed out that Bilac Pinto, former President of the Senate was awarded the ambassadorship to France by the Costa e Silva government for his services to the regime.

within the area specializations at the home office the general rule is that one man does not take responsibility for one set of countries.⁶⁷ Instead, each diplomat within an area division may freely move from country to country, and after two years, he may move onto another division or (more usually) a field assignment.⁶⁸ The result, of course, is diplomats with strikingly varied career experiences. The present Divisional Chief of Western Europe, for example, has never had a European post; his experience has been entirely in Latin America.⁶⁹ The Chief of the East European Division has had no assignment in that area although he has served in Japan and Great Britain.⁷⁰ And the then Chief of the old West European and African Division, Antonio Castello Branco, had to visit Africa, after taking the position, since he had never been there before.⁷¹

⁶⁷There is one exception. The West European Division is divided into three responsibilities. The senior diplomat handles relations with France, Italy, the Vatican, West Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland. The Second Secretary has Spain, Portugal, and the Benelux countries; the Third Secretary has Greece, Turkey, Austria, and the Scandinavian countries including Finland and Iceland. Interview with Victor José Silveira.

⁶⁸Interview with Geraldo Heráclito de Lima. The rule is six years in the field and then rotation home for two years at Itamarati.

⁶⁹Interview with Victor José Silveira.

⁷⁰Interview with Geraldo de Heráclito Lima.

⁷¹Jornal do Brasil, Novembre 9, 1961, p. 4. The countries on his itinerary were Nigeria, Ghana,

It should be pointed out, however, that positions are not always filled in such a haphazard manner. For example, the former Chief of East Europe Luiz de Almeida Nogueira Porto had previously (and recently) been assigned to Moscow, Sofia, and Belgrade.⁷² The then recently appointed Chief of American Affairs, Arnaldo Vasconcellos had served as consul in New Orleans, Philadelphia, Montreal, and New York, and had served as a diplomat in Mexico, Washington, Venezuela, and had been the ambassador in Bolivia. His sole post outside the hemisphere was Bonn.⁷³ These, however, appear to be exceptions to the general rule.

Itamarati, by and large, has not encouraged specialization. The criteria for selection to a post do not include pre-knowledge of the country or area, but only general diplomatic experience. This phenomenon, combined with the short term duration of each assignment, causes a certain amount of haphazardness; heavy responsibility may be given to someone who is not acquainted with the area's problems, although his procedural training may be excellent. Yet with Brazil's

Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, the Cameroon--all with diplomatic stations, and Tanganyika which was then celebrating its independence.

⁷²Itamaraty, Julho 30, 1964, p. 242. His appointment may have been influenced by the fact that he had had close ties with the Brazilian Army in Italy in 1942 and with the Brazilian military mission in Berlin in 1946.

⁷³Itamaraty, Agosto 31, 1964, p. 306.

heavy and still increasing responsibilities, and with the small core of men available to handle them, specialization is a luxury for which the Foreign Ministry has not had time to develop a taste. It is also quite unlikely that the lack of "narrow specialists" (as one diplomat called them) will continue even if Itamarati recruits enough personnel to handle adequately the amount of business which it faces.

Besides the lack of personnel and expertise, Itamarati has also encountered problems in the area of foreign policy planning. In 1960 under the guidance of Roberto Campos, Itamarati for the first time established an Economic Policy Planning Committee with a full-time staff.⁷⁴ In mid-1967, a Political Planning unit was added.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, research, analysis and planning still goes on within each division including Economic Affairs, since diplomats within each division feel they are closer to the problem. The co-ordination between policymaker and planner seems slight indeed. Furthermore, there is the ingrained habit, even in Itamarati, of relying less on formal analysis and more on the palpate. Planning then, despite its formal status, has not really been well-integrated into the policy-making process.

⁷⁴Jornal do Brasil, Setembro 22, 1963, p. 21, and Interview with Geraldo Heraclito de Lima.

⁷⁵Interview with Jom Azulão.

Closely connected to the planning problem is that of the question of coordination. The 1961 reform law hoped to resolve this difficulty. Thus according to one observer: "All formulation of foreign policy will be centralized in the Secretariat-General of Foreign Policy, a kind of collegiate organ which consists of the Secretary-General and the four Assistant Secretary-Generals..."⁷⁶

This high level co-ordination, however, never really worked. The Secretary-General and his divisional chiefs found they had little to say to each other in terms of policy-making and little was accomplished during these meetings. The result then has been a general shunning of formal coordinational procedures, and the use of informal contact when it proves necessary.

Nevertheless, problems of co-ordination remain, and they have not as yet been dealt with in a realistic manner. Perhaps the greatest source of confusion is the only partial switch from functional to geographical divisions within the Ministry. It was imagined during the planning of the Foreign Ministry reform that geography would win out completely over the functional approach, and that political and economic policy would be worked out within each division. However, an Economics Affairs

⁷⁶ Luiz Carneiro, p. 4. The four assistants were the chiefs of the European and International Agencies Division; the Inter-American Division; Economic Policy Division; and the African, Asian and Oceania Division. These areas have been shifted and changed a number of times since.

Division was retained, and soon difficulties began emerging. Thus, for example, when the East European Division works on economic problems (and this currently is its primary function) a good deal of overlapping occurs with the Economics Affairs Division. An informal co-ordination takes place, but even so a good deal of confusion crops up. As one diplomat put it "it should be one way or the other," that is, the Ministry should be drawn up strictly according to functional or geographic lines, but not an uneasy combination of both.⁷⁷ Political policy coordination problems arise too. For example, responsibility for policy with Portuguese Africa rests with the European Division. However, the African Division is also keenly interested in what happens in that part of the world. Therefore, although it is not directly responsible for policy-making in this area, the African Division does collect information and makes analyses of the current situation. There are no apparent arrangements between the divisions for jointly reviewing Brazil's policy on this matter.

Coordination of policy-making, despite efforts to put it on a regular basis, still remains a very informal matter, largely accomplished through random face-

⁷⁷ Interview with Geraldo Heraclito de Lima. A similar problem is encountered by the West European Division in regard to EEC policy. This is handled by the Commercial Policy branch of the Economics Division, but overlap is inevitable, and close contact must be kept to prevent confusion. Interview with Victor José Silveira.

to-face contact. As problems become more complex, and as the amount of work increases, this easy going arrangement will probably have to be revised. Even now it seems evident that despite the comparative compactness of the organization, one division is not aware of what the others are doing. Duplications and uncertainty arise which means a wasting of the limited amount of diplomatic resources which Brazil has. The solution then is twofold: first, better coordination techniques; second, provision for more trained professionals to carry out the work of Itamarati.

This brings us to the final major problem faced by Itamarati--the training of new diplomats. As has been noted, the Rio Branco Institute was established in 1945 to provide two years of training to those who were able to pass the diplomatic exams. The number selected are few, but their capabilities are quite high. At the Institute courses in language, law, and diplomatic history are offered. But despite the uniqueness of this facility (of which Brazilians are quite proud), the Institute has inadequacies.

The most obvious of these is that young diplomats have not been prepared for the day-to-day work of diplomacy. Their training has been highly academic, which is largely the result of recruiting a faculty outside of the diplomatic community. (Brazil has few professionals to spare for teaching purposes). Thus

while students receive large doses of international law, their ability to handle the routine policy-making questions is limited.

Another problem is the lack of balance in the curriculum. Major subjects such as international economics or international politics have until recently been largely overlooked. Thus, unless a diplomat has received this training elsewhere (and it must be admitted that many do), he shall emerge from his training with serious deficiencies in his grasp of international life.

The Institute, however, is undergoing changes. A study group has been organized to make suggestions for improvement.⁷⁸ The group is apparently focusing on making the faculty more professional and on making the curriculum more vocational. In addition, the Secretary General has been authorized to encourage diplomats in foreign assignments to enter post-graduate studies in political science, international politics, international law, and public administration. The encouragement consists of paying the costs of the education.⁷⁹ Training then is being re-furbished at Itamarati. How profound the changes will be, and how effectively they will meet the requirements of the increasingly

⁷⁸ Foreign Minister Araujo Castro, a professional diplomat, first made the suggestion. Jornal do Brasil, Setembro 22, 1963, p. 21.

⁷⁹ Boletim Especial, Abril 10, 1967, p. 1.

complex demands of diplomacy can only be known at a future date. The chances seem good though that Itamarati will at least make enough changes to keep their diplomatic training program at a relatively high level.

Summary and Conclusion

Itamarati, as has been seen, has definite problems which do and will handicap it in its representation of Brazil and its responsibility in the decision-making process. Will it be able to maintain its importance in making foreign policy or will it find, as other Foreign Offices have, that it has become "just the spokesman for decisions which have been made elsewhere...?"⁸⁰

The answer to this question may act as a summary of this chapter. On the one hand, Itamarati possesses a number of assets which support its claim to be the principal foreign policy-maker. In the first place, it has constantly sought to improve its efficiency through structural reforms. It has not succeeded completely, of course, but there is a healthy awareness of when to change in order to keep up with the twentieth century. Secondly, its recruitment, while technically free from discrimination, does manage to select its diplomats from the higher social segments; it is these elements that

⁸⁰

Bonnani, Spettatore Internazionale, p. 209.

are usually best able to carry out the tasks of diplomacy. Furthermore, the new recruits are put through a fairly rigorous training program. Thirdly, Itamarati's discipline is so complete that very little friction is generated within the Ministry and decision-making can be carried out with a minimum of delay. This may also involve the cost of stifling and discouraging original thought among the younger diplomats, however. Fourthly, Itamarati has been assiduous in cultivating good relations with a variety of groups inside and outside of the Government in order to build good will; the Ministry has provided services for them (such as the economic groups), and has impressed them with the idea that the Foreign Ministry is best equipped to handle foreign affairs. Fifthly, the rate of turnover among the professional diplomats is much slower than that of the Foreign Minister and the President which leaves the men of Itamarati in a powerful policy-making position. And finally, Itamarati possesses an aura of competence which it has acquired over the last century. This tradition is easily deferred to by outsiders who have only the germ of an interest in foreign policy.

On the other hand, Itamarati does face severe challenges to its authority in this area. In the first place, it has internal problems of its own. The most striking is the lack of personnel to carry out the job. Secondly, there are problems of co-ordination that have

not really been resolved and which will grow more complex as the amount of business which Itamarati handles is increased. Finally, there has been a serious lack of thought regarding the policy planning process.

Itamarati faces other challenges too. An aggressive President (or even Foreign Minister) can take much of the policy-making away from the diplomats. This is especially true when the President has campaigned using foreign policy issues. When foreign policy becomes involved in the attainment of political power then changes in foreign policy are apt to be sudden and not under the control of Itamarati. Also with the military taking an increasingly overt role in the making of policy, it seems unlikely that they shall stop at domestic policy. A reasonably united military can, if need be, dictate its own wishes regarding foreign policy, and all Itamarati's attempts at good will with the officers will have been for nought.

Finally, Itamarati does face the severe challenge of the encroachment of other agencies of government into policy-making. Itamarati, of course, has attempted to be in control whenever others have been involved, but it may lose this control in the future. In fact, in one important area it has already lost to the armed forces, to the Ministry of Mines and Energy and indirectly to the President of Brazil. This area is that of Brazil's nuclear policy, that is, how and when Brazil shall develop atomic power, and in what manner she will

use it. In October of 1967, after a meeting of the National Security Council, it was decided that Itamarati would be removed from having any policy-making authority in this area. The Foreign Ministry's sole duty would be to act as the principal agent in international negotiations concerning nuclear energy; this role does not include participation in the decisions made regarding the country's negotiating position. The retirement from the nuclear field also meant that Itamarati's policy of independent development of a nuclear capacity for Brazil was defeated, and that the Ministry of Mines and Energy's plan to develop atomic energy only in cooperation with the United States was victorious.⁸¹

Itamarati then has been removed from the policy-making scene on an important subject. Atomic policy may be considered peripheral to the principal tasks of foreign policy. Yet in many ways nuclear policy is very much a part of a nation's affairs, especially at a time when long and complex negotiations regarding atomic energy are going on among the nuclear powers. The question now becomes whether the Foreign Ministry will lose other battles, and in fact whether it will become merely

⁸¹ Jornal do Brasil, Octobre 8, 1967, p. 6. Earlier Itamarati had showed a willingness to whip up nationalist sentiment over the issue of whether Brazil should develop an independent atomic force. The Ministry of Mines and the Armed Forces feared the reaction to such a campaign, arguing that it would only set loose anti-American passions, and that it would get nothing concrete accomplished. Jornal do Brasil, Agosto 15,

a ratifier of decisions already made. There is no question that Itamarati will be challenged in the future. Whether it wins or loses is not as important to know as the fact that it is being challenged. The men of Itamarati can no longer be assured that foreign policy-making will be left largely to them. It has now become the vital interest of others.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS

The study of any policy-making process is necessarily a broad one. The examination of the making of Brazilian foreign policy is no exception. Such a study, of course, runs the risk of being incomplete since certain data may be difficult if not impossible to obtain. This particular study, however, has avoided the problems of scant evidence and consequently shaky generalizations. Although there are considerable areas for additional research (these will be indicated later) the following conclusions regarding the foreign policy-making process in Brazil can be made.

On the most general level, it can be asserted that foreign policy is not made by a few men oblivious of the interests of others. In fact, foreign policy in the last two decades has become the concern of many people in and out of government. The range of influences on policy-makers includes groups, institutions, and government agencies plus the Brazilian political culture itself. However, despite the growing number of factors involved in policy-making, much of it is still controlled by the career civil servants of the

Foreign Ministry. To a remarkable degree these men manage to control policy-making, perhaps more than most contemporary foreign ministries. Nevertheless, they are being challenged more and more by others. This challenge should lead to even more complex patterns of inter-actions in defining foreign policy.

The most pervasive of these influences (and the most difficult to analyze) is the Brazilian belief system. The notions of reality and value held by Brazilians greatly affect decision-making. For example, it has been demonstrated that the Brazilian penchant for high flown ideas which ignores practical limitations has been characteristic of persons interested in or responsible for policy-making. It has also been shown that reliance on intuition rather than on systematic investigation of a problem occurs even within the Foreign Ministry. The content of the belief system then conditions the way foreign policy will be formed and executed.

A more concrete set of beliefs that have profoundly affected foreign policy is nationalism. In Brazil, it is both a guide to action and a vision of the future. A varied assortment of groups and individuals have spelled out a nationalist ideology. Intellectuals and military officers, taking their cue from President Getulio Vargas, first emphasized Brazil's need to control her own considerable economic resources. This became such an important issue for the nationalists

that the Brazilian Armed Forces began to split into factions--factions which are still part of the political life of the military.

The nationalist ideology, however, is not exclusively concerned with economics. Jânio Quadros added another dimension by insisting on independent foreign policy. Again intellectuals and to a lesser extent businessmen and military officers were profoundly influenced by the vision of Brazil playing an important and independent role in world politics. In fact, numerous schemes were proposed to enhance the nation's prestige. Some advocated a revised Luso-Brazilian community in which Brazil would become the leader of a far flung commonwealth consisting of herself, Portugal, and the latter's Afro-Asian empire. Others envisioned Brazil as the leader of a "South Atlantic Community." Still others preferred Brazil to go it alone, using her own resources in order to become a third superpower. As a superpower it could mediate or even hold the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

These schemes have been put forward by academicians, diplomats, and military officers. Although there are differences of opinion among them, especially on domestic policy (they range from revolutionary to conservative) they do share one conviction, namely Brazil has the resources to play a far greater role in

the world than it has played in the past. The certainty of eventual Brazilian greatness is all but unshakeable. To question it places the skeptic outside the dialogue carried on by most of the politically sophisticated. Therefore, some form of nationalism is a part of the common political culture. This conviction, therefore, is strong enough and pervasive enough to exercise considerable influence on whatever regime is responsible for the nation's foreign policy.

The policy-making process has also recently been affected by the appearance of intellectuals concerned with Brazil's role in world politics. Although there are a great many of them with varying shades of opinion, the majority of intellectuals have rejected the traditional lines of diplomacy and have selected a much more ambitious role for Brazil. On the other hand, the intellectuals have not been known for the originality of their ideas, but rather for their tendency to follow trends set by others. But as a result of their commentary, foreign policy questions are no longer the business of a tiny elite, but are the concern of at least the urban middle class. Intellectuals have usually acted individually, and have not formed a class of

their own with shared attitudes and experiences. In fact, the foreign policy demands which they have made are quite diverse and often contradict each other. Thus policy-makers can usually ignore the demands of any one segment of the intellectual community, knowing full well that it can count on the support of other intellectuals.

The interests of economic pressure groups cannot be so easily ignored, especially when these groups come from the business community. Brazil does not, however, have a unified private sector in matters of state. Interests vary depending on the nature of the organization. On the one end of the spectrum is a confederation of Sao Paulo industrialists who have favored innovation in policy (for example, recognition of Communist bloc nations, trade with the new African states), while on the other end is a group of Rio de Janeiro merchants and bankers who favor the old policies of close ties with the West (especially the United States) and militant anti-communism. These groups influence foreign policy through communication of appeals both to the Foreign Ministry and to the President. They also exert

their influence by being members of trade delegations, and by participating in conferences with Foreign Ministry personnel. Business groups are also used by policy makers to obtain their good will and to get their expertise in drawing up schemes for promoting trade and for securing development funds from international agencies and from the advanced countries. Although the phenomenon of business interest groups involving themselves directly in foreign policy is relatively new, their concern has grown rapidly, and it is likely that they will take seriously the problem of making Brazilian foreign policy work to their advantage.

The Roman Catholic Church as a whole does not involve itself in foreign policy, but it has certain outspoken clerics who do. The more influential of these have favored Brazil's traditional foreign policy. In recent years, however, it has become clear from Vatican sources that such pronouncements from individual clergy do not represent the opinion of the Church. Nevertheless, some churchmen, like the Cardinal of Rio de Janeiro, have been courted by officials responsible for foreign policy -- especially when the policy has concerned the sensitive subject of relations with the Communist world.

Other pressure groups, such as the students and the trade unions, have acted in a much more sporadic fashion and have usually been subject to government

manipulation, both before and after the 1964 revolution. In any case, their effect on foreign policy has been extremely irregular, and in the Quadros-Goulart period they were often used as support props for the regime. They were not independent variables in foreign policy-making.

On the whole, pressure groups which are of rather recent origin in Brazil have yet to exert their maximum influence on foreign policy. They still tend to be passive in its formulation except when it directly influences their narrow economic interests. Still, in contrast to only a few decades ago, foreign policy has become a concern for them, and is not seen as a matter automatically left to the President and the Foreign Ministry.

The Brazilian military has also become increasingly involved in foreign policy (as well as in other political questions). Its ability to impose its wishes on policy makers, however, has been handicapped by the factionalization of the armed forces. The left-wing nationalists first presented their views on foreign policy, and they were in turn attacked by the more conservative officers. Among the latter, two groups were formed. First, there appeared an influential set of officers who had served together in Italy in World War II, and who maintained a lively interest in foreign affairs. They have adopted a pro-Western position, but one which does not exclude contacts with the Afro-Asian and Communist

worlds. The other conservative group, the so-called linha dura, has less interest in foreign affairs, but does advocate a highly charged nationalism and a militant anti-communism. Each faction has articulated its views and sought to capture positions of power within the military in order to impose its views on the official policy makers. Despite the fact that the leftists were removed from power after 1964, it is still not clear which faction will win out. Moreover, more research must be done on what the younger officers think about foreign policy. The generation which has arisen since World War II has no clear-cut loyalties to any of the older factions. What their views on foreign policy will be is vital to an understanding of the future role of the Brazilian armed forces in the making of foreign policy.

The Brazilian Congress is also a recent factor in foreign policy. Although it has constitutionally had the power of advice and consent in the ratification of treaties, approval of ambassadorial appointments and the federal budget, it has not exercised these powers in vigorous fashion. In recent years it has been moved to action only when an innovating President like Janio Quadros has challenged certain conventions. The Congress, however, through individual legislators, has acted as critic, and if that body is restored to life, it will continue to do so. The foreign policy makers, especially within

the Foreign Ministry, have reacted to the occasional demonstration of power by Congress by attempting to include them within the process of policy formation. Congress, often just its leaders, has been kept informed of the latest thinking, and occasionally policy makers have been asked to give an account of their decisions before a sometimes hostile group of legislators. But the Congress, even assuming its eventual restoration, will never be a vigorous participant in policy-making, as indeed no legislature in the world is today. It can merely act as a critic and a gadfly, forcing the policy makers to justify and perhaps to accommodate their views to the prevailing sentiment of the Congress.

The Brazilian President is the officer formally responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. Until recently this was true only in a limited sense. He approved rather than initiated. In the last decade, however, several executives have found pleasure and perhaps political profit in articulating their own conceptions of what Brazil's place in the world should be. With greater or lesser success, the President has exercised the powers of his office in formulating policy. He has innovated, he has handled crises, and he has manipulated interest groups to further his foreign policy aims. The success which the President has had in imposing his ideas has varied according to the personality of the Chief Executive. What is striking, however, is that the President

has now become a major source of policy initiation. It is unlikely that he will return to the passive position regarding foreign affairs that Brazilian Presidents once assumed.

The traditional center of policy-making is the Foreign Ministry. This continues to be true. Itamarati has assembled the expertise to transact the business of diplomacy in a relatively efficient manner. In many ways it is an independent, self-perpetuating body. The Foreign Minister, who is an appointee of the President, usually relies on the judgment of his subordinates because of his lack of expertise. Furthermore, below the Foreign Minister, no outsiders are allowed in. Thus a new administration cannot appoint politically reliable men as divisional chiefs. It must remain content with the loyalty of the civil servant.

Itamarati does have problems, however. Its most serious one is a shortage of personnel to carry the growing work load. It has attempted to remedy this by carefully taking in small amounts of expertise from outside groups without relinquishing its basic control over the direction of foreign policy. But despite this desire to remain on top of policy-making, the Foreign Ministry has been steadily challenged by other groups and institutions. The President is now involved in policy innovation. The military on occasion has imposed its ideas on Itamarati, and is consulted on all major

issues. Experts from other branches of government, like the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank, are involved in the complex business of trade promotion. Itamarati faces the challenge of competing participants in the decision-making process. This is likely to continue, and the Foreign Ministry's iron hand over policy-making will have to be relaxed. But it is not likely that the Foreign Ministry will evolve into merely an implementer of policy already decided upon by others. It will continue to have a major share in making foreign policy.

It has been shown that a very heterogeneous collection of groups and individuals have involved themselves in the making of Brazil's foreign policy. In the future, it is more than likely that the number of interested parties will grow. The resulting foreign policy will lack the simplicity and tightness of Brazil's traditional foreign policy, but this is the price a nation must pay if it seeks a larger role in world politics. Most Brazilians alert to foreign policy making seem more than willing to pay that price.

In more specific terms, what can this analysis of the forces that shape Brazilian foreign policy tell us about Brazil's future role in the world arena?

In the first place, Brazil will seek a more ambitious role than it has had in the past. There are many groups today within Brazil who view their country

as a (potential) great power. They will not be content with the foreign policy of the past. Intellectuals, business groups, a substantial portion of the military and Foreign Ministry personnel all want a foreign policy that will match their estimation of Brazil's national greatness. An aggressive President could act as a catalyst, setting off a chain reaction that would result in a highly expansive foreign policy similar to that of Janio Quadros, whose own diplomatic style intoxicated so many Brazilians.

The reach for a greater world role has specific policy overtones. For the United States, it may well mean dealing with a more difficult friend. In the past, the chief defense against anti-Americanism has been the FEB officers, who shared campaign experiences with the American army in World War II. The members of this group became influential in military politics owing to their ability and to their rapid promotion as a reward for their combat record. While these men remained in power, hostility toward the United States, generated by intellectuals and the left-wing military officers, could be restrained. For the United States, however, these FEB officers are a limited advantage. Through death and retirement, these men are being replaced with officers who apparently do not share their friendly attitude toward the United States. Thus with a more nationalist officer corps there will be a greater pressure

on decision-makers to disagree with the United States if the latter stands in the way of Brazilian policy objectives. The recent (and heated) Brazilian-American quarrel over instant coffee at the International Coffee Agreement conference in London may well be a preview of future, perhaps even stronger, disagreements with the United States.

It should be added that the 1968-1969 moves of the Peruvian junta against American economic interests in that country should have considerable impact on Brazilian policy. If decision-makers, especially within the military, are convinced that hostile confrontation with the United States can produce economic gains, then the more nationalistic military officers may well support moves similar to those already taken by the Peruvians.

This de-emphasizing of cooperation with the West (that is, the United States) will not mean a proportionately increased emphasis on relations with the Communist nations. The new nationalists, especially within the military, have not linked their views on Brazilian greatness with an aggressive and pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese outlook. On the contrary, many are militantly anti-Communist--although this is usually confined to domestic Communists. The earlier romantic views of the Socialist bloc and the great benefits to be derived from trade with these countries have been dispelled.

Among most groups in Brazil today there is a consensus to continue trade and diplomatic ties with the East, but these relations are no longer viewed as a solution to Brazil's economic problems. Thus there is no substantial interest group within Brazil to side with the Soviet Union at the expense of the United States. But at the same time there is less and less enthusiasm to cooperate in any project that involves conflict with and Communist nation.

In line with the vision of future Brazilian greatness there is some support for Brazil to act as a leader among the less developed countries--at least on aid and trade issues. The current regime has invested its prestige in the success of its "Diplomacy of Prosperity," a plan which is rooted in trade promotion and concessions from the developed world to the poor nations. Such benefits include preferential tariffs, commodity agreements--in short, the full panoply of concessions demanded by the underdeveloped at the United Nations conferences for trade and development. This bidding for leadership in economic matters should receive wide support, especially from intellectuals, business groups, and the Foreign Ministry.

Brazil's leadership, however, will not extend far into purely political matters. The flirtation with non-alignment (if not outright neutralism), and the characteristic programmatic vagueness so typical of the

Quadros-Goulart period is unlikely to be repeated since it enjoys the support of only one part of the intelligentsia. Thus Brazil's current independent policy on nuclear development, in which it has sought support from such nations as India, Israel and France, has received less support within Brazil; indeed, it has received active opposition, in contrast to the regime's popular foreign economic policies.

Conversely, there is no great push within Brazil for that country to assume leadership within the Latin American bloc. Not even among intellectuals is there a strong sentiment for strengthening hemispheric ties, or more specifically, for making Brazil a leader or a spokesman for Latin America vis-a-vis the United States. Only in the area of a Latin American free trade association is there support from some Brazilian business groups for an expanded role. And because of LAFTA's lack of marked success even this somewhat limited enthusiasm has declined in recent years. In short, Brazilian policy makers will continue to show more interest in areas of the world other than Latin America.

Also, there is little internal support for a continued "special relationship" with Portugal. Most intellectuals and much of the Foreign Ministry has little enthusiasm for Lusophile sentiments. Other groups, like the military and a considerable portion of the

business community, show no particular interest either. Comparatively few still wish Brazil to support Portugal in all of its actions including its African policy. Thus while Brazil may continue to refrain from outright condemnation of Portugal in the United Nations, it will also no longer seek close ties or national identification with the Portuguese. Furthermore, as Brazil becomes more and more committed to its own expansionist role in world politics, the anomaly of intimate ties with a small and relatively backward European nation will become even more obvious; good relations with the former metropole will be placed at an even lower priority.

The forces behind Brazilian foreign policy's pursuit of world prestige have increased greatly in the last 15 years. Intellectuals, business groups, military officers, several Presidents, and an increasing number of foreign service officers are no longer content with Brazil's isolated and limited position. In order to satisfy varying interests, policy makers now find that they must move into areas that were scarcely contemplated 20 years ago. With this wide range of support for a more active foreign policy, the only check that will be encountered is the limited resources available for such a program. But as many Brazilians realize, such relatively impoverished countries as Ghana and Indonesia have made their mark in world politics. Therefore, a

lack of resources may restrain, but it will not prevent Brazil from going beyond the traditionally limited role it has played in the past.

Yet the changes in Brazil's foreign policy in the near future can be easily exaggerated. The variables that will account for continuity in foreign policy must also be examined. Four factors which affect the stability of foreign policy can be discerned: idiosyncratic, role, governmental, and societal.¹ Idiosyncratic variables refer to the personality characteristics of the decision makers. It is hypothesized that if the turnover among the leading decision-makers (the President and Foreign Minister) is greater than among those bureaucrats just below the top level of decision-making, then the idiosyncracies of leadership will have less bearing on foreign policy. This has been true for Brazil in the past. Neither the Presidents nor the Foreign Ministers have been in power a sufficient length of time to counteract the time accumulated by the professional diplomat. Even a striking personality like Janio Quadros accomplished little that was lasting in his seven month administration. The relative shortness of command by any one individual contributes to the slow rate of change in foreign policy-making in Brazil.

¹The terminology and concepts have been borrowed from Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, pp. 27-92.

The second variable deals with role or the effect which a particular office has on foreign-policy making. The important hypothesis in this regard is that if there is a clearly established system of training or apprenticeship in order to achieve top leadership positions then the rate of change is slowed. In Brazil this is true to a certain extent. In the Foreign Ministry there is a very clear pattern of training, and the personnel acquire the outlook of the Ministry. On the other hand, the positions of the President and Foreign Minister are not prepared for their role with any uniform kind of training. This would tend to counteract the stability of the Foreign Ministry in decision-making, but the latter, of course, are in positions of influence longer than are the President or the Foreign Minister.

The third variable, the governmental, may be stated in the following hypothesis: if foreign policy is involved in the attainment of political power, then changes in foreign policy are likely to be abrupt. In Brazil, of course, the political struggle, whether electoral or revolutionary, has included debate over foreign policy to some extent. Janio Quadros campaigned in 1960 with the promise of a new look in Brazil's foreign policy. The revolution of 1964 was motivated in part by the desire of its leaders to return to a firmer commitment to the West. It should be pointed out,

however, that this factor is relatively recent in Brazilian politics, and that in the instances cited the principal reason for the struggle for political leadership was not that of foreign policy. Nevertheless its injection into the political system at least in part adds an element of uncertainty and sudden change to the policy-making process.

The final variable deals with the nature of society. The relevant hypothesis here is that if the society is stable and the decision-makers tend to be accountable for their policies to a sophisticated electorate, then their flexibility in changing foreign policy is circumscribed. In Brazil this is not the case. Policy makers, even elected ones, have relatively little knowledge of what public opinion is, and they are therefore free to pursue their own favorite schemes unchecked by an aroused electorate. We find then that two variables, that of personality and that of role help to limit change. The case of the governmental is mixed and the societal variable is clearly favorable to change. On balance, these variables seem to inhibit rapid changes of policy, but they do not rule out gradual, and on occasion, sudden shifts in policy.

We have examined Brazilian foreign policy in terms of the influences on decision-making. The belief and value system of the participants of foreign policy-making, the participants themselves who include

the intellectuals, interest groups, military and foreign service officers and politicians whether they are Presidents or Congressmen. In addition, we have attempted to assign the relative weight of each of these influences on foreign policy. Finally, we have attempted to delineate the key variables which will help indicate the amount and kind of change that will occur in future foreign policy-making.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Abreu Ramos, Plinio de. Brasil, 11 de Novembro. São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1960.
- Affonseca, Jose Armando. Política Exterior do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1948.
- Alencastre, Amilcar. O Brasil e as Relações com o Leste e a URSS. Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Editora, 1959.
- Alencastre, Amilcar. Oswaldo Aranha: O Mundo Afro-Asiática e a Paz. Rio de Janeiro: Capa de Fortunato, 1961.
- Alencastre, Amilcar. A Rebelião dos Povos Coloniais. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Prado Editora, 1962.
- Almond, Gabriel, and Coleman, James. The Politics of Developing Areas. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960.
- Alves, das Neves João. Temas Luso-Brasileiros. São Paulo: Conselho Estadual de Cultura, 1963.
- Amado, Gilberto. A Dança sobre o Abismo. Rio de Janeiro: Ariel, Editora Ltda., 1932.
- Amado, Gilberto. Espírito do Nosso Tempo. Rio de Janeiro: Ariel, Editora Ltda., 1932.
- Amado, Gilberto. Oração aos Jovens Diplomatas. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1956.
- Amado, Jorge. Gabriella: Cloves and Cinnamon. Translated by James L. Taylor. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962.
- Apter, David E. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
- Araujo Gomes, Francelino. Programação Econômica e a Operação Pan-Americana. Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Editora Aurora, Ltda., n.d.

- Araujo Lima, Claudio de. Imperialismo e Angústia. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1960.
- Araujo Lima, Claudio de. Mito e Realidade de Vargas. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1955.
- Archer, Maria. Brasil: Fronteira da África. São Paulo: Editora Felman-Aego, 1963.
- Arinos de Melo Franco, Afonso. A Alma do Tempo. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1961.
- Arinos de Melo Franco, Afonso. Discurso de Saudação a Adlai Stevenson. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, June, 1961.
- Aron, Raymond. The Opium of the Intellectuals. Translated by Terence Kilmartin. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1957.
- Azevedo, Fernando de. Brazilian Culture. Translated by W. Rex Crawford. New York: Macmillan Company, 1950.
- Baciu, Stefan. Um Continente em Busca de uma Doutrina. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria San José Editora, 1959.
- Baciu, Stefan. Cortina de Ferro sobre Cuba. Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Tupy Ltda., Editora, 1961.
- Baer, Gabriel. A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.
- Barros, Jayme de. A Política Exterior do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Zelio Valverde, n.d.
- Barroso, Gustavo. História do Palácio Itamaraty. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1956.
- Bello, Jose Maria. A History of Modern Brazil. Translated by James L. Taylor. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966.
- Bezerra de Menezes, Adolpho Justo. Ásia, África e a Política Independente do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1961.
- Bezerra de Menezes, Adolpho Justo. O Brasil e o Mundo Ásia-Africano. Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Ponghetti-Editores, 1956.
- Bezerra de Menezes, Adolpho Justo. O Brasil e o Mundo Ásia-Africano. 2nd ed. Rio de Janeiro: Edições GDR, 1960.

- Black, C.E. The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.
- Black, Joseph E., and Thompson, Kenneth W., eds. Foreign Policies in a World of Change. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
- Bonilla, Frank. "A National Ideology for Development: Brazil." Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development. Edited by K. H. Silvert. New York: Random House, 1963.
- Bopp, Raul, Notas de um Caderno sobre Itamaraty. Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1956.
- Borba, Joaquim. Util ou Espoilador o Capital Estrangeiro? São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora 1964.
- Boxer, C.R. Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Bradesco, Fausto. O Reatamento Econômico com a União Soviética. Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1962.
- Brazilian Institute of International Relations. Brazil and the United Nations. Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Institute of International Relations, 1957.
- Butler, David. The Study of Political Behavior. London: Hutchison and Company Ltd., 1958.
- Campos, Roberto de Oliveira. A Moeda, o Governo e o Tempo. Rio de Janeiro: APEC Editora, 1964.
- Carpeaux, Otto Maria. A Batalha da América Latina. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965.
- Carvalho, Nelson R. Operação Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1959 (?).
- Castello Branco, Humberto. Textos e Declarações sobre Política Externa. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1965.
- Castello Branco, Manoel Thomaz. O Brasil na II Grande Guerra. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1960.
- Castello Branco, Renata. Um Programa de Política Exterior para o Brasil. São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense Ltda., 1945.
- Castilhos Goycochêa, Luis Filipe de. Dois Ensaios. Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1949.

- Cesar, Afonso. Política, Cifrao e Sangue. Rio de Janeiro: Editorial Andes, 1955.
- Chacon, Vamireh. Qual a Política Externa Conveniente ao Brasil? Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1963.
- Colombo, Pedro. Quem Faz a Revolução no Brasil? São Paulo: Livraria Martins, Editora, 1964.
- Corção, Gustavo. Patriotismo e Nacionalismo. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Presença, 1963 (?).
- Costa, Licurgo. Uma Nova Política para as Américas - Doutrina Kubitschek e OPA. São Paulo: Livraria Martins, Editora, 1960.
- Coutinho, Lourival, and Silveira, Joel. O Petróleo do Brasil: Traição e Vitória. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Editora Coelho Branco, 1957.
- Delgado de Carvalho, Carlos Miguel. Organização Social e Política Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundo da Cultura, 1963.
- Duarte Pereira, Osny. A Constituição do Brasil 1967. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1967.
- Duarte Pereira, Osny. A Constituição Federal. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1967.
- Dubnic, Vladmir R. de. Political Trends in Brazil. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968.
- Dulles, John W.F. Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1967.
- Fonseca, Gondim de. Jango Fala a Nação. São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1963.
- Fontenele, Leopoldo C. Aspectos do Investimento Internacional. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundo de Cultura, 1960.
- Fontes, Lourival. Discurso aos Surdos. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio, 1955.
- Fontes, Lourival. Missão ou Demissão. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1961.
- Fontes, Lourival. Política, Petróleo, e População. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1958.

- Fontes, Lourival. Uma Política de Preconceitos. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1957.
- Free, Lloyd A. Some International Implications of the Political Psychology of Brazilians. Princeton, New Jersey: Institute for International Social Research, 1961.
- Freitas Oliveira, Waldir. A Importância Atual do Atlântico Sul. Bahia: University of Bahia, 1961.
- Freyre, Gilberto. Aventura e Romance. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1953.
- Freyre, Gilberto. Brazil. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1963.
- Freyre, Gilberto. The Masters and the Slaves. Translated by Samuel Putnam. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1946.
- Freyre, Gilberto. New World in the Tropics. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1959.
- Freyre, Gilberto. Uma Política Transnacional de Cultura para o Brasil de Hoje. Rio de Janeiro: Edições da Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, 1960.
- Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Evolução do Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, n.d.
- Furtado, Celso. Development and Underdevelopment. Translated by Ricardo W. de Aguiar and Eric Charles Drysdale. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1964.
- Genofre, Edmundo M. Pasaporte para Moscou. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Sedegra, 1959.
- Golbery do Couto e Silva. Aspectos Geopolíticos Brasileiros. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Exército, 1957.
- Gomes, Anápio. Radiografia do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Ponghetti Editores, 1955.
- Gomes, Pimental. O Brasil entre as Cinco Maiores Potências no Fim Neste Século. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Leitura, 1964.
- Gomes, Pimental. Porque Não Somos uma Grande Potência. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965.

- Gomes Neto, Francisco Antonio. Da Luta pela Auto-determinação. São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1962.
- Gouvea de Bulhoes, Octavio. A Margem de um Relatório. Rio de Janeiro: Edições Financeiras, S.A., 1950.
- Gross, Feliks. Foreign Policy Analysis. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1954.
- Gudin, Eugenio. Análise de Problemas Brasileiros, 1958-1964. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Agir Editora, 1965.
- Guerreiro Ramos, Alberto. O Problema Nacional do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Saga, 1960.
- Guilherme, Olympio. O Brasil e a Era Atômica. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vitória, 1957.
- Guilherme, Olympio. Robore: A Luta pelo Petróleo Boliviano. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Freitas Bastos, 1959.
- Guilherme, Olympio. U.R.S.S. & U.S.A. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Prado Ltda., 1955.
- Guimarães, Mario. Política Exterior do Brasil: Atitude Conservadora e Não Inerte. San Jose, Costa Rica: n.p., 1956.
- Haas, Werner. Os Investimentos Estrangeiros no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Edição Atualizada, 1958.
- Haddad, Jamil Almansur. Revolução Cubana e Revolução Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1961.
- Haddad, Jamil Almansur. Romanceiro Cubano. São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1960.
- Halpern, Manfred. The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Haring, C.H. Empire in Brazil. New York: W.W. Norton, 1968.
- Hechen, Santiago. Proyección Internacional de Brasil. Santa Fe, Argentina: Editorial Castellvi, 1964.
- Hill, Lawrence F. Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1932.

- Hirschman, Albert O. The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958.
- Holanda, Nestor de. Dialogo Brasil: URSS. 2nd ed. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1962.
- Horowitz, Irving Louis. Revolution in Brazil. New York: E.P. Dutton Co., 1964.
- Houtart, Francois, and Pin, Emile. The Church and the Latin American Revolution. Translated by Gilbert Barth. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965.
- Huzar, George B. de. The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960.
- Johnson, John J. The Military and Society in Latin America. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964.
- Kautsky, John H. Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962.
- Kubitschek, Juscelino. A Marcha do Amanhecer. São Paulo: "Bestseller," 1962.
- Lacerda, Carlos. Palavras e Ação. Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1965.
- Lacerda, Carlos. O Poder das Ideias. Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1963.
- Lima, Hermes. Lições da Crise. São Paulo: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1954.
- Lins, Alvaro. Missão em Portugal. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1960.
- Louriero, Pizarro. Getúlio Vargas e a Política Luso-Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Zelio Valverde Editor, 1941.
- Macedo Soares, Jose Carlos de. Conceitos de Solidariedade Continental. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1959.
- Machado, Unirio. Indústria da Doença. São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1963.
- Machado, de Souza, J. Getúlio Vargas, Político e Estadista. Recife: Soc. Gráfica Ipanema, 1958.

- MacIver, Robert M. The Web of Government. New York: Macmillan Company, 1947.
- Magalhães, Sergio, et al. A Questão da Remessa de Lucros. São Paulo: Editora Universitaria, 1962.
- Mangabeira, Francisco. Imperialismo, Petróleo, Petrobrás. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1964.
- Mangabeira, Francisco. O Progresso Econômico e a Questão Social. Rio de Janeiro: Universidade do Brasil, 1959.
- Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936.
- Maranhão, Jarbas. Brasil e África: Um Mesmo Caminho. São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1962.
- Marcondes Reis, Morel. Brasil: Zero Quilômetro. São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, 1963.
- Martins Parreira, Alceu. A Batalha do Café. Santos: Editora Presença, 1961.
- Martorelli, Victorio. No País dos Sputniks. São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1958.
- Matos, Almir. Em Agosto Getúlio Ficou Só. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Problemas Contemporâneos do Centro Popular de Cultura da UNE, 1963.
- Mecham, J. Lloyd. Church and State in Latin America: A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations. Rev. Ed. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1966.
- Meira Mattos, Carlos de. Projeção Mundial do Brasil. São Paulo: Gráfica Leal Ltda., 1959.
- Mello Henriques, Elber de. A FEB Doze Anos Depois. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1959.
- Mendes, Candido. Nacionalismo e Desenvolvimento. Rio de Janeiro: IBEEA, 1963.
- Mendes, Candido, ed. Senhor em Dialogo. Rio de Janeiro: IBEEA, 1965.
- Ministério da Guerra. Almanaque do Exército. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Guerra, 1964.
- Ministério das Relações Exteriores. A Política Exterior da Revolução Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1966.

- Montenegro, Abelardo F. Juarez Tavora e a Renovação Nacional. Fortaleza: Editora A. Batista Fontenele, 1957.
- Moog, Vianna. Bandeirantes and Pioneers. Translated by L. L. Barrett. New York: George Braziller, 1964.
- Moreira Alves, Marcio. A Velha Classe. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Arte Nova, 1964.
- Mosca, Gaetano. The Ruling Class. Translated by Hannah D. Rahn. New York: McGraw Hill, 1939.
- Moura, Aristóteles. Capitais Estrangeiros no Brasil. 2nd ed. São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1960.
- Myrdal, Gunnar. An American Dilemma. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944.
- Nasser, David. Portugal Meu Avozinho. Rio de Janeiro: Edições O Cruzeiro, 1965.
- Nasser, David. A Revolução que se Perdeu a si Mesma: Diário de um Reporter. Rio de Janeiro: Edições O Cruzeiro, 1965.
- Nery, Adalgisa, et al. Antologia Nacionalista: Brasileiros contra Brasil. São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1958.
- Nery, Adalgisa, Retrato Sem Retoque. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização, 1963.
- Nery, Adalgisa, ed. Sopram Os Ventos da Liberdade. São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1959.
- Neto, Maia. Brasil: Guerra Quente na América Latina. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965.
- Neves da Fontoura, João. Depoimentos de um Ex-Ministro. Rio de Janeiro: Organização Simões Editora, 1957.
- Neves da Fontoura, João. Palavras aos Portugueses. Rio de Janeiro: Edições Dois Mundos, 1946.
- Nicolson, Harold. Diplomacy. 2nd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1950.
- O'Connor, Harvey. World Crisis in Oil. London: Elek Books Ltd., 1962.
- Olinto, Antonio. Brasileiros na África. Rio de Janeiro: Edições GRO, 1964.

- Orico, Oswaldo. Novos Rumos a Política Exterior do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1952.
- Pacheco, Felix. A Política Americana do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1926.
- Paleologo, Constantino. O Brasil na América Latina. São Paulo: Edições O Cruzeiro, 1960.
- Passos, Gabriel de Rezende. Temas Nacionalistas. São Paulo: Editôra Fulgor, 1961.
- Pedreira, Fernando. Março 31. Rio de Janeiro: José Alvaro, Editor, 1964.
- Pinto Ferreira. Capitais Estrangeiros e Divida Externa do Brasil. São Paulo: Editôra Brasiliense, 1965.
- Pontes Sette, Adyr. A Verdade sobre a Disposição de Getúlio Vargas. Juiz de Fora: Gazeta Comercial, 1947.
- Portella, Eduardo. Política Externa e Povo Livre. São Paulo: Editôra Fulgor, 1963.
- Potsch, Waldemiro. Brazil: Land and People. Translated by William Douglas Reid. 30th ed. Rio de Janeiro: Fundacao Alfredo Herculano Xavier Potsch, 1960.
- Prado, Eduardo. A Ilusão Americana. 3rd ed. São Paulo: Editôra Brasiliense Ltda., 1961.
- Prado, Paulo. Retrato do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Paulo, Ponghetti e Cia., 1931.
- Pye, Lucian W., and Verba, Sidney, eds. Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965.
- Rabelo, Genival. O Capital Estrangeiro na Imprensa Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1966.
- Ranney, Austin, and Kendall, Willmoore. Democracy and the American Party System. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956.
- Rego, Jose, and Estrella, J.E. Ianques contra Cuba: David Enfrenta Golias. São Paulo: Editôra Fulgor, 1963.
- Ribeiro, Moacyr. Jânio Deposto. Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Tupa Ltda. Editôra, 1962.

- Ribeiro da Graça, Jayme. A Geografia na Política Externa Biblioteca do Exército, 1951.
- Rodrigues, José Honório. Aspirações Nacionais: Interpretação Histórico-Política. São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1963.
- Rodrigues, José Honório. Brazil and Africa. Translated by Richard A. Mazarra and Sam Hileman. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.
- Rodrigues, José Honório. Interesse Nacional e Política Externa. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1966.
- Rodrigues, Lysias A. Geopolítica do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Edição da Biblioteca Militar, 1947.
- Rodrigues Monteiro, A. Como os Trustes Exploram o Brasil. 2nd ed. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria-Editora da Casa do Estudante do Brasil, 1947.
- Rodrigues Ferreira, Manoel. A Causa do Subdesenvolvimento do Brasil. São Paulo: Gráfica Biblos Ltda.-Editora, 1963.
- Rolim de Moura, Plínio. O Líder da América Latina. São Paulo: Editora e Distribuidora Universal, 1960.
- Sa, Hernane Tavares de. The Brazilians: People of Tomorrow. New York: The John Day Co., 1947.
- Salgado Freire, J. Para Onde Vai o Brasil?: Grandezas e Misérias do Nosso Desenvolvimento. Rio de Janeiro: Conquista, 1959.
- Salles, Dagoberto. As Razões do Nacionalismo. São Paulo: Editora Fulgor, 1959.
- San Thiago Dantas, Francisco Clementino. Política Externa Independente. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1962.
- Santos, John. "A Psychologist Reflects on Brazil and Brazilians." New Perspectives of Brazil. Edited by Eric N. Baklanoff. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966.
- Santos de Oliveira, Antenor. Voce Conhece o Comunismo? Mas Conhece Mesmo. São Paulo: Editora ASO, n.d.
- Sapin, Burton M. The Making of United States Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1966.

- Satow, Ernest. A Guide to Diplomatic Practice. 4th ed. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1957.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Harper Torchbooks. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
- Sen, Biswanath. A Diplomat's Handbook of International Law and Practice. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.
- Skidmore, Thomas E. Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Smith, T. Lynn. Brazil: People and Institutions. 3rd ed. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1963.
- Soares Pereira, J. Terceiro Mundo: Unidade e Emergencia. Rio de Janeiro: IBEEA, 1962.
- Souza Junior, Antonio de. O Brasil e o Terceira Guerra Mundial. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1959.
- Special Operations Research Office. U.S. Army Handbook for Brazil. Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1964.
- Tavora, Juarez. Petróleo para o Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1955.
- Toledo Bandeira de Melo, Afonso de. O Espírito do Pan-Americanismo. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério de Relações Externas, 1956.
- Vargas, Getúlio. A Campanha Presidencial. São Paulo: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1951.
- Vargas, Getúlio. A Política Trabalhista no Brasil: São Paulo: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1950.
- Vianna, Helio. História da República: História Diplomática do Brasil. São Paulo: Edições Melhoramentos, n.d.
- Vianna, Oliveira. Instituições Políticas Brasileiras. 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1949.
- Victor, Mario. Cinco Anos que Abalaram o Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965.
- Vieira, Luiz. Getúlio Vargas Estadista e Sociologo. Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1952.

- Vieira Pinto, Alvaro. Consciencia e Realidade Nacional. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Educação e Cultura, 1961.
- Wagley, Charles. Introduction to Brazil. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965.
- Wedge, Bryant. Problems in Dialogue: Brazilian University Students and the United States. Princeton, New Jersey: Institute for the Study of National Behavior, 1965.
- Werneck Sodré, Nelson. Memórias de um Soldado. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1967.
- Whitaker, Arthur P., and Jordan, David C. Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America. New York: Free Press, 1966.
- Wrzos, Conrad. Juscelino Kubitschek: Estados Unidos - Europa. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1960.
- Zweig, Stefan. Brazil: Land of the Future. Translated by Andrew St. James. New York: Viking Press, 1941.

Journals and Magazines

- Alencastre, Amilcar. "A Nova África." Revista do Clube Militar, XXXIII (October-December, 1960), 18-22.
- Alves Pinto, Paulo F. "O Monopólio Estatal do Petróleo no Brasil." Revista Brasiliense, no. 19 (September-October, 1958), 21-39.
- Alves Pinto, Paulo F. "O Significado Internacional de Punta del Este." Revista Brasiliense, no. 40 (March-April, 1962), 26-43.
- Amoroso Lima, Alceu. "A Posição do Brasil em Punta del Este." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, V (March, 1962), 5-12.
- Andrade, P.N. de. "Brasil, Berço do Renascimento da Civilização Cristã." Revista Marítima Brasileira, LXXIX (April-June, 1959), 129-35.
- Aranha, Oswaldo. "Relações Diplomáticas com a União Soviética." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, I (June, 1958), 18-28.

- Arinos de Melo Franco, Afonso. "Brasil-França." Digesto Econômico, no. 166 (July-August, 1963), 119-24.
- Arinos de Melo Franco, Afonso. "Co-existencia Interna." Digesto Econômico, no. 167 (September-October, 1963), 23-30.
- Arinos de Melo Franco, Afonso. "A Intervenção em São Domingo." Digesto Econômico, no. 178 (July-August, 1965), 23-32.
- Arinos de Melo Franco, Afonso. "Política Externa." Digesto Econômico, no. 174 (November-December, 1964), 19-20.
- Arruda, Lucídio de. "Relações com a URSS." Mensário de Cultura Militar, XIV (March-April, 1962), 117-24.
- Arruda Campos, Dácio de. "Cuba e o Princípio da Soberania." Revista Brasiliense, no. 36 (July-August, 1961), 94-9.
- Azevedo, Oswaldo Benjamin de. "O Comércio do Brasil com os Países Socialistas." Carta Mensal, VIII (July, 1962), 21-36.
- Barroso, Celso. "As Nossas Relações e o Real Interesse de Nosso Povo." Revista Brasiliense, no. 33 (January-February, 1961), 114-27.
- Bastian Pinto, Luis. "A Política Exterior do Brasil na América Latina." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, II (December, 1959), 53-54.
- Benevides, Salvador. "Os Trustes Estrangeiros e a RCM." Revista do Clube Militar, XXIV (July-August, 1951), 48-52.
- Boer, Nicolas. "A Revolução e a Política Externa." Cadernos Brasileiros, May-June, 1964, 16-26.
- Boletim de Informações-Ministério da Guerra-Estado Maior de Exército (Rio de Janeiro), January, 1955-December, 1966.
- Bonanni, Massimo. "New International Policy Makers." Lo Spettatore Internazionale, II (May-June, 1967), 183-210.
- Borges da Fonseca, Herculano. "Política do Capital Estrangeiro." Carta Mensal, X (September, 1964), 3-8.
- Borges Fortes, Amyr. "Estado-Nação e Poder Nacional." A Defesa Nacional, LXIII (November, 1955), 85-6.

- Braga, Valério. "Importancia do Monopólio Estatal do Petróleo para o Progresso do Brasil." Revista do Clube Militar, XXX (no month given, 1957), 37-8.
- Brandão, Octávio. "O Brasil Explorado e Oprimido." Revista Brasiliense, no. 40 (March-April, 1962), 181-93.
- Burns, G. Bradford. "Tradition & Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy." Journal of Inter-American Studies, IX (April, 1967), 195-212.
- Camilio de Oliveira, A. "Linhas Mestras da Política Exterior do Brasil." Digesto Econômico, no. 143 (September-October, 1958), 113-30.
- Campos, Roberto de Oliveira. "A Imbecilidade dos 'Slogans'." Digesto Econômico, no. 169 (January-February, 1963), 21-3.
- Campos, Roberto de Oliveira. "Reflexões Incomodas sobre a Aliança para o Progresso." Cadernos Brasileiros, January-February, 1963, 10-20.
- Campos, Roberto de Oliveira. "Sobre as Atribuições da Diplomacia." Digesto Econômico, no. 177 (May-June, 1964), 87-8.
- Campos, Roberto de Oliveira. "Sobre o Conceito de Neutralismo." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, IV (September, 1961), 5-10.
- Carnauba, General. "O Petróleo e o Clube Militar." Revista do Clube Militar, XXIV (November-December, 1951), 128-9.
- Carneiro, Mario Afonso. "Opinião Militar." Cadernos Brasileiros, November-December, 1966, 18-27.
- Castro, Josue de. "O Brasil e o Mundo Afro-Asiático." Revista Brasiliense, no. 36 (July-August, 1961), 9-15.
- Castro, Therezina de. "Ghana Independente." Revista do Clube Militar, XXXI (no month given, 1958), 134-7.
- Chagas Nogueira, Alcio. "Possibilidades de Intercâmbio entre o Brasil e o Mundo Afro-Asiático." A Defesa Nacional, XLVIII (May, 1961), 173-5.
- Chaves Neto, Elias. "A Batalha em Torno da Petrobrás." Revista Brasiliense, no. 21 (January-February, 1959), 1-8.
- Chaves Neto, Elias. "Política de Neutralidade." Revista Brasiliense, no. 10 (March-April, 1957), 54-63.

- Chaves Neto, Elias. "O Presidente Kubitschek e o Fundo Monetário Internacional." Revista Brasiliense, no. 24 (July-August, 1959), 1-8.
- Chaves Neto, Elias. "A Revolução Cubana." Revista Brasiliense, no. 34 (March-April, 1961), 84-95.
- Cintra do Prado, Luiz. "Portugal e Brasil." Digesto Econômico, no. 189 (May-June, 1966), 59-60.
- Cocito, Raul. "Missão Comercial Brasileira a África Ocidental." CNC Mensário, no. 56 (January, 1966), 13-57.
- Corção, Gustavo. "Nacionalismo." Digesto Econômico, no. 144 (November-December, 1958), 87-106.
- Costa Couto, Rodoval. "Uma Perspectiva Político-Mundial dos Entendimentos de Cúpula entre as Potências Ocidentais e o Bloco Soviético." Rev. Marítima Brasileira, LXXXI (April-June, 1961), 13-78.
- Cunha Xavier, Alcindo da. "O Governo Atual e os Interesses da Indústria Nacional." Revista Brasiliense, no. 35 (June-July, 1961), 46-60.
- Desenvolvimento e Conjuntura (São Paulo), July, 1957-December, 1966.
- Dias Carneiro, Otavio. "O Comércio entre o Brasil e a Europa Oriental." Revista Brasileira da Política Internacional, V (June 1962), 227-39.
- Dinheiro, Alves. "O Milagre Lusiada na Obra Civilizadora do Ultramar?" Revista das Classes Produtores, XXV (August, 1963), 46.
- Diniz, Hilton. "A 'Alianza para Progresso' e a Realidade Nacional." Revista Brasiliense, no. 42 (March-April, 1962), 12-17.
- Duarte, Paulo. "Colonialismo Portugues." Anhembi, X (June, 1960), 134-5.
- Duarte, Paulo. "Destino Político da África Negra." Anhembi, V (July, 1955), 225-31.
- Duarte, Paulo. "Política Exterior Independente." Anhembi, VIII (February, 1958), 517-18.
- Duarte, Paulo. "A Política Externa do Jânio." Anhembi, XI (July, 1961), 326-7.

- Duarte, Paulo. "Reatamento das Relações com a URSS." Anhembi, XI (June, 1961), 113-14.
- Duarte, Paulo. "Uma Universidade do Brasil em África?" Anhembi, XII (May, 1962), 553-54.
- Espírito Santo, Newton de. "Os Movimentos Nacionalistas Angolanos." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, VI (September, 1963), 457-78.
- Fernandes, Raul. "O Malogro da Segurança pela União das Nações e a Liderança Americana." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, I (March, 1958), 32-40.
- Ferreira Lima, Heitor. "Capitais Estrangeiros e Interesse Nacional." Revista Brasiliense, no. 19 (September-October, 1958), 9-20.
- Ferreira Reis, Artur Cezar. "África e Brasil: Relações e Competições." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, VI (June, 1963), 209-222.
- Fischlowitz, Estanislau. "Subídios para a 'Doutrina Africana' do Brasil." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, III (March, 1960), 82-95.
- Foland, Frances M. "The Prospects for Brazil." The New Leader, January 20, 1969, 5-8.
- Freire, Dorian Jorge. "Relações Brasil--União Soviética." Revista Brasiliense, no. 27 (January-February, 1960), 134-36.
- Freitas Oliveira, Waldir. "Branços e Pretos em Angola." Afro-Ásia, I (December, 1965), 33-39.
- Freyre, Gilberto. "Misconceptions of Brazil." Foreign Affairs, XL (April, 1962), 453-62.
- Gadelha de Melo, Rógue. "Neutralidade do Brasil: Imperativo Constitucional." Revista Brasiliense, no. 22 (March-April, 1959), 165-78.
- Galvao de Sousa, José Pedro. "Brasil e Portugal em Face do Despertar Afro-Asiático." Digesto Económico, no. 137 (September-October, 1957), 43-51.
- Galvão de Sousa, José Pedro. "Brasil e 'Terceiro Mundo'." Digesto Económico, no. 184 (July-August, 1965), 71-75.
- Garcia Paula, R. Descartes. "Petróleo e Minas Estratégica." Revista do Clube Militar, XXIV (April, 1951), 58-74.

- Garrido Torres, José. "Operação Pan-Americana: Uma Política a Formular." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, III (June, 1960), 33-48.
- Goes, Raul de. "A Margem do Intercâmbio Brasil-URSS." Revista das Classes Productores, XXIII (August, 1961), 72.
- Golbery do Couto e Silva. "Problemas da América Latina: O Brasil e a Defesa do Ocidente." A Defesa Nacional, XLVI (February, 1959), 123-28, and (April, 1959), 105-14.
- Graça, Arnóbio. "O Nacionalismo Brasileiro e a Cultura Americana." Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, no. 10 (January, 1961), 23-33.
- Gurgel do Amaral, Ernesto. "O Petróleo é Nosso." Revista do Clube Militar, XXIV (July-August, 1951), 37-40.
- Hickey, John. "The Day Mr. Berle Talked with Mr. Quadros." Inter-American Economic Affairs, XV (Summer, 1961), 58-71.
- Hispanic-American Report (Stanford, California), January 1957-November 1964.
- Horta Barbosa, Julio. "O Problema do Petróleo." Revista do Clube Militar, XXIV (May, 1951), 35-45.
- Jaguaribe, Helio. "A Renúncia do Presidente Quadros e Crise Política Brasileira." Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, I (November, 1961), 272-311.
- Kalili, Narciso, and Mattos, Odacir de. "Racismo: EUA e Brasil--Existe Preconceito de Cor no Brasil." Realidade, October, 1967, 35-52.
- Konder, Vitor M. "Petróleo...e Política." Revista Brasiliense, no. 12 (July-August, 1957), 1-5.
- Laredo, Inis Mabel. "Incidencia de los Grupos de Presión en la Formulación y Control de la Política Internacional." FORO Internacional, VI (July-September, 1965), 136-94.
- Leitão de Carvalho, Estevão. "O Anteprojeto de Estatuto do Petróleo." Revista do Clube Militar, XXIV (September-October, 1951), 18-25.
- Leite Linhares, Maria y. "Brazilian Foreign Policy and Africa." The World Today, XVIII (December, 1962), 532-40.

- Machado da Veiga, Arnaldo José. "O Exército e a Revolução Democrática de 31 Março 1964." A Defesa Nacional, LII (July-August, 1965), 29-38.
- Marshall, Andrew. "Brazil: The Reawakening of the Giant." The World Today, XVII (August, 1961), 336-44.
- Martin, Paulo. "Um Dia na Vida de Brasileiro." Revista Brasiliense, no. 34 (March-April, 1961), 107-12.
- Meira Mattos, Carlos de. "O Brasil e o Despertar Afro-Asiático." A Defesa Nacional, XLVII (June, 1960), 111-18.
- Meira Mattos, Carlos de. "Caribe--O 'Punctum Dolens' da Política Continental." A Defesa Nacional, XLVIII (August, 1961), 77.
- Meira Mattos, Carlos de. "Mosaico Internacional." Revista do Clube Militar, XXVII (January-February, 1954), 49-50.
- Mendes Viana, Antonio. "O Mundo Afro-Asiático--Sua Significação para o Brasil." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, II (December, 1959), 5-23.
- Moreira, Adriano. "Aspectos Negativos da Imagem Reciproca de Portugal-Brasil." América Latina, X (January-March, 1967), 49-62.
- Moritz, Charles Edgar. "Impressões de uma Viagem ao Leste." Carta Mensal, VII (September, 1961), 25-31.
- Motta Lima, Paulo. "JK em Face do Enigma do Itamarati." Revista Brasiliense, no. 31 (September-October, 1961), 130-33.
- Muniz, João Carlos. "Significado da Operação Pan-Americana." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, II (September, 1959), 5-23.
- Nevins, Lawrence. "Brazil and Africa." Journal of Inter-American Studies, VI (January, 1964), 121-23.
- Nilo Tavares, José. "A Exportação do Mineiro de Ferro e as Atividades na Hanna no Brasil." Revista Brasiliense, no. 39 (January-February, 1962), 57-76.
- Nunes, Danilo. "Verdade sobre Portugal e as Províncias de Ultramar." Revista das Classes Produtoras, XXV (September, 1963), 12-22.

- Nunes de Andrade, Primo. "Os Militares na Empolgante Batalha do Desenvolvimento." Revista do Clube Militar, XXIX (June-September, 1956), 17-20.
- Nunes Coelho, Emerson. "Marxismo." Mensário de Cultura Militar, XIII (September, 1961), 5-15.
- Osinis da Silva, Luis. "A Petrobrás, a Borracha Sintética e a Amazônia." Revista Brasiliense, no. 39 (January-February, 1962), 124-27.
- Paiva, Glycon de. "Nacionalismo e Petróleo." Digesto Econômico, no. 183 (May-June, 1965), 5-11.
- Paiva, Glycon de. "Petrobrás como Banco da Subversão Nacional e Escola Prática de Corrupção." Digesto Econômico, no. 176 (March-April, 1964), 63-68.
- Paiva, Glycon de. "Recurso Minerais e Assalto ao Poder no Brasil." Digesto Econômico, no. 188 (March-April, 1966), 48-54.
- Paixão, Moacyr. "Capitais Estrangeiros Dominam a Economia Nacional." Revista do Clube Militar, XXIII (October, 1950), 25-30.
- Peregrino, Umberto. "O Pensamento da Escola Superior de Guerra." Cadernos Brasileiros, November-December, 1966, 29-38.
- Petrobrás (Rio de Janeiro); January, 1954-June, 1967.
- Pinto de Souza, Roberto. "Investimento Estrangeiro." Digesto Econômico, no. 139 (January-February, 1959), 10-17.
- Política Externa Independente (Rio de Janeiro), May, 1965; August, 1965; January, 1966.
- Pompeo do Amaral, F. "Soja-Instrumento de Imperialismo!" Revista Brasiliense, no. 26 (November-December, 1959), 42-58.
- Prado Junior, Caio. "Os Empreendimentos Estrangeiros e o Desenvolvimento Nacional." Revista Brasiliense, no. 23 (May-June, 1959), 1-10.
- Prado Junior, Caio. "O Projecto de Lei de Remessa de Lucros." Revista Brasiliense, no. 41 (May-June, 1962), 1-11.
- Prado Junior, Caio. "A Remessa de Lucros e a Libertação Econômica do Brasil." Revista Brasiliense, no. 39 (January-February, 1962), 1-9.

- Prado Leite, Julio Cesar do. "Remessa de Lucros." Desenvolvimento e Conjuntura, VIII (July, 1964), 27-34.
- Quadros, Jânio. "Brazil's New Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs, XL (October, 1961), 19-27.
- Revista das Classes Produtoras (Rio de Janeiro), April 1961-July 1966.
- Rocha Diniz, Osorio da. "O Monopólio Estatal do Petróleo e sua Importancia para o Brasil." Petrobrás, X (January-February, 1964), 36-37.
- Rodrigues, José Honório. "The Foundations of Brazil's Foreign Policy." International Affairs (London), XXXVIII (July 1962), 324-38.
- Rodrigues, José Honório. "La Política Internacional del Brasil y África." FORO Internacional, IV (January-March, 1964), 313-46.
- Rossi, Dom Agnello. "A Igreja e o Nacionalismo." Síntese, no. 7 (July-September, 1960), 29-33.
- Sa Martins, José de. "A Estratégia Revolucionaria no Quadro Mundial." A Defesa Nacional, L (January, 1963), 3-14.
- Salguerio Freitas, Aryton. "O Brasil e os Estados Africanos." A Defesa Nacional, XLVIII (June-July, 1961), 127-28.
- Santhiago Dantas, Francisco. "Política Exterior e Desenvolvimento." Digesto Econômico, no. 175 (January-February, 1964), 77-80.
- Silveira, Paulo. "Yugoslavia & Brazil: United for Peace." Review of International Affairs, XV (February 5, 1964), 12-13.
- Soares, Fabrício. "Conceito Atual de Nacionalismo." Revista Brasiliense, no. 23 (May-June, 1959), 76-94.
- Sobrinho, Raphael Valentino. "A Plataforma Continental." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, VI (September, 1963), 375-409.
- Souza, Lydio de. "Cuba e o Ponto Crítico da Guerra Fria." Cadernos Brasileiros, January-February, 1963, 88-90.
- Souza Dantas, Raymundo. "Miragem Africana." Cadernos Brasileiros, January-February, 1964, 5-19.

- Souza Sampoio, Nelson de. "As Relações Brasil-Estados Unidos." Síntese, no. 20 (October-December), 67-78.
- Souza e Silva, Celso A. de. "Operação Pan-Americana-- Antecedentes e Perspectivas." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, III (March, 1960), 41-59.
- Stokes, William S. "Economic Anti-Americanism in Latin America." Inter-American Economic Affairs, XI (Winter, 1957), 3-22.
- Taques Bittencourt, J.M. "Dominio da Indústria Farmacêutica pelo Capital Estrangeiro." Revista Brasiliense, no. 35 (May-June, 1961), 13-25.
- Tejo, Limeira. "Brasil, País Satellite." Cadernos Brasileiros, July-August, 1966, 25-32.
- Testa, José. "Cinco Milhões Sacas de Café para a Rússia." Digesto Econômico, no. 146 (March-April, 1959), 106-108.
- Valle, Henrique. "ALALC: Realizações e Perspectivas." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, VI (September, 1963), 413-27.
- Valle, Henrique. "Alguns Aspectos das Relações Brasil-Estados Unidos." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, IV (December, 1961), 5-18.
- Vasconcellos, J.R. "Um Caminho Certo e Pacífico para o Progresso do Brasil." Revista Brasiliense, no. 36 (July-August, 1961), 126-31.
- Vasconcellos, J.R. "As Investidas Imperialistas contra a Bacia Amazônica." Revista Brasiliense, no. 13 (September-October, 1957), 147-55.
- Villar de Queiroz, J.M. "Bloco Ocidental: Problemas Políticos, Econômicos e Militares." Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, VI (September, 1963), 431-454.
- Yelyutin, Y. "Resignation or Coup?" International Affairs (Moscow), VII (October, 1961), 89-90.

Newspapers

- Correio da Manhã (Rio de Janeiro), December 4, 1960; September 24, 1961; October 5, 1967.
- Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), January 1, 1957--December 31, 1967.

Novos Rumos (Rio de Janeiro), March 20-26, 1959; July 24-30, 1959; July 31-August 6, 1959; August 19-25, 1960.

O Estado de São Paulo, April 20, 1952.

O Seminário (Rio de Janeiro), January 1-7, 1961; and February 8-15, 1961.

Tribuna da Imprensa (Rio de Janeiro), September 21, 1967.

Última Hora (Rio de Janeiro), January 1, 1957-December 31, 1967.

Miscellaneous

Ata Final da Comissão Mista Franco-Brasileira (mimeographed).

Boletim Especial (Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D.C.), January 1, 1965-December 31, 1967.

Brazilian Bulletin (New York), January, 1963, no. 424.

Itamaraty (Rio de Janeiro), January, 1956; January 31, 1957; May 31, 1957; January 31, 1958; January, 1964; July 30, 1964; August 31, 1964; and January, 1965.

The Vision Newsletter (New York), August, 1963; January 7, 1964; October 21, 1964; December 8, 1964; February 9, 1965; and September 16, 1965.

Interviews

Interview with Geraldo de Heráclito Lima, December 5, 1967, Rio de Janeiro.

Interview with Victor José Silveira, December 5, 1967, Rio de Janeiro.

Interview with Cristiano Whitaker, December 6, 1967, Rio de Janeiro.

Interview with Jom Azulão, December 6, 1967, Rio de Janeiro.

Interview with Sergio Luiz de Souza Tampajos, December 5, 1967, Rio de Janeiro.

Interview with Marcel Hasslocher, June 18, 1967, Washington, D.C.

Interview with Artur Cezar Ferreira Reis, July 12, 1967, Rio de Janeiro.

VITA

Name: Roger W. Fontaine

Birthdate: March 13, 1941

Place of Birth: Madison Wisconsin

Education: Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana, 1959-1963. American University, Washington, D.C., Washington Semester Program, 1962. B.A. 1963. Major in political science, minors in history and Spanish. 37 credits in government, almost entirely in American politics, method, and political theory. Graduate work at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C. with M.A. in 1965. Accepted as PhD. candidate in 1966. Expected completion date of dissertation June 1969. Areas of concentration were Latin America, comparative politics, American foreign policy, international economics, and international organization.

Languages: Spanish: M.A. exam (written and oral) 1965.

Portuguese: PhD. exam (written) 1966, and M.A. exam (written and oral) 1967.

Work Experience: I have worked for a number of research organizations in the Washington area over the past few years as a consultant: 1) American University Foreign Areas Studies Division (John O. Weaver, director; Washington, D.C.). Work is on U.S. Army area handbook for the Dominican Republic. 2) Research Analysis Corporation (Dr. John Hardt; McLean, Virginia); political developments in Latin America. 3) Resources for the Future, Inc., Brookings Institution (Dr. Harvey Perloff; Washington, D.C.); research for a book on the Alliance for Progress. 4) Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research (Dr. Herbert Dinerstein; Washington, D.C.); Guatemalan politics. 5) State Department, Office of External Research (Dr. Pio Uliassi; Washington, D.C.); Ideological Outlook of Three Latin American Communist Parties (Cuba, Chile, Venezuela).

Publications: Book review on the collected writings of Che Guevara, National Review, January 14, 1969. Ideological Outlook of Three Latin American Communist Parties (State Department for public sales). Estimated publication date fall of 1969.

Teaching: Seminar for first year graduate students on the United States in a Changing World Environment at the Johns Hopkins SAIS. September to May 1965-66.